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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyses the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego and their application to the 
law of trusts in South Africa. Following an initial examination of the historical development 
of the law of trusts in English law and the principles of equity law, the study focuses on the 
current legal status of the trust inter vivos in South Africa and the similarities to its English 
forerunner. The work traces the sham doctrine back to its origins in English law, where the 
term “sham” was first used in the context of fraud and dishonesty in cases involving matters 
arising from hire-purchase agreements, and explains how it gradually began to find its place 
in the law of trusts. During the exploration, the work highlights the cornerstone of the sham 
doctrine’s development, the Snook test, which in effect became the internationally accepted 
guideline for any sham trust enquiry. In terms of the alter-ego doctrine, the work highlights 
the birth of the principle in Australian law and the doctrine’s immediate reception into other 
common law jurisdictions and its resultant development. The growth, maturity and popularity 
of the doctrines are key to the thesis and, in the course of the investigation, the study provides 
a legal-comparative analysis of the treatment of the doctrines in the context of trusts against 
that in other common law countries. The study then shifts its focus to South Africa’s 
interpretation and application of these doctrines in trust law, and reveals the erroneous 
judicial development in which the courts have in some instances mistakenly replaced the 
sham doctrine with the company law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil or, in other 
instances, have erroneously conflated the two trust doctrines. The results highlight a breach 
of a fundamental rule observed overseas – the “no half way house” rule, which specifically 
cautions against South Africa’s chosen direction when allowing the lifting of a trust’s veil. 
The study closes with suggestions as to how the country could reconcile the problems 
underlined in the thesis by means of law reform, as well as offering practical advice for 
settlors, trustees and beneficiaries, the core of which is given in the handbook that 
accompanies this thesis. 
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“Certainty is the principle virtue of every legal system” 
 
 
A Oakley 
Constructive Trusts 3 ed (1997) Sweet & Maxwell: London. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CONTEXT, GOALS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
1.  A BRIEF CONTEXT 
Many people, often without realising it, will come into contact with a trust in one form or 
another at some point in their lives. Be that as it may, it is submitted that trusts are widely 
misunderstood by those who use them, wish to use them, or adjudicate disputes concerning 
them. Trusts have become a global phenomenon, although they are most commonly found in 
those countries where the legal system has its roots in English law. South Africa is no 
exception, having used this legal institution since the turn of the 19th century. Today trusts 
are a vibrant and authentic institution of modern South African law for which the courts have 
devised distinctively South African rules and principles, 1  and for which new uses are 
constantly being developed. After years of academic thought, the South African Legislature 
introduced the Trust Property Control Act,2 which came into operation on 1 March 1989 and 
sought to introduce an authoritative statutory definition of, amongst other things, “trust”, 
“trustee” and “trust instrument” into South African law.3 The Act is concise and seeks only to 
regulate certain administrative aspects of a trust, and also to empower the Master of the High 
Court to oversee and act in certain ways in respect of trust affairs and to impose certain duties 
on trustees. 
 
Today’s law of trusts is therefore no longer confined to the traditional common law principles 
that previously existed. Since the implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, together with the functioning of the Act, South African courts have become 
obliged to give the fullest protection to the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust and, in so 
doing, keep a watchful eye on miscreant trustees. However, unlike most other common law 
jurisdictions, the inter vivos trust in South Africa is based on the law of contract and not the 
law of equity. The consequence of the above is a seeming mismatch of beneficiary rights and 
trustee obligations, and a mountain of legal disparities. 
                                                             
1 E Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed (2002) 2. 
2 Act 57 of 1988. Hereafter referred to as “the Act”. 
3 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 2. 
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Trusts are, in principle, a simple concept whereby a private legal arrangement transfers the 
ownership of someone’s assets (commonly the settlor)4 to a small group of people (referred to 
as the trustees) to look after and use to benefit a defined (or reasonably identifiable) group of 
beneficiaries. The newly transferred assets thereby fall under the protection of the trust’s 
veneer (or veil) and thus fall outside the scope of a settlor’s (or trustee’s) estate. In the 
process, the trust assets cannot be used in settlement of any claims against the estates of a 
settlor or trustee.  
 
In 2005 one of the most significant developments in trust law since the promulgation of the 
Act occurred when the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down judgment in Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others.5 Cameron JA, writing a unanimous 
judgment, noted that a trust, although a useful instrument in the management of assets, is 
often exploited for the protection it offers.6 The learned judge reasoned that in the light of the 
widespread abuse of the trust form, it may be necessary to extend the well-established 
principles of company law to trust law. In particular, the court necessitated the importation of 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as well as the future possibility of also extending 
the Turquand Rule7 in the same manner. 
 
The outcome of the Parker judgment is that the courts are now able to ‘pierce the veneer’ of a 
trust, should the conduct of its trustees invite the inference that the trust form was a mere 
façade for conducting a business “as before”, and that assets allegedly vested in trustees in 
fact belong beneficially to one or more trustees.8 Under such circumstances, the veil will be 
lifted, and the trust property which was once protected by the trust becomes exposed to the 
claims of third-party creditors.  
 
This study therefore analyses the newly founded risk now faced by thousands of South 
African trusts of being set aside by the courts as “alter-ego” or “sham” trusts. In particular, 
                                                             
4 The term “settlor” is synonymous with “founder” in the Trust Property Control Act. 
5 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
6 Paras 23–24. 
7 Based on the rule developed in Royal British Bank v Turquand 1856 119 ER 866. 
8 Para 37.3. 
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the research focuses on recent important judgments, including the decision of Cameron JA in 
Parker and the resultant ripple-effect of the judgment in subsequent cases, such as Van der 
Merwe NO and Others v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC and Others; Van der Merwe NO and 
Others v Bosman and Others.9 Recent South African cases have ultimately led to a law of 
trusts skewed by judicial development. 
 
Although the South African courts acknowledge and often “make use” of the doctrines of the 
sham and the alter-ego, a lack of investigation and understanding of these delicate principles 
has over the past five years led to many unwarranted developments. In the matter of 
Badenhorst v Badenhorst,10 the SCA once again sought to develop trust law, and the ripple-
effect of the Parker judgment became apparent. What is evident from Badenhorst is that the 
courts are willing to pierce the trust should they find the trust to be the alter-ego of the settlor.  
 
An examination of trust doctrines reveals many details which South African courts have 
erroneously not taken note of. To begin with, the doctrine of the “sham” has its origins in 
English law. The Snook test,11 which sets out the shamming status of any transaction, is 
unanimously accepted in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom. This test 
has been adopted and readily applied in the majority of sham trust cases abroad and, in 
summary, requires there to be a common intention between the settlor and at least one trustee 
to mislead or deceive third parties into the belief that the trust is genuine when in fact it is 
not.12 Should the facts before the court fit the Snook test, the court may declare the trust void 
and lift the veil.  
 
Foreign law precedent suggests that, unlike a sham trust, an alter-ego trust is more limited 
and represents two distinct situations. The first is where assets are settled on a trust but the 
trustees of the trust act as mere puppets, doing whatever they are instructed to do. The second 
is where the trust property is treated as if it were personally owned by the trustees or settlor, 
                                                             
9 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC). 
10 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
11 Based on the case of Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd 1967 (2) QB 786. 
12 Official Assignee in Bankruptcy in the Property of Gary Martin Reynolds v Wilson & Others 2008 NZCA 
122. 
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instead of belonging to the trust.13 Should the facts of the case give rise to the decision that 
the trust is the alter-ego of the settlor,14 the finding of an alter-ego trust merely serves as 
evidence in the conclusion that a trust is a sham. A trust in this instance is not void, and the 
veil may not be lifted without further evidence indicating the trust to be a sham (with the use 
of the Snook test).  
 
In this regard, as will be seen in Chapter 3 below, the court erred by either replacing the test 
for a sham with the test developed by the court, or, in the alternative, ignoring the question of 
sham and relying on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Unbeknown to Combrinck 
AJA was the fact that the alter-ego trust argument is not an argument of sham.15 For the sake 
of clarity, the argument of sham arises when it is found that the arrangements apparently in 
place are not real. As it relates to a family trust, the concept of sham requires there to be a 
finding at law that a part or the whole of the trust is in fact a façade.16  
 
An examination of the law in the British Commonwealth of Nations revealed a number of 
interesting and relevant developments. The distinction between the doctrines of the sham and 
the alter-ego was confirmed in the case of Official Assignee in Bankruptcy in the Property of 
Gary Martin Reynolds v Wilson & Others, 17  where the New Zealand Supreme Court 
cautioned against the amalgamation of the two doctrines. In particular, Robertson J reasoned 
that, if alter-ego trusts were to be automatically recognised as shams, the common intention 
requirement held in Snook would be negated. The learned judge pointed out that the result 
would be the creation of a halfway house between a conventional sham trust and a valid trust 
and that such a development would be effectively to rewrite the traditional understanding of a 
sham.18  
  
                                                             
13 Faucilles 90 ATC 4003. 
14 In certain circumstances, the controller may instead be the trustee. 
15 Sagl v Sagl 1997 (31) RFL 405 (Ont Gen Div) 409. 
16 Faucilles 90 ATC 4003. 
17 2008 NZCA 122. 
18 Para 58. 
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An examination of the ratio decidendi in the Parker case raises questions. The trust in dispute 
was neither held to be a sham nor was it declared the alter-ego of the settlor. Overseas it is 
settled practice that the veil of a trust cannot be lifted unless the trust is declared a sham. 
Hence the importation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which, in effect, allowed 
the court to lift the trust veil without employing the necessary trust doctrines. In this thesis it 
is argued that the SCA failed to realise the incompatibility of the imported corporate law 
doctrine and trust law, thus developing South African trust law incorrectly and unnecessarily. 
 
In essence, the South African approach concerning the piercing of the inter vivos trust’s 
veneer differs significantly from the global trend. Abroad it is common practice to analyse 
the material facts presented and to pierce the veneer of a trust in circumstances where the 
doctrine of the sham prescribes such measures. South African courts have adopted an ad hoc 
basis for making such a decision, using the newly imported doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil as opposed to the correct trust doctrine. The implications of this can be severe for the 
parties to a trust. Moreover, the failure to appreciate and distinguish relevant trust law 
doctrines properly is offensive not only to the rights of beneficiaries, but also to the very 
essence of the trust entity and the duty of South African courts to uphold those rights. 
Recommendations are necessary in order to correct the superfluous development. It is for 
these reasons that this research was undertaken. 
 
2. GOALS OF THE STUDY 
The primary goal of the study is to identify the problems with veil-lifting in South African 
trust law by means of an examination of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego, and to 
provide practical solutions to address these problems. The research thus focuses on a practical 
and legal comparison between South Africa and other common law jurisdictions which allow 
for the piercing of the veneer of a trust by means of the application of those doctrines. 
 
Critical to the study, it was necessary to ascertain key information concerning the extent and 
nature of the protection afforded by the trust inter vivos abroad, as well as the approach 
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followed for veil-lifting. The study then seeks to blueprint the above pattern, focusing on the 
customary approach as to how and when trusts abroad are pierced. 
 
The secondary goal of this research is therefore to prove that the veneer of the trust inter 
vivos can only be breached by the courts through the proper use of the appropriate trust 
doctrines and by no other means. This will therefore serve as evidence that not only have 
South African courts been unable to apply the relevant trust doctrines, but the importation of 
any company law doctrine to replace these principles is not only unwelcome but technically 
unsound. 
 
Specifically, this research sets out to achieve the following: 
 
a) To identify the theoretical boundaries of the protection afforded by the trust inter 
vivos. 
b) To ascertain the manner in which common law jurisdictions abroad pierce a trust inter 
vivos. 
c) By means of a qualitative comparison, to provide evidence that the veil-lifting 
approach in South Africa differs fundamentally from that of other countries. 
d) To show that the South African approach to the lifting of the trust veil is 
fundamentally flawed, and that South Africa should adhere to the settled practices 
abroad. 
e) To outline the common features of other jurisdictions in relation to the application of 
relevant trust doctrines. 
f) To establish the inter-relationship between the doctrines of the “sham” and the “alter-
ego.” 
g) To propose appropriate remedies to alleviate the legal disparities in South African 
trust law. 
h) To produce a thorough and complete practical administrative handbook for settlors, 
trustees and beneficiaries in the light of the current trust laws. 
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3. METHODS AND STRUCTURE 
Owing to the diverse nature of the legal issues faced in this thesis, the study does not conform 
to a single set of concepts or theories. The adopted research methodology is a qualitative 
approach. In broad terms, the most inclusive framework for the thesis is case law. Foreign 
case law aids in ascertaining the common approach to veil-lifting of the trust inter vivos. This 
framework also allows for an insight to be gained into these foreign courts’ interpretation of 
the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego. Relevant foreign legislation also accompanies this 
framework. South African case law is also a highly emphasised source for the thesis: the 
general trend of the courts across the country in relation to trust disputes is what has 
inevitably prompted this investigation. Both foreign and local case law therefore serve as the 
backbone of the research. There is, however, a scarcity of legal material and cases in this 
field in South Africa, so reference often is made to case law, journal articles and legal texts 
from the UK, Jersey, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. 
 
The thesis has been divided into six chapters, with an accompanying handbook. Chapter 1 
serves as an introduction. The second chapter focuses on a historical analysis of the 
development of the South African law of trusts, touching on its roots in English law, contract 
law and the law of equity. This is followed by an exposition of the nature, use and main 
features of today’s trusts. The chapter concludes with an enquiry into the formation of a trust, 
in company with the essentialia of the trust entity. Chapter 3 gives a full account of the most 
relevant South African trust law, with a special focus on the cases of Parker, Badenhorst and 
Van der Merwe. The chapter reveals the abovementioned negative “ripple-effect” on South 
African trust law. Chapter 4 traces the development of the doctrines of the sham, the alter-ego 
and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in comparable foreign jurisdictions. In 
particular, the research focuses on the evolution of sham transactions into the modern-day 
principle of the sham trust. The doctrine of the alter-ego is defined and its nature traced 
through relevant foreign case law. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is examined 
through foreign trends, the tests which have arisen in foreign case law, and also the 
established South Africa approach to the piercing of the corporate veil.  
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Chapter 5 begins with an investigation of the rights of beneficiaries, taking into account the 
origins of trust law, the common law relating to such rights, South African case law and 
academic writings on the matter. This serves as an important backdrop to the chapter, which 
proceeds to disentangle the confusion in South Africa pertaining to veil-lifting in trust law. 
With its particular focus on the Parker, Badenhorst and Van der Merwe cases, as well as 
other relevant South African cases, Chapter 5 is instrumental in illustrating the relevance of 
the trust doctrines in South African law, the irrelevance of the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil and the correct application of these trust doctrines in considerations of veil-
lifting. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the consequences of a court’s decision 
to declare a trust a sham or an alter-ego.  
 
The concluding chapter seeks to offer legislative, judicial and administrative 
recommendations in the light of the unwarranted developments in South African trust law. 
Such recommendations aim to realign South African trust law with the current trends 
practised overseas. 
 
This thesis reflects the law as stated in the sources available to the author as at 15 December 
2010.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRUSTS 
 
 
1.  DEFINITION OF “TRUST” 
The term “trust” is conventionally used in both a wide and a narrow sense. In the wide sense, 
“trust” is a generic term referring to any legal arrangement in terms of which a functionary 
controls and administers property on behalf of another, or in pursuance of an impersonal 
goal.1 This arrangement is, however, rarely referred to as a “trust”, and is more commonly 
labelled tutorship, curatorship, executorship, trusteeship in an insolvent estate, or agency.2 
These instances are, however, referred to as trusts in the wide sense due to the common 
characteristic of all trusts. Such trusts are typified by a fiduciary relationship between the 
parties concerned in terms of which the trustee in the wide sense is duty-bound to show 
utmost good faith in the administration of the property at hand, for the benefit of the trust 
beneficiary in the wide sense.3 
 
This study, however, focuses specifically on the “trust” in the narrow sense. This type of trust 
exists when one person (the settlor) has handed over or is bound to hand over the control of 
property to another (the trustee), which property and/or its proceeds is to be administered by 
the trustee for the benefit of some person or persons (the beneficiary) or in the pursuance of 
an impersonal object.4 It is evident from this definition that the separation between control 
over property and the benefit derived from such control which characterises the trust in the 
wide sense is also a feature of the trust in the narrow sense:5 
 
“The distinction between trusts in the wide and narrow sense becomes pertinent when trusteeship under 
each is at issue. The trustee of a trust in the narrow sense holds an office and is, as such, subject to 
                                                             
1 Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers 1993 (3) SA 786 (C) 794D–E.  
2 F du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles & Practice 2 ed (2007) 2. 
3 du Toit South African Trust Law 2. 
4 W Abrie et al Estates: Planning and Administration Volumes 1–3 4 ed (2000) 27–28. 
5 du Toit South African Trust Law 2. 
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control by the Master of the High Court and the High Court itself. Whereas some trustees in the wide 
sense do hold office ... others do not necessarily act in an official capacity.”6 
 
Usefully, the Hague Convention states that the term “trust” refers to the legal relationship 
created inter vivos or on death by a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under 
the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or a specified purpose. 
  
With the inception of the Trust Property Control Act,7 which came into operation on 1 March 
1989, an authoritative statutory definition of “trust” was introduced into South African law. 
The statutory definition conforms to the Hague Convention, referring to trusts in the narrow 
sense.8 According to s 1 of the Act: 
 
“‘trust’ means the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one person is by virtue of a 
trust instrument made over or bequeathed – 
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed of 
according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of 
persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in 
the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed under the 
control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of according to the 
provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class or persons 
designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust 
instrument, 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be administered by any person as 
executor, tutor or curator in terms of the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act.”9 
 
The Act therefore adopted the definition set out by the Hague Convention that the trust assets 
constitute a separate fund and are not part of the trustee’s own estate. Notably, though, the 
                                                             
6 du Toit South African Trust Law 3. It is noted, however, that it is indeed possible to have a trust in the narrow 
sense over which the Master does not exercise control because it is an oral trust. 
7 Act 57 of 1988. Hereafter referred to as “the Act”. 
8 In the matter of Conze v Masterbond Participation Trust Managers 1996 (3) SA 786 (C) 797, Friedman JP 
noted that the term “trust” as defined in the Act relates to a trust in the strict or narrow sense, where the trustee 
becomes the owner of the trust property for the purposes of the administration thereof for the benefit of the 
beneficiary. 
9 Act 66 of 1965. 
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trustee is described as administering for some other person, or for an impersonal reason; there 
is nothing to prevent the settlor from being a beneficiary, or indeed the sole beneficiary.10 
Similarly, the trustee too may be a beneficiary, but may not be the sole beneficiary. “Every 
trust therefore imports the element of holding or administering property in part at least for a 
person or object other than the trustee.”11  
 
According to the Act, ownership of the trust property may therefore vest in either trustee or 
beneficiary. Interestingly, “trustee” in this definition includes an administrator. Thus a 
seemingly broad definition of trusts in the narrow sense has been legislated. The reasons for 
this characterisation of the definition are terminological, administrative and functional,12 
bearing in mind that the terms “trustee” and “administrator” have become interchangeable 
over time, although “administrator” has now been replaced by the term “trustee” in the 
Administration of Estates Act.13 
 
2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The idea of trust stems from the depths of antiquity and is a universal concept.14 Although 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law form the basis of South African common law, the trust idea, as 
it was received in South African jurisprudence, derives mainly from Germanic and English 
law.15 It is not my intention to make the comparative study undertaken here all-inclusive in its 
scope. The jurisdictions examined have been selected on the basis that they are typical 
examples of the modern-day trust as found in South Africa. Certain trust-like institutions 
(trustagtige figure) in civil-law jurisdictions such as Germany (the Treuhand), the 
Netherlands (the bewind or fiducia) or Belgium (the stichting or fiducia) are not examined 
thoroughly. Those institutions mentioned below are used to provide a brief historical 
overview only. 
 
                                                             
10 E Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed (2002) 11. 
11 Goodricke v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N) at 408. 
12 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 8. 
13 Act 66 of 1965. 
14 NJ van der Merwe and CJ Rowland Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg 6 ed (1990) 342; MJ de Waal “Authorisation 
of Trustees in Terms of the Trust Property Control Act” (2000) 62 THRHR 472 at 548. 
15 PA Olivier Trust Law and Practice (1990) 8. 
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2.1 THE GERMANIC TREUHAND 
In Germanic tribal custom, there was no such thing as testamentary succession. The 
Treuhand, however, developed as an exception to these strict Germanic rules. According to 
the Lex Salica,16 which codified the legal rules of the Salin Francs, property was permitted to 
be transferred to an intermediary with instructions as to the disposal of the property in favour 
of nominated beneficiaries upon the transferor’s death.17 The intermediary was to be known 
as the Treuhänder and eventually the saalman (from the word “sala”, meaning transfer). 
Despite the fact that the intermediary could become the owner of the property should the 
transferor die, the intermediary did not receive any benefit from this ownership, as the 
transferor continued to retain the use and enjoyment of the property until his death.18 
 
Interestingly, even once the Germanic tribes had become familiar with the Roman principles 
of testamentary succession, the Treuhand as embodied in the saalman institution did not 
disappear completely, and was further adapted in order to fulfil many other functions.19 
Today it is still possible to create a Treuhand and traces of the institution are also detectable 
in a similar institution, known as the “use”, which was developing in England at the time. 
This was to be the forerunner of the trust as we know it today.20 
 
2.2 THE ENGLISH LAW OF TRUSTS 
During the crusades of the 13th century in which English noblemen fought, these men were 
away for long periods of time. They were also the most significant landowners in England 
under the old feudal land system. The problem therefore arose as to who would be able to 
direct how the land should be used if the landowner was out of the country. Thus, the concept 
of the use was born.21  
 
 
                                                             
16 Title 46. 
17 du Toit South African Trust Law 16. 
18 HR Hahlo “The Trust in South African Law” (1961) SALJ 195 at 198. 
19 Olivier Trust Law and Practice 9. 
20 MM Corbett “Trust Law in the 90s: Challenges and Change” (1993) 56 THRHR 262 at 263. 
21 A Hudson Understanding Equity & Trusts 3 ed (2008) 13. 
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In essence, the use22 entailed that: 
 
“A (the feoffer) transferred something to B (the transferee or feofee) to the use of C (the cestui que 
use).23 B became the owner of the property so transferred, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of 
C.”24 
 
The use was also used by the Franciscan friars, who, as missionaries, required some form of 
accommodation, especially when settling in a new location. However, as they were bound by 
an oath of poverty, they could not hold any property. In consequence, a custom arose in terms 
of which a benefactor would transfer land to a borough community “to the use of the 
friars.”25 
 
In both instances, equity recognised that land could be left by the landowner “to the use” of 
another while the landowner was unable to exercise his legal rights in person. Importantly, 
equity recognised that in such an arrangement, the landowner should be treated as retaining 
some property rights.26 Consequently, equity came to recognise an arrangement by which the 
landowner would pass the legal rights in the land to a trusted person (or “trustee”) so that the 
trustee could control the use of the land, but on the understanding that the definitive rights to 
the property remained with the landowner as the “beneficiary” of the arrangement.27 Notably, 
upon the knight’s return, the feoffee was bound to transfer it back to the knight. In the event 
of the crusader’s non-return, the feoffee had to transfer the property to a nominated 
beneficiary. 
 
Today traces of the use can still be seen in English law and, astonishingly, the Treuhand 
continues to exist in Germany. Although modernised, the trust retains the basic concepts 
which were developed more than eight centuries ago. 
                                                             
22 From the Latin ad opus. 
23 du Toit South African Trust Law 16. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Corbett 1993 THRHR 262. 
26 Hudson Equity & Trusts 13. 
27 Ibid. 
14 
 
2.3 THE LAW OF EQUITY 
Strictly speaking, the principles of equity are the rules which have been developed by the 
Courts of Chancery over the centuries.28 Equity traces its philosophical route from the ancient 
Greek philosopher Aristotle and, in particular, lends credence to the notion that a judge may 
ignore a legal rule if its literal application would cause an injustice which the legislator could 
not have intended.29 The following principles come from Aristotle and concern the difference 
between common law and equity: 
 
“For equity, though superior to justice, is still just… justice and equity coincide, and although both are 
good, equity is superior. What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not what is legally 
just: it is a rectification of legal justice.”30 
 
Equity offers a better form of justice than the common law because it provides for a specific 
judgment as to right and wrong in individual cases, thus rectifying errors of fairness which 
the common law would otherwise have had: 
 
“The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which it is not 
possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a 
general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, 
though not unaware that in this way errors are made.... So when the law states a general rule, and a case 
arises under this that is exceptional, then it is right, where legislator owing to the generality of his 
language has erred in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling such as the legislator 
himself would have given if he had been present there, and as he would have enacted if he had been 
aware of the circumstances.”31 
  
Therefore, equity exists to rectify what would otherwise be an error in the application of a 
common law to factual situations in which judges have developed common law principles, or 
the legislators who passed the statutes but could not have intended the error.32 
 
                                                             
28 Hudson Equity & Trusts 1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics (334BC) Book 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Hudson Equity & Trusts 2. 
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It is believed, however, that English courts have not expressly adopted the ideas of Aristotle 
nor of any other philosopher as part of equity, but rather that the core principles of English 
equity are in sympathy with the philosophical tradition that the courts consider the conscience 
of the individual defendant in any particular case.33 
 
In essence equity is thus a collection of legal principles that allowed the courts to reach fair 
results in cases in which it appeared that the rigour of the common law would otherwise have 
led to injustice:34  
 
“Equity was necessary to provide social justice in these early days. However, as social life became 
more complicated, the rules of equity have become more formalised and slightly less flexible. 
Therefore, the trust became a more rigid institution in the 19th century as it was used by commercial 
people to develop the means of holding property and conducting trade during the social and industrial 
advances in Great Britain.”35 
 
Accordingly, the most important equitable principle is that the jurisdiction of the court is to 
act in personam. The court is thus concerned with the conscience of the individual defendant 
as much as with any strict rule.36 A court of equity will therefore make an order based on the 
facts of an individual case so as to prevent that particular person from continuing to act 
unconscionably. As it relates to trust law, equity will look at how a trustee is dealing with a 
beneficiary’s property, or to a claimant’s fear that the defendant will move his or her property 
out of the jurisdiction before trial. In all circumstances, a court of equity employs common 
sense. Equity will always look at intent as opposed to form.37 The most relevant advances in 
modern equity are obviously focused on the trust. In jurisdictions where equity is recognised, 
beneficiaries – unlike in South Africa – have rights against the trust as well as the trustees. 
Beneficiaries acting together, and as such constituting 100 per cent of the equitable interest in 
the trust, can direct trustees as to how they should deal with the property.38 
                                                             
33 Hudson Equity & Trusts 1. 
34 Hudson Equity & Trusts 5. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Hudson Equity & Trusts 7. 
37 Hudson Equity & Trusts 11. 
38 This is the rule formulated in the case of Saunders v Vautier 1841 (4) Beav 115. 
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The equitable interest a beneficiary has in a trust is a dynamic of English law which separates 
all other legal spheres with that of England. The very nature of trust law is defined through 
equity in England. For instance, contrast the South African definition of a ‘trust’ from that 
below: 
 
“The essence of a trust is the imposition of an equitable obligation on a person who is the legal owner 
of property (a trustee) which requires that person to act in good conscience when dealing with that 
property in favour of any person (the beneficiary) who has a beneficial interest recognised by equity in 
the property. The trustee is said to ‘hold the property on trust’ for the beneficiary. There are four 
significant elements to the trust: that it is equitable, that is provides the beneficiary with rights in 
property, that it also imposes obligations on the trustee, and that those obligations are fiduciary in 
nature.”39 
 
Other propositions which dictate the law of equity are as follows:40 
• Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. 
• Equity follows the law. 
• Where there is equal equity, the first in time shall prevail. 
• He who seeks equity must do equity. 
• He who comes to equity must come with clean hands. 
• Delay defeats equities. 
• Equality is equity. 
• Equity looks on that as done that which ought to have been done. 
• Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation. 
• Equity will not permit statute or common law to be used as an engine of fraud. 41 
• Equity will not permit a person who is a trustee of property to take benefit from that 
property qua trustee. 42 
• Equity abhors a vacuum.43 
 
                                                             
39 GW Thomas and AS Hudson The Law of Trusts (2004) 36. 
40 J McGhee Snell’s Equity 31 ed (2004) 27. 
41 Rochefoucauld v Boustead 1897 1 Ch 196. 
42 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBS 1996 2 All ER 961. 
43 Vandervell v IRC 1967 1 WLR 495. 
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Whichever way equity and trust law is to be viewed, it is a certainty that this institution does 
not find itself in South African law. However, the principles entrenched in the law of equity 
are pertinent for understanding the manner in which the law of trusts has been developed in 
English law. Furthermore, the principles of equity are useful for adapting existing South 
African trust law practices where necessary, and such standards will help in the development 
of several of this study’s hypotheses.44  
 
2.4 THE IDENTITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF TRUSTS 
Trusts were introduced in the Cape in 1815, after the British had occupied the area 
intermittently between 1795 and 1806. The Articles of Capitulation,45 amongst other things, 
guaranteed the existing rights and privileges of the Cape burgers, including Roman-Dutch 
law, the legal system put into effect in the Cape by the Dutch settlers almost a century and a 
half earlier.46 Notwithstanding the use of Roman-Dutch law, a gradual assimilation of English 
legal principles and institutions was unavoidable. Trusts were no exception. Having being 
introduced into the Cape in 1815, they spread quickly through Natal and eventually the rest of 
the country. “The British officials and settlers who came to the Cape in the early nineteenth 
century brought with them the words ‘trust’ and ‘trustee’ and the notion of a trust as it was 
conceived in England and to some extent Scotland.”47 Soon after, wills, deeds of gift, land 
transfers and antenuptial contracts began to make use of the notion of trusts, and a variety of 
19th century statutes at the Cape and in Natal used the mechanism of a trust and trustees.48 
 
In 1833 South Africa saw the first case in which a trust was the subject of litigation – 
Twentyman v Hewitt.49 The case appears to have sparked the establishment of the first trust 
companies within the country as these companies undertook the administration of deceased 
estates as well as offering themselves as trustees to private trusts. The first was the South 
                                                             
44 See, for instance, Chapter 6, 4.2 “The Intermediate-Equity Approach”. 
45 Articles of 10 and 18 January 1806. 
46 du Toit South African Trust Law 18. 
47 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 21. 
48 Cape: Ords 4 of 1829, 5 of 1832, 71 of 1830, 86 of 1831, 5 of 1832, 7 of 1836, 2 of 1842, 6 of 1843, 5 and 7 
of 1845, 13 of 1846, 9 of 1855, 17 of 1859, 31, 32 and 34 of 1861, 20 of 1863, 3 of 1873, 17 of 1876, 7 of 1882, 
33 of 1884; Natal: Ords 4 of 1849, 11 of 1856, 27 of 1874 and 10 of 1881 per Cameron et al Honoré’s South 
African Law of Trusts (note 145) 21. 
49 1833 (1) Menz 156. 
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African Association for the Administration and Settlement of Estates, founded in 1834. 
According to some, it was the first such company in the world, although such an instance has 
been reported as having existed in Massachusetts in 1818.50 Today, there are thousands of 
trust companies in South Africa, controlling billions of rands in trust funds. These trust 
companies and are seen as financial institutions and their officers are subject to stringent 
liabilities in carrying out the trusts they assume, carrying liabilities similar to those imposed 
on banks.51  
 
Despite the historical influence of England and Scotland, not all the South African trust law 
rules follow English law. There has indeed been only a partial reception of English trust law 
in South Africa:52  
 
“The most important import from England has been the conception that trusteeship is an office subject 
to public control. A trustee has two capacities, one as a private citizen, the other as trustee or 
administrator. The trustee may die, resign or be removed from office as trustee. The trustee then 
automatically loses or must transfer to a successor the ownership or control of the trust property, in 
contradistinction with his or her private estate. But the form in which this conception has been received 
has been to treat trusteeship as analogous to the Roman and Roman-Dutch institutions of tutorship, 
curatorship and administratorship.”53 
 
Of course, South African common law itself handles many other characteristics of trust law 
in South Africa. The creation and revocation of trusts is an example of a purely South African 
approach to trust law. In essence, South African trust law is a mixture of English, Roman-
Dutch and distinctively South African rules, with South African rules continually growing in 
importance.54 Analytically, if not historically, these can be viewed as natural developments 
from “the rules of such institutions as the fideicommissum, 55  fiducia, stipulatio alteri, 
tutorship, curatorship and common law administratorship. But historically the rules of trust 
                                                             
50 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 21. 
51 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 22. 
52 Braun v Blann & Botha NNO 1984 (2) SA 850 (A) 866–867. 
53 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 22. 
54 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 23. 
55 Notably, in Braun v Blann, the court held that a fideicommissum and a trust are separate and distinct legal 
institutions and it was wrong to equate a trustee of a testamentary trust with a fiduciary. In its conclusion, the 
court held that a testamentary trust was a legal institution sui generis. 
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law have at least these three main sources, and trust law is all the stronger for being able to 
draw so widely.”56 As former Chief Justice Corbett correctly stated, “the fascinating structure 
that South African courts, practitioners, officials and legislators have built up and are still 
developing is a selective form of ‘jurisprudential osmosis’.”57 Thus South Africa, through the 
assimilation of English law and Roman-Dutch law, together with the refinement of these 
rules by the courts and the Legislature, has developed a genuinely hybrid and well-respected 
law of trusts. Geach and Yeats note that “the common law in South Africa, together with 
good practice that has developed over the years by practitioners and trust companies, 
currently forms the cornerstone of the law of trusts in South Africa.”58 In the context of trusts, 
knowledge of the development of South African law is important because a trust, as we know 
it today, was unknown to the Roman-Dutch law practised here.59 
 
3. THE NATURE, USE AND MAIN FEATURES OF TRUSTS 
For a long time trusts were thought to be exclusively for the powerful and wealthy, and 
beyond the average South African’s reach. In more recent times, as the complexity and risk 
of conducting business increases and society in general become more litigious, many people 
are taking up the opportunity to use this ever-practical asset protection tool. Moreover, today, 
the flexibility of trusts contributes greatly to their popularity and the multifarious purposes to 
which they are put.60 The machinery of administration may be varied: the number of trustees, 
their mode of appointment and replacement, the system of management, the period of their 
appointment, their remuneration and the degree of discretion entrusted to them, all depend on 
the settlor as expressed in the trust instrument.61 According to Edmonds Judd, a member of 
the New Zealand Law Association of Legal Practices, the sole purpose for most people in 
establishing a trust is to safeguard a family’s assets and wealth against risk, and for a variety 
of reasons, which may include: 
• protecting assets from business risk; 
• protecting children’s inheritance from claims; 
                                                             
56 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 23. 
57 Corbett 1993 THRHR 56; Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 23. 
58 WD Geach and J Yeats Trusts Law and Practice (2007) 6. 
59 Braun v Blann and Botha. 
60 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 19. 
61 Ibid. 
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• providing for special family needs, such as a child with a disability; 
• protecting assets in a second marriage, a relationship situation and/or a relationship 
breakdown; 
• preventing claims on one’s estate when one dies (family protection and testamentary 
promises); 
• protecting assets against the possible introduction of capital gains tax or estate duty; 
• providing funding for educational costs for children and/or grandchildren; 
• allowing family assets, such as family homes, to pass to the next generation without 
exposing inheritances to estate duty tax, or in order to 
• give to the community through a charitable trust.62 
 
Whatever the purpose may be, the ease of establishing a trust undeniably adds to the 
attractiveness of this tool. Referring to the establishment of the trust inter vivos,63 the settlor 
gives, or transfers, property to the trustees to hold for the beneficiaries. Any property or asset 
can be transferred to a trust; however, it is generally recommended only to transfer assets 
which are likely to retain or increase their value. Practically speaking, this often involves 
transferring a family home, a rental property, vehicles and monetary investments.  
 
The ultimate reason behind a trust’s ability to protect assets is the legal veneer that encloses 
the trust property. In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Friedman and Others NNO64 it was 
confirmed that a trust is not a legal person, but rather an accumulation of rights and duties 
which constitute the trust estate and form a separate entity.65 Although forming a separate 
entity, that entity, such as a deceased estate, is not a legal persona. 66  Of course, when 
litigating, it is always important to cite the parties in the proceedings correctly, and in order to 
                                                             
62Edmonds Judd “Trusts - Why Establish Them” 
http://www.edmondsjudd.co.nz/dms/images/custom_content/Fineprint_45_may.pdf (accessed 1 February 2010). 
63 See below. 
64 1993 (1) SA 353 (A) at 10. 
65 Although in some instances a trust is recognised as a person by statute: Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 defines a trust as a person for the purposes of income tax and capital gains purposes. Similar instances can 
also be seen in the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991, the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1927 and the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008. For further reading on the lack of juristic personality, see Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A), and Crundall Brothers (Pvt) Ltd v Lazarus NO and Another 1992 (2) 
SA 423 (Z). 
66 L Stander “Piercing the Veneer of the Trust in South African Trust Law: Liability of Trustees of a Business 
Trust for Fraudulent Trading” (2008) 17 INSOL 165 at 166. 
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litigate against an entity, it must have legal standing. Unlike other corporate entities, a trust 
lacks locus standi, and it is this lack of legal personality which translates into a lack of legal 
standing. Thus, in order to litigate on behalf of or against a trust, it is the trustees in their 
capacity as trustees who must bring and defend actions in relation to a trust. Furthermore, it is 
the pure nature of the trust, in its foundation as a separate entity, that allows assets to be 
transferred into a trust, and if correctly done so, ceteris paribus, the trustees will retain the 
property and become the new legal owner(s) of such property, distinct from any previous 
legal relationship which the property had. Therefore, the legal veneer, which is discussed at 
length in this study, is merely the legal separation of ownership between the settlor, his or her 
estate and the transferred asset(s).  
 
4. DIFFERENT TYPES OF TRUST 
Although often considered a single concept, the trust as it currently operates may take on a 
variety of different forms, and with an assorted history the complex origins of the trust in 
South Africa undoubtedly add to the disclarity of the legal institution today. Undeniably 
however, the different forms and uses that the trust institution offers only add to the 
attractiveness of this asset preservation tool, and the seeming ruggedness of this institution 
should see it surpass all its critics’ predictions. 
 
4.1 THE TESTAMENTARY TRUST 
Although the South African trust has English roots, the English law of trusts has not been 
received in our law and thus forms no part of our law. In Estate Kemp v MacDonald’s 
Trustee67 the court held that, despite this, the court could accommodate the institution and 
would therefore give effect to a testamentary disposition expressed by way of a trust.68 In 
order to do so, a solution had to be found whereby the simultaneous proprietary rights of a 
trustee and a trust beneficiary under English law could be recognised in accordance with 
Roman-Dutch legal principles.69 The answer was in found in the fideicommissum, with the 
testamentary trustee being equated to a fiduciary (under a fideicommissum purum; a transient 
                                                             
67 1915 AD 491. 
68 At 508. 
69 Corbett 1993 THRHR 263. 
22 
 
form of the fideicommissum).70 The result indicated that the momentary rights of the fiduciary 
and the immediate acquisition of rights by the fideicommissary prompted the inference that 
they were both simultaneous fideicommissary property – a position which corresponds with 
the simultaneous ownership of the trustee and beneficiary under the English law of trusts.71 
The fideicommissum therefore became not only the vehicle for the introduction of the 
testamentary trust into South African law, but also the construction, illustrating its legal 
nature.72 Deciding the correctness of this decision was a task undertaken by the court in the 
Braun case, drawing on a number of points: 
 
“… many of the functions which the fideicommissum, either by itself or in conjunction with other 
devices of the Roman law, performed could have been performed by the trust had the latter been 
known to the Romans, but the fact remains that historically- and jurisprudentially the fideicommissum 
and the trust are separate and distinct legal institutions, each of them having its own set of legal rules. 
The fideicommissum has a long and intricate history which cannot be traced and analysed in a 
judgment.... The trust of English law forms an integral part of all common law legal systems, including 
American law. In its strictly technical sense the trust is a legal institution sui generis. In South Africa 
which has a civil law legal system the trust was introduced in practice during the 19th century by usage 
without the intervention of the legislature but the English law of trusts with its dichotomy of legal and 
equitable ownership (or ‘dual ownership’ according to the American law of trusts) was not received 
into our law. The English conception of an equitable ownership distinct from, but co-existing with, the 
legal ownership is foreign to our law. Our courts have evolved and are still in the process of evolving 
our own law of trusts by adapting the trust idea to the principles of our own law.”73 
 
The Appellate Division (AD) found that in South African law the trust inter vivos is created 
by way of a stipulation for the benefit of a third party, a stipulatio alteri, but the equation of 
the testamentary trust with the fideicommissum was rejected. The AD noted in this regard that 
it was unequivocally incorrect, through history and jurisprudence to equate the testamentary 
trust with the fideicommissum.  
 
Evidently, the precise legal nature of the testamentary trust is as yet still unknown. However, 
its purpose and function have been well established in South Africa, and it is used in much 
                                                             
70 At 502–503. 
71 du Toit South African Trust Law 21. 
72 Ibid. 
73 At 858–859. 
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the same way as its English brother. Generally speaking, a testamentary trust is used as a 
legal institution in the context of the law of testate succession. “In general a testator resorts to 
this legal institution if he [or she] wishes to benefit a particular beneficiary (the trust 
beneficiary) but wants to place ownership and/or control over the assets in the hands of 
another person (the trustee).”74 This type of trust is created in a will, mortis causa, and is 
acknowledged in the Act. 
 
4.2 THE BEWIND TRUST 
This type of trust occurs when ownership of the trust property is conferred on the trust 
beneficiary, while control over and administration of the same trust property is vested in the 
trustees of the trust.75 This type of trust is also a form of the trust in the narrow sense.76 
 
4.3 THE TRUST INTER VIVOS 
It has been authoritatively decided that the trust inter vivos is created by a stipulatio alteri – a 
contract between a trust settlor and a trustee for the benefit of a trust beneficiary.77 This 
declaration is stated cautiously, as the use of the stipulatio alteri to accommodate the trust 
inter vivos is met with fierce academic opposition: the point to be made is that at the least, 
through its creation, a nexus exists between the two. In Crookes NO v Watson and Others,78 a 
matter dealing with the amendment of a trust instrument, Centlivres CJ seemed to assume too 
much of this underlying relationship where he held that the principles applicable to an inter 
vivos trust are to be found in the law of contract, due to the fact that a trust instrument 
executed by a settlor and a trustee for the benefit of another is a contract between two persons 
for the benefit of a third person.79 However, it is respectfully submitted that the generalisation 
                                                             
74 MJ de Waal and MC Schoeman-Malan The Law of Succession 4 ed (2008) 168. 
75 Conze 794 E–D; De Waal and Schoeman-Malan Succession 159. 
76 Braun v Blann and Botha 864G–H. 
77 Crookes NO v Watson and Others 1956 (1) SA 277 (A); MJ de Waal “In Search of a Model for the 
Introduction of the Trust Into a Civilian Context” (2001) 1 Stell LR 63 at 77. 
78 1956 (1) SA 277 (A). 
79 At 287H. Importantly, it must be noted that this conclusion reflects the position of only inter vivos trusts. 
Although a highly debatable realisation, the courts have supported this finding. In Crookes Centlivres CJ 
reasoned (at 286) that: 
“[t]here is nothing else in the deed which seems to me to need consideration and the question now 
arises as to the principle of Roman-Dutch law which is applicable in the present case. We are not 
concerned with the English law of trusts which has never to my knowledge been held to be applicable 
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that a trust inter vivos can in all respects be equated with a stipulatio alteri should be rejected. 
The most accurate proposition was noted in the matter of Mariola v Kaye-Eddie,80 and that is 
to view the trust inter vivos in the same light as the testamentary trust – an institution sui 
generis. 
 
Regardless of the technical aspects of a trust inter vivos and its status quo, the most notable 
and distinguished feature is that it is a living trust. A trust inter vivos is created during the 
lifetime of the settlor, and there are two types of trust in this respect: vested trusts and 
discretionary trusts. In vested trusts the benefits of the beneficiaries are set out in the trust 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
in South Africa. The cases quoted by the appellants' counsel support the view that a trust deed executed 
by a settlor and a trustee for the benefit of certain other persons is a contract between the settlor and the 
trustee for the benefit of a third person and that the settlor and the trustee can cancel the contract 
entered into between them before the third party has accepted the benefits conferred on him under the 
settlement.”  
After examining the relevant Roman-Dutch authorities, Centlivres CJ noted (at 289): 
“I can see no reason in law why a contract between a settlor and trustees, which is intended for the 
benefit of a third party, should not be capable of being amended by agreement between the settlor and 
the trustees, as long as the third party has not accepted the benefit of the contract. Up to this stage there 
is no vinculum juris as between the beneficiary and the settlor or trustees.”  
In the matter of Hofer and Others v Kevitt NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA) 387 Van Coller AJA held the 
following:  
“[the appellants] submitted that an approach which recognises that an inter vivos trust in South African 
law is not purely contractual in nature should be adopted. Support for this approach is to be found ... 
not only in the minority judgments of Schreiner JA and Fagan JA in Crookes' case but also in the 
judgment of Steyn JA in that case ... Once it is accepted that a trustee is not merely a party to a contract 
with the founder, the trustee, in view of his [or her] fiduciary position, so it was argued, may only agree 
to a revocation or amendment of the trust agreement if he considers it to be in the interests of the 
beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries. I cannot agree with this argument ... In the present case the 
amendments were made before the benefits had been accepted by or on behalf of the children ... and 
consequently they were on the authority of Crookes' case, valid. During argument [the appellants] ... 
submitted that the majority judgment was wrong but the submission was made without any motivation 
or conviction ... In my judgment, it cannot be said that the majority judgment was clearly wrong.”  
It is submitted that there are a number of reasons why Centlivres CJ’s ratio falls short. First, the principles 
governing inter vivos trusts cannot be considered in a vacuum. It would be absurd to believe that the law of 
contract, which supposedly applies to trusts inter vivos, does not apply to testamentary trusts. Both are governed 
by the same branch of law, and therefore the ratio could be accurate only if the law of contract applied to 
testamentary trusts as well. Second, the ratio of Centlivres CJ mistakenly squeezes a trust into the form of a 
stipulatio alteri. In Honoré, Cameron notes (at 34) that:  
“[i]t is sometimes said that a trust set up by a living founder (trust inter vivos) is a contract for the 
benefit of a third person (stipulatio alteri) or transfer to a trusted friend on specified terms (fiducia cum 
amico). The point correctly made is that such a trust is usually created by way of a contract that 
contains a stipulation in favour of the beneficiary, who on acceptance acquires an indefeasible right 
under the trust. A trust inter vivos can be revoked or varied in the same manner as a contract, viz with 
the concurrence of the contracting parties including any third party beneficiaries who have accepted ... 
But this does not establish that trusts inter vivos are contracts or a species of contract, and the 
suggestion that ‘in our law a consensual trust is nothing but a contract’ suggests an unfortunate 
reductionism that ignores the subtlety of 200 years of historical development, while threatening to 
impoverish our law of obligations.”  
This view, it is submitted is more accurate. 
80 1995 (2) SA 728 (W) at 731C–D. 
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instrument and are to be adhered to as accurately as is possible, whereas in a discretionary 
trust the trustees have full discretion at all times as to how much and when each beneficiary is 
to benefit.  
 
Family trusts have a prominent basis in the trust inter vivos and may take the shape of either 
(or both) a discretionary or a vested trust. This type of trust inter vivos is designed to secure 
the interests and protect the property of a group of family members,81 but is increasingly 
receiving negative attention from the courts. Careful consideration should be paid to the 
administration of family trusts because what will become evident below is that the assets in 
such a trust are often not protected, despite the intentions and beliefs of the settlor. 
 
5. PARTIES TO A TRUST AND THE NATURE OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT 
The provisions of a trust instrument are important because they are the trust’s constitutive 
charter.82 It is essential at this stage to define with certainty all persons involved in the 
establishment and administration of the trust inter vivos. The parties who concern this work 
are (a) the nominee settlor; (b) the settlor; (c) the trustee; (d) the beneficiary, and (e) the 
Master of the High Court. The parties (a) through to (d) are discussed below with frequent 
commentary as to the Master’s contingent role in relation to those parties. Furthermore, 
insight into the key features, nature and contents of the trust instrument are examined 
throughout the study. 
 
5.1 THE NOMINEE SETTLOR 
The nominee settlor83 is the agent of the true settlor. This person is therefore usually someone 
approached by the settlor to form the trust in their own name and is given instructions as to 
what the trust instrument should contain. A nominee settlor is usually used in instances where 
the true settlor wishes to detach him- or herself from the ownership of the trust. Thus the 
nominee settlor’s name would appear on a trust instrument and, after the initial donation, then 
                                                             
81 Geach and Yeats Trusts 13. 
82 Land & Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 10. 
83 Sometimes mistakenly referred to as “the planner”. 
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disappears. It is submitted that this strategy is unnecessary and a court would most likely, if 
required, look through the formality and hold the principal settlor to be the true settlor of the 
trust. 
 
5.2 THE SETTLOR 
The settlor, otherwise referred to as the ‘founder’ or ‘donor’, is the person who in reality 
establishes the trust. Notably, even in the absence of a trustee, a trust can still be valid 
because s 7 of the Act establishes that the Master of the High Court must appoint a trustee in 
the absence of any other appointment. The settlor is the person who makes the initial “making 
over”. Geach and Yeats observe the following regarding the importance of the settlor’s initial 
making over: 
 
“To ensure that the trust is actually formed, it is important to (a) ensure that the founder has legal 
capacity ... and (b) that the amount stipulated as the amount of the original donation that establishes the 
trust is actually paid over to the trustees. If the amount is not paid by the founder to the trustees, the 
creation of the trust is suspended until such time as the amount is in fact paid to the trustees. If there is 
any doubt as to whether or not the trust has been formed, it is submitted that the onus to prove its 
existence will be on those persons who allege the existence of the trust. This is because a trust imposes 
a burden or obligation on trust assets, and a freedom of obligations is presumed.”84 
 
A trust may also have more than one settlor. Although unusual, business trusts often have 
several settlors who act together in agreement to form the trust. Once a trust is formed, 
however, be it a family trust or a business trust, the settlor becomes incapable of controlling 
or managing trust assets in his or her capacity as settlor. As seen in the Crookes case, it is 
possible for the settlor to be a trustee. Significant to this discussion is that a settlor can play 
an important role in the amendment of the provisions of a trust inter vivos.  
 
A common reason the settlor may use the trust inter vivos was displayed upon the death of 
the late Harry Oppenheimer. The South African mining tycoon, reputed to be one of the ten 
richest men in the world, went to his grave leaving little trace of his vast personal fortune. 
                                                             
84 Geach and Yeats Trusts 58. 
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Conservatively estimated to be worth more than R30 billion around the time of his death, 
Oppenheimer’s will declared a mere R307 million as his personal wealth. The remainder of 
his fortune had been carefully placed in a trust to protect his assets for the future benefit of 
his family. The attempt to minimise estate duty paid off, and to this day serves as a practical 
example of the enormous benefit of trusts that the ultra-rich can indeed make use of.85 
 
5.3 THE TRUSTEE 
The trustees of a trust inter vivos undoubtedly form the backbone of a trust’s activities. A 
person becomes appointed as a trustee in terms of a trust instrument or by the Master if the 
trust instrument does not provide for it. Such person must accept the appointment, upon 
which the Master must then also authorise the appointment by issuing written letters of 
authority. Thus, the process works as follows: appointment, acceptance and authorisation. 
Section 1 of the Act defines “trustee” as “any person (including the founder of a trust) who 
acts as trustee by virtue of an authorization under section 6 [authorisation of trustee and 
security] and includes and person whose appointment as trustee is already of force and effect 
at the commencement of this Act”. 
 
Importantly, trustees have bare ownership of trust assets, and must administer assets in 
accordance with the terms of the trust instrument. Such ownership, or co-ownership in the 
case of multiple trustees, is non-beneficial and the common law rule is that decisions of 
substance regarding any transaction in respect of trust matters must be reached by all the 
trustees unanimously.86 
 
 
                                                             
85 According to the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, the current exemption stands at R3,5 million. 
86 Nieuwoudt and Another v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA); Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 
2003 (5) SA 674 (T).  
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A seemingly vital concept in South Africa today is the independence of trustees. In the matter 
of Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others87 Cameron JA reasoned 
that the:  
 
“[E]ssential notion of trust law, from which the further development of the trust form must proceed, is 
that enjoyment and control should be functionally separate ... it is separation that serves to secure 
diligence on the part of the trustee, since a lapse may be visited with action by beneficiaries whose 
interests conduce to demanding better.”88  
 
The court in this instance proposed the compulsory future use of an independent trustee in all 
types of business and family trusts where (a) the trustees are all beneficiaries and (b) the 
beneficiaries are all related to one another. The rationale behind such a development is that an 
independent trustee can have no interest in concluding transactions that may prove invalid. 
 
In practice, what often happens is that the settlor appoints existing professional advisers as 
trustees.89 However, in reality, these professional persons may not be independent in the 
sense required because they are likely to accede to the wishes and demands of the settlor 
without objectively taking into account all beneficial interest and all circumstances before 
arriving at a decision. 90  The notion of the independent trustee is to combat such 
circumstances. 
 
It is noteworthy that the King Code on Corporate Governance91 recommended that there 
should ideally be a majority of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors 
of a company in order to ensure good corporate governance.92 In the same manner trusts too 
should have a majority of independent trustees who are not in any way related to the settlor or 
beneficiaries. Geach and Yeats submit that a “majority of independent trustees will not only 
ensure good corporate governance, but will ensure that there is a separation of control of the 
                                                             
87 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
88 Para 22. 
89 Geach and Yeats Trusts 41. 
90 Ibid. 
91 King Report on Corporate Governance March 2002. 
92 Geach and Yeats Trusts 84. 
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trust from the enjoyment of benefits.”93 However, practically speaking, the above notion is 
realistic only with regard to large family and business trusts, because the independent trustees’ 
fees will eventually erode the income of smaller trusts. Indeed, in the case of smaller trusts, a 
single independent trustee should be adequate. 
 
The Act also imposes several duties on trustees. Since these are duties imposed by statute, 
there is little uncertainty surrounding them and trustees are therefore not only required to 
acquaint themselves with these duties, but also to ensure practical compliance with them.94  
 
The most relevant duty conferred through the Act is the duty to act with care, diligence and 
skill. According to s 9 of the Act, a trustee is obliged to conduct the administration of a trust 
in the utmost good faith as a sensible trustee. Such standard of care expected of a trustee is 
defined by the common law principle of a bonus et diligens paterfamilias. In Sackville West v 
Nourse95 the court held that this standard implied that a trustee is required to show greater 
care in administering trust property than might be expected of him when dealing with his own 
property.96 According to du Toit, the duty of care is of the utmost importance: 
 
“A trustee’s duty of care is the most important manifestation of the fiduciary nature of a trustee’s office, 
it being an accepted principle of South African law that a trustee, as any other functionary relationship, 
must perform his duties and exercise his powers in utmost good faith. Any omission to conduct the 
affairs of a trust in accordance with the above standard results in breach of trust by trustee. The duty of 
care therefore establishes the basis for the various remedies awarded to trust beneficiaries and third 
parties in consequence of a trustee’s breach of trust.”97 
 
Other duties founded by the Act include: the duty to bank all monies and to do so in a 
separate banking account; the duty to lodge the trust instrument with the Master; the duty to 
furnish the Master with an address for the service of notices and processes; the duty to obtain 
written authorisation from the Master to act as trustee; the duty to register and identify trust 
                                                             
93 Geach and Yeats Trusts 85. 
94 Ibid. 
95 1926 AD 516. 
96 At 533–534. 
97 du Toit South African Trust Law 71. 
30 
 
property; the duty to protect trust documents; the duty to take only reasonable remuneration; 
the duty to account to the Master when requested to do so, and the duty to perform all duties 
imposed by the trust instrument. 
 
The remaining duties bestowed upon trustees stem from the trust instrument, decided case 
law and common law. Generally speaking, trustees are under a duty to find unanimity in 
making decisions; 98  to invest productively; 99  to avoid risk; 100 to identify and account to 
beneficiaries;101 to make proper distributions to the identified beneficiaries;102 to appoint the 
stipulated number of trustees;103 to ensure that a proper system of control is in place,104 and 
also to obtain expert advice.105  
 
Perhaps one of the most important duties that arises as a result of one person’s assuming 
responsibility to manage and control assets on behalf of another is a fiduciary duty. A 
fiduciary is a person who undertakes or assumes responsibility to act for or on behalf of and 
in the interests of another.106 In particular this duty requires that property under the control of 
trustees must be managed and controlled for the purposes of the trust instrument and for the 
                                                             
98 Coetzee v Peet Smith 2003 (5) SA 674 (T). Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, trustees are at all 
times to reach decisions of substance regarding a trust unanimously. 
99 In Administrators, Estate Richards v Nichol 1999 (1) SA 551 (SCA) it was stated that if the trust is to endure 
for a long period, the trustees are obliged to invest the assets of the trust in a manner that provides adequate 
income as well as capital growth. 
100 In Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 (T) it was made clear that when trustees dealt with 
or invested money, this had to be done with safety and security, and monies were not to be placed in anything 
involving an element of uncertainty or risk.  
101  Potgieter en ’n Ander NNO v Shell Suid-Afrika (Edms) Bpk 2003 (1) SA 163 (SCA). Identifying the 
beneficiaries of a trust is not always easy. Sometimes there may be certainty regarding their rights, for example 
income or capital, or uncertainty regarding their status as beneficiaries. Furthermore, there is a duty, as 
discussed in the matter of Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C), to keep proper accounts for the trust 
and distribute necessary information to beneficiaries accordingly. 
102 Liebenberg NO v MGK Bedryfsmaatskappy (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 224 (SCA). A trustee must apply the trust 
assets as provided for in the trust instrument for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 
103 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). Where a trust instrument 
prescribes a minimum number of trustees to be in office, such requirement is a capacity-defining condition. 
Failure to meet the requirement will inevitably result in acts by appointed trustees being invalid. 
104 Geach and Yeats Trusts 96. Trustees should make certain that the correct systems are in place to ensure that 
assets are not lost and their actual location is recorded. 
105 Expert advice extends to all areas beyond the trustee’s own experience or expertise. According to Geach and 
Yeats Trusts 96, circumstances which would require a trustee to enlist the services of an expert or make use of 
expert advice include the investment and financial affairs of the trust. 
106 MS Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) 208. 
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benefit of the beneficiaries. According to Blackman, there are certain fundamental fiduciary 
duties, and trustees are accordingly prohibited from the following: 
a) Exceeding their powers; 
b) Exercising their powers for an improper purpose; 
c) Fettering their own discretion; 
d) Placing themselves in a position where their personal interests conflict with their 
duties to the beneficiaries; 
e) Making a secret profit; 
f) Competing with any business of the trust; 
g) Making personal use of or abuse confidential information, or 
h) Unduly favouring one beneficiary to the detriment of another or others.107 
 
Impartiality is therefore a prominent fiduciary duty of trustees, who should always conduct 
all trust administration in an impartial manner. According to du Toit, this duty comprises two 
elements:  
 
“On the one hand a trustee must avoid a conflict of interest between his personal concerns and his 
official duties. An important manifestation of this rule is that a trustee is not permitted to derive 
unauthorised profit from the administration of a trust. A trustee is therefore in general not allowed to 
purchase trust property, either directly or indirectly, nor cede it to himself in his personal capacity. A 
trustee should also not borrow trust money nor involve himself in any other conduct which may result 
in self-enrichment at the cost of the interests of the trust and its beneficiaries… The second aspect to 
the duty of impartiality relates to a trustee’s obligation to treat beneficiaries impartially, particularly 
when trust income and/or capital is distributed. Impartiality in this context often refers to the equal 
treatment of present and/or future beneficiaries, but may in certain circumstances entail discrimination 
between beneficiaries in favour of those with the greatest need.”108 
 
Whichever way impartiality is to be viewed, it is evident that this common law duty, together 
with the statutory duty of care, diligence and skill, has incited the new and increasingly 
important requirement of the independent trustee. Thus the trustee must exercise an 
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independent discretion at all times with respect to trust matters, and must not be under the 
undue influence of any person, particularly not the settlor of the trust.109 In the Parker case 
Cameron JA made the following comment regarding the notion of the independent trustee: 
 
“The independent outsider does not have to be a professional person, such as an attorney or accountant: 
but someone who with proper realisation of the responsibilities of trusteeship accepts office in order to 
ensure that the trust functions properly, that the provisions of the trust deed are observed, and that the 
conduct of trustees who lack a sufficiently independent interest in the observance of substantive and 
procedural requirements arising from the trust deed can be scrutinised and checked. Such an outsider 
will not accept office without being aware that failure to observe these duties may risk action for 
breach of trust.”110 
 
5.4 THE BENEFICIARY 
Bearing in mind that trusts are generally created to benefit one or more persons or classes of 
person, the trust beneficiary forms an integral part of the institution. Any person, be it born or 
unborn, natural or juristic, can become a beneficiary. This is because the law sets no 
requirements for trust beneficiaries, and thus they need not have contractual or legal capacity. 
Furthermore, trusts for unformed companies have also received approval by the courts, 
although Cameron et al maintain that such a trust is not one in the strict or narrow sense.111  
 
Importantly, and something which has become popular over the years, a trustee may also be a 
beneficiary112 or even the sole beneficiary in a trust, although a trustee may not be the sole 
beneficiary as well as the sole trustee,113 as there would be no separation of the control from 
the enjoyment of the trust assets. 
 
                                                             
109 Geach and Yeats Trusts 91. 
110 Para 36. 
111 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 553. Acceptance by a trustee or agent for an unformed 
company is possible but does not give it an indefeasible right as beneficiary until it comes into existence and 
accepts the designation. 
112 The Master v Edgecombe’s Executors 1910 TS 263 274. 
113 See, for example, Goodricke & Son v Registrar of Deeds, Natal 1974 (1) SA 404 (N). 
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In Jewish Colonial Trust v Estate Nathan 114  the issue of ambiguity regarding the 
identification of beneficiaries in the trust instrument arose. The court held that, if the name or 
description used in the trust instrument does not unequivocally designate any one person or 
body, the court may declare on a true interpretation of the trust instrument, that in the light of 
the admissible evidence, a certain beneficiary was intended. 
 
Beneficiaries also enjoy a wide spectrum of rights. Income and capital rights are normally the 
first differentiation. The trust instrument in this regard should always distinguish between 
income and capital beneficiaries as well as give clear definitions as to what exactly is income 
and what is capital for the purposes of the trust. According to Geach and Yeats, owing to the 
difficulties that may arise where both classes of beneficiary are designated in the trust 
instrument, it may be desirable for the trust instrument to provide that in the event of the 
income of a trust being insufficient for the maintenance, education or medical care of an 
income beneficiary, then the capital of the trust may be used to make good on any shortfall.115 
“A clause of this nature will not only ensure that the needs of beneficiaries are taken into 
account and will eliminate hardship, but will also enable trustees to focus on ensuring capital 
growth that exceeds the inflation rate.”116 It is evident that, when trustees try to maximise 
income flows to meet the needs of income beneficiaries, the long-term security and value of 
assets is compromised. 
 
Other important privileges which affect trust beneficiaries are variable and fixed rights. Also 
largely dependent on the trust instrument, a beneficiary may be entitled to a fixed amount of 
income, or it could be entirely variable. The variation may also depend on economic 
circumstances, or even the happening of a specified event. Defining these rights is therefore 
of the utmost importance in order to avoid confusion down the line.  
 
A trust instrument may also allow a beneficiary the right to use and enjoy trust assets. The 
formation of this right in the trust instrument should be carefully thought out and planned, as 
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disputes often arise regarding the obligation of the beneficiary to preserve and maintain the 
asset:  
 
“In the absence of a clause giving clear directions as to how costs and expenses are to be treated, a 
distinction should be drawn between costs and expenses that are necessary to keep the property in a 
usable form (such as repair and maintenance) and other costs (such as rates, employee costs and 
improvements).”117 
 
As previously noted, beneficiaries also have either a discretionary or a vested right. A 
discretionary right is in the nature of a contingent right or a spes or hope. The trustee will at 
times exercise discretion in favour of a beneficiary with a discretionary right and the 
beneficiary will in turn benefit to the extent that the discretion has been exercised in his or 
her favour.118 On the other hand, a beneficiary with a vested right can enforce that right by 
calling upon the trustees to deliver to that beneficiary income or capital or a specific asset, 
depending on whether the right is a vested right to income, capital or a specific asset.119 Note, 
however, that both discretionary and vested beneficiaries have personal rights against the 
trustees because the rights that a beneficiary has, whether discretionary or vested, are 
personal rights.120 
 
Clearly of significance to this study, a beneficiary also has a right – albeit a limited one – to 
information. Such information concerns the matters of the trust, and is commonly enforced in 
order to gather knowledge as to the manner in which assets have been invested and 
distributed as well as the financials of the going concern. This right is contingent to a trustee's 
duty to account to beneficiaries.121  
 
 
                                                             
117 Geach and Yeats Trusts 121. 
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120 A personal right is, however, to be contrasted with a real right in that a real right is enforceable against the 
entire world, whereas a personal right is against the trustees. 
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In summary, the basic structure of the trust in the narrow sense can be depicted by Figure 2.1: 
 
Figure 2.1: The Parties that Constitute the Structure of a Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. THE FORMATION OF A TRUST 
For a valid trust to be created (a) the settlor must intend to create one, (b) the settlor’s 
intention must be expressed in a mode appropriate to create an obligation, (c) the property 
subject to the trust must be defined with reasonable certainty, (d) the trust object, which may 
either be personal or impersonal, must be defined with reasonable certainty, and (e) the trust 
object must be lawful.122 
 
Notably, the designation of a trustee as well as the acceptance by the designated trustee is not 
essential to the existence of a trust. According to Committee of the Johannesburg Public 
Library v Spence,123 as long as the obligation to create or administer a trust is present, the 
Master or the court will, if necessary, see that the trust is put into effect by appointing a 
trustee.124  Furthermore, the matter of Deedat v The Master, 125  established that it is not 
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essential that the trust property be transferred to the trustee or beneficiary: all that is 
necessary for the existence of a valid trust is that the settlor should be under a duty to give the 
control of the property to a trustee.126  
 
6.1 INTENTION 
Any person with contractual capacity or the capacity to create a will may create a trust. 
Furthermore, a trust may be set up by a court, by statute or on statutory authority. Importantly, 
an intention to create a trust must be present in each case, since a trust imposes a burden on 
the trust property and freedom from burden is presumed.127 With regard to trusts in the 
narrow sense, the settlor should intend that the transferee should hold an office by virtue of 
which duties attaching to the office will descend to a successor in office rather than to the 
deceased trustee's executor.128  
 
In order to ensure sufficient intention it is necessary for the settlor of a trust to demonstrate a 
clear and explicit intention to create a trust.129 Relatively, the settlor must confer sufficient 
independence on the supposed trustee as well as adequately vest property in the trustee, 
otherwise the trustee becomes a mere agent and the element of intention will be lacking. 
Crucially, the intention to create a trust inter vivos must be shared by the settlor and the 
prospective trustee: 
 
“Intention is inferred from the circumstances and depends on what words are used, how formal the 
arrangement is, what the normal practice is in the context, and other factors ... and [w]ords such as 
‘trust’ and ‘administrator’ point to the creation of a trust, but are not conclusive, since they may have 
been employed by mistake, or may denote trusts or trust-like arrangements only in a wide sense.”130  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
125 1998 (1) SA 544 (N). 
126 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 176. 
127 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 118. See further, Ex parte Kaminsky 1917 TPD 338. 
128 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 118. Such a person is to hold the property in a purely 
administrative capacity, whereas in the latter, the transferor does not intend that anyone other than the transferee 
should be burdened with the obligation. 
129 MM Corbett et al The Law of Succession in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 395-396. 
130 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 119. 
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According to Prichard’s Trustee v Estate Prichard,131 if a settlor has endowed the intended 
trustee with a discretion to create a trust or to implement its provisions, an intention on the 
part of the settlor may be lacking. However, if an intention to create a trust is evident from 
the trust instrument, together with the surrounding circumstances, the use of mere directory 
or precatory words by the settlor will not preclude the formation of a trust.132  
 
In the case where the intention to create a trust is not clearly stated, the courts have accepted 
that the creation of a trust can be inferred, even though there are no explicit references to the 
trust. On this point, in the case of Harper v Epstein,133 Schreiner JA concluded that such an 
interpretation should proceed on the lines that what must be ascertained is what the settlor 
meant or intended by using the words.134 Nevertheless, the bottom line in this enquiry is 
neatly set out in Dempers and Others v The Master and Others (1),135 where the presiding 
judge noted: “[t]he vital question to be answered is whether he [the settlor] has expressed his 
intention with sufficient clarity to create an obligation.”136 The importance of this element 
should not be undermined, and its particular relevance will become sufficiently clear upon an 
examination of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego. 
 
6.2 OBLIGATION 
In its simplest expression, the intention must be expressed in a mode appropriate to create an 
obligation. Therefore, it is necessary to house the intention in some legally recognised form, 
such as a will, contract, transfer, statute, treaty or court order. It is of no importance whether 
the act was unilateral – such as a will, statute or court order – or bilateral – such as a contract 
or treaty.  
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Cameron et al describe the so-called obligation as either: 
 
“(i) the obligation resting on the trustee to administer the property for the trust object, or (ii) the 
obligation resting on the founder or on another (eg the founder’s executor) to take the necessary steps 
to ensure that the property is administered by a trustee, for example by transferring the property to the 
latter.”137 
 
The legal obligation referred to under the obligation requirement depends on the particular 
situation at hand. “If the trust property has already been transferred to or placed under the 
control of a duly appointed trustee, the obligation refers to the obligation imposed on such 
trustee to administer the trust property in pursuance of the trust object.”138 It thus follows that 
for the creation of a trust inter vivos by way of contract (between the settlor and the trustee), 
the appointment of a trustee and their acceptance of such appointment are not essential for the 
creation of a legitimate trust. It does however stand to reason that with the creation of a trust 
inter vivos by way of stipulatio alteri, such is indeed required.139 
 
6.3 PROPERTY 
Trust property can consist of any asset or group of assets, movable or immovable as well as 
corporeal or incorporeal.140 As such, any asset that can be held in ownership and that can be 
converted into money if liquidated can constitute trust property.141 According to the Act, 
“trust property” is described as “movable or immovable property and includes contingent 
interests in property which in accordance with the provisions of a trust instrument are to be 
administered or disposed of by a trustee.”142 
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Whatever form the property subject to a particular trust takes, it is essential that such property 
be defined with reasonable certainty,143 and failure to do so will result in the non-creation of 
the trust. The onus of such determination falls on the trust instrument, and if no property at all 
is located in the trustee, then a trust in the wide sense only may be the result. This was the 
case in the matter of Conze, where investors sent funds to their agent, Masterbond, who even 
though described as the “trustee”, paid the funds to a corporate investment company on the 
investor’s behalf. The court noted that there was therefore no “notional transfer of funds from 
Masterbond as agent to Masterbond as trustee”.144 
 
Importantly, “if the description of the trust property is ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved 
like any other in a will or contract by recourse to such intrinsic or extrinsic evidence as is 
admissible for the purpose.”145 In the case of Deedat and Others v Master of the Supreme 
Court, Natal and Others, 146  the facts of which case followed similar lines, the court 
confirmed that at common law one of the essential elements of a valid trust “is a definite or 
identifiable subject-matter.”147 The court held that, although the trust instrument declared a 
“clear intention on the part of the settlors and trustees to create a charitable trust for the 
promotion of the charitable or religious activities of the Islamic faith”,148 the trust instrument 
did not expressly identify its source and exact nature.149  
 
Drawing on the above definition of a “trust” in the Act, of particular relevance is the 
statement “‘trust’ means the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one 
person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed.”150 A trust will thus 
obviously exist only if there is a factual making over or bequest of assets to at least one 
trustee. Where a settlor of a trust inter vivos makes a nominal amount available in order to 
establish a trust “(for example, the founder donates R1 000 as the initial amount in order to 
form the trust), it is important that this amount is actually received and banked by trustees, 
                                                             
143 du Toit South African Trust Law 30. 
144 At 793F–G. 
145 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 147. 
146 1995 (2) SA 377 (AD). 
147 At 383E–F. 
148 At 383E–I. 
149 The court held the trust to be void ab initio. This decision was however overturned on appeal by the 
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150 Section 1 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
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and the trustees accepting [of] these assets [is what] ... actually forms the trust.”151 If the 
amount is not actually paid over to the trustees, it must be argued that the trust has not yet 
been formed. Moreover, the requirements of s 10 of the Act establish that should any money 
be received by a trustee, that person “shall deposit such money in a separate trust account at a 
banking institution”. Thus it would be unacceptable that such money be placed in the petty 
cash box.152 
 
On a practical note, inter vivos trusts are normally formed by trustees’ acquiring a nominal 
sum of money in terms of the trust instrument. On behalf of the trust, the trustees afterwards 
purchase the majority of trust assets from the settlor on loan account. According to Geach and 
Yeats, in practice many trusts have acquired assets from a settlor, and the settlor holds a loan 
account in the trust. In this way any increase in the market value of assets takes place in the 
trust, and the settlor effectively freezes his or her estate at the time that assets were acquired 
by the trust.153 This act of making over an asset to the trustees forms the trust. From a tax 
perspective, s 55(1) of the Income Tax Act154 defines “donee” as including a trustee where 
assets are given to a trust for the benefit of any beneficiary. In order to avoid double 
donations tax, s 56(1)(l) exempts from donations tax distributions from a trust to a 
beneficiary. Usually the assets are sold to the trust at current market value to avoid having to 
pay donations tax (in the context of the trust inter vivos).  
 
Typically, trusts do not have the cash available to pay the purchase price, so the sale creates a 
debt due to the settlor which is forgiven over time. The process is as follows: a transfer of 
property may take one of two forms, either a donation or a sale. If the transaction is by way 
of sale and the trust does not have the funds available, the transaction goes through the trust’s 
loan account. Thus the lender becomes the debtor and the trust’s loan account is credited with 
the amount, with a concurrent debit in the trust’s asset account. In order for the trust to reduce 
the debt, the trustees will use the annual limit per tax payer for donations, 155  and the 
beneficiaries (as well as the settlor), if agreed upon, will donate, say, R100 000 per annum to 
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153 Geach and Yeats Trusts 14. 
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the trust and in doing so reduce the loan account by the said amount. Donating at a rate of 
R100 000 per annum can be a slow process, and in order to make the most of the advantages 
of having a trust, it is important not to delay the process of transferring assets. It is important 
to remember that until the loan account is diminished, the loan to the trust forms an asset in 
the creditor’s estate and, as such, is available to his or her creditors in turn. The risk is 
diminished over time, thus the earlier the donations begin, the better. 
 
6.4 OBJECT 
The trust object must be sufficiently certain.156 This means that the object of the trust has to 
be stated in clear terms in the trust instrument, and that a trust without an indication of the 
object to be served by the restrictions imposed on the trust property constitutes a nudum 
praeceptum and is consequently ineffectual.157 Normally trusts are set up to benefit one or 
more persons or classes of persons. Should the trust be effected so as to benefit one or more 
persons, such persons must be identifiable with reasonable certainty. This is often the duty of 
the settlor, although he or she need not appoint the beneficiaries him or herself, as a power to 
appoint can within limits be bestowed on the trustees. The power to appoint enables the 
trustees to identify individual trust beneficiaries, usually from a group of beneficiaries 
designated by the settlor.158  
 
The same guidelines must be followed for trusts which are established for an impersonal 
object. The settlor must therefore define such object (often charitable in nature) with 
sufficient certainty. The court’s stringent approach to this requirement was observed in the 
matter of Re Grayson159 where a testator attempted to set up a charitable trust. According to 
the court, the terms contained in the trust instrument were vague and as such the trust was 
declared invalid as the testator had failed to impose a binding obligation on his executors to 
create a trust. 
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Accordingly, when the trust object is for the benefit of persons or classes of people, two main 
rules must be taken into account. First, if the person for whose benefit the trust is intended is 
not named or determinable, the trust fails for lack of a certain object,160 and, second, if the 
trust derogates from the rights of the owner of the trust property, the restrictions it contains 
must be imposed in the interests of a person other than the owner, otherwise it is a nudum 
praeceptum.161 When there is no designated beneficiary, the trust automatically fails.162 
 
6.5 LEGALITY 
Simply put, the trust object must be lawful. According to the decided case of Oosthuizen v 
Bank Windhoek,163 a trust object will be unlawful if it is illegal, contrary to public policy or 
contra bonos mores. Obviously, illegality is a notion easily determinable by the courts, but 
bonos mores represents a slightly more problematic determination. Hahlo observes that 
“[t]imes change and conceptions of public policy change with them”164 and therefore an 
arrangement considered in conflict with public policy or contra bonos mores in the past need 
not necessarily be so considered at present, while, conversely, prevailing public policy 
considerations might require invalidity to be imposed on an arrangement regarded as 
completely valid in the past.165 An enquiry into case law reflects that the element of legality 
is more often than not an inquisition founded by testamentary trusts. As for the trust inter 
vivos, should the object of the trust be to protect the beneficiary against the claims of his or 
her creditors, the trust is not unlawful.166 
 
Regarding the elements of legality and object, an interesting development in the law took 
place recently in South Africa. In the case of Peterson NO and Another v Claassen and 
Others, 167  the Western Cape High Court was faced with an exception raised by the 
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defendants to the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim on the basis that they were vague and 
embarrassing. The plaintiffs in the matter, being the joint liquidators and trustees in a number 
of interlinked insolvent estates, sought to set aside the transfer of those properties as well as 
an order declaring that the transfers of the relevant land were void and that the deeds of 
transfer be cancelled.  
 
The grounds relied upon by the plaintiffs were that the defendants had devised a scheme 
which was intended to defraud their personal creditors and those of the Family trust and the 
corporation be dissipating the assets of the insolvent entities to new trusts.168 The fraudulent 
scheme devised also required the defendants to obtain a decree of divorce so as to separate 
their joint estate. To this end, seven new trusts were created and registered and immediately 
after their registration, the defendants sold immovable properties registered in their names to 
two of the seven newly formed trusts. To complicate matters further, with the transfer of each 
property, a mortgage bond was registered over them in favour of the second defendant (Absa 
Bank Ltd).169 During the period of transfer, two previously properties of the original Family 
trust were sold to another of the new trusts, with the occurrence of another mortgage bond 
being registered thereafter. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs alleged that the intended effect of the scheme was to divest the 
insolvent entities of their assets and to place them beyond the reach of creditors and that it 
constituted fraud on the creditors of the estates of the insolvent entities.170 
 
In reaching a decision, Bozalek J examined the difference between the object of a trust and 
the purpose thereof: 
 
“The object is openly proclaimed and ascertainable and all parties who have dealings with that trust 
will be held to have knowledge of the trust’s object. In the present case the objects of the three new 
trusts which took transfer of the properties were entirely lawful, the primary object being in each case 
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‘om bates en inkomste te bekom en aan te wend tot uiteindelike voordeel van die begunstigde’ ... By 
contrast where a trust is formed for an illegal or unlawful purpose this knowledge is jealously guarded 
by those who harbour such purpose. This is but one reason, although an important one, why the 
purpose of a trust, where it is an illegal or immoral purpose but is known only to the founder and to the 
trustees, cannot be equated in all circumstances with that trust’s (lawful) object.”171 
 
The learned judge then inspected the common law view of an agreement with which the 
purpose behind it is illegal: “At common law an agreement is unenforceable if the ultimate 
purpose of the parties is prohibited by common law.”172 Whether or not the contract is void 
however requires further attention, because as Bozalek J noted in his judgment, the “general 
rule has been relaxed to some extent in the situation where on party enters into the contract 
for an illegal purpose but the other knows nothing of that purpose and is entirely innocent. In 
such a case the innocent party can enforce the contract but the guilty party cannot.”173 
 
Notably, Bozalek J fairly reasoned that: 
 
“the fact that a trust is created for an unlawful purpose does not automatically render it void. Such an 
approach has anomalous and unfair results, not least of which is that where transfers of properties are 
effected for a fraudulent purpose using a trust, a different result will obtain depending on whether the 
trust is created with that purpose in mind or whether that purpose pre-exists the establishment of the 
trust.”174  
 
The judge therefore adopted the view that where a trust is created for an illegal purpose, 
agreements which it thereafter purports to conclude may be void or voidable in accordance 
with the ordinary contractual principles and depending on the individual circumstances of 
each agreement. 175  Bozalek J held that for those reasons, even if the illegal purpose 
contended for by the plaintiffs rendered the new trusts void, the excipient, as an innocent 
third party, was not thereby stripped of the rights of security in the properties which it 
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acquired for at fair value. 176  The court thus upheld the exception, and the plaintiff’s 
particulars of claim, were deemed vague and embarrassing. 
 
7. GOOD BUSINESS PRACTICE 
The above five elements impose several duties upon settlors and trustees to a trust and. as 
observed by Geach and Yeats, the following five observations serve as good business practice: 
First, there must be a written document, in this case the trust instrument.177 Second, there 
must be at least one trustee and one beneficiary. Third, the trustees must have legal 
ownership of the trust property. Fourth, the trustees must hold the trust property for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries and, finally, the fifth expression is that there must be a clear 
separation of control from the enjoyment of trust assets.178 It is appropriate at this stage to 
consider each element separately below. 
 
In s 1 of the Act,179 a trust instrument is defined as “a written agreement or a testamentary 
writing or court order according to which a trust is created.”180 This founding document of 
the trust is the trust deed or instrument. A trust instrument must contain the names of the 
beneficiaries or a list of the objects of the trust as well as the terms of the trust. The trust 
instrument should also identify the trustee(s). In the absence of such appointment, the Master 
is empowered in terms of s 7 of the Act to appoint at least one trustee in order to avoid a 
nullity.  
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In the second expression, it is of the utmost importance that not only should there be at least 
one trustee and one beneficiary, but that those two parties not be the same person. The 
reasoning behind this prerequisite is articulated in Thorpe v Trittenwein,181 where Scott JA 
reasoned that there must not be a blurring of the separation between ownership and 
enjoyment, and that separation is the very core of the idea of a trust.182  
 
In the third expression, it is a requirement that the property to be held in trust be transferred 
to the trustees during the lifetime of the settlor (for an inter vivos trust) and that ownership of 
the assets shifts to the trustees. Upon the death of the settlor, and in accordance with his or 
her will, all trust property not yet transferred should be bequeathed to the trust or otherwise 
made over to the trustees, and when that occurs ownership of the assets passes to the trustees.  
 
In the fourth expression, although the trustees have legal ownership of the trust property, the 
ownership is non-beneficial. This “bare-ownership” requires the trustees not to benefit 
personally or enjoy the trust property183  but rather to act in accordance with the trust 
instrument and in the best interests of the beneficiaries.184 Stander articulately expresses this 
notion as follows: 
 
“The trustees are not the agents of the trust nor for that matter of the beneficiaries. They are subject to a 
fiduciary obligation and have the power and duty, in respect of which he/she may be held to account, 
manage, employ or dispose of the trust assets in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument and 
the special duties imposed by law. It is often said that trustees must use greater care in handling trust 
property than they might in dealing with their own property. Trustees are in a fiduciary position and in 
dealing with the money of the beneficiary obliged to observe due care and diligence.”185 
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In the fifth and final expression, a clear separation of the control of trust property from the 
enjoyment of the assets is essential. Each trustee must act in all trust matters with the utmost 
good faith and observe all duties imposed in terms of the Act and by the common law.186 In 
this regard, the appointment of one or several independent trustees is recommended in order 
to maintain the distinction mentioned above. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
From a comparatively humble and uncertain inception, the trust has been developed to such 
an extent that a unique and distinctively South African law of trusts has been formed. 
Although this development was initially undertaken exclusively by the courts, it later became 
clear that the intervention of the Legislature was necessary in order to clarify the uncertainties 
created by the exercise of judicial discretion. Even though legislation has succeeded, to an 
extent, in providing the clarity sought, a number of problematic issues still exist. Owing to 
the simplicity of the Act and the ever-increasing discretion used by the courts to interpret the 
law of trusts, this sphere of the law remains vague. Moreover, the uncertainty lends itself not 
only to the ambiguity of the law of trusts in general, but also to the difficulty now faced by 
those who use trusts legitimately. 
 
Regardless of the above, the law and principles laid down in this chapter serve as the most 
crucial reference point for an interpretation of the relevant case law in South Africa,187 as 
well as the articulation of the recommendations that follow.188 
                                                             
186 Geach and Yeats Trusts 3. 
187 See Chapter 3 below. 
188 See Chapter 6 below. 
48 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS POST PARKER 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces three landmark decisions central to this thesis, and is divided into 
three sections. The first examines the Supreme Court of Appeal’s (SCA) decision in the 
matter of Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others1 with specific 
emphasis on the court’s development of trust law in accordance with business efficacy, 
commercial accountability and the reasonable expectations of outsiders – the supposed duty 
pronounced on by the court which has in turn led to the adoption of the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil – an unsightly and erroneous development. This section then undertakes a 
comprehensive examination of the court ruling, clearing up any potential speculation as to the 
status of the law following the Parker judgment. It is submitted that what will become 
apparent from Cameron JA’s decision is that the court in fact ignored the doctrine of the 
sham, and instead adopted the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil into trust law – a 
company law principle foreign to the law of trusts. The case also introduces the topic of the 
independent trustee, a feature of modern-day trust law which has become increasingly 
important in South Africa. 
 
The second section of this chapter examines the South African High Court decision of 
Badenhorst v Badenhorst2 and the subsequent appeal to the SCA, Badenhorst v Badenhorst.3 
This case is important as it illustrates the negative ripple-effect the Parker case has had on the 
South African law of trusts. In addition, the Badenhorst case offers an insight into the courts’ 
lack of understanding of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego. A case which should 
have simply fallen under the rules of the alter-ego principle became in effect confused, 
resulting in the amalgamation of the trust doctrines, a mistake which disrupted the rules of 
trust veil-lifting in South Africa. 
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The third section of this chapter covers the recent case of Van der Merwe NO and Others v 
Hydraberg Hydraulics CC and Others; Van der Merwe NO and Others v Bosman and 
Others.4 The inclusion of this matter helps to measure the ripple-effect of the Parker case five 
years later and offers a somewhat similar, yet “fresh” judicial perspective on the rules of trust 
veil-lifting in South Africa.  
 
The three cases above, together with those mentioned in Chapter 5 which include Jordaan v 
Jordaan, 5  Nedbank Ltd v Thorpe, 6  Nel and Others v Metequity Limited and Another, 7 
Nieuwoudt and Another v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk,8 Thorpe v Trittenwein and Another 
9and Grobbelaar v Grobbelaar10 provide a much needed insight into the pertinent South 
African trust law developments and provide the basis for the foreign law comparison on point. 
 
The unwelcome development in South African trust law, on the other hand, will allow for the 
courts to make a value judgement in future. As a result, owing to the aforementioned 
precedent, future courts will not be obliged to follow the strict trust law doctrines and allow 
for an equitable decision based on fairness and public policy. This unenvisaged development 
in South African law comes at the price of legal uncertainty and a law of trusts disturbed by 
the law of commerce – a con which largely outweighs any pros.  
 
2.  THE PARKER CASE 
This case was heard on appeal in the SCA. The facts concerned an insolvent family trust 
which had been established in 1992. The settlor, Mr Parker, a previously well-off 
Lichtenburg farmer, named the trust after his wife (“the Jacky Parker Trust”). The named 
beneficiaries of the trust included Mr and Mrs Parker11 and their descendants. The trustees 
were the Parkers and their family attorney, who subsequently resigned in 1996, leaving the 
                                                             
4 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC). 
5 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
6 [2009] ZAKZHC 44. 
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9 2007 (2) SA 172 (SCA). 
10 Case No 26600/98 (unreported judgment of the Transvaal Provincial Division). 
11 Hereafter referred to as “the Parkers”. 
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Parkers as the sole remaining trustees. The trust instrument required a minimum of three 
trustees in office at all times, and stipulated that should the number fall below that mark, the 
remaining trustees were empowered to appoint a third. The court concluded that this power, 
together with the minimum requirement, in effect placed a duty on the Parkers to appoint a 
third trustee when one resigned.12 
 
In breach of the remaining trustees’ (the Parkers) duty to give effect to the terms of the trust 
instrument, they failed for nearly two years to do so. From April to October 1998, whilst 
operating below the sub-minimum, the Parkers accepted loans for the repayment of which 
they purported to bind the trust. On behalf of the trust as co-principal debtor and surety the 
Parkers entered into a series of agreements in which the companies connected to their family 
business obtained considerable advances from the bank. Upon firm direction from the Master 
to appoint a trustee, the Parkers assigned their son as the third trustee – who, too, was a 
beneficiary. 
 
In September 2000, the bank obtained a provisional order to sequestrate the trust after the 
Parkers’ business dealings began to fail. The court a quo confirmed the orders of 
sequestration and refused leave to appeal. However, the trust obtained leave and successfully 
appealed the decision to the full bench, thus setting aside the sequestration order.13 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal granted special leave to the bank to appeal the judgment. 
 
Cameron JA reasoned that the trust deed is the constitutive charter of the trust and, as such, 
any act outside the provisions of the instrument cannot bind the trust estate.14 Thus, the 
Parkers were incapable of entering into any loan agreements or business transactions on the 
trust’s behalf, even with a majority vote, as the trust deed required three trustees to be in 
office.  
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In terms of going behind the trust form, Cameron JA stated that the essential notion of trust 
law is that enjoyment and control should be functionally separate.15 With regard to s 9 of the 
Trust Property Control Act,16 the duties imposed on trustees and the standard of care required 
on them derives from this principle. Cameron JA cautioned against the Parkers’ disregard of 
this fundamental principle in the following terms: 
 
“It is evident that in such a trust there is no functional separation of ownership and enjoyment. It is also 
evident that the rupture of the control/enjoyment divide invites abuses. The control of the trust resides 
entirely with beneficiaries who, in their capacity as trustees, have little or no independent interest in 
ensuring that transactions are validly concluded. On the contrary, if things go awry, they have every 
inducement as beneficiaries to deny the trust’s liability. And no scruple precludes their relying on 
deficiencies in form or lack of authority since their conduct as trustees [will] unlikely ... be scrutinised 
by the beneficiaries. This is because the beneficiaries are themselves, or those who through close 
family connection have an identity of interests with them.”17 
 
In other words, as trustees and principal beneficiaries, the Parkers had an interest in obtaining 
loans from the bank. The Parkers’ actions thus did not derive from their fiduciary duty as 
responsible trustees, but rather from their capacity as beneficiaries who required protection 
from their creditors. Furthermore, Cameron JA warned that, while outsiders have an interest 
in self-protection, the primary responsibility for observance with the formalities, and for 
ensuring that contracts lie within the authority conferred by the trust instrument, lies with the 
trustees. The logic adopted by the learned judge underpins the rule that outsiders contracting 
with an entity and dealing in good faith may presume that acts performed within its 
constitution and powers have been properly and duly performed, and are thus not bound to 
enquire whether acts of internal management have been met.18  
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16 Section 9 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 - “Care, diligence and skill required of trustee” states: 
“(1) A trustee shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers act with the care, 
diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of another. 
 (2) Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of 
exempting a trustee from or indemnifying him against liability for breach of trust where he fails to 
show the degree of care, diligence and skill as required by subsection (1).” 
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On this point, Cameron JA eloquently expressed the inference which could therefore be 
drawn: 
 
“… that the trustee who concluded the allegedly unauthorised transaction was in fact authorised to 
conduct the business in question as the agent of the other trustees.... Such an inference may in a 
suitable case be drawn from the fact that the other trustees previously permitted the trustee or trustees 
in effective charge of affairs free rein to conclude contracts. A close identity of interests between 
trustee-beneficiaries, as in most family trusts, may make it possible for the inference of implied or 
express authority to be more readily drawn.”19 
 
After cautiously suggesting the above, the court went on to make its landmark decision, 
varying the law of trusts, which is most applicable to this study. Cameron JA reasoned that, 
based on the evidence before the court, it may be necessary to extend the well-established 
principles of company law into trust law.  
 
Accordingly, where the conduct of the trustees invites the inference that the trust form is a 
mere façade for the conduct of a business “as before”, and that the assets allegedly vesting in 
trustees in fact belong beneficially to one or more of the trustees (a complete failure to give 
away control of the property), the trust assets may be used in repayment of debts to which the 
trustees purported to bind the trust.20  
 
The obiter statement articulated by Cameron JA was as follows: 
 
“Where trustees of a family trust, including the founder, act in breach of the duties imposed by the trust 
deed, and purport on their sole authority to enter into contracts binding the trust, that may provide 
evidence that the trust form is a veneer that in justice should be pierced in the interests of creditors.”21 
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The SCA pointed out that the pretension to bind the trust estate during the two-trustee period 
was an act of usurpation that simply compounded the breach of trust they committed by 
failing to appoint a third trustee.22 The appeal of the bank consequently succeeded, and the 
sequestration order against the trust was reinstated. 
 
3. THE BADENHORST CASES 
3.1 THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
In Badenhorst, the plaintiff, Ian Badenhorst sued his wife, Lynette Badenhorst, in the court a 
quo for a decree of divorce and ancillary relief. The defendant counter-claimed and sought a 
redistribution order, in terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act,23 whereby 50 per cent of the value 
of the plaintiff’s estate would be awarded to her. Included in the prayer was a claim that the 
assets within the family trust (“the Jubilee Trust”) be regarded as assets in the plaintiff’s 
estate. The defendant alleged in support of her claim that the trust was controlled by the 
plaintiff and was in effect his alter-ego. It was further alleged that both parties had in fact 
contributed income and talent in order to acquire the trust assets and had the trust not been 
created at all, the assets would have vested in the plaintiff’s estate. 
 
The plaintiff, Mr Badenhorst, and his brother were the co-trustees of the family trust. The 
capital beneficiaries included the four children born of the marriage, and the income 
beneficiaries were Mr and Mrs Badenhorst.24 In terms of the trust instrument, the respondent 
had the right to discharge his co-trustee and appoint someone in his place at his own 
discretion. Furthermore, the trustees had an unfettered discretion to do with the trust assets 
and income as they saw fit.  
 
In coming to a decision in the court a quo, Ngwenya J examined the possibility of the trust 
being the alter-ego of the plaintiff. The question structured by the court was “whether the ... 
Jubilee Trust [was] used by the plaintiff such that [it was] his convenient vehicle to amass 
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assets.”25 In the defendant’s evidence in chief, she testified that the plaintiff did as he pleased 
as regards the property of the Jubilee Trust, but conceded under cross-examination that she 
could not deny that he consulted his brother, the other trustee, when dealing with the finances 
and immovable property pertaining to the trust. The defendant further admitted that she kept 
the trust assets as a bookkeeper separately from those of the plaintiff. The defendant testified 
further that, where the plaintiff was to make payment on behalf of the trust from his personal 
account, the trust was debited accordingly, and vice versa.26  
 
Accordingly, Ngwenya J noted: “[a]part from the general statements that the plaintiff was 
manipulating the trust there is no factual basis upon which I can come to the conclusion that 
the trust was a vehicle through which the plaintiff protected himself.”27 The defendant’s 
counsel referred to the matter of Jordaan v Jordaan28 as authoritative in support of the 
contention the presiding judge must have in mind that the plaintiff had access to the assets of 
the trust.29 In Jordaan, Traverso J noted: 
 
“Maar daar kan nie uit die oog verloor word dat die verweerder in die verlede en ongetwyfeld ook in 
die toekoms, die plaas gebruik het om vir hom finansieel voordeel in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid in te 
hou nie. Na my mening sou dit reg en billik wees indien ek ingevolge die bepalings van Art 7(5) van die 
Wet op Egskeidings die bates van hierdie plaas in aanmerking neem, by hierdie beoordeling van die 
vraag of dit in die omstandighede reg en billik sal wees om ’n herverdelingsbevel te maak met die basis 
dat daar ’n ‘clean break’ bewerkstellig word.”30 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 Para 20. 
26 Para 23.  
27 Ibid. 
28 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
29 Para 23. 
30At 299G–I. The statement loosely translates as follows: “But we cannot lose sight that the defendant in the 
past and certainly in the future will use the farm to benefit himself financially in his personal capacity. I believe 
it would be right and fair if, under the provisions of s 7(5) of the Divorce Act, the assets of the trust be taken 
into account during this assessment of the enquiry as to whether, in the circumstances, the redistribution is fair 
and reasonable and that a ‘clean break’ has been achieved”. 
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Ngwenya J dispelled the contention, explaining that the argument that the plaintiff and the 
defendant were entitled to the farm was irrelevant. The presiding judge importantly noted the 
following: 
 
“The Jubilee Trust is a separate legal entity which stands to benefit her own children. If [the 
defendant’s counsel] meant in [their] submission that I must regard it as a separate entity, and yet take 
into account that the plaintiff had unlimited access to it, I have grave difficulties with this reasoning. It 
is contradictory. It implies that I must make an adverse order against the trust via the back door. Simply 
put ... I must order the plaintiff to transfer an amount of R946 046,50 to the defendant. The defendant 
will, in turn, thus, have her estate increased to the net value of R1 924 366,50. That of the plaintiff 
reduced to R946 046,50. Because the plaintiff has unlimited access to Jubilee Trust, even if he cannot 
raise this amount from his own assets, so proceeds this reasoning, he should be able to access Trust 
property to satisfy this order. In my judgment, unless I find the trust to be a sham, I cannot make an 
order like this. When I find the trust to be such, I hope I will make a clear order to this effect.”31  
 
In the court a quo’s closing, Ngwenya J reasoned that, despite the extensive powers granted 
to the plaintiff in the trust instrument, there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff abused 
his powers, nor that the assets which the trust owned and acquired over a period of time were 
acquired through means which were prejudicial to the matrimonial estate.32  Ngwenya J 
remarked: “This trust however remained an independent entity. It is not the alter-ego of the 
plaintiff ... I therefore do not have reasons to make an order that any asset belonging to either 
of these trusts should be transferred to the defendant or any other person.”33 The decree of 
divorce was granted, without the inclusion of the trust property. 
 
3.2 THE APPEAL 
A year later, the Badenhorst case reached the SCA, despite the court a quo refusing the 
application for leave to appeal. Leave to appeal was granted by the SCA on two grounds: first, 
that the court a quo had erred in not taking into account that the respondent enjoyed the 
benefit of occupying, farming, and receiving an income from the farm and, second, that the 
court found that the assets of the Jubilee Trust did not form part of the parties’ “joint” estate 
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and that the appellant was therefore not entitled to 50 per cent thereof.34 The appellant, 
Lynette Badenhorst, therefore sought an order for the addition of 50 per cent of the net value 
of the trust to be paid to her by the respondent. 
 
Combrinck AJA noted that the crisp issue on appeal was whether, when making a 
redistribution order in terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act, the assets of an inter vivos 
discretionary trust created during the marriage should be taken into account.35 Upon resolving 
the debate, the learned judge reasoned that “[a] trust is administered and controlled by 
trustees, much as the affairs of a close corporation are controlled by its members and a 
company by its shareholders.”36 Combrinck AJA further articulated that, although the assets 
vested in the trustees and did not form part of the respondent’s estate, this did not exclude 
them per se from consideration when determining what must have been taken into account 
when making a redistribution order.37 With regard to the idea of lifting the veil of the trust, 
the learned judge set out the logic behind the question, as follows: 
 
“To succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one of the parties to a marriage there 
needs to be evidence that such party controlled the trust and but for the trust would have acquired and 
owned the assets in his own name. Control must be de facto and not necessarily de iure. A nominee of 
a sole shareholder may have de iure control of the affairs of the company but the de facto control rests 
with the shareholder. De iure control of a trust is in the hands of the trustees but very often the founder 
in business or family trusts appoints close relatives or friends who are either supine or do the bidding of 
their appointer. De facto the founder controls the trust. To determine whether a party has such control it 
is necessary to first have regard to the terms of the trust deed, and secondly to consider the evidence of 
how the affairs of the trust were conducted during the marriage.”38 
 
In contrast to the court a quo’s findings, Combrinck AJA held that the respondent seldom 
consulted or sought the approval of his co-trustee and was, in short, in full control of the 
trust.39 Furthermore, the court noted that the respondent paid limited regard to the difference 
between trust assets and his own assets. Combrinck AJA noted for example, in a written 
                                                             
34 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) at para 6. 
35 Para 1. 
36 Para 9. 
37 Para 9. 
38 Para 9. 
39 Para 11. 
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application for credit facilities with the local co-operative, that the respondent listed the 
trust’s assets as his own, and the liabilities in the form of bonds over the fixed property and 
the rental income from the trust assets were also described as his own. Moreover, a property 
registered in the name of the respondent was financed by the trust. The respondent also 
received income from an estate agent company, when in fact the shares were owned by the 
trust. “It is evident that, but for the trust, ownership in all the assets would have vested in the 
respondent.”40 
 
Addressing the question of whether trust assets could be taken into account in a redistribution 
order, the court referred to Grobbelaar v Grobbelaar 41  where de Vos AJ came to the 
following conclusion: 
 
“Inaggenome die diskressionêre aard van die trust, verweerder se feitelike algehele beheer daaroor, 
die feit dat eiseres nie meer ‘n begunstigde van die trust gaan wees nie en die feit dat die trust in wese 
bestaan uit bates wat die verweerder versamel het, meen ek egter dat die trust se bates moet in ag 
geneem word by beoordeling van beide die onderhoudseis en die herverdeling van bates.”42 
 
Similarly, Combrinck AJA highlighted the court’s ruling in the matter of Jordaan v 
Jordaan,43 (as also in the unreported decision of the Cape High Court Pienaar v Pienaar44) 
where Louw J noted: 
 
“In 1996 the bare dominium of the land ... was sold and transferred to the trust. In my view, given the 
reason for these transactions (estate planning aimed at reducing or avoiding estate duties on his death) 
and the control which the defendant, who is not a beneficiary under the trust, retained over the land 
through his controlling position as donor/trustee of the trust ... and the fact that he has, despite the 
separate existence of the trust and the separate bank account which was opened and operated by the 
trust, continued to treat the farm and the rental income of the trust as his own in all but name, the farm 
                                                             
40 Ibid. 
41 Case No 26600/98 (unreported judgment of the Transvaal Provincial Division). 
42 The statement loosely translates as follows:  
“Considering the discretionary nature of the trust, the defendant’s overall factual control, the fact that 
the plaintiff is no longer a beneficiary of the trust, and the fact that the trust consists of assets that the 
defendant had collected, I believe that the trust’s assets must be considered when assessing both the 
maintenance and redistribution of assets.” 
43 2001 (2) SA 288 (C). 
44 Case No 8713/2003 (unreported judgment of the Cape High Court). 
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should, for the purposes of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, be treated as if it is the defendant’s personal 
property.”45 
 
Unsurprisingly, Combrinck AJA held that the present case was a classic example of the one 
party having full control of the assets of the trust and merely using it as a vehicle for his 
business activities.46 On the face of it, it appears as if Combrinck AJA formulated a unique 
test for the inclusion of assets and for the most part, disregarded Ngwenya J’s more accurate 
assertion in the trial court judgment. The SCA reasoned that the value of the trust assets 
should have been added to the value of the respondent’s estate and, on the basis of the above 
knowledge, that the decision of the trial judge to exclude the trust assets amounted to a clear 
misdirection. 47 The learned judge also noted a further misdirection, in the decision as to what 
is a just and equitable distribution: Ngwenya J started from the premise that at the 
commencement of the marriage neither party had any assets – he started therefore, from what 
he called a “clean slate”.48 This, according to Combrinck AJA, is incorrect, as the respondent 
brought into the marriage from its inception a running farm complete with livestock, 
machinery, vehicles and everything else necessary for a successful farm.49 Accordingly, the 
appeal succeeded. The court held that the appellant be awarded an additional amount by 
taking the total of the net asset value of the parties’ estates and that of the trust, calculating a 
percentage which was considered just and equitable for the appellant’s contribution and 
deducting what she already possessed.50 
 
 
 
                                                             
45 Paras 29–34. 
46 Para 10. There is some thought that this may be the case with the majority of business trusts. At first, it may 
seem as though there is a blurring of the line between the average business trust and a sham trust operated under 
the veil of a family trust. However, a business trust, although different from the more passive trust formed as 
part of an estate duty plan, or formed in order to protect assets, is operated in order to pursue the interests of the 
beneficiaries in accordance with the mandated business objects of the trust instrument. In Badenhorst (para 10), 
Combrinck AJA noted that Mr Badenhorst was using the family trust as a vehicle for his own business activities 
(emphasis added), which fell far short of the family trust’s mandate (to protect the assets in the interests of the 
family members). 
47 Para 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Para 16. 
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5. THE VAN DER MERWE CASE 
This case arose through two separately instituted applications which came before Binns-Ward 
J in the Western Cape High Court. In both instances the applicants were the trustees of the 
Monument Trust,51 and had bought a business from Hydraberg Hydraulics CC and the land 
on which the business was operated. The seller was the Hydraberg Property Trust and the sale 
was in terms of a single indivisible agreement in favour of the applicants. The first 
application which came before the court was for the rectification of the deed of sale to reflect 
the correct description of the trust and for an order directing the trust to effect transfer.52 The 
second application sought to enforce a restraint of trade included in the sale agreement. 53 The 
applications were heard together. 
 
The property subject to the deed of contract was registered in the names of Clarke and his 
wife. The couple owned the property jointly and in undivided shares.54 Significantly though, 
the parties had executed a deed of alienation in 2005, some three years prior to the conclusion 
of the contract in issue.55 Thus, the Clarkes had bound themselves, as sellers, to sell the 
property to the Hydraberg Property Trust. The property had, however, not yet been 
transferred to the Hydraberg Property Trust when the contract in issue was concluded. 
 
In light of the indivisibility of the agreement, the outcome of the applications hinged on 
whether the Hydraberg Trust was bound to the contract. The contract was however only 
signed by two of the three trustees, and so the respondents argued that the agreement was 
void for two reasons, namely, that the trust had not been properly represented and also, that 
there had been no written authority from the trust, as required by s 2(1) of the Alienation of 
Land Act,56 to empower the two (out of the three) trustees to have executed the agreement of 
sale as agents of the trust. 
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55 Ibid. 
56 Act 68 of 1981. 
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In defence, it was disputed by the respondents that the third trustee, Gerhard, was not in fact a 
trustee at the time in which the contract of sale was entered into. Furthermore, the trust 
instrument provided for the entrenchment of Clarke and Bosman’s position as trustee for as 
long as they might wish to hold office. The instrument also denoted that the independent 
trustee may be dismissed if the majority of the other trustees so decide.57 The trust instrument 
also required there to be a minimum of three trustees in office at all times. 
 
Binns-Ward J noted in his judgment that it was not in dispute that Slabbert, who had been 
appointed as the third trustee upon the establishment of the trust, was not informed or 
consulted by the remaining two trustees regarding the conclusion of the contract. 58 
Furthermore, the learned judge reasoned that “[i]f Slabbert was indeed still one of the trustees 
at the time, the omission to involve him in the decision to conclude the agreement would 
ordinarily have fatal consequences for the validity of the agreement”.59 
 
On consideration of the trust instrument and the pertinent provisions regarding trustee 
capacity, Binns-Ward J reasoned that: 
 
“It is evident from these provisions that unanimity amongst the trustees is not required in order for 
decisions to be made effectively in respect of transactions concerning the administration of the trust 
and the dealing with its assets in terms of the powers conferred on the trustees in terms of clause 6 of 
the trust deed. It is sufficient if the relevant decision enjoys the support of a majority. A majority 
decision is competent only if adopted by a majority of the trustees present at a quorate meeting of 
trustees. Whether such a 'meeting' would need to be one at which the trustees attending were physically 
present together, or whether the 'meeting' could be held in some alternative form, is a question which it 
is not necessary to decide. It is evident, however, that in order to qualify as 'a meeting', all the trustees 
in office would have to receive notice thereof so as to be able to participate in it if they so wished. 
Slabbert did not receive any such notice and was therefore not afforded an opportunity to participate in 
the decision by the Trust to sell the fixed property. The terms of the trust instrument which provide for 
the trustees to make decisions by a majority vote at a quorate meeting do not provide an exception to 
the rule that all the trustees must act jointly; they merely provide that, subject to the indemnity in clause 
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5.7, a majority decision will bind the dissenting or absent trustees. The minority is obliged to act jointly 
with the other trustees in executing the resolution adopted by the majority.”60 
 
On the evidence before the court, the court concluded that Slabbert did not resign as trustee in 
terms of s 21 of the Act or in the appropriate manner, as prescribed in the trust instrument. In 
order to prove that Slabbert’s appointment as a trustee had been terminated, the applicants 
relied on the fact that Slabbert, who confirmed this in a confirmatory affidavit, had told the 
attorney representing the purchaser that he was unaware that he was a trustee. He further 
supposed to the attorney that he was in any event unable to perform his duties as a trustee due 
to a breach of trust and confidence between the other two trustees and himself.61 Slabbert 
confirmed that he resigned from office as trustee at least a year prior to the Hydraberg 
transaction.62 
 
Relevantly, the applicants further alleged that should the court find Slabbert to have held the 
position of trusteeship during the period of the transaction, that by application of the 
Turquand Rule,63 the agreement should nevertheless be held to bind the trustees. Binns-Ward 
J explained the above Rule entails that: 
 
“a party dealing in good faith with a company is entitled, if the latter's affairs appear to be being 
conducted in a manner permitted by its memorandum and articles, to assume that any internal 
formalities required thereby have been duly complied with.”64 
 
After careful consideration, Binns-Ward J agreed with Cameron et al’s view in Honoré that 
the rule that trustees must act jointly in the discharge of their functions is not a matter of 
‘internal management’, but a matter of capacity.65 
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The applicants added a further alternative should their endeavour to invoke the Turquand 
Rule fail:  
 
“... that the court should disregard the veneer of a trust under which Clarke and Bosman had in fact 
conducted their personal business as usual. After all, it is apparent that Clarke and Bosman represented 
that they were the only trustees of the Trust. Furthermore, it is evident that they must in fact have 
conducted themselves as such quite consistently, and in a number of matters besides the purported 
conclusion of the option agreement. In this regard it is apparent that Clarke and Bosman must have 
conducted the business of the Trust, including making decisions on the distribution of its income for a 
year or more without the involvement of their co-trustee, Slabbert.”66 
 
Binns-Ward J evaluated the conduct of the trustees in light of the applicants’ prayers and 
reasoned that the structure and operation of the Hydraberg Property Trust was of paramount 
interest to the court. The learned judge remarked that the provision of a separation between 
the person or persons vested with the ownership and control of property from the person or 
persons for whose benefit or enjoyment the property is held has appositely been described as 
‘the core idea’ or ‘the essential notion’ underlying the trust form as a legal concept.67  
 
Binns-Ward J applauded Cameron JA’s comments in Parker: 
 
“In Parker’s case, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeal observed that ‘[T]he great virtue of the trust 
form is its flexibility, and the great advantage of trusts their relative lack of formality in creation and 
operation: “the trust is an all-purpose institution, more flexible and wide-ranging than any of the 
others”. It is the separation of enjoyment and control that has made this traditionally greater leeway 
possible. The courts and legislature have countenanced the trust’s relatively autonomous development 
and administration because the structural features of “the ordinary case of trust" tend to ensure 
propriety and rigour and accountability in its administration.’ … Cameron JA, however, discerned that 
since the mid-1980’s there had been a noticeable change brought about by the formation of many 
business trusts ‘in which functional separation between control and enjoyment is entirely lacking. This 
is particularly so in the case of family trusts - those designed to secure the interests and protect the 
property of a group of family members, usually identified in the trust deed by name or by descent or by 
degree of kinship to the founder.’ I doubt that anyone with a modicum of commercial law experience 
would doubt the pertinence of this insight concerning what Harms JA in Nieuwoudt [disparagingly] 
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described as a ‘newer type of trust’. Cameron JA proceeded ‘The core idea of the trust is debased in 
such cases because the trust form is employed not to separate beneficial interest from control, but to 
permit everything to remain “as before”, though now on terms that privilege those who enjoy benefit as 
before while simultaneously continuing to exercise control.’”68 
 
Crucially, the judge concluded that the Hydraberg Property Trust carried with it, the 
unwholesome hallmarks of the ‘newer type’ of business trust.69 Binns-Ward J concluded: 
 
“Although the trust instrument makes provision for the mandatory appointment of a third so-called 
‘independent’ trustee, that trustee holds office only at the pleasure of Clarke and Bosman, or should the 
latter have resigned or forfeited their office (for example, as a consequence of having been 
sequestrated), at the pleasure of the substitute trustees appointed by their respective family member 
beneficiaries. The independent trustee’s position can in any event never prevail against that of Clarke 
and Bosman, who if they vote together will always constitute a majority. In theory the trust could 
operate with a real functional separation between control and benefit were additional independent 
trustees to be appointed thereby overriding the otherwise controlling majority of the entrenched 
initially appointed beneficiary trustees or their successors. Having regard to the provisions of the trust 
instrument considered as a whole, it is no cause for surprise to find that no additional trustees have 
been appointed during the five years of the Trust’s existence. Instead, as is all too likely to happen with 
such a trust structure, the beneficiary trustees have sidelined the independent trustee; and, when he 
ceased to [fulfill] his essential role in the control of the Trust’s affairs, they blithely proceeded without 
him, indifferent to the trust instrument’s requirement that there be a minimum of three effectively 
functioning trustees and oblivious of their obligation, should this requirement fail for any reason, to 
ensure the appointment of an additional or replacement trustee.”70 
 
Unsurprisingly, the ripple-effect of the Parker case continued half a decade after the 
landmark judgment was handed down in 2005. Binns-Ward J argued that the trust form 
should not lightly be countenanced by the courts in cases in which the veil of a trust is used 
as protection by the trustees against fraud and dishonesty and to raise unscrupulous defences 
against bona fide third parties seeking to enforce the performance of contractual obligations 
purportedly entered into by such trustees ostensibly in that capacity.71  
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The judge held that: 
 
“In parker, Cameron JA ventured the following observations in this connection: ‘the courts will 
themselves in appropriate cases ensure that the trust form is not abused. The courts have the power and 
the duty to evolve the law of trusts by adapting the trust idea to the principles of our law … This power 
may have to be invoked to ensure that trusts function in accordance with principles of business efficacy, 
sound commercial accountability and the reasonable expectations of outsiders who deal with them’ 
and ... ‘where trustees of a family trust, including the founder, act in breach of the duties imposed by 
the trust deed, and purport on their sole authority to enter into contracts binding the trust, that may 
provide evidence that the trust form is a veneer that in justice should be pierced in the interests of 
creditors.’ A decision to disregard the veneer would, like one to pierce the corporate veil, be a decision 
to afford an equitable remedy. The weight of the policy considerations arising from the need to respect 
corporate or juristic personality that make piercing the corporate veil a rare event is less, I venture, in 
the matter of disregarding the form of an example of the ‘newer type of trust’. In the latter type of case 
no question of disregarding juristic personality presents. On the contrary the issue in such cases of 
abuse of the trust form is whether or not it would be conscionable for a court to give credence to a 
natural person’s disguise of him or herself as a trustee of what is in reality treated by such person as his 
or her own property.”72 
 
In the courts findings, the learned judge stated, much like in the Parker case, that the facts of 
the case illustrated the classic example of an abuse of the trust form flowing directly from the 
conduct of the two trustees in respect of ownership of the fixed property and having no 
distinction between their responsibilities as trustees and their expectations as beneficiaries: 
 
“They treat the property as their own, and invoke the existence of the trust only when it suits them. 
There has not been any suggestion that in acting as they did at the time Clarke and Bosman prejudiced 
the rights of the beneficiaries of the Trust. On the contrary, the evidence is that the third (independent) 
trustee would have consented to the transaction, had his input been sought. It is apparent that the only 
reason that non-compliance with the requirements of the trust instrument is being raised at this late 
stage is because it apparently no longer suits the personal interests of Clarke and Bosman for effect to 
be given to the contract they purported to enter into. In principle I consider that it would be 
unconscionable to allow them to get away with such behaviour.”73 
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Importantly, Binns-Ward J held that this matter would have been an appropriate case to have 
disregarded the veneer of the trust form.74 According to the learned judge, this might have 
been so in one of two ways: “[b]y holding the delinquent trustees personally liable for 
performance, or by directing the trust to perform as if the obligation had been properly 
incurred by the trustees acting in the capacity that they purported to.”75 
 
The final course of the matter was however changed due to the formalities applying in respect 
of the alienation of land: 
 
“Whereas, as between the parties to the contract I might, on the basis described at some length above, 
have been able to disregard the veneer of the trust to overcome an unscrupulous resort by the trustees to 
internal formalities and conveniently assumed lack of capacity to escape contractual obligations, I am 
not able to ignore the trust's existence as a formally constituted legal concept when it comes to 
compliance with the peremptory requirements of applicable legislation. When law and equity cannot 
concur, it is the law that must prevail. As mentioned earlier, it was not competent for the trustees of the 
Trust to act other than jointly. Therefore, as also mentioned earlier, Clarke and Bosman, being only two 
of the three trustees in office, could bind the Trust in respect of a sale of immovable property only by 
acting together with their co-trustee as joint principals, alternatively, on the written authority of all of 
the trustees given acting jointly.”76 
 
Thus, the application for an order compelling the transfer of the fixed property as well as the 
enforcement of the restraint of trade clause was dismissed.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In Parker, the court mentions that certain types of business trusts have developed in which 
functional separation between control and enjoyment is entirely lacking. 77  Cameron JA 
pointed out that this is particularly so in the case of family trusts, those designed to secure the 
interests and protect the property of a group of family members, usually identified in the trust 
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instrument by name, descent or by degree of kinship to the founder.78 For estate planning 
purposes or to escape the constraints imposed by corporate law, assets are put into a trust 
“while everything else remains as before”.79 The core idea of the trust is debased in such 
cases because the trust form is employed not to separate beneficial interest from control, but 
to permit everything to remain “as before”, though now on terms that privilege those who 
enjoy benefit as before while simultaneously continuing to exercise control.80  
 
Upon taking the above into consideration, Cameron JA insisted that the courts must 
themselves in appropriate cases ensure that the trust form is not abused:  
 
“The courts have the power and duty to evolve the law of trusts by adapting the trust idea to the 
principles of our law.... This power may have to be invoked to ensure that trusts function in accordance 
with the principles of business efficacy, sound commercial accountability and the reasonable 
expectations of outsiders who deal with them.”81  
 
Cameron JA noted that “[w]here trustees of a family trust ... act in breach of their duties 
imposed by the trust instrument, and purport on their sole authority to enter into contracts 
binding the trust, that may provide evidence that the trust form is a veneer that in justice 
should be pierced in the interest of creditors.” (My emphasis added.) Regardless of the 
court’s subsequent investigation regarding legal standing, which is irrelevant to this study, 
what has become substantially clear is the ripple-effect Cameron JA’s obiter statements have 
had on subsequent cases. 
 
In Badenhorst, Ngwenya J in the court a quo imposed a strict interpretation of the facts and 
law, crucially noting that unless the court found the trust to be a sham, he may not, following 
the principal rules of trust law, pierce the veneer of the family trust and expose the trust assets 
to the matrimonial claim. However, on appeal to the SCA, whether directly or indirectly 
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influenced by Parker, the court took on a completely different approach towards the matter. 
Combrinck AJA implicitly accepted the trial court’s conclusion that, unless the court finds 
the trust to be a sham, no redistribution order can be made with regard to the trust property.82 
The court then went on to give an exposition of the careless mistakes made by the respondent, 
ignoring the overarching question of sham. Combrinck AJA instead reasoned that in order to 
grant the claim that trust assets be included in the respondent’s estate, there needs to be 
evidence that the respondent controlled the trust and, but for the trust, would have acquired 
and owned the assets in his name.83 
 
In effect, the SCA made one of two mistakes regarding Badenhorst. The first is that they 
replaced the test for sham with their own, where Combrinck AJA explained that the crucial 
issue of de facto control is the deciding point upon which the court may pierce the veneer 
(bearing in mind that, prior to this statement, the learned judge had agreed with the court a 
quo, in that the court may not pierce the trust unless the court finds such trust to be a sham). 
Alternatively, the court, as in Parker, ignored the doctrine of the sham, and pierced the trust 
based on nothing more than what could only be the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. 
 
It is also apparent that the Van der Merwe case followed upon similar lines to the Parker case. 
Had it not been for the alienation of land technicality, Binns-Ward J would have pierced the 
veneer of the Hydraberg Property Trust purely on the precedent set by Cameron JA in Parker 
and what Harms JA in Nieuwoudt unsympathetically described as “the newer type of trust”.84 
 
The decisions, with respect, reflect significant misunderstandings of the doctrines of the sham 
and the alter-ego, which have in turn led to two judgments which take South African trust law 
into strange and uncharted territory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DOCTRINES OF THE “SHAM”, THE “ALTER-EGO” AND THE “PIERCING 
OF THE CORPORATE VEIL” 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is evident in Badenhorst v Badenhorst1 that the courts are willing to pierce the veneer of a 
trust should it appear that a trust is in fact the alter-ego of a settlor. Furthermore, Combrinck 
AJA implicitly accepted the trial court’s conclusion that, unless the court finds a trust to be a 
sham, no redistribution order can be made.2  This supports the academic opinion that in 
Badenhorst the court did in fact find the trust to be a sham.3 In Land and Agricultural Bank of 
South Africa v Parker and Others,4 however, no reference was made to the trust being either 
a sham or the alter-ego of the Parkers. Instead, Cameron JA referred to the family trust as a 
“veneer that in justice should be pierced in the interests of the creditors.”5 In Van der Merwe 
NO and Others v Bosman and Others6 Binns-Ward J stated that:  
 
“[a] decision to disregard the veneer would, like one to pierce the corporate veil, be a decision to afford 
an equitable remedy ... The weight of the policy considerations arising from the need to respect 
corporate or juristic personality that make piercing the corporate veil a rare event is less ... in the matter 
of disregarding the form of an example of the ‘newer type of trust’. In the latter type of case no 
question of disregarding juristic personality presents. On the contrary the issue in such cases of abuse 
of the trust form is whether or not it would be conscionable for a court to give credence to a natural 
person’s disguise of him or herself as a trustee of what is in reality treated by such person as his or her 
own property.”7 
 
Bearing the above in mind, it is submitted that in all three cases the findings were inaccurate. 
The decisions respectfully reflect a lack of knowledge of the doctrine of the “sham” as well 
as the principle of the “alter-ego”, which have, in turn, led to three ill-founded decisions, not 
                                                             
1 2005 (2) SA 253 (C). 
2 Para 7. 
3 H Joffe “The Future of Trust Law” (2007) DR 25 at 26.  
4 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
5 Para 37.3.  
6 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC). 
7 Para 39. 
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to mention the other South African cases revolving around these two particular decisions. 
Furthermore, in those cases it was undecided whether or not such trusts were in fact invalid. 
These uncertainties can be made clear by reference to foreign law, where in many countries 
such practices regarding this area of trust law have been settled. 
 
The aim of this chapter is thus to examine the doctrines of the “sham”, the “alter-ego” and the 
“piercing of the corporate veil”. With respect to the doctrine of the sham, foreign case law 
will be employed in order to trace the roots of the doctrine, beginning with the broader 
definition of sham transactions and followed by the subsequent interpretation of this 
classification, which has led to the evolution of the sham trust. The tendencies discovered in 
the past – together with the modern-day interpretation of the doctrine – are later contrasted 
with its application in South Africa.8  
 
The doctrine of the alter-ego, too, is traced back to its source, followed by the ensuing use of 
this principle in the courts across the world today. What the findings reveal – specifically the 
doctrine’s fundamental principles, function and use – is, in Chapter 5, then compared to the 
interpretation and application by the South African Judiciary.  
 
The final principle reviewed in this chapter, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, is 
important to consider as well. In Parker the court inadvertently sought to incorporate it into 
the trust inter vivos, when Cameron JA reasoned that it was necessary to use the doctrine,9 
which, until then, had been solely reserved for use in companies and other entities attributed 
with separate legal persona. Notably, the learned judge further reasoned that it may be 
necessary in the future also to extend the Turquand Rule10 in the same manner,11 a rule also 
reserved for entities clothed with separate legal persona. In order to inspect the doctrine’s 
                                                             
8 See Chapter 5. 
9 Para 37.3. ‘Where trustees of a family trust, including the founder, act in breach of the duties imposed by the 
trust deed, and purport to act on their sole authority to enter into contracts binding the trust, that may provide 
evidence that the trust form is a veneer that that in justice should be pierced in the interest of creditors’. 
10 Based on the rule developed in Royal British Bank v Turquand [1856] 119 ER 866. 
11 Para 18. ‘Within its scope the [Turquand] rule may well in suitable cases have a useful role to play in securing 
the position of outsiders who deal in good faith with trusts that conclude business transactions’. 
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suitability in trust law, this section explores the historical use of the doctrine in common law 
systems overseas as well as the use of the principle locally.  
 
2. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SHAM 
Documents or arrangements which have been falsely created will not be permitted to prevent 
a court from getting at the real truth of the matter,12 and “if it [is] a mere cloak or screen for 
another transaction one [can] see through it.”13 Such documents or transactions are generally 
referred to as “shams”.14 The doctrine, which first surfaced in England in the late 1800s, was 
necessitated through contentions of fraud and dishonesty in cases related to taxation, sale 
agreements and tenureships. As will become apparent, through time, the scope of the 
principle broadened, eventually gaining relevance and coherence in the law of trusts.  
 
2.1 FOREIGN LAW PRECEDENT 
2.1.1 SHAM TRANSACTIONS 
The underlying idea of the sham doctrine is well illustrated by reference to Diplock LJ’s 
statement in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd.15 This matter involved a hire-
purchase agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant company which had been entered 
into in order to refinance the purchase of a motor vehicle. The vehicle was in the possession 
of the plaintiff, but had been subject to another hire-purchase agreement between the plaintiff 
and TI Ltd. In the hire-purchase agreement the cash price for the car was stated as £800 and 
the initial payment was to be £500. These figures were, however, fictitious. The defendant 
paid out £300, of which £160 was paid to TI Ltd, £125 was paid to the plaintiff and £15 was 
retained by the intermediary finance company that filled out the figures.16 In an action for the 
recovery of the motor vehicle by the defendant, it was held by Denning LJ that the title to the 
vehicle had been passed to the defendants who were not parties to the sham financing 
operation. It was furthermore found by Diplock LJ and Russell LJ that as the defendant was 
                                                             
12 In re Watson [1890] 25 QB D 27 at 33. 
13 Yorkshire Railway Wagon Co. v Maclure (1882) 21 Ch D 309 at 318. 
14 M Conaglen “Sham Trusts” (2008) 67 Cambridge LJ 176 at 176. 
15 [1967] 2 QB 786. 
16  S Pryke “Sham Trusts” http://www.fiduciarylegal.com/uploads/Sham_Trusts_Lecture_2005__FL_title_.pdf 
(accessed 8 April 2009). 
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not a party to the sham, the plaintiff was stopped on the basis of documents from denying the 
defendant’s title to the car.17 In his judgment, Diplock LJ stated: 
 
“As regards the contention of the plaintiff that the transactions between himself, Auto Finance and the 
defendants were a ‘sham’, it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in 
the use of this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any meaning in law, it means acts 
done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third 
parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations 
different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. But one 
thing, I think, is clear in legal principle, morality and the authorities… that for acts or documents to be 
a ‘sham’, with whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a 
common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which 
they give the appearance of creating.”18 
 
The above dictum has acquired “canonical” status,19 having been cited and adopted as an 
authoritative statement of the sham doctrine in common law jurisdictions worldwide. It will, 
however, be evident later that the adoption of Diplock LJ’s formulation in Snook has led to a 
restrictive view of the concept of sham. Interestingly, though, it is believed that this narrow 
view appeared to prevail prior to the Snook case and as long ago as 1882, where the court in 
Yorkshire Railway Wagon Company v Maclure20 considered the idea of a “device” or “cloak” 
to conceal a transaction. The question faced by the court was whether a purported sale and 
leaseback agreement between a railway company and a wagon supply company was in truth a 
secured loan. Lindley LJ stated the following: 
 
“I understand that the view the learned judge took was this, that this transaction of hire was a mere 
device or cloak to conceal a loan. If that had been the view I took of the facts, I should have come of 
course to the same conclusion. I should disregard or throw aside the cloak, and look at the real 
transaction alone. But for reasons I will give presently I am satisfied that the purchase and hire 
transaction was the real transaction, in this sense – that the parties meant it to operate according to its 
tenor as comprised in the deeds. It was not intended by them as a mere blind or cloak for something 
                                                             
17 Pryke “Sham Trusts”. 
18 At 802. 
19 A v A [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) para 32. 
20 (1882) 21 ChD 309. 
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behind, it was a transaction substituted for another, but bona fide substituted, and intended to be acted 
upon according to its purport and apparent effect.”21 
 
Jessel MR commented further on the matter: 
 
“But even if the Wagon Company understood it [the sale and leaseback agreement] as a loan, in order 
to set aside the deed, that is to treat it as a nullity you must show that the Railway Company were 
parties to the understanding.”22 
 
There are also a number of cases which arose through the United Kingdom’s Tax Court and 
which, at the time, added to the jurisprudence of the doctrine. In Dickenson v Gross,23 a 
taxpayer who owned various farms formed a partnership between himself and his three sons. 
The farms were then leased to the partnership at a determined rent. The partnership 
agreement provided that the accounts were to be drawn up annually, that the net profits were 
to be divided equally between the parties and that each partner on his own could endorse 
cheques. However, no rent was paid, nor were the accounts drawn up and no profits were 
distributed. Moreover, the only cheques drawn were by the taxpayer, and business income 
was paid ad hoc into the partnership account and the taxpayer’s private account. Rowlatt J 
confirmed the Commissioners of Tax’s findings that there was no partnership in existence for 
tax purposes. The learned judge said: 
 
“The partnership deed here … was a deed perfectly good according to its tenor … But … the facts 
show that in very many ways the deed was simply set on one side and disregarded, and when you find 
the deed is disregarded, and also that it was entered into for the purpose of obtaining relief from 
taxation, one is apt … to pay attention to those circumstances … in which it was disregarded.”24 
 
 
 
                                                             
21 At 317. 
22 At 314. 
23 (1927) 11 TC 614. 
24 At 620. 
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Rowlatt J added that the Commissioners:  
 
“have not used the word ‘sham’ but I think they have put it even more clearly. They say: The facts here 
were not a partnership although there was a bit of paper in drawer, which if the facts had been 
according to it, would have shown there was a partnership.”25 
 
With respect to sham transactions in a company, the English Appeal Court held in Gilford 
Motor Co v Horne26 that a person could not incorporate a company as a “cloak or sham” to 
enable him to commit a breach of covenant under his contract as managing director.27 
Evidently, these early English cases involving sham transactions prompted a surge in interest 
in the sham worldwide. In Bateman Television v Coleridge Finance Co Ltd,28  the New 
Zealand court reasoned that a sham: “is an act done or document executed that is intended to 
mislead. It is where the parties resort to a form of action or document which does not fit the 
real facts in order to deceive a third person.”29 In the Supreme Court of Canada the approach 
recommended by Martland J in Minister of National Revenue v Cameron30 was to follow the 
rules laid down in Snook. This matter dealt with the distribution of income and the taxation 
consequences thereof and was the first reported case in Canada dealing with sham 
transactions. In considering the contention that the agreement between the two respondents 
was nothing but a sham, the learned judge cited the definition of a sham set out by Diplock 
LJ in Snook. Martland J then remarked: “I am not prepared to find that the agreement 
between Campbell Limited and Independent was a sham. The legal rights and obligations 
which it created were exactly those which the parties intended”.31  
 
Returning to England, in Massey v Crown Life Insurance Co,32 an employment law case, a 
stern view was taken of the sham. The appellant, who had previously been employed as a 
branch manager by the respondent, had entered into a new agreement whereby he was to 
become a freelance agent. The appellant, under his new position no longer received wages 
                                                             
25 Ibid. 
26 (1933) Ch 935. 
27 At 957. 
28 [1929] NZLR 794. 
29 At 813. 
30 [1974] SCR 1062. 
31 At 1069. 
32 [1978] 2 All ER 576. 
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with a deduction for income tax and national insurance contributions, but rather the full 
amount, on which he was assessed on as a self-employed person. The appellant was 
subsequently dismissed, and sought to make a claim for wrongful dismissal on the grounds 
that their relationship as employer and employee had remained. In holding the arrangement to 
be a genuine transaction, rendering the appellant the status of a self-employed person, Lord 
Denning MR made this point in his inimitable way: 
 
“[I]f the true relationship of the parties is that of master and servant under a contract of service, the 
parties cannot alter the truth of that relationship by putting a different label on it … On the other hand, 
if their relationship is ambiguous and is capable of being one or the other, then the parties can remove 
that ambiguity, by the very agreement itself which they make with one another. The agreement itself 
then becomes the best material from which to gather the true legal relationship between them.”33 
 
The court noted, importantly, that if the relationship between the parties was ambiguous in 
any way, then the parties could remove that ambiguity by stipulating what the legal situation 
between them should be. The genuine relationship could then be determined from the 
agreement itself. The court found that there were no “tricks” involved and both parties had 
acted in accordance with the terms of the arrangement. The claim was dismissed. A further 
and, it is submitted, a more accurate articulation of a sham was given in IRC v Garvin,34 
where Buckley LJ insistently noted that the question of whether or not a transaction is a sham 
must be an issue of fact. His lordship continued by saying: 
 
“In this jurisdiction the function of determining the facts of the case belongs exclusively to the 
Commissioners. We cannot treat as a sham any transaction which the Commissioners have found to 
have taken place and which they have not found to be a sham.”35 
 
Sham transactions had, for the most part, maintained the stringent guidelines set out in Snook. 
The Australian Tax Court sustained this trend in the matter of Clyne v Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Tax.36 In this matter the court held that for an arrangement to be a sham 
there must be a finding that there was a common intention between the parties to the 
                                                             
33 At 579. 
34 (1980) STC 295. 
35 At 300. 
36 (1983) ATC 4503. 
75 
 
arrangement that the transaction was a cloak or disguise for some other, real transaction, or 
no transaction at all.37 It is evident when one examines the cases that the common intention 
requirement urged in Snook has seeped through as the general guideline. In the Canadian 
matter of Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen,38 the facts of which involved a lengthy tax 
battle between the two parties which had gone on for nearly sixteen years, the respondent had 
alleged that one of the appellant’s transactions prior to litigation was a sham. In two of the 
lower courts the transaction had been found to be a sham, whereas the Federal Court of 
Appeal found it unnecessary to determine whether or not the term “sham”, in the 
circumstances of the case, was properly applicable to the transaction. In reaching this 
conclusion, it was observed that the evidence had clearly pointed in that direction.39 Estey J 
noted the following in his majority judgment: 
 
“The element of sham was long ago defined by the courts and was restated in Snook v London & West 
Riding Investments, Ltd, [1967] 1 All ER 518. Lord Diplock … found that no sham was there present 
because no acts had been taken ... which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the 
appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal 
rights and obligations … which the parties intend to create.”40 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada had without hesitation adopted the English approach regarding 
the definition of sham.  
 
A similar view was taken by Croom-Johnson LJ in Hilton v Plustitle Ltd. 41  This case 
concerned an attempt by the plaintiff, a landlord, to avoid giving security of tenure to a tenant 
by letting only to a company. Prior to the dispute, the plaintiff suggested that the second 
defendant buy an off-the-shelf company with whom the plaintiff then entered into an 
agreement for the grant of a lease. The agreement specified that the second defendant was to 
be the occupier of the property. On a claim by the plaintiff for the possession of the property, 
the second defendant contested that the allocation of tenancy to the company was a sham and 
should be ignored, that it was, in reality, the second defendant who was granted tenancy and 
                                                             
37 At 4508. 
38 [1984] 1 SCR 536. 
39 At 572. 
40 At 553. 
41 [1988] 3 All ER 760. 
76 
 
who should therefore have enjoyed the protection afforded to a statutory tenant.42 Croom-
Johnson LJ of the English Court of Appeal rejected the argument, and relevantly cited the 
shortened version expressed by Bingham LJ in Antoinaides v Villiers:43 “Put more shortly, a 
sham exists where the parties say one thing intending another.”44 For that reason, his lordship 
agreed with the court a quo’s conclusion that there was no sham, and it was indeed the 
intention of both parties for the tenancy to be granted to the company and not the second 
defendant.45 
 
In Australia at the time, the Judiciary confirmed the decision in Clyne to adopt the definition 
set out in Snook, and in Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy,46 Lockhart J 
remarked that a sham is something which is not genuine or true, but false or deceptive. Where 
it is alleged that the trusts of a settlement are a sham, it is necessary to prove that it was the 
intention of the settlor that the settlement itself be a sham.47 This point was further enunciated 
by the learned judge, as follows: 
 
“A ‘sham’ is ... something that is intended to be mistaken for something else or that is not really what it 
purports to be. It is a spurious imitation, a counterfeit, a disguise or a false front. It is not genuine or 
true, but something made in imitation of something else or made to appear to be something which it is 
not. It is something which is false or deceptive.”48 
 
Another key English case concerning sham transactions was that of Hitch & Others v Stone.49 
The case concerned a tax-avoidance scheme involving an agreement between a farming 
family and certain companies. The scheme revolved around a lease of the family farm to 
                                                             
42 In terms of s 2 of the Rent Act 1977. 
43 [1988] 2 WLR 139. 
44 At 147. 
45 This was also the approach adopted by Ralph Gibson LJ in Gisborne v Burton (1988) 3 All ER 760 at 772, 
who, in explaining that the essential question is always to determine the reality of the transaction, reasoned 
that: 
 “[I]f the nature of the transaction was made clear to both sides, together with the consequences which would 
follow by way of reduced statutory protection … and that there was thus informed assent and understanding by 
all parties.” 
46 [1988] 18 FCR 449. 
47 At 454. 
48 At 537. 
49 (2001) STC 214 (CA). 
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these companies. The dictum of Diplock LJ in Snook was cited as the appropriate test for a 
sham, Arden LJ noting the following: 
 
“An inquiry as to whether an act or document is a sham requires careful analysis of the facts, and the 
following points emerge from the authorities. First, in the case of a document, the court is not restricted 
to examining the four corners of the document. It may examine external evidence. This will include the 
parties’ explanations and circumstantial evidence, such as evidence of the subsequent conduct of the 
parties. Second, as the passage from Snook makes clear, the test of intention is subjective. The parties 
must have intended to create different rights and obligations from those appearing from the relevant 
document, and in addition they must have intended to give a false impression of those rights and 
obligations to third parties. Third, the fact that the act or document is uncommercial, or even artificial, 
does not mean it is a sham. A distinction is to be drawn between the situation where parties make an 
agreement which is unfavourable to one of them, or artificial and a situation where they intend some 
other arrangement to bind them. In the former situation, they intend the agreement to take effect 
according to its tenor. In the latter situation, the agreement is not to bind their relationship. Fourth, the 
fact that parties subsequently depart from an agreement does not necessarily mean that they never 
intend the agreement to be effective and binding. The proper conclusion to draw may be that they 
agreed to vary their agreement and that they have become bound by the agreement as varied.50 Fifth, 
the intention must be a common intention.”51 
 
Evidently, the definition in Snook had in fact become the universal test for determining 
whether or not a transaction was a sham. It is submitted that, although somewhat restrictive, 
the basic premise of the guideline laid down by Diplock LJ, coupled with the elucidation in 
various other cases, leads to the following interpretive definition of a sham transaction:  
 
A sham transaction is an act done or document executed between the parties to the act or execution 
with the common intention to conceal the true nature of the transaction and to use the concealment as a 
cloak of disguise which falsely and deceptively cloaks the transaction in the eyes of third parties and 
the courts, so that it appears to be something different from what in fact it is in reality.  
 
                                                             
50 See, for example, Garnac Grain Co Inc v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 at 683–684, per 
Diplock LJ. 
51 At 229. 
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In Jones v Lipman,52 Russell J neatly put it as follows: “a device and a sham, a mask which 
[the defendant] holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of 
equity.”53 The consequence of the statement by Diplock LJ in Snook has been decisively 
influential in many other areas of law worldwide. The test, which has subsequently been 
termed “the Snook test”, can be easily traced into a number of trust-related authorities. 
 
2.1.2 SHAM TRUSTS  
It was inevitable, by the nature of the instrument, that the modern-day trust, too, would be 
used in an abusive fashion; and should a trust be established to protect assets, it is only to be 
expected that it may be challenged at some stage.54 And, with respect to the doctrine of the 
sham, the exposé of sham transactions is but the tip of the iceberg. Sham transactions have of 
late become much more prevalent in the guise of trusts, and the “sham trust”, as it is referred 
to, holds the same key characteristics of the original “sham transaction”. In the event of a 
sham trust, a trust inter vivos would have been created, the trust assets having been 
transferred to the trustee, but the trustee does not hold the assets beneficially. Thus, the trust 
purports to have been established on the terms of a particular trust instrument, but these terms 
do not reflect the parties’ true intentions, the trust document being proffered with the 
intention of misleading third parties as to the true terms of the trust.55 The Snook test referred 
to above, much like any other transaction, plays an integral part in the determination of 
whether the trust is a sham. In fact, what will become apparent is that the Snook test has 
become the most widely accepted means of ascertaining the sham status of a trust, and 
without its application the trust cannot be termed a “sham”. 
 
Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada56 offers an insightful definition of a sham trust: 
 
“... used in the trust law setting, now a practice in Canada as elsewhere, [the term sham trust] describes 
a trust that the courts will declare void because the provisions in the trust instrument do not represent 
the settlor’s true intent as to the terms upon which the trustee is to hold the trust asset(s). Though the 
                                                             
52 [1962] 1 WLR 832. 
53 At 836. 
54 JW Brown New Zealand Master Trusts Guide 2 ed (2005) 40.  
55 D Brownbill Sham Trusts (Personal publication, Maitland Chambers: London, 2004) 2. 
56 DWM Waters Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada 3 ed (2005). 
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trust instrument sets out the persons or purposes that are the benefit, the settlor’s true intent is to retain 
control of the assets purportedly held in trust because the true intent is to appear to have disposed of the 
assets and so as to evade tax, defeat personal creditors, or to prejudice the claims of an estranged 
spouse or the children of the relationship.”57  
 
It is noteworthy that the most common challengers of these trusts have been spouses, 
creditors and revenue collectors. If the court finds that a trust is a sham, the result may be the 
loss of the asset if the challenger is a creditor or property relationship claimant. Thus, the 
effects can be harsh on all the parties to the trust in some way or another, and being able 
clearly and precisely to identify a sham trust should be of the utmost importance in any court 
considering an allegation of a sham. 
 
Despite what English jurists may believe, the most dated cases which link both the doctrine 
of the sham and trust law together can be found in the US. In Gregory v Helvering, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,58 the issue at hand was whether the corpus of the trust 
established by the respondent should for income tax purposes be treated as his. The court, 
having regard to the substance as opposed to the form of the arrangement, held that abusive 
trust arrangements may be viewed as sham transactions, and the Internal Revenue Service 
may ignore the trust and its transactions for tax purposes.59 One year prior to the Snook case, 
in the matter of Scott v Federal Commissioner of Taxation Solutions (No 2),60 Windeyer J 
identified the relevant factors to be considered, as follows: 
 
“… if the scheme, including the deed, was intended to be a mere façade behind which activities might 
be carried on which were not to be really directed to the stated purposes but to other ends, the words of 
the deed should be disregarded … A disguise is a real thing: it may be an elaborate and carefully 
prepared thing; but it is nevertheless a disguise. The difficult and debatable philosophic questions of 
the meaning and relationship of reality, substance and form are for the purposes of our law generally 
resolved by asking: did the parties who entered into the ostensible transaction mean it to be, and in fact 
                                                             
57 Waters Law of Trusts 145. 
58 [1935] 293 US 465. See also Helvering Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Clifford [1940] 309 US 331. 
59 XIV 1 CB 193. 
60 [1966] 40 ALJR 265. 
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use it as, merely a disguise, a façade, a sham, a false front – all these words have been metaphorically 
used – concealing their real transaction.”61 
 
Critically, even before the introduction of the Snook test – a year prior in fact – the common 
principles of sham transactions which are evident in Snook can be noted in Windeyer J’s 
remarks.  
 
Remaining in the US, in Markosian v Commissioner,62 the court placed its emphasis on the 
parties’ observation of the terms of the trust. In this matter the trust was declared a sham 
because the parties had failed to comply with both the trust instrument and the supporting 
documents, while the relationship of the grantors to the property had failed to differ in any 
material aspect. Not too long after the decision in Markosian, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal handed down a significant decision in Marac Finance Ltd v Virtue.63  
 
Concerned with the directions of the trust instrument, it was reasoned that where the 
genuineness of the documentation is challenged, a trust may be treated as a sham only: 
 
“… where the document does not reflect the true agreement between the parties in which case the cloak 
is removed and recognition given to their common intentions; and where the document was bona fide 
in inception but the parties have departed from their initial agreement and yet have allowed its shadow 
to mask their new arrangement.”64 
 
While staying true to the requirements in Snook, the Court of Appeal advised, through an 
obiter dictum, that a sham could be affirmed in only two instances: first, if the facts indicate 
that, upon the trust’s inception, the parties used the trust as a cloak which concealed the 
common intentions of the parties, or, second, if the trust was legitimately set up, and the 
                                                             
61 At 279. 
62 (1980) 73 TC 1235. 
63 [1981] 1 NZLR 586 (CA). 
64 At 588. 
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parties veer from the agreement and use the trust as a “shadow” to conceal the new 
arrangement.65 
 
A seemingly seminal Jersey case for the progression of the doctrine in modern law was that 
of Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank (CI) Trust Company Limited and Others. 66  The facts 
concerned a wealthy Lebanese domiciliary who established a trust in 1977. The trust 
contained a number of provisions whereby trustee actions required Mr Rahman’s consent, 
and some which did not. In particular, the trust instrument allowed Mr Rahman to allocate 
one-third of the capital of the trust fund to a nominee of his choice without trustee consent, 
and the trust instrument directed the trustees to apply the capital or income of the trust to or 
for the benefit of Mr Rahman. Upon the death of Mr Rahman, his widow and the estate of his 
mother sought a declaration by the court invalidating the trust on the grounds that, first, the 
trust instrument was in breach of the maxim donner et retenir ne vaut67 and, second, that the 
trust was a sham. In coming to a conclusion, the court noted some particular instances which 
warranted attention: funds were commonly paid out of the trust at the instruction of Mr 
Rahman, without any real thought as to the basis on which they were paid; and payments 
were made directly from the trust banker to Mr Rahman without consulting the trustee until 
afterwards. 68  In its conclusion, the court held that Mr Rahman exercised dominion and 
control over the trustee in the management and administration of the settlement, including 
distributions of capital to himself, to others as gifts or loans, and the making and disposal of 
investments.69 Moreover, he treated the assets comprised in the trust as his own and the 
trustee as though he were his agent. Thus, the settlement was declared a sham on the facts, in 
the sense that it was made to appear to be genuine, but it was not.70 
  
                                                             
65 At 587–590. 
66 [1991] JLR 103. 
67 This principle, which has since been removed from Jersey law by statute, literally translates to: “to give and 
retain is worthless”. The essence of the notion is that a gift into a trust will not be effective if the settlor retains 
the power to deal freely with the assets. 
68 At 157. 
69 At 167. 
70 At 169. 
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The entrenchment of the sham doctrine in New Zealand was affirmed by the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in NZI Bank Ld v Euro-National Corporation Ltd.71 Discussing the law 
relating to shams, the court noted that a document may be brushed aside if and to the extent 
that it is a sham, which may take the form of either of two situations: 
 
“The first is where the document does not reflect the true agreement between the parties in which case 
the cloak is removed and recognition is given to their common intentions. The second is where the 
document was bona fide in inception but the parties have departed from their initial agreement while 
leaving the original documentation to stand unaltered.”72 
 
The New Zealand Judiciary seemed persistent in clarifying that a sham trust may be 
fashioned either at the trust’s inception, or at a later stage; and, notably, the trend to adopt the 
Snook test into trust disputes was becoming a frequent occurrence across the globe. In the 
case of Merklinger v Merklinger73 the court dealt with a husband who had acquired a summer 
cottage through a specially incorporated company. Upon transfer of the deed, he then 
transferred the shares into a trust inter vivos for his children. During post-matrimonial 
litigation, the court accepted evidence indicating that the husband had clearly treated the 
property as his own, whilst pleading a trust when it suited him. The Court confidently held 
that the claim of a trust for the children was a pure sham and that if ever there was a trust, it 
was for the benefit of the husband.74  
 
In 1994, in Midland Bank Plc v Wyatt,75 Young QC was confronted with the first case in the 
UK involving a sham trust. The matter involved a property purchased by the defendant and 
his wife in 1981. In 1987 the defendant entered into a trust instrument with his wife, giving 
the equity in the property to his wife and two daughters in order to protect his family from the 
possible commercial consequences of the textile business he was setting up.76  The trust 
instrument was prepared by Mr Wyatt’s solicitor and witnessed by a family friend. Mrs 
Wyatt could not remember either signing the instrument or what it meant. Regrettably, the 
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instrument was never returned to the solicitor, but rather kept in the house safe. The solicitor 
was not advised that the trust instrument had been signed, and thought that Mr Wyatt may 
have been having second thoughts about the instrument. On the refinancing of the property a 
year later, the new lender was not made aware that Mr Wyatt was not the beneficial owner of 
the property. Unfortunately, Mr Wyatt’s new business went under, wherefore Mr Wyatt 
handed in the declaration of trust to his solicitors. The plaintiff contended that the trust was a 
sham and could thus be ignored. However, the defendant, Mr Wyatt, argued that, according 
to Snook, the trust could be a sham only if both parties to the trust had the common intention 
that it was not intended to take effect and be acted upon. The learned judge noted that: 
 
“Subsequent to the execution of the trust deed nothing had changed in Mr Wyatt’s behaviour or attitude 
with regard to his dealings involving Honer House [the house property]. I do not believe Mr Wyatt had 
any intention when he executed the trust deed of endowing his children with his interest in Honer 
House, which at the time was his only real asset. I consider the trust deed was executed by him, not to 
be acted upon but to be put in the safe for a rainy day. As such I consider the declaration of trust was 
not what it purported to be but a pretence, or as it is sometimes referred to a ‘sham’.”77 
 
Young QC went on to scrutinise Diplock LJ’s comments in Snook, stating: 
 
“I do not understand Diplock LJ’s observations regarding the requirement that all parties to the sham 
must have a common interest to be a necessary requirement in respect of all sham transactions. I 
consider a sham transaction will still remain a sham transaction even if one of the parties to it merely 
went along with the ‘shammer’ not either knowing or caring about what he or she was signing. Such a 
person would still be a party to the sham and could not rely on any principle of estoppel such as was the 
case in Snook – the defendant there not being a party to the transaction at all ... I do not accept therefore 
the defendants’ contention that it is a necessary requirement for the plaintiff to establish that both Mr 
Wyatt and Mrs Wyatt had a common intention that the declaration of trust signed by them was not 
intended to take effect and be acted upon by them as from the time of its execution.”78 
 
Significantly, the Judge dissected the Snook test and reasoned that the common interest 
requirement, which is so often reported as the cornerstone of the test, can be viewed as a 
flexible criterion. However, in Midland Bank Plc, Young QC considered that a sham 
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transaction would still remain a sham transaction even where one of the parties was not fully 
aware of the nature of the transaction and simply went along with it. Such a party would 
remain a party to the sham. He considered Diplock LJ’s observations and commented that: 
 
“… in their proper context [they] state no more than where a ‘sham’ transaction affects the rights of a 
third party, the ‘shammer’ cannot rely on the sham transaction unless the third party is also a party to 
the sham. The ‘shammer’ is otherwise estopped by his conduct from so relying on the sham 
transaction.”79  
 
Thus, according to Young QC, that party would still be a party to the sham and could not rely 
on any principle of estoppel. Consequently, the declaration of the trust sought to be relied 
upon was void and consequently unenforceable. 
 
A year later, the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal held a trust to be a sham where 
the actions, or inactions, as the case may be, of the trustees negated the trust.80 The facts 
concerned a challenge by the Commission of Taxation regarding certain alleged distributions 
to a beneficiary of a trust inter vivos. Notably, the distributions had been retained by the 
trustee and invested in the settlor’s business. The tribunal looked at the evidence presented 
and noted that there was no written acknowledgment for the alleged distribution; that the 
information concerning distributions to beneficiaries was conveyed not by the trustees, but by 
other relatives; that the beneficiary who received the distribution was in bad health and in 
difficult financial circumstances, yet no distribution had actually occurred; and that on the 
beneficiary’s unfortunate death, the distributions were not included in the beneficiary’s 
inventory. The Commissioner, in deciding whether the distributions were a sham, accepted 
the conclusions reached in Sharrment to adopt the Snook test. McDonald DP concurred with 
Lockhart J and noted: 
 
“A ‘sham’ is therefore, for the purposes of Australian law, something that is intended to be mistaken 
for something else or that is not really what it purports to be. It is a spurious imitation, a counterfeit, a 
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disguise or a false front. It is not genuine or true, but something made in imitation of something else or 
made to appear to be something which it is not. It is something which is false or deceptive.”81 
 
The judge then reviewed the guidelines applied by Lockhart J within the context of the facts 
in Sharrment, stating them in his own way, as follows: 
“1. The fact that the transaction involved a ‘round robin’ of cheques does not necessarily establish that 
the transaction is a sham, even when no party has funds to meet the cheques. 
2. The artificiality of the transaction does not give rise to its characterisation as a sham or to the 
characterisation of the constituent documents as a sham so long as each document ‘had the effect that it 
purported to have’, and so long as none of the documents purported ‘to do something different from 
what the parties had agreed to do’. 
3. The complexity of the transaction does not in itself establish its character as a sham. 
4. A purported disposal of property or purported creation of a debt may be a sham where donor and 
donee or lender and debtor do not intend to give effect to the transaction, it being agreed between them 
that there will be no change in the legal and beneficial ownership of the property. 
5. The fact that a transaction may have been intended to present a shield against creditors does not … 
characterise it as a sham. Transactions may in themselves be legally effective although intended to 
achieve an unacceptable purpose. The essential question seems to be whether what has been done has 
been genuinely done. 
6. Circumstances giving rise to suspicion do not establish a transaction as a sham unless it can be 
shown that the outward and visible form does not coincide with the inward and substantial truth.”82 
 
On reflection, McDonald DP reasoned that:  
 
“… an allegation of ‘sham’ is to be determined having regard to the intentions of the parties involved in 
a transaction and that, in considering those intentions, reference to what was sought to be achieved by 
the transaction will be of no assistance or, at most, of very limited assistance … For the purposes of the 
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instant case, the Tribunal is to decide whether it was ever intended that the beneficiaries would benefit 
from distributions made by the Trust.”83  
 
In conclusion, the circumstances of the case indicated to the tribunal a lack of any real 
intention to see that the purpose for which the trust had been established was actually 
implemented. The tribunal was thus satisfied that the transactions were a sham, having 
emphasised that the trust lacked substance and not form. 84  However, conversely to the 
apparent rigid application of the sham doctrine, the Ontario case of Sagl v Sagl85 highlighted 
Canada’s flexibility of application. In this instance, the husband, Mr Sagl, was one of the 
beneficiaries of a discretionary family trust. He was also a trustee of the trust with the power 
to appoint and remove trustees. Evidently, Mr Sagl had no intention of defeating his wife’s 
entitlement to the assets therein contained; however, Mr Sagl had always treated the trust 
property as his own, going so far as to include the trust assets in statements as to his personal 
assets and making use of friends as trustees. The court, although concerned with these facts, 
agreed with the husband’s submission that it would be “turning trust law upside down to say 
the trust was a sham.”86 On the contrary, in R v Dimsey; R v Allen,87 the English Court of 
Appeal upheld the basic premise of the Snook test: no intention means no sham. The matter 
concerned alleged fraudsters, who had, amongst other things, set up a tax avoidance scheme 
involving the use of companies incorporated from outside the UK to evade paying tax. Laws 
LJ approved Diplock LJ’s test in Snook, and added: 
 
“But here the question is, was Mr Allen [the defendant] the beneficial owner the true owner of the 
shares, the properties and the bank balances in question? If he was then clearly the schedule of assets 
which he provided to the Revenue in answer to their enquiries was entirely wrong. If he appreciated 
that he should have declared [them] to the Revenue, then he was cheating the Revenue by failing to do 
so.... That is entirely right [viz that the assets belonged to the trusts] unless you are satisfied that the 
various very lengthy trust deeds you have seen are a sham, that is to say, documents which purport to 
show a legal situation which is other than the real one intending to give the appearance of creating legal 
rights different from the actual legal rights, if these trust deeds are a sham then it is open to you to find 
that the defendant was the beneficial owner of the various assets, knew that he was, and was cheating 
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the Revenue in not disclosing the various [assets] in the schedule of assets which he was required to 
give them.”88 
 
In the matter of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd and Others v 
Akindele89 and also of Macniven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd,90 both judgments were 
delivered on appeal within four months of each other in the Royal Court of Justice and the 
House of Lords, respectfully, both based the sham enquiry around the Snook test. In BCCI 
and Macnivem, Nouse LJ and Hobhouse L respectfully faced two similar scenarios of 
spiralling share procurements and sale agreements which were alleged to be a sham. In BCCI 
his lordship warranted the classical definition propounded by Diplock LJ, and held that the 
facts did not pass the muster of Snook, though he did recognise that the artificial nature of any 
arrangement may be evidence of dishonesty.91 Although the Commissioners did not follow 
through with the shamming allegation, in Macniven, Hobhouse L also concluded that the 
agreement was not a sham on the basis that the facts did not align themselves with the 
principles laid down in Snook. The payments in issue were thus declared real and not 
artificial in the eyes of the court.92 
 
Much as in Hitch, a similar stance on the matter was adopted in Jersey in the case of Re 
Esteem Settlement, Grupo Torras SA and Others v Sabah and Others,93 where litigation arose 
out of fraud committed by Sheikh Fahad Mohammed al Sabah on Grupo Torras to the value 
of US$430 million. In this matter the focus of the sham argument fell on the legal issue as to 
whether it is necessary for both the settlor and the trustees of a settlement to be parties to a 
sham or whether it is possible to have a so-called “unilateral sham”.94 The underpinning 
importance of this inquisition cannot be under-emphasised, as the Snook test has its basis in 
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an arrangement being a bilateral action. Prior to the proceedings, Grupo Torras had 
successfully traced the proceeds of the fraud into two Jersey trusts, the Esteem Settlement 
and the No 52 Trust. Grupo Torras therefore sought to have these trusts invalidated on the 
basis that the trusts were a sham. Significantly, the presiding judge disagreed with the notion 
of a unilateral sham, holding that in order for a trust to be a sham, both the settlor and the 
trustee must intend that the true arrangement is otherwise than as set out in the trust 
instrument.95 The Royal Court noted in particular that a trust instrument will not be held to be 
a sham unless both the settlor and the trustee have the necessary shamming intention. It is 
submitted that the reason for such a firm stance is due to the fact that, if decided otherwise, a 
trust might be considered invalid simply because of the secret and unexpressed intention of 
the settlor.  
 
Thus, drawing directly on the guidance given by Diplock LJ in Snook, at the time the trust 
was established and prior to Sheikh Fahad’s fraud against Grupo Torras, the trusts 
commenced with clean assets. His lordship further noted the following points: 
 
• The trust was established by deed, which had been the subject of detailed 
consideration and prepared by a solicitor.96 
• All contact, at the time of the establishment of the trust, was between the trustees and 
Sheikh Fahad’s solicitors.97  
• There was an absence of any reassurance from the trustees to Sheikh Fahad that they 
would always follow his instructions.98 
• The trustee in question was a substantial professional trustee.99  
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Reflecting the guidance of both Snook and Wyatt, the Jersey Royal Court proffered the 
following test: 
 
“It follows that in our judgment, in order to succeed, the plaintiffs will need to establish that, as well as 
[the settlor], [the trustee] intended that the assets would be held upon terms otherwise than as set out in 
the trust deed or, alternatively, went along with [the settlor’s] intention to that effect without knowing 
or caring what it had signed, and that both parties intended to give a false impression of the position to 
third parties or to the court.”100 
 
According to Richmond-Coggan, the above test, in the case of professional trustees 
conducting themselves sensibly and with due consideration, can be seen to be an extremely 
onerous test for the prospective claimant to overcome.101 Moreover, it is a test that requires 
the parties to undertake a detailed analysis of the dealings between settlor and trustee, not 
only at the time at which the trust was set up, but also subsequently.102 Munby J reiterated 
this theme in A v A:103 
 
“I agree with that analysis [in Re Esteem]. What is required is a common intention, but reckless 
indifference will be taken to constitute the necessary intention. An allegation of sham is a serious 
matter. As Neuberger J said in National Westminster Bank plc v Jones … ‘there is a very strong 
presumption indeed that parties intend to be bound by the provisions of agreements into which they 
enter, and, even more, intend the agreements they enter into to take effect.’ Moreover, and because as 
Neuberger J pointed out … ‘a degree of dishonesty is involved in a sham’, it follows that: ‘there is a 
strong and natural presumption against holding a provision or a document a sham.’ Moreover, it has to 
be borne in mind that a finding of sham may have serious implications, not least for trustees. As the 
Royal Court of Jersey said in CI Law Trustees Limited and Another v Minwalla and Others.... ‘It is a 
serious matter to find that a professional trustee in Jersey has been party to a sham. It is a finding 
moreover which might well have adverse consequences under the statutory regime which regulates the 
activities of professional trustees in Jersey and which, incidentally, is absent in England and 
Wales.’”104 
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The approach set out in Re Esteem was subsequently endorsed by the English Court in the 
case of Shalson and Others v Russo and Others.105 The facts concerned fraudulent activity 
committed by an Italian national, Onofrio Russo, against several persons and companies, 
including that of Peter Shalson. One of the claims brought forward by Mr Shalson was that a 
particular trust established by the defendants known as “Brookcastle settlement” was a sham. 
Rimer J referred to Diplock LJ’s comments in Snook as well as the decisions in Hitch and Re 
Esteem.106 In the presiding judge’s conclusion, Rimer J noted the following: 
 
“After a careful consideration of the authorities the Royal Court of Jersey held in Abacus (CI) Limited 
and Others v Sheikh Fahad Mohammed al Sabah and Others ... that the like principle applies to an 
allegedly sham settlement: both the settlor and the trustee must intend the settlement to be a sham, and 
they rejected the proposition that all that counts is the settlor’s intention.”107 
 
Rimer J then concluded: 
 
“I respectfully regard the approach adopted by the Royal Court in the [Re Esteem] case as correct. It is 
not only squarely in line with the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Snook and Hitch, it also 
appears to me to be correct in principle. The settlor may have an unspoken intention that the assets are 
in fact to be treated as his own and that the trustee will accede to his every request on demand. But 
unless that intention is from the outset shared by the trustee (or later becomes so shared), I fail to see 
how the settlement can be regarded as a sham.”108 
 
This is an interesting case, in that it appears almost to have been accepted by the court that, 
contrary to the intention of the trustee, Mr Russo’s own intention probably had been that the 
assets should be treated as his own. Nevertheless, the court held that the trustee’s intention 
had throughout been an honest one, and it had never shared any contrary intention with Mr 
Russo. 109  Thus, what is unmistakably apparent is the court’s absolute unwillingness to 
recognise a sham unless both the settlor and the trustee have a shared intention to that effect. 
This fundamental concept to the doctrine of the sham has since been well entrenched and 
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commonly accepted as correct throughout the UK. The decisions have as such firmly clarified 
the essential elements of a sham trust. A suitable example of a case highlighting the elements 
of a sham trust is Mackinnon v The Regent Trust Company Ltd and Others.110 
 
In the Bailiff’s discussion regarding the proposition that the trusts in question were a sham, 
the following was held: 
 
“In my view, it is implicit … that the settlor and trustee must have a joint intention to present the 
declared trusts to a third party as genuine, or in other words must have intended to mislead or deceive. 
Applying a common sense approach to the matter, it is inherent in the establishment of a sham trust that 
the parties to the arrangement intend to mislead or deceive others … In my judgement such an intention 
is a necessary element of a sham trust. If the plaintiff is alleging a sham he must plead an intention to 
mislead or deceive others.”111 
 
On appeal,112 this position was confirmed by Southwell QC. The learned judge noted, first, 
that in order for a trust to be declared a sham, both the settlor and trustee must have intended 
that the true position would not be as set out in the trust instrument, but that either the trust 
was invalid and of no effect, or that the assets of the trust were held for the settlor absolutely, 
so that the assets were simply held to her order. Second, that both the settlor and the trustee 
intended to give a false impression to a third party or parties (including other beneficiaries 
and the Courts) that the assets had been donated into a trust and were held on the terms of the 
trust instrument. 113  Southwell QC also noted the difference between “giving a false 
impression” and “deceit” and that the two should not be equated for the purposes of a sham 
(as was done in the trial court): “[d]eceit is an English tort with particular requirements. What 
is required in a case based on ‘sham’ is a common intention to give a false impression.”114 
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This position was reiterated in the complicated tax case of Raftland v Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Tax,115 where Kirby J held that the trust in question was a sham because it 
was not intended by the settlor or the trustee to have substantive, as opposed to apparent, 
legal effects. 
 
More recently, the latest sham trust case to emerge is that of the Official Assignee in 
Bankruptcy in the Property of Gary Martin Reynolds v Wilson and Others,116 which was 
heard in the New Zealand Court of Appeal. In short, the appellant represented 117  Mr 
Reynolds, a bankrupt property developer who owed more than NZ$500 000 to his creditors 
post-bankruptcy. In an attempt to decrease his liabilities, the Official Assignee of Mr 
Reynolds sought a court order declaring the GM Reynolds Family Trust (which held a house 
in Queensland) a sham. If such an order were to be granted, the property would in reality be 
the property of Mr Reynolds and thus available to his creditors to liquidate. The claim was 
brought against the legal owners of the Queensland house, the trustees of the GM Reynolds 
Family Trust. 
 
Robertson J accepted the Snook test to be correct, noting that a sham exists where there is an 
intention to conceal the true nature of a transaction.118 This point was further demonstrated as 
follows: 
 
“A trust will be held to be a sham where there is an intention to have an express trust in appearance 
only. An example is where the settlor seeks the protection offered by the pretence of there being a valid 
trust. A sham requires an intention to mislead. Equity looks to intent rather than form. The absence of 
an intention to create a genuine trust prevents the trust from being valid, because the essential 
ingredients for its creation [are] missing. The trust is void for the lack of intention to create a trust.”119 
 
The appellant’s main contention in arguing that the court a quo had erred in not finding the 
trust to be a sham was that it was in fact not necessary to prove a common intention between 
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both the settlor and the trustees. On this issue Robertson J once again referred to Snook, 
noting that Diplock LJ held that “all parties to the transaction must share a common intention 
before a sham finding could be made.”120 Interestingly, the appellant sought to distinguish 
from Snook’s bilateral requirement by contending that Snook involved a bilateral transaction 
(a hire-purchase agreement), whereas in the context of trusts, transactions are unilateral – “a 
settlor can unilaterally create a trust, and a trust is complete, without any element of 
acceptance by the trustee.”121 The court, however, rejected this argument, holding true to 
Hitch, Re Esteem Settlement and Shalson, which courts had all supported the same argument 
and had explicitly disagreed. Robertson J reasoned that this disagreement was based on four 
main reasons highlighted in Re Esteem Settlement, which are: 
“(a) Previous authority suggests a common intention is required;122 
(b) It would be absurd if in circumstances where a trustee has acted as a perfect trustee applying 
assets in good faith that the secret, unexpressed intention of the settlor that a trust be a sham 
could cause the trust to be held to be invalid.123 Estoppel would prevent the settlor from 
attacking the trust but a third party would not be stopped. The Deputy Bailiff stated, ‘such 
extraordinary consequences, must at least, raise questions as to whether [the plaintiff’s 
counsel’s] formulation of the law can be correct’; 
(c) Gifts should not be invalidated solely on the basis of intention, some prejudice is required in 
order to reject the validity of a formal legal document;124 and 
(d) Trusts are not necessarily unilateral transactions.125 The Court found that the trust deed in this 
case was not unilateral as it contained terms for the benefit of the trustee such as 
remuneration.”126 
 
As has been clearly illustrated in the above cases, Robertson J agreed with the requirement 
that there must be a common intention before a transaction is found to be a sham. The learned 
Judge further reasoned that equal importance must be placed on the initial intention to create 
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a trust. After all, a court cannot hold that a trust exists unless it is satisfied that there was the 
intention to create such a trust.127 Such a determination was sketched, as follows: 
 
“In determining whether the requisite intention exists the Court may look at the nature of the 
transaction and the whole of the circumstances attending the relationship between the parties. The 
overall question is whether in the circumstances of the case, and on the true construction of what was 
said and written, a sufficient intention to create a trust has been manifested.... The creation of a trust is 
rightly described as a unilateral transaction. If objectively assessed, a settlor intends to create a trust, 
and the other certainties and requirements of constitution are present then the intentions of the trustee 
will be irrelevant. Conversely, if objectively the settlor does not intend to create a trust then one of the 
core certainties is missing and there cannot be a valid trust. The trustee’s intentions are not critical.”128 
 
Robertson J did, however, further note that within the trust, not all transactions take the same 
form. The learned judge asserted that some are unilateral because the settlor and the trustee 
are not separate persons, and there is therefore no possibility of mutuality in any mental state, 
thus precluding a common intention.129 On the other hand, Robertson J concluded that some 
trusts are practically speaking bilateral as they entail an actual intention and a consciousness 
of the settlor and the trustee(s).130 Nevertheless, Robertson J held that, be that as it may, if 
only the settlor’s duplicitous intention is required, then it is relatively straightforward to set 
aside a sham trust; but few sham trusts will be set aside if common intention is required and 
this would therefore promote commercial certainty.131  
 
Significantly, Glazebrook J investigated the link between the concept of a sham and that of 
intent. In summary, the learned judge found that where a sham is alleged, the search is for 
subjective intent that the transaction is a sham. This is because the whole point of a sham is 
that, if looked at objectively, it is intended to have an effect other than the effect it would 
have.132 Furthermore, when assessing whether a trust is a sham or not, the courts, in the 
opinion of Glazebrook J, must consider contemporary evidence of the actions (and words) of 
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the relevant parties showing that the trust was not intended to be genuine. In terms of the 
onus and burden in relation to allegations that a trust is a sham, it was held that the party 
asserting the existence of the sham bears the onus of proving this on a balance of 
probabilities.133 
 
Much as in Markosian and NZI Bank, the court in Reynolds acknowledged that some trusts 
are intended to be legitimate from their outset, but that during the course of the life of the 
trust the parties then change their intention (to manage the trust as if it were a sham) and act 
on this intention thereafter. Robertson J remarked as follows in this regard: 
 
“Once a trust is validly created, the beneficiaries have an interest in the trust property that cannot easily 
be undone. Unless the later appearance of a sham can be traced back to the creation of the trust, the 
trust remains valid. An exception to this could be where an item of property is later transferred to the 
trust, the trust could be a sham with respect to that property only, but the remainder of the trust would 
remain valid.”134 
 
In the court’s conclusion, Robertson J and Glazebrook J dismissed the sham allegations of the 
family trust. In its findings, the court held that the documentation which was completed was 
consistent with Mr Reynolds’ subjective wish to create a trust. On the findings of the judge, 
there were non-complicit trustees who entered into the transaction and acquired property (and 
administered that property even if not very well) in the name of the trust, and so they could 
not be said to have intended the trust to operate as a mere sham.135 
 
In the US the Supreme Court has consistently stated that the substance as opposed to the form 
of a transaction is controlling for tax purposes. Interestingly, though, the US has been able to 
achieve something other foreign courts have not. Solely for tax purposes, but still of value, 
the American courts apply the so-called “Buckmaster 4-factor approach” in order to decide 
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whether a trust is a sham. This approach was formed in the case of Buckmaster v CM136 and 
comprises a four-stage enquiry, as follows:  
 
“(1) Whether the taxpayer’s relationship, as grantor, to the property differed materially before and after 
the trust’s formation. Ie did the taxpayer transfer assets to the trust, continue to use the assets and 
receive income from the assets for his efforts? (2) Whether the trust had an independent trustee. Ie was 
there any meaningful restriction on the taxpayer’s use of the trust property for his own purposes or 
access to the trust’s accounts? (3) Whether an economic interest passed to other beneficiaries of the 
trust. Ie did the taxpayer transfer an economic interest to a third party when he transferred his assets to 
the trust? Did the taxpayer actually transfer away all of his legal and beneficial interests in his assets, 
including the tools of his trade, for practically nothing in return? (4) Whether the taxpayer felt bound 
by any restrictions imposed by the trust itself or the law of trusts. Ie were the actions of the taxpayer 
limited by any restrictions imposed by the trust agreement or the law of trusts as to the use of the 
transferred property? Did the taxpayer have unrestricted use and control over the property without 
fiduciary limitations imposed on trustees?”137 
 
This somewhat ingenious and original test differs vastly from the Snook test, and displays a 
completely new set of guidelines for the trust to meet. What is of particular interest here is 
that no common or bilateral intention to sham is necessary in order for the trust to be void as 
per the sham doctrine. What is abundantly clear is the emphasis to look past the form of the 
trust and into the substance of the arrangement. This is evident in the approach’s examination 
of the internal administration of the trust (the independent trustee requirement and the 
settlor’s limitations as imposed by the trust instrument), as well as the effect the trust has on 
the settlor. In other words, does he or she clearly cede all property rights of the donated assets 
to the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries?   
 
Should the Buckmaster 4-factor approach be broadened to include trusts, it is submitted that it 
would still not be a candidate as a viable alternative to the Snook test because the approach 
lacks the restrictive attitude formulated in Snook, which has to a greater or lesser extent, been 
praised in subsequent judgments. 
 
                                                             
136 (1997) TC Memo 236. 
137 R Sommers “Sham Trust Analysis” http://www.taxprophet.com/pubs/sham_Trust_Analysis.htm (accessed 9 
April 2009). 
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2.1.3 THE SHAM SYNOPSIS AND THE PROOF THEREOF 
In brief, it is evident that the concept of sham transactions, through the ages, seeped into trust 
law. And what was once a theory has now become a firm principle in the law of trusts. 
Although the sham doctrine is still a concept which is continually evolving, the basic premise 
laid down in Snook has become the most relevant guideline in ascertaining the sham status of 
any trust. Thus, when proving a sham, it is necessary to establish a subjective bilateral 
shamming intention at the time of the trust’s establishment. In this regard focus will be on 
contemporaneous documentary records and oral evidence of key witnesses under cross-
examination. Compounding the difficulty of proof, it is unfortunately unlikely that parties 
with an intention to sham will leave any documentary evidence or make detrimental 
admissions. What is evident from the above cases is that courts are hesitant to make a finding 
of a sham unless there is very strong evidence to the like. The courts have, however, 
examined the subsequent conduct of the parties in order to verify the shamming intention at 
the outset. In Re Esteem the court held that “[t]rustees who in good faith consider the exercise 
of their fiduciary duties under a discretionary trust cannot be said to be under the requisite 
control of another person.”138 
 
2.1.3.1 FOREIGN SHAM TRUST CASES SUBSEQUENT TO THE SNOOK 
JUDGMENT 
The above cases constitute the foreign sham trust cases that were available for review. Cases 
subsequent to the Snook case (1969) have, for the purposes of classification, been considered 
once again. In order to give an outline of the sham trust cases referred to above, Table 4.1 
below provides a summary of foreign court judgments concerning sham trusts. Running in 
chronological order, the table depicts: (1) the case name; (2) the jurisdiction in which the case 
was heard; (3) the court it was heard in; (4) whether the court applied the Snook test; (5) 
whether the trust in question was pierced by the court, and (6) the corresponding court 
reasoning. The table is necessary in order to round off the chapter’s foreign sham trust 
analysis. However, the focus of this table is on whether the court made use of the Snook test 
and the outcome thereof. 
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Table 4.1: The Foreign Evolution of the Sham Trust: Summary 
 
Year Case Name Jurisdiction Court 
Application 
of the Snook 
Test? 
Result: 
Trust 
Pierced? 
Reason 
1980 Markosian v Commissioner United States 
The U.S. Tax 
Court No Yes 
Settlor and trustee failed to 
comply with trust instrument 
and property not 
administered differently post 
settlement 
1981 Marac Finance Ltd v Virtue New Zealand 
The NZ Court of 
Appeal Yes Yes 
Trust instrument did not 
reflect the common 
intentions of the parties since 
the trust's inception 
1991 Abdel Rahman v Chase Bank Jersey 
The Jersey Royal 
Court No Yes 
Accused exercised dominium 
and control over the trustees 
and treated trust assets as his 
own 
1992 Merklinger v Merklinger Canada 
Ontario General 
Division No Yes 
Husband treated trust 
property as his own without 
having regard to the interests 
of the beneficiaries 
1995 Midland Bank v Wyatt England Family Law Court Yes Yes 
Plaintiff produced 
declaration of trust upon 
shamming allegation; no 
other effort was made to 
create the trust 
1996 Case S45 Australia Administrative Appeals Tribunal Yes Yes 
Lack of evidence indicating 
trust was established for 
purpose set out and 
documented 
1997 Sagl v Sagl Canada Ontario General Division No No 
No evidence that settlor 
intended trust to defeat his 
co-beneficiaries 
1999 R v Dimsey; R v Allen England 
English Court of 
Appeal Yes Yes 
Trust instrument reflected 
one situation, while the 
trustees carried out another, 
fraudulently 
2001 
 
BCCI v 
Akindele 
 
England Royal Court of Justice Yes No 
The facts did not pass the 
Snook test 
2001 
 
Macniven v 
Estmore 
Invetments 
 
England House of Lords Yes No The facts did not pass the Snook test 
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Year Case Name Jurisdiction Court 
Application 
of the Snook 
Test? 
Result: 
Trust 
Pierced? 
Reason 
2003 
Re Esteem 
Settlement: 
Grupo Torras 
Jersey The Jersey Royal Court Yes No 
Court held that it would be 
highly exceptional to 
invalidate a trust that was 
initially valid on grounds of 
public policy 
2003 Shalson v Russo England and Wales 
The High Court of 
England and 
Wales 
Yes No No intention from the outset to regard the trust as a sham 
2004 
Mackinnon v 
Regent Trust 
Company 
Jersey The Jersey Royal Court Yes No 
Trusts established by the 
settlor for the benefit of close 
family. Held, it could not be 
concluded against her that 
she had in fact pretended, for 
more than 20 years, that she 
had established trusts in their 
favour, while not having 
done so 
2007 A v A England and Wales 
The High Court of 
England and 
Wales 
Yes No 
Facts did not pass the Snook 
test. Held, the court cannot 
grant relief because the 
husband’s arrangements 
appear to be artificial. The 
judge warned, in particular, 
about the need for care, 
where third-party interests 
were involved 
2008 
 
OA in 
Bankruptcy of 
Reynolds v 
Wilson 
 
New Zealand The NZ Court of Appeal Yes No 
Documentation consistent 
with settlor's subjective wish 
to create trust 
 
The cases cited above have already been discussed in detail. It is noteworthy that the 
application of the Snook test has become a worldwide trend. Undoubtedly, the general 
tendency has been to use the test more frequently when dealing with a sham trust allegation. 
Corresponding to this upward trend, there has been a somewhat remarkable propensity not to 
pierce the trust, or lift the veil, so to speak. The results from the above summary are best 
depicted graphically.  
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The graph below provides a graphical illustration of the tendencies which have been 
discovered. 
 
Figure 4.1: Foreign Courts: Frequency of the Snook Test Utilisation and the Correlation to the 
Frequency of Trusts Pierced 
 
 
The blue line represents the accumulative net amount of cases in which the court adopted the 
Snook test so as to determine whether a trust was a sham. The last decade, especially, 
indicates that the test has become the norm abroad. The red line characterises the 
accumulative net frequency with which these trusts were in fact pierced. The downward trend 
is unmistakable. Evidently there is an inverted relationship between the frequency of use of 
the Snook test and the corresponding incidence of the amount of trusts subsequently pierced.  
 
The results undeniably reflect the restrictive view of the concept of sham as realised by 
Diplock LJ. The stringent guidelines contained in the test have thus significantly reduced the 
number of trust piercings over time. This is a welcome result, for the reason that once a trust 
is validly created, the beneficiaries have an interest in the trust property that should not easily 
be undone, and the courts should thus be constrained in their veil-lifting discretion.  
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2.1.3.2  ASCERTAINING THE TRUE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION 
The duty of the courts is therefore to discover the true nature of the transaction in question. 
The above cases relating to both sham transactions and sham trusts suggest that there are six 
questions involved in ascertaining this. The first question is: what was the genuine intention 
of the parties?139 In Northumberland Insurance Ltd v Alexander,140 Clarke J remarked: 
 
“... it is the intention of the parties to the transaction which determines whether the act or document was 
intended to be operative according to its tenor or whether it was simply a façade or a disguise. It is not 
essential, in my view, that the façade disguises another or different transaction. It is enough if it creates 
the appearance that the contractual relationship between parties is different from the actual 
relationship.”141  
 
The genuine intention of the parties to the transaction is thus imperative.142 In Sharrment, 
Lockhart J reasoned that in order to determine this enquiry, reference is to be made of their 
actual intentions whether by direct evidence or by inference from the circumstances of the 
transactions. 143  Hunt J reiterated this theme in Coppleson v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation Solutions,144 noting that: “It is the intention of the parties to the transaction which 
determines the question whether the act or document was never intended to be operative 
according to its tenor at all, but was rather meant to cloak another and different 
transaction.”145 
 
The second question in determining the true nature of the transaction is that the legal 
character of the agreement which embodies the transaction must be considered.146 It is only 
where the genuineness of the agreement evidenced by the documents is challenged that it is 
then necessary to consider whether the substance of the transaction as represented by the 
                                                             
139 R Holmes “Sham Trusts and Sham Transactions” http://www.rossholmes.co.nz/article.php?id=112 (accessed 
12 March 2010). 
140 [1984] 8 ACLR 882. 
141 At 888–889. 
142 Boydell v James (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 620; Dennis Willcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
Solutions (1976) 10 ALR 513; Coppleson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation Solutions (1981) 34 ALR 377; 
Sharrment v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1988] 18 FCR 449. 
143 At 539. 
144 (1981) 34 ALR 377. 
145 At 381. 
146 Holmes “Sham Trusts and Sham Transactions” . 
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documents is not the true substance of the transaction, and the documents themselves are a 
cloak to conceal its true nature.147 Thus, the modern trend is for the courts to try to give 
business efficacy to commercial transactions. If a court is satisfied that the real intention of 
the parties was to enter into a binding agreement, then the court will do its best to give effect 
to that intention.148 Interestingly, the modern-day approach can be contrasted with the earlier 
judicial approach, when a finding of sham inevitably enabled a court to infer the true nature 
of the arrangement in an “in-substance” manner.149  
 
The third step in the enquiry is as follows: In arriving at the determination, all circumstances 
and incidents of the ostensible transaction must be taken into account.150 Thus, prior to any 
issue of sham, it is imperative that a systematic and objective approach is examined so as to 
ascertain the nature of the transaction. In the matter of Re Securitibank Ltd,151 Richardson J 
reasoned: “[i]t is well settled that, where documents have been drawn to define the 
relationship of persons involved in a business operation, the true nature of the transaction can 
only be ascertained by careful consideration of the legal arrangements actually entered into 
and carried out.”152 This point was reiterated in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Europa 
Oil:153 “It is the legal character of the transaction which is decisive, not the overall economic 
consequences to the parties.”154 Under a similar mindset, Richardson J outlined the crucial 
role evidence plays in the sham enquiry. In his majority judgment of Buckley & Young Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue,155 the learned judge noted: “it is well established that the 
true nature of a transaction must be ascertained by reference to the legal arrangements 
actually entered into and carried out”.  
 
 
                                                             
147 Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 136. 
148 Attorney-General v Baker Bros Ltd [1976] 2 NZLR 495. 
149 Holmes “Sham Trusts and Sham Transactions”. See for example, Polsky v SA Services [1951] 1 All ER 185, 
where Goddard L had no difficulty inferring from the fact that there had not been payment of a deposit, as set 
out in a hire-purchase agreement used in a refinancing situation, that he was dealing with a clear case of sham. 
150 Holmes “Sham Trusts and Sham Transactions”. 
151 [1978] 2 NZLR 136. 
152 At 167–168. 
153 [1971] NZLR 641. 
154 At 648–649. 
155 [1978] 2 NZLR 485. 
103 
 
These words were outlined in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Ramsay,156 per Wright L, 
who reasoned:  
 
“The decision in any particular case can only be arrived at by considering what is the substance of the 
transaction in question, and what is the substance of that transaction can only be ascertained by a 
careful consideration of the contract which embodies the transaction. That being so, in our judgment 
what has to be done here is to examine the particular clauses of… the agreement in question, and to see 
what is the appropriate conclusion … to be arrived at on the consideration of that agreement.”157 
 
Thus, the court is duty-bound to construe the trust instrument as a whole and the judge will 
need to be persuaded that the trust document was used by both the settlor and the trustee as a 
camouflage, to conceal the true position of the arrangement. The fourth step in this enquiry 
reads as follows: The court may receive oral evidence as to the intentions of the parties. In the 
majority of cases dealt with thus far, oral evidence has indeed served a crucial role in the 
courts determination. The reason is that, as noted in the above, there is often very little 
physical or documentary evidence left behind by the shamming parties to indicate their ill 
intentions. The Australian case of Hawke v Edwards158 usefully interpreted this important 
emphasis in the process of the sham determination, where Jordan CJ confirmed the following: 
 
“… oral evidence is admissible in such proceedings that the parties intended themselves to be bound 
only by a contemporaneous oral agreement and that the document was brought into existence as a mere 
piece of machinery for serving some other purpose than that of constituting the real agreement between 
them. Oral evidence may also be given that the document is a sham – that it was never intended by the 
parties to be operative according to its tenor at all, but was meant to cloak another and different 
transaction.”159 
 
In addition, in Hitch, Arden LJ confirmed that the court may examine external evidence. This 
will include the parties’ explanations and circumstantial evidence, such as evidence of the 
                                                             
156 (1935) 20 TC 79. 
157At 94. 
158 (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 21. 
159 At 23. 
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subsequent conduct of the parties.160 Evidence of subsequent conduct has, however, been 
treated with caution thus far. Arden LJ explains: 
 
“… the fact that parties subsequently depart from an agreement does not necessarily mean that they 
never intended the agreement to be effective and binding. The proper conclusion to draw may be that 
they agreed to vary their agreement and that they have become bound by the agreement as varied.”161 
 
The implications of this limitation on trusts is that once a trust has been validly created, a 
subsequent agreement between the settlor and the trustee that the trust will be a sham merely 
exposes the trustee to a claim for breach of trust.162 This profound conclusion was expounded 
upon by Munby J in A v A: 
  
“A trustee who has bona fide accepted office as such cannot divest himself of his fiduciary obligations 
by his own improper acts. If therefore, a trustee who has entered into his responsibilities, and without 
having any intention of being party to a sham, subsequently purports, perhaps in agreement with the 
settlor, to treat the trust as a sham, the effect is not to create a sham where previously there was a valid 
trust. The only effect, even if the agreement is actually carried into execution, is to expose the trustee to 
a claim for breach of trust and, it may well be, to expose the settlor to a claim for knowing assistance in 
that breach of trust. Nor can it make any difference, where the trust has already been properly 
constituted, that a trustee may have entered into office – may indeed have been appointed a trustee in 
place of an honest trustee – for the very purpose and with the intention of treating the trust for the 
future as a sham. If, having been appointed trustee, he has the trust property under his control, he 
cannot be heard to dispute either the fact that it is trust property or the existence of his own fiduciary 
duty.”163 
 
This rather interesting conclusion can be supported historically. In Hitch, his lordship 
remarked: 
 
“… the fact that the act or document is uncommercial, or even artificial, does not mean that it is a sham. 
A distinction is to be drawn between the situation where parties make an agreement which is 
unfavourable to one of them, or artificial, and a situation where they intend some other arrangement to 
                                                             
160 Para 65. 
161 At 229–230. 
162 Conaglen 2008 Cambridge LJ 193. 
163 Para 43. 
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bind them. In the former situation, they intend the agreement to take effect according to its tenor. In the 
latter situation, the agreement is not to bind their relationship.”164 
 
The notion can, however, be contrasted with the situation faced in Rahman. The trust in this 
instance was still declared a sham because the trustee was never made master of the assets. 
The settlor intended to and in fact did retain control of the capital and income of the trust 
fund throughout his lifetime, and used the trust and the trust instrument to make testamentary 
dispositions.165 
 
Returning to the ascertainment of the true nature of the transaction, the fifth step in the 
enquiry is as follows: The court may have regard not only to the inferences drawn from its 
acceptance of such evidence, but also those which flow from disbelief.166 Thus, the court 
should be wary of the unreliable witness and scrutinise all testimonials objectively. Should 
the presiding judge be of the opinion that a witness has offered incomplete, incoherent or 
untrustworthy evidence, that too should be taken into consideration and, if need be, be used 
together with other evidence, to infer the intention to sham. 
 
The last step in the enquiry flows from the previous one, and is the following: To create an 
inference of a sham in the absence of direct evidence is to reach a finding, one which cannot 
be made if another inference is at least equally open.167 Seen more as a warning than as an 
actual stage in the enquiry, the caution originates from the basic principles of the law of 
evidence. Marac is a perfect example of this: there during proceedings it was established that 
where the genuineness of the documentation is challenged, a trust may be treated as a sham 
only in two situations (if the concept of the emerging sham is allowed): first, where the 
document does not reflect the true agreement between the parties, in which case, the cloak is 
removed and recognition given to their common intentions;168 and second, where the trust 
instrument was bona fide in inception, but the parties have departed from their initial 
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165 At 168. 
166 Holmes “Sham Trusts and Sham Transactions” . 
167 Ibid. 
168 NZI Bank 539. 
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agreement and have allowed its shadow to mask their new arrangement. 169  Once it is 
established that a transaction is not a sham, its legal effect will be respected.170 
 
In the matter of Re W (Ex Parte Orders),171 Munby J made a useful observation that is well 
worth restating here. The judge reasoned that: “[t]he court should adopt a robust questioning 
and [where appropriate], sceptical approach to trust and company structures, but that [does] 
not mean that it [can] ride roughshod over established principles where third party interests 
[are] involved.”172 
 
2.1.3.3  ONUS AND BURDEN 
In order to answer the questions: Who bears the onus of proving a sham? and What burden of 
proof must that person meet?, consideration must once again be directed to foreign authority. 
In the matter of Mikeover Ltd v Brady,173 the court noted that the party asserting the existence 
of a sham bears the onus of establishing it.174 This view was mimicked by Neuberger J in 
National Westminster Bank plc v Brady, as well as by Munby J in A v A.175  
 
In order to answer the second question, attention should be focussed on the nature of the 
proceedings. Even in extreme matters such as Re Esteem, litigation was directed by way of 
civil procedure. It thus follows that the burden of proof in matters dealing with the sham 
status of a trust, is that of an ordinary civil burden, ie the balance of probabilities. That said, 
an allegation of a sham is a serious matter,176 and as has been evident in the above case 
exploration, the courts will not lightly reach a conclusion of a sham.  
 
 
 
                                                             
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid.  
171 [2000] 2 FLR 927. 
172 At 938–939. 
173 (1989) Ch 86 103 (CA). 
174 At 626. 
175 [2001] 1 BCLC 98 and [2007] EWHC 99 (Fam) 53 respectively. 
176 A v A para 53. 
107 
 
In National Westminster Bank, Neuberger J shared his thoughts on the matter: 
  
“… there is obviously a strong presumption, even in the case of an artificial transaction, that the parties 
to what appear to be perfectly proper agreements on their face, intend them to be effective, and that 
they intend to honour and enjoy their respective obligations and rights. That is supported by the fact 
that an allegation of sham carries with it a degree of dishonesty, and the court should be slow (but not 
naively or unrealistically slow) to find dishonesty.”177 
 
Conaglen submits that this reflects the normal approach to the burden of proof in civil cases, 
pursuant to which “the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred 
and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation 
is established on the balance of probability.”178 
 
2.1.3.4  THE EMERGING SHAM 
A somewhat conflicted view has arisen regarding the notion of an emerging sham. This idea 
acknowledges that some trusts are intended to be legitimate from their outset, but that during 
the course of the life of the trust the parties then change their intention – to manage the trust 
as if it were a sham – and act on this intention thereafter. The case of NZI Bank touched on 
the question of the notion’s legitimacy. The court in this instance pointed out that a document 
may have been bona fide at inception, but the parties then departed from the initial agreement 
and the trust thus in fact became a sham. In Reynolds Robertson J reflected on the intricacies 
of recognising an emerging sham: 
 
“A trust is validly created, the beneficiaries have an interest in the trust property that cannot easily be 
undone. Unless the later appearance of a sham can be traced back to the creation of the trust, the trust 
remains valid. An exception to this could be where an item of property is later transferred to the trust, 
the trust could be a sham with respect to that property only, but the remainder of the trust would remain 
valid.”179 
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Having regard to Marac, it was noted above that Richardson J said: 
 
“Where the essential genuineness of the documentation is challenged a document may be brushed aside 
if and to the extent that it is a sham. There are two situations: (1) where the document does not reflect 
the true agreement between the parties in which case the cloak is removed and recognition given to 
their common intentions; and (2) where the document was bona fide in inception but the parties have 
departed from their initial agreement and yet have allowed its shadow to mask their new 
arrangement.”180 
 
However, Marac involved a financing agreement, not a trust. A practical example of the 
emerging sham is when a genuine trust is established, the trustees initially practise good 
behaviour, but, then, over time, they stop meeting in order to discuss and document their 
activities on behalf of the trust. The records documenting the decisions are thus not kept and 
the settlor gradually starts to treat the trust assets as if they were his or her very own property. 
Notably, the lack of documentation will not of itself make a trust a sham, but will inevitably 
assist a court in finding that a sham exists. Another, more obvious example is where the 
settlor of an established trust changes his or her intentions regarding the trust. The settlor 
might in this case use the trust to defraud creditors and instruct his or her trustees to follow 
their commands. 
 
Unfortunately, accepting the notion of an emerging sham is more complicated than it may 
seem at first. In Shalson, Rimer J made a very valid point when he noted that, as a matter of 
principle, a trust which was initially not a sham cannot subsequently become one. The reason 
for this is that for a properly constituted trust to become a sham after its inception would 
require all the beneficiaries with the requisite shamming intention to join together with the 
trustees for that purpose.181 Munby J elaborated on the matter in A v A (discussed above), 
reasoning that a trust could not as a matter of law be a sham if either of the original trustees 
were not parties to the sham at the time of their appointment, unless the beneficiaries were to 
join the trustees with the intention of creating a sham, and thereafter participate together as 
                                                             
180 At 558. 
181 This is applicable only where beneficiaries have either a vested right or, in English law, an equitable interest. 
In South Africa, the intention of the beneficiaries would be irrelevant. 
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such.182 The court was unable to agree with the concept, reasoning that a sham could be one 
only if it existed from the beginning, but, Munby J further explained that it would, however, 
be possible for a trust which was initially a sham subsequently to lose its character.183  
 
The point to be understood, taking into account the proponents and opponents of the idea, is 
that a sham is not the same as where there is a valid trust, but when the trustee, for whatever 
reason, defaults on his or her duties and fails to administer the trust according to the trust 
instrument or his or her other legal duties. This, then, is a breach of trust in which the trustee 
is personally liable to the beneficiaries of trust for the losses he or she has caused.184 As has 
been discussed in Snook, the test requires both the settlor and at least one other trustee to go 
along with the sham. A trustee acting on his or her own accord only fails to follow his or her 
duties owed to the beneficiaries. This is in line with the Reynolds case, as Robertson J was 
fairly specific in noting that the appearance of a sham would need to be traced back to its 
creation.  
 
As yet the legitimate use of the emerging sham is still uncertain. The fair approach, it is 
submitted, would be to recognise the concept of an emerging sham in the very strictest of 
senses. It is possible for a settlor and trustee to abuse the trust after its inception, should they 
share a bilateral intention. Thus, staying within the realms of the Snook test, it would seem 
that this would be a welcomed and intelligent development which broadens the sham horizon 
to a more realistic level. Moreover, the recognition of the emerging sham is clearly necessary 
to cover situations where a trust’s objectives are subverted only after it has been set up.185 
 
3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ALTER-EGO 
This doctrine, which is often masked in the description of a trust being the “alter-ego”, 
“puppet” or “nominee” of a settlor, is a principle separate and distinct from the sham doctrine. 
                                                             
182 Para 44. 
183 Para 45. 
184 WH Muller et al Anti-money Laundering - International Law and Practice (2007) 31. 
185 The Rahman case is useful as an example here. The settlor in this matter created the trust with an initial 
US$100, which is standard. There was no shamming intention at that moment. That only came later. 
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In essence, an alter-ego trust represents two distinct situations. The first is where assets are 
settled on a trust, but the trustees of the trust act as mere puppets, doing whatever they are 
instructed to do. The second is where the trust property is treated as if it were personally 
owned, instead of belonging to the trust. Interestingly, as will be noted below, the majority of 
both foreign and local alter-ego cases revolve around matrimonial proceedings. 
 
Astonishingly, despite the fact that the courts today have asserted an increasing interest in 
trusts, many settlors continue to treat trust assets as if they still own them, failing to observe 
even the most basic principles of the fiduciary duties they created. Courts may under such 
circumstances be compelled to look behind the guise and into the reality of the situation, 
which ultimately may lead to a declaration that the trust is in fact the alter-ego of the settlor 
or trustee.  
 
The principle of the alter-ego has a settled function overseas, but just how exactly can one 
identify an alter-ego trust? Moreover, how does this doctrine differ from the sham doctrine? 
Furthermore, what are the consequences of such a finding? The answer to these questions can 
be found in the exploration of the principle in foreign law that follows. 
 
3.1 FOREIGN LAW PRECEDENT 
Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper186 was one of the earliest cases in which the High Court 
of Australia discussed the notion of the “alter-ego” or “puppet”. Gibbs J suggested that an 
alter-ego trust occurs where a person is held to have control over an express trust to such an 
extent that the trustees are considered to be “mere puppets” of the defendant.187 Robertson J 
commented on Gibbs J’s characterisation in Reynolds, and reasoned:  
 
“There are instances of where a valid trust has been established but the trustee’s discretion has been 
subsumed by the controller to such a degree that in reality decisions made about the operation of the 
trust are made by the controller. It is argued that the relinquishment of control by the trustee to the 
controller allows the Court to find that the trust structure is a façade that can be disregarded. The level 
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of control over the trust property by someone other than an appointed trustee is said to justify the Court 
piercing the express trust and thereby making what would otherwise be trust property, available to third 
party claimants.”188 
 
In Ascot, the court identified that when a third party is a mere puppet of a party to a marriage, 
this could be determining as an exception to the lack of power a court has to make orders 
against third parties.189 Without refining this thought, Gibbs J left the jurisprudence of the 
alter-ego open to interpretation. A Sydney barrister eloquently elaborated on the judge’s 
remarks: 
 
“The second exception which Gibbs J referred to was where the third party is a mere puppet of the 
spouse. There is no reported case where this concept has been dealt with in circumstances where a 
spouse had no legal control over the third party. The question therefore arises as to the circumstances in 
which this exception may apply. It may be that this exception only applies in circumstances which 
satisfy the current criteria as to when a third party can be treated as the alter ego of a party. It may be 
that such an approach is too restrictive and that it is intended to cover some of the problem areas 
described above … If the spouse is not in effective legal control; receives financial benefits from the 
trust which may be deductible in the hands of the trust; may have a loan account with the trust; is likely 
to be the only person to receive benefit from the trust during the lifetime of the spouse; is also not able 
by the terms of the trust deed to access profit and corpus of the trust then why should not the assets of 
this trust be treated as the property of the spouse … In the result there may be circumstances which do 
not fit easily with the established approaches to the third party problems but may yet be capable of just 
resolution within established principle.”190 
 
Evidently the “puppet” described above can be depicted as a creature that from a distance 
appears to have independent animation, but in reality has no independence at all, and is 
incapable of making a move without the direction of another. In relation to trusts, the puppet 
– or creature as, it may often be characterised – is the trustee of an inter vivos trust who is 
powerless to the commands and directives issued by the settlor or co-trustee. 
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In pronouncing on the confusion between the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego, a 
number of Family Law Court decisions have incorrectly created the impression that if a trust 
is the alter-ego or puppet of the settlor it can be disregarded. Three examples of such a 
decision are to be found in the cases of In the Marriage of Ashton,191 In the Marriage of 
Goodwin192 and Davidson and Davidson.193 
 
In Ashton a husband replaced himself as trustee of the family trust with a company and 
continued to act as sole appointer for the family trust. Furthermore, Mr Ashton was never a 
beneficiary, but consistently received income from the trust. The court found that the husband 
was “in full control of the assets of the trust.”194 The evidence was clear that he had applied 
the assets and income as he wished and for his own benefit.195 Strauss J, on behalf of the Full 
Court, subsequently held: 
 
“The powers which the husband has in the Ashton Family Settlement give him control of the trust 
either as trustee or through a trustee which is his creature, and at the same time he is able to apply all 
the income and property of the trust for his own benefit. In my opinion, in a family situation such as the 
one here, this court is not bound by formalities designed to obtain advantages and protection for the 
husband who stands in reality in the position of the owner. He has de facto, legal and beneficial 
ownership – no person other than the husband has any real interest in the property or income of the 
trust except at the will of the husband.”196 
  
Thus, the trust property was taken into account when making the redistribution order.197 
Similarly, in Goodwin, the trust beneficiaries were the husband, wife and family. The 
husband had the sole power to appoint and remove trustees (although he was not entitled to 
be a trustee). Mr Goodwin also had the power to alter the trust instrument and to add or 
remove beneficiaries, which he used following the couple’s separation, removing the wife 
and their two children as beneficiaries. The trustee of the family trust was a company, of 
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which Mr Goodwin was the director alongside his accountant. The Family Law Court held 
that “the trust property was, in reality, the property of the husband”,198 ordering the trust 
assets to be realised as part of Mr Goodwin’s personal estate. On appeal the court considered 
that it “seems not unreasonable for his Honour to have concluded that the husband’s co-
directors would act upon his instructions in relation to matters affecting the trust.”199 Under 
cross-examination, Mr Goodwin admitted that he had practical control of the funds of the 
trust, and the court saw this and his action in removing the claimant wife as beneficiary of the 
family trust as further evidence of the trust being his alter-ego. The learned judge reasoned 
that rather than the power of appointment being a fiduciary power, it was but a power which, 
by the terms of the trust instrument, the husband may exercise for the purposes of controlling 
the trust for his own benefit, should he so choose.200 
 
In Davidson, the facts resembled those of Ashton, where the husband was the appointer and 
the other trustee was controlled by him as shareholder. The court found that, notwithstanding 
the existence of a valid trust, the trust was the husband’s alter-ego. Under cross-examination, 
Mr Davidson believed that he had complete control of the trust and supervision of its 
operations. The court noted that the husband had absolute control of the trustee company, and 
the said company had become his “creature” or “puppet”. The trust assets were dealt with 
accordingly, as in Ashton and Goodwin. 
 
In summary, the decisions in Ashton, Goodwin and Davidson201 were based on the finding 
that each respective trust was the alter-ego of the settlor. Such a conclusive factor allowed the 
Family Law Court to “pierce the veneer” of the family trust, and look behind the trust, so to 
speak. What will become evident is that this severe action illustrates a lack of understanding 
of the alter-ego doctrine and, under such false interpretation, violates the rules of the sham 
doctrine.  
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A more nuanced approach was adopted in the matter of In the Marriage of Gould,202 where 
Fogarty J correctly stated that: 
 
“… the description of an entity as the ‘alter ego’ or ‘puppet’ of a person really denotes something 
different. Correctly described, it is not an assertion that it is a ‘counterfeit, a facade or a false front’. 
Rather, it describes an actual situation although as a matter of law or practicality the actions of the other 
entity may be capable of and may in fact be controlled by the party in question. For example, a party 
may establish a trust over which he or she exercises control. That trust may in turn own or control 
property. It may be correct to describe that trust as the alter ego or even perhaps the puppet of that party, 
but it would not be correct to describe its existence or its ownership or control of property as a sham. 
Transactions entered into by it under which it deals with its property by, for example, a transfer of 
property to a third party would not be a sham transaction. It is likely to be a genuine transaction 
although the evidence may demonstrate that the transaction was carried out ‘by direction of or in the 
interest of' the party’.”203 
 
Thus, the court correctly identified that alter-ego trusts differ materially from sham trusts. An 
alter-ego trust is not a “façade”, as is the case of a sham, but rather an actual ongoing 
situation in which a power shift has occurred, and this transfer of control from the trustees to 
a dominant settlor or single trustee diminishes the purpose for which the trust was set up. 
This interesting interrelationship between the two doctrines is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Prime v Hardie204 is a classic case which represents the narrow view of alter-ego trusts, this 
example being from New Zealand. The facts concerned a family trust controlled by two 
trustees, the husband (Mr Hardie) and a close friend. The trust property included a house (the 
“Rahopara Street house”) which Mr Hardie, his wife and their two children lived in. A few 
years after the creation of the trust, Mr Hardie decided that he wished to end the marriage, 
and foolishly sought to keep the trust property for himself. Mr Hardie had deceitfully 
persuaded his wife and children to move temporarily out of the house and into a motel, after 
which Mr Hardie informed his wife of his plans to end the marriage. To stop his family from 
moving back into the house, Mr Hardie had arranged for the family home to be rented out to 
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the two trustees. What is noteworthy is that Mr Hardie had always included the trust property 
in his annual tax returns. In the majority judgment of Salmon J, the following was held: 
 
“What is clear on the evidence ... is that the trust was effectively Mr Hardie's alter-ego. He was the 
principal (although not the only) beneficiary. He borrowed the money which enabled the trust to 
purchase its assets. He paid the interest on the mortgages and rates and insurance. In the 1998 financial 
year his personal income return showed an apparently fictitious rental received from Rahopara Street of 
$3 600 and deductions for interest, depreciation and other items resulting in a net loss of $10 975 which 
he claimed as a tax deduction against his personal income.”205 
 
The court found on the evidence that the trust was the husband’s alter-ego, the Rahopara 
Street home being treated as though it was owned by the defendant. The court applied the 
case of Lankow v Rose,206 and imposed a constructive trust207 on the property owned by the 
trust in favour of the wife. 
 
In Glass v Hughey208 the facts concerned business assets owned by a family trust which came 
into dispute upon divorce proceedings. In particular, the husband was entitled to acquire 
ownership of the family trust’s primary asset by a contract in which a shareholding of the 
asset (a company) would be transferred to him. Prior to litigation the trust had purchased 
shares in a company, EVP International Ltd, which owned a business run by the defendant. 
Shortly after the couple separated, EVP sold its shares to a holding company, EVP Holding 
Ltd. The company took up 75 per cent of the shares, the balance of which was purchased by 
an entrepreneur. Under examination it was determined that the plaintiff had made a 
significant contribution to the defendant’s business assets and the parties had had a 
reasonable expectation of her sharing in the assets.  
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Under cross-examination the husband maintained that by restructuring EVP International the 
residual sale proceeds were his own, when, in fact, they belonged to the trust. Priestly J 
applied the rationale in Prime and stated the following by way of obiter: 
 
“I find that the trust has for all intents and purposes been disregarded by the husband so far as his 
operation of International is concerned and, so far as the wife’s claim is concerned should be regarded 
as a sham or more particularly the husband’s alter ego.”209 
 
When the entrepreneur established his majority holdings, a shareholder agreement, to which 
the husband was a party, was signed, and provided that the shares owned by the trust were to 
become the husband’s sole property. The learned judge concluded that: “It thus ill behoves 
the husband to endeavour to raise as a defence to the wife’s equitable claim the point that 
International is owned not by him but a separate entity, the trust.”210 
 
Prime and Glass are two cases which clearly reflect the confusion displayed by many courts 
when interpreting the doctrine of the alter-ego. In Glass Priestly J went as far as to say that 
the trust in issue should be regarded as a sham, or more particularly the husband’s alter-ego. 
Bluntly stated, this interpretation is incorrect. What will become apparent is that the two 
doctrines are two separate arguments with very little in common. On the other hand, the facts 
of the cases do aid in demonstrating the notion of the alter-ego, which has most frequently 
been identified through a spouse’s unwillingness to separate trust assets from those of his 
own. 
 
Remaining in New Zealand, the case of Fay v Chirnside211 was the next reported case to deal 
with the alter-ego principle. Notably, the judicial use of the alter-ego had not been restricted 
to relationship–property type claims only. In a successful claim in the New Zealand High 
Court for an account of profits, Mr Fay was in a joint property development venture with Mr 
Chirnside. During the attainment of a major tenant, the defendant chose to dispense with the 
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plaintiff and in his place bring into the project a number of investors. This was achieved 
through a company in which a trust associated with the defendant took a 75 per cent interest 
in the venture. The court held: “It would appear that the trust associated with Mr Chirnside is 
in substance, his alter-ego and I will generally refer to the trust’s 75 per cent stake in RPL as 
if it were Mr Chirnside’s.”212 
 
Reluctant to use the alter-ego principle at a whim, the court in P v P213 demonstrated the 
importance of examining the facts first, before labelling a trust the alter-ego of the settlor on 
impulse. The facts, which once again concerned a trust property claim upon the breakdown of 
a marriage, involved several trusts which the defendant formed between 1997 and 1998. 
During this period the matrimonial home was transferred by the couple to two mirror trusts, 
each party being owed a debt of roughly NZ$1 million by their respective trusts. Another 
trust was subsequently formed to purchase the husband’s surgical consultancy practice and 
consultancy rooms. This trust also held the shares of a company incorporated during the 
above period, of which the husband was director. In accordance with the trust instrument, the 
husband was a discretionary beneficiary. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that the scenario 
was an Ashton-type situation, arguing that the respondent husband had a controlling interest 
as a discretionary beneficiary and by being a director of the company. Importantly, the court 
noted that there was no evidence of similar control of the relevant trusts in the matter and that 
the parties’ children had remained major beneficiaries throughout the existence of the trust.214 
Furthermore, having regard to the administration of the trust, the trustees were the respondent, 
a barrister and an accountant, all of whom knew each other personally. In its conclusion, the 
court stood firm, reasoning that there was no evidence to suggest that the trustees had acted at 
any time other than bona fide in terms of their obligations as trustees in terms of the trust 
instrument and that there was nothing in the instrument which favoured the respondent in 
terms of the exercise of the trustee’s discretion.215 
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In the case of Charman v Charman216 the existence of the doctrine in modern-day English 
law emerged, although the expression was never specifically used. In this matrimonial 
property matter, the wife issued a petition for divorce which included a disputed application 
for ancillary relief. During the marriage the husband had made a fortune in the insurance 
market in London.217 The husband conceded that the assets which fell for division in the 
proceedings amounted to £59 000 000, although the wife contended that the relevant assets 
amounted to £126 000 000, the difference representing the assets of a trust now situated in 
Bermuda (the Dragon Holdings Trust). The beneficiaries of the trust included the husband, 
the wife and their two children. The sole trustee was a private trust company. Wilson J stated 
that the question is easily framed as being whether the trust was a financial resource of the 
husband or, more simply put, whether, if the husband were to request the trustee(s) to 
advance the whole (or part) of the capital of the trust to him, the trustee(s) would be likely to 
do so.218 The learned judge added that much consideration should be given to Butler-Sloss 
LJ’s obiter statement in the matter of Browne v Browne219 and that, in this context, the 
question is more appropriately expressed as whether the spouse has “immediate access to the 
funds” of the trust rather than “effective control”220 over it.221 In the court’s conclusion it was 
accepted that the trustee held the income for the husband absolutely, and thus regarded the 
trust as an abuse of the ‘interest in possession trust’. The full amount of the trust was thus 
taken into account during property redistribution considerations. 
 
In Australia two cases have recently emerged dealing with the alter-ego contention. In 
Richstar Enterprises, French J determined that the court was able to grant the orders sought 
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission in respect of the property of a 
person, and apply that order to assets within a family trust. This was decided upon in spite of 
the fact that the defendant was one of two directors of the corporate trust and one of two joint 
appointers to the trust. “Many would have thought that this was sufficient to achieve the 
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protection that may have been sought. At the time that it was needed, it was not available.”222 
In Daniels, the Court of Appeal was called on to revise a Family Law Court’s decision about 
whether assets within a family trust may be the subject of a property order imposed upon an 
individual. The facts concerned an unpaid child maintenance debt, where the Family Law 
Court found it necessary to order the disposal of the property of the parent who was in arrears. 
The reason for employing the alter-ego principle was that there were no other assets out of 
which the child support debt could have been settled, and therefore assets within the family 
trust were argued to be the cure. Thus, in order to do so and give effect to the order, the court 
maintained that it would be necessary to determine that the assets of the trust were the 
property of the parent owing the child maintenance. The judge of appeal upheld the lower 
court’s decision confirming that there was no error found in applying the alter-ego principle 
under the particular circumstances, and the trust was opened in order to satisfy the 
outstanding maintenance. 
 
Evidently the Australian courts also confused the separateness of the two doctrines. 
Fortunately, over the past few years, the courts across the common law systems appear to 
have picked up on these mistakes and have since begun to realise the distinctiveness of the 
two principles. Genc v Genc223 exhibited this new awareness and involved an appeal against a 
decision of O’Donovan J in the New Zealand Family Law Court. The parties met in 1994 and 
married in 1999, before separating in 2002. Mr Genc had prior to their stated intention to 
marry at the end of 1998, set up the Genc Family Trust. That same year the trust not only 
acquired shares in a newly formed company, but purchased the Gencs’ family residence and 
was to be the home of the parties during the subsistence of their marriage. The applicant, Mrs 
Genc, argued that the disposition of property to the trust was made in order to defeat the 
statutory claim she would have had. The High Court confirmed the Family Law Courts 
decision: 
 
“The sales to the trust were made at the time when the applicant was unable to rely upon any statutory 
relationship property regime, as supporting any right by her to an interest in the property in question, 
                                                             
222 P Bobbin “Alter Ego Trust Failure” http://www.argylelawyers.com.au/pdf_files/fin_dit_pub/AP143058.pdf 
(accessed 9 April 2009). 
223 [2006] NZFLR 119. 
120 
 
on which basis it is difficult to see how it could be argued that any disposition of property to the trust 
was made either with the intention of defeating any claim by the applicant or has had that effect.”224 
 
This finding was made regardless of the fact that the trust and the transfer of property had 
been established before the Genc’s marriage. Notably, all of the cases thus far have dealt with 
alter-ego trusts in the context of de facto (Genc) or marital relationships. However, none of 
these cases have conclusively addressed the theoretical basis upon which a court is justified 
in finding an alter-ego trust. It is submitted that there are a number of reasons for the 
uncertainty. First, the majority of cases confuse the doctrine of the sham with that of the alter-
ego and the resultant effect on the development of these principles has been unconstructive. 
Second, the courts have struggled to address with any confidence the question of what 
exactly happens when a trust is declared a sham or the alter-ego of the settlor, which only 
adds to the perplexity of the matter. Thus, the issue requires a higher degree of “reading 
between the lines” in order to achieve attribution to the alter-ego principle. Fortunately, the 
case of Reynolds once again sheds some light on what is surely becoming an entanglement of 
legal doctrines. Robertson J described the alter-ego principle as follows: 
 
“These are instances where a valid trust has been established but the trustee’s discretion has been 
subsumed by the controller to such a degree that in reality decisions made about the operation of the 
trust are made by the controller … The assumption of factual control by someone other than a trustee 
(or a sole trustee if there is more than one trustee) or by someone without legal right to exercise such 
power cannot of itself invalidate a trust. As noted by Jessica Palmer at 89: The alter ego, as factual 
control, should be an impotent, meaningless concept. In the eyes of the law, factual control has no 
effect on legal ownership. Indeed a stranger who takes control of trust assets will be considered a 
trustee de son tort and be liable to account for the property of beneficiaries. Factual control of trust 
property cannot justify recognition that the controller thereby owns the trust assets … The alter ego 
concept, as it relates to factual control, serves to attribute an individual’s actions to those of the 
organisation that he is controlling. It is not a mechanism whereby an individual can appropriate 
property to him or herself by virtue of control that he or she exercises.”225 
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Thus, crucial to the alter-ego doctrine is the recognition that control alone does not provide 
justification for looking behind the veneer of a trust:  
 
“The uptake of control by someone other than an authorised person cannot be sufficient to extinguish 
the rights of the beneficiaries under a trust. It is difficult to see the alter ego trust operating… as an 
independent cause of action”.226  
 
3.2 THE ALTER-EGO SYNOPSIS 
In general terms, should it be proven that a party has the ultimate control of a trust, or that the 
trust is a creature wholly controlled by him- or herself as trustee or settlor, coupled with the 
capacity to derive benefit from the trust, then the trust may be treated as the alter-ego of the 
trustee or settlor. Apart from the various mistakes made across the world in which the 
doctrine of the alter-ego is often amalgamated with the doctrine of the sham, clear evidence 
exists that the two are separate and distinct. Unlike a sham, an alter-ego trust is intended to be 
a genuine trust. There is no requirement of an intention to deceive or mislead. Although dealt 
with below, it is important to confirm at this stage that – correctly interpreted – the sham trust 
argument is therefore an independent cause of action, whereas the alter-ego argument is not. 
The consequence of this fundamental distinction is that an alter-ego trust, on its own, cannot 
be pierced. 
 
With the above difference highlighted, we must now turn our attention to the common theme 
of control. Consistently, no matter the case, an alter-ego allegation concerns de facto control. 
The question, though, remains: How much control is necessary to prove an alter-ego trust 
successfully?  
 
The South African High Court recently addressed this question in the matter of Brunette v 
Brunette and Another.227 Chetty J, examining the situation, stated that in practice the settlor 
often places de iure control of the assets of a business of a family in the hands of trustees. But 
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the trustees act as mere puppets in the hands of the settlor, who manages the trusts through 
them, and de facto it is the settlor who controls the trust despite the fact that the de iure 
control is in the hands of the trustees.228 The learned judge noted that, in order to determine 
whether a settlor was in de facto control, the court will have regard to:  
1. the terms of the trust instrument, and to  
2. evidence of how the trusts were conducted.229  
In addition to this somewhat general outline, the American courts have considered a number 
of factors to determine whether a corporation is the alter-ego of a shareholder. These include:  
1. the absence of formalities and records that are part and parcel of corporate existence;  
2. the use of funds for personal rather than corporate use;  
3. a lack of business discretion displayed by the dominated corporation;  
4. the non-functioning of other shareholders, officers or directors, and  
5. whether the corporation in question had property used by a dominating shareholder as 
if it were his or her own.230 
If one were to replace “corporation” with “trust” and “shareholder(s)” with “trustee(s)”, the 
above definition most definitely serves useful when considering factors which may aid in 
proving an alter-ego allegation. The relevant factors would thus be:  
1. the absence of formalities and records that are part and parcel of the trust. The 
formalities which are pertinent to this discussion include the trust instrument, a 
separate banking account, banking records, and properly documented minutes of the 
trustees’ meetings;  
2. the use of funds for personal rather than trust use;  
3. a lack of business discretion displayed by the trustees. Such discretion falls under the 
fiduciary duty a trustee owes to the beneficiaries, and may also concern the duty to 
seek external advice on professional matters which are out of the scope of the 
trustee’s personal knowledge;  
4. the non-functioning of the trustees or settlor, and  
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5. whether the trust in question had trust property used by a dominating trustee or settlor 
as if it were his or her own. 
 
4. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE SHAM AND 
THE ALTER-EGO 
As has often been the case, the alter-ego and sham doctrines are frequently conflated. On 
appeal, in the matter of Reynolds, the term “alter-ego trust” was suitably used to describe the 
situation where the settlor controls the trust to such an extent that the trustees relinquish 
control and are said to be mere puppets of the settlor. Under such circumstances a valid trust 
could be created, but the trustees’ discretion is then subsumed by the settlor to the extent that 
the trust is merely the alter-ego of the settlor. From a matrimonial standpoint, the English 
courts have accepted the confines of this distinction and, as seen in Charman, should a 
spouse – who is the settlor of the trust – be able successfully to request the trustees to 
advance the whole or part of the capital of the trust to himself or herself, that trust will to all 
intents and purposes be regarded as the alter-ego of the settlor.231 Clearly such instances 
negate the trustees’ fiduciary duty as well as the object of the trust to be for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries.  
 
In both Australia and New Zealand, with the exception of Gould, the Family Law Courts 
have demonstrated a failure to appreciate the difference between a “sham” and an “alter-ego” 
trust by amalgamating the principles, and consequently these cases need to be treated with a 
great deal of caution. Thus the question still remains: what, if any, relationship is there 
between the two doctrines? 
 
It has already been firmly established that, unlike an allegation of a sham, the alter-ego trust 
argument cannot form the basis of an independent cause of action. However, factual control 
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of a trust by someone other than those authorised to have such power is not an irrelevant 
consideration.232  
 
Robertson J confirmed this thought in Reynolds as follows: 
 
“Such control may give rise to a claim for breach of trust. Evidence of such control may be relevant to 
the question of whether a trust is a sham in that it may evidence a lack of true intention to form a trust. 
That is not to say that an alter ego trust is the same as a sham.”233 
 
Thus, what the Court was correctly trying to say is that a finding of de facto control may 
indeed help establish that a trust is a sham, if the evidence indicates that there was no 
intention to establish a trust according to the terms of the trust instrument. However, such a 
finding does not automatically lend itself to the establishment of a sham trust. Thus, should 
the court then be of the opinion that a trust was in fact the alter-ego of a party to the trust, the 
trust is not a sham. But such evidence may aid the court in adducing that there was an 
intention to mislead from the inception of the trust, or from the time when the particular 
property was disposed of to the trust. “Evidence of effective control of the trust post 
settlement may be used to infer the requisite intention.”234 
 
The Appeal Court thus accepted the trial court’s treatment of the alter-ego trust argument: 
“Alter-ego trusts are not an independent cause of action, nor are they the same as shams. In 
the trust context, alter-ego arguments are confined to evidence to help establish a sham which 
is how [the trial court] treated the matter.”235 Gould was applied in Reynolds as Chisholm J 
correctly stated: 
 
“The underlying common intention requirement for a sham has been consistently adopted by the Court 
of Appeal and is clearly binding on this Court. If alter ego trusts were to be automatically recognised as 
shams that underlying requirement would be negated. The result would be that a half way house 
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between a conventional sham trust and a valid trust would be created. In Re Securitibank Limited (No.2) 
at 168 Richardson J seems to have rejected the possibility that there is any half way house. I accept that 
view. It seems to be that to adopt a half way house would be to effectively re-write the traditional 
understanding of a sham.”236 
 
Thus, if alter-ego trusts were to be automatically recognised as shams, the common intention 
requirement held in Snook would be annulled. The result, referred to as the “half way house”, 
is an unwarranted and unwelcome development which only serves to confuse the well-
established doctrines. 
 
5. THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the sphere of companies the directors and members of a company ordinarily enjoy 
extensive protection against personal liability. This is one of the cornerstones of South 
African company law, and has been so since 1897, when the House of Lords handed down its 
decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.237 One of the most fundamental consequences of 
incorporation is that a close corporation, as well as a company, is a juristic entity separate 
from those who control it. Incorporation also entails “limited liability” of the director and 
members, with the result that they are generally not liable for the debts of the corporation. 
Furthermore, the assets of a corporation are the exclusive property of the corporation itself 
and not of those who control it. In Salomon, the locus classicus on this topic, Lord 
MacNaghten said the following with regard to some of the motives for incorporation: 
 
“Among the principal reasons which induce persons to form private companies … are the desire to 
avoid the risk of bankruptcy, and the increased facility afforded for borrowing money. By means of a 
private company a trade can be carried on with limited liability, and without exposing the persons 
interested in it in the event of failure to the harsh provisions of the bankruptcy law.”238 
 
                                                             
236 The Official Assignee v Wilson & Anor and Others [2006] NZHC 389 at para 58. 
237 [1897] AC 22. 
238 At 52. 
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Even though this fundamental rule has considerable influence in company law worldwide, 
including South Africa, it cannot be absolute and, as such, allows for exceptions. A 
company’s separate existence is, by way of metaphor, described as a “veil”. This veil is said 
to separate the company from its directors and protect them from the claims of those who 
deal with the company. The corporate veil, then, is a fundamental aspect of company law and 
is a protective device for those who exist behind it.239 However, under limited circumstances, 
the courts may ignore the limited liability of the company or close corporation and “pierce 
the corporate veil” such that the members or directors of the company become liable for the 
actions of the entity, despite their separate identities. Consequently, the courts will treat the 
company’s executives as if they were the owners of the company’s assets and as if they were 
conducting the company’s business in their own personal capacities.  
 
The SCA in Parker240 prompted a new era in trust law. Cameron JA, writing a unanimous 
judgment, noted that the trust, although a useful instrument in the management of assets, is 
often exploited for the protection it offers. The learned judge reasoned that in light of the 
widespread abuse of the trust form, it may be necessary to extend the well-established 
principles of company law into trust law. In particular, the court felt it necessary to import the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil from company law into trust law. Subsequently, the 
outcome has been that the courts now have a wider discretion when it comes to piercing the 
veneer of a trust and, according to Cameron JA, should the conduct of a trustee invite the 
inference that the trust form was a mere façade for the conduct of a business “as before”, and 
that the assets allegedly vesting de iure in the trustees in fact belong de facto to one or more 
trustee, the veil will be lifted, and the trust property which was once protected by the trust 
will become susceptible to the claims of third-party creditors. 
 
It is debatable whether or not this was the correct development. In order to find an answer, it 
is necessary to take a closer look at the company law doctrine and then make comparisons 
with the principle in relation to the trust inter vivos.241  
 
                                                             
239 N Hawke Corporate Liability (2000) 126.  
240 A ratio supported by Binns-Ward J in the Van der Merwe case. 
241 Such comparison is undertaken in Chapter 5. 
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5.2 A BRIEF THEORETICAL EXPOSITION ON THE DOCTRINE OF 
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
According to Blackman: 
 
“Veil piercing takes at least two forms. Firstly, there are cases where the court disregards the company 
and treats the members242 as if they had been acting in partnership (or where the company has a single 
member, as if he had been acting on his own behalf), with the consequence that they are, for example, 
held to be the owners of property otherwise owned by the company, or to be personally liable for its 
debts and other liabilities.”243  
 
Second, there are those circumstances where obligations incurred by shareholders in their 
personal capacity are treated as if they were incurred by the company. Whatever form it takes, 
veil-lifting is an “exceptional procedure.”244 
 
Because veil-lifting is an exception to the rule of separate legal personality and not the rule 
itself, courts must be careful to permit it only in egregious cases. Accordingly, in this area of 
the law, it has understandably been stated time and time again that courts lift the veil 
reluctantly.245 In the matter of Hülse-Reutter and Others v Gödde,246 Scott JA reasoned that a 
court has no general discretion simply to disregard the existence of a separate corporate 
identity whenever it deems it just or convenient to do so. The circumstance in which a court 
may lift the veil was summed up in the court’s decision as follows: 
 
“Much will depend on a close analysis of the facts of each case, considerations of policy and judicial 
judgment. Nonetheless what, I think, is clear is that as a matter of principle in a case such as the present 
there must at least be some misuse or abuse of the distinction between the corporate entity and those 
who control it which results in an unfair advantage being afforded to the latter.”247 
 
                                                             
242 The term “members” is used loosely in this study to describe the controlling executives in the case of a 
company. 
243 MS Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) 4–133. 
244 MS Blackman “Companies” in WA Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 4(1) (1995) para 43. 
245 J Cohen Veil Piercing - A Necessary Evil? (LLM thesis, UCT, 2006) 20. 
246 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
247 Para 20. 
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Similarly, in The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another248 
Corbett CJ required substantial proof of an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the 
establishment or use of the company or the conduct of its affairs prior to the piercing.249 In 
the matter of Airports Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim and Others,250 as judge of first 
instance Griesel J confirmed the above reasoning, noting that the requirement of fraud or 
other improper conduct finds resonance in the provisions of s 65 of the Close Corporations 
Act, 251  where the Legislature, with regard to close corporations, constructed a statutory 
remedy which is equivalent to the court’s jurisdiction at common law allowing for the 
piercing of the corporate veil in relation to a company.252 The learned judge further noted that 
in circumstances where a court is asked to pierce the veil of a company, the court will do so 
only where special circumstances exist indicating that the company or close corporation is a 
mere façade concealing the true facts:  
 
“Fraud will obviously be such a special circumstance, but it is not essential. In certain circumstances, 
the corporate veil will also be pierced where the controlling shareholders do not treat the company as a 
separate entity, but instead treat it as their ‘alter-ego’ or ‘instrumentality’ to promote their private, 
extra-corporate interests.”253  
 
However, on appeal, 254  Cameron JA noted that it was unnecessary to consider the 
applicability of both s 65 of the Close Corporations Act255 and the issue of fraud.256 
 
On the international front it is evident that, in order to pierce the corporate veil, foreign courts 
require at least two prerequisites to be present. First, there must be control over the finances, 
policies and practices to the extent that the company has no separate mind, will or existence 
from those who control it.257 This, on its own, will not be conclusive enough, as a proper 
examination of Lord Halsbury’s judgment in Salomon suggests. Accordingly, a sub-condition 
                                                             
248 1994 (1) SA 550 (A). 
249 At 566. 
250 2008 (2) SA 303 (C). 
251 Act 69 of 1984. 
252 PM Meskin Henochsberg Commentary on the Close Corporations Act Issue 13 (1997) 189. 
253 Para 12. 
254 Ebrahim and Others v Airports Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 113. 
255 Para 25. 
256 Para 25. 
257 Blackman “Companies” in Joubert LAWSA (1995) para 43. 
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of this first condition that must be taken into account by the courts prior to their intervening is 
whether the company is being used for the purpose of fraud or as a means to avoid other legal 
obligations.258 Second, it must be remembered that veil-lifting is an exceptional procedure, 
requiring exceptional circumstances. The general rule is that the separate corporate 
personality should be upheld, except in the most unusual circumstances.259  
 
In South Africa, there have been many approaches to veil-lifting, however, none as popular 
and as widely applied in the courts as the categorisation approach. This approach, which was 
established by the courts, sets out various categories which must be taken into consideration 
prior to making a decision whether to pierce the veil or not. These categories include “in the 
interests of justice”, “equity”, “alter-ego”, “fraud or improper conduct” and “agency”. 
 
“In the interests of justice” is a category which lays the policy foundation for the exception to 
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Thus, the courts will pierce the corporate veil in 
instances where it would result in justice prevailing.260 However, the category is seemingly 
vague and offers little more than a reminder to the courts of their jurisprudential duties. In 
Botha v Van Niekerk261 the court held that it would hold someone other than the company 
liable for its debts if an unconscionable injustice had been suffered as a result of what was, to 
the right-minded person, conduct that was clearly improper. 
 
The “equity” category in this instance remains two-fold. First, there is the policy-based 
argument that it is unfair to allow the owners of a company to avoid debts at the expense of 
the company’s creditors and, second, the allegation that the owner acted fraudulently or that 
he or she disposed of the company’s assets so as to prejudice the company and its 
creditors.262 According to Matherson and Eby, however, “while some courts use equity as a 
                                                             
258 Cohen Veil Piercing 22. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Cohen Veil Piercing 31. 
261 1983 (3) SA 513 (W). 
262 Cohen Veil Piercing 39. 
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gloss when considering the ‘alter-ego’ category, other courts have pierced the corporate veil 
based on equitable situations alone.”263 
 
The “alter-ego” query maintains that the courts should pierce the veneer of those companies 
which do not carry on their own business or affairs, but rather act in the furtherance of the 
affairs of the controlling members, “resulting in the situation where the controlling members 
do not treat the company as a separate entity, resulting in an abuse of the separateness of the 
company”.264 
 
“Fraud or improper conduct”, which has been briefly explored above, is one of the most 
commonly cited reasons for piercing the veneer. Linked with the “interests of justice” 
category, courts invoke this category to try to achieve justice for the parties involved. Most 
cases indicate that where there is an avoidance of an existing obligation and such avoidance 
would result in an injustice, then it would result in the veil being lifted.265 In Dadoo Ltd v 
Krugersdorp Municipal Council,266 the learned judge held that, if a transaction may in truth 
be within the provisions of a statute but the parties call it by a name or cloak it in a guise 
calculated to escape those provisions, the court will strip off its form and disclose its real 
nature and the law would prevail.267 
 
According to Blackman, the “agency” category involves identifying a company that is merely 
a conduit for the controlling members to carry on their own personal business, resulting in an 
abuse of the separateness of the company.268 This is so because the company in such a 
scenario does not carry on its own business affairs, but rather acts in pursuance of the affairs 
of the controlling members. 
                                                             
263 JH Matheson and RB Eby “The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: 
An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability Protection” (2000) 75 Washington 
Law Review 147 at 180. 
264 Cohen Veil Piercing 43. 
265 Cohen Veil Piercing 32. See further Lategan and Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T), 
where the court pierced the veil due to a finding of fraud. Thus, the company in this instance was held liable for 
the obligations of the members. 
266 1920 AD 546. 
267 At 200. 
268 Blackman “Companies” in Joubert LAWSA (1995) para 46. 
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Apart from the categorisation approach, three other tests have been used in both foreign and 
local jurisdictions. The first is the “good commercial reason test”. This test speaks for itself in 
that it asks the question: Does it make good commercial sense to have created a limited 
liability company? If so, then the courts will be reluctant to pierce the corporate veil. 
However, according to Payne the test has an inherent flaw, as any acquisition, creation or use 
of the corporate structure would satisfy it, since it can almost always make good commercial 
sense to make use of the corporate structure.269  
 
The second test is known as the “promotion of private interests/alter-ego test”. As described 
above, the courts are willing to pierce the corporate veil in cases where the controlling 
members do not treat the company as a separate entity. However, in this test, the alter-ego 
enquiry is the only enquiry.  
 
The third test, better known as the “control test”, is allied to the “alter-ego test”.270 In the case 
of Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v Eskom271 the SCA held that 
the control test was suitable for the purpose of deciding whether a public company is the 
alter-ego of the government that established it. In this test, the court will pierce the corporate 
veil in circumstances where the members of the company have control and ownership over 
the company as well as its finances, resulting in a company that has no mind of its own. What 
is of crucial significance to the control test is the manner in which the control is exercised, 
and not the control itself.272 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this chapter has been two-fold. The first was to analyse the doctrines of the sham 
and the alter-ego in the context of trust law. Most importantly, this evaluation has been 
sourced from foreign law. Although no single jurisdiction can provide a firm stance on the 
doctrines, the consolidation of the approaches applied abroad most certainly shows a 
                                                             
269 PJ Payne “Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception” (1997) Cambridge LJ 284 at 
285. 
270 Cohen Veil Piercing 30. 
271 [1999] ZASCA 95. 
272 MP Larkin and FHI Cassim “Company Law” (2000) The Annual Survey of South African Law 486 at 491.  
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chronological progression towards a better understanding of these principles. The broad 
structural nature of the doctrines can now be clearly differentiated as well as understood.  
 
The second aim of this chapter has been to elucidate the basic principles of the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil. The latter examination is as important as the former as all three 
doctrines play a role in the confused state the South African law of trusts is currently 
experiencing. 
 
It is not incorrect to assume that the facts of a particular case will be determinative. However, 
it is imperative that a proper understanding of the principles and the application of these three 
doctrines is obtained prior to their use in court. The reason for this caution is that when the 
courts lift the veil, the effect thereof is substantial and is potentially damaging to the parties 
involved. It is for this reason that foreign courts observe the strictest approach (the Snook test) 
when considering the casting aside of a trust’s veneer. 
 
With regard to the sham doctrine, courts may choose to forgo the requirement that the 
abusive party be a settlor of the trust since such requirement may not serve any legitimate 
rationale. However, this not only debases the foundation of the Snook test, but also 
inappropriately exposes the trust to third-party piercing. This is because the settlor, along 
with the trust instrument, underpins a trust’s existence. In a nutshell, the Snook test is correct 
in that it maintains that a trust cannot be void if it was set up correctly and the settlor still, to 
the best of his or her knowledge and energy, carries forward the terms of the trust instrument. 
Trustees, on the other hand, form the foundation of a trust’s administration. Correctly, a 
trustee who acts contrary to the wishes of the settlor and against the trust instrument cannot 
alone affect the validity of a trust. The Trust Property Control Act273 accurately reflects this 
as a breach of his or her fiduciary duty, which does not in turn open the trust up to piercing. 
However, a settlor and a trustee together conspiring against the beneficiaries and/or the trust 
instrument should – and does – allow for an allegation of shamming which, if declared as 
such, will permit the trust to be set-aside and susceptible to third-party claims.  
                                                             
273 Section 9 - “Care, diligence and skill required of trustee”, read together with s 16 - “ Master may call upon 
trustee to account” and s 19 - “Failure by trustee to account or perform duties”. 
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Unmistakably, in order to justify a conclusion that the trust is a sham, the requisite intention 
to mislead must be a common intention of the parties and the test of intention is subjective. 
This is the only means of piercing the veneer of a trust inter vivos and it was revealed in 
Figure 4.1 above. “A device and a sham, a mask which the settlor holds before his face in an 
attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of equity.”274 Importantly, it must be recalled that a 
sham is not the same as where there is a valid trust but the trustee for whatever reason 
defaults on his or her duties and fails to administer the trust according to the instrument or 
any other legal duties. That is a breach of trust for which the trustee is personally liable to the 
beneficiaries of the trust for the losses caused. A finding of sham by a court is a finding that 
the trust does not and, never has, existed, barring an emerging sham. A trustee who has 
colluded with a settlor to create a sham exposes him- or herself to significant financial and 
regularity risk, because of the inherent element of deception involved in creating a sham.275 
Furthermore, an accusation of an alter-ego trust should always be distinguished from that of a 
shamming allegation. The conclusion that a trust is in fact a mere puppet of the settlor or 
trustee does no more than:  
1. add to the evidence which the courts consider when pronouncing on the validity of a 
trust, and  
2. expose the trustee to a claim for breach of his or her fiduciary duties. 
 
All the above theory is, however, hollow as it is devoid of a comparison between what this 
chapter has established as the most practical and modern interpretation of the doctrines, on 
the one hand, and the South African approach, on the other. The next chapter reveals that the 
two approaches are strikingly dissimilar. 
 
                                                             
274 Jones v Lipman 1962 1 WLR 832 at 836. 
275 Muller et al Anti-money Laundering 30. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The international framework set out in the previous chapter provides a benchmark for the 
application of the doctrines of the sham, the alter-ego and the piercing of the corporate veil. 
In this chapter relevant South African cases are measured against the foreign standards in 
order to contrast South Africa’s application of the principles with those of the rest of the 
world. Furthermore, the analysis of South African case law also focuses on instances where 
the sham doctrine was not employed, yet the veil of the trust was pierced.  
 
Although the application of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego are fiercely contested 
– with courts and commentators ascribing diverse meanings to them, one can be certain about 
the following presumption: the trust inter vivos cannot be pierced without a finding of a sham. 
At the bare minimum, a court should at least acknowledge the Snook test and decide on an 
alternative option if that is deemed to be in the interests of fairness and justice.  
 
The aim in this chapter is therefore to provide an exposition of the erroneous developments in 
South African trust law regarding the lifting of a trust’s veil. This enquiry involves many 
technical principles, often at play simultaneously, and the complexity has unmistakably 
caused much confusion, the result of which is a law of trusts not only muddied but 
unconcerned about the rights of beneficiaries – arguably the cornerstone of a trust. 
 
The starting point of this analysis is an examination of the rights of beneficiaries in South 
Africa, taking into account the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,1 the Trust 
Property Control Act 2  and the common law. This is followed by an account of the 
                                                             
1 Hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”. 
2 Act 57 of 1988. Hereafter referred to as “the Act”. 
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contradictions between South African trust laws and abroad. The segment looks in particular 
at South Africa’s unjustifiable amalgamation of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego; 
the interrelationship of the doctrines which has subsequently arisen; sham trusts in South 
Africa; and, lastly, alter-ego trusts in the Republic. The chapter then seeks to ascertain the 
correct consequences of a finding of a sham or an alter-ego trust, turning on the question of 
void and voidable trusts. 
 
2. THE RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES? 
The rights of beneficiaries are an important consideration, and should be kept in mind 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. More often than not, the effects of veil-lifting are 
serious, often denying beneficiaries the trust property which they had either a right to receive 
or, at least, a legitimate expectation of receiving. For this reason, it is imperative to have an 
appreciation of the nature of the beneficiaries’ rights in order to understand the underlying 
message of this work.  
 
To begin with, a beneficiary may have any number and a variety of rights, depending on the 
terms and conditions of the trust instrument or upon the manner in which trustees have, or 
have not, exercised their discretion in favour of a beneficiary. 3  The most important 
classification of these rights is into discretionary rights and vested rights, as well as income 
rights and capital rights.4 A discretionary right is nothing more than a contingent right – a 
spes or a hope. Importantly, contingent rights are not dependent on the exercise of a 
discretion, but may also be conditional upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event. To 
this extent, “[i]f a trust instrument provides that a beneficiary’s acquisition of a personal right 
to claim payment of trust income and/or capital from the trust’s trustee is not immediate but 
rather contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event, the right to trust income 
and/or capital will only vest in such beneficiary if and when the contingency has taken place 
or the condition has been fulfilled.” 5  Consequently, only if the trustees exercise their 
discretion in favour of a beneficiary with a discretionary right will that beneficiary benefit to 
                                                             
3 WD Geach and J Yeats Trusts Law and Practice (2007) 19. 
4 The differentiation of income rights and capital rights is discussed in Chapter 2. 
5 F du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles & Practice 2 ed (2007) 108. 
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the extent that the discretion has been exercised in their favour.6 Until such time as the 
trustees have exercised their discretion, a discretionary beneficiary has only a hope that some 
benefit will be received in the future. Thus, in the case of a discretionary trust, the 
beneficiaries do not have a vested right in the trust property, and any income or capital 
received by the beneficiary is determined purely in the discretion of the trustees.  
 
A vested right, on the other hand, gives a beneficiary far more certainty, in the sense that a 
beneficiary with a vested right knows exactly what he or she can expect in the way of assets, 
income or benefits from a trust.7 A vested right therefore allows a beneficiary to enforce that 
right by calling upon the trustees to deliver income or capital to the beneficiary. In particular, 
a beneficiary with a vested right carries a personal right or a right in personam. This right is a 
right against the trustees to claim income and/or capital or the transfer of an asset.8 This right 
can be contrasted with the discretionary right, which is nothing more than an optimistic 
expectation that income or capital will eventually accrue to a beneficiary. 
 
Vested or contingent, capital or income, beneficiaries do have rights which are inherent in the 
trust institution itself.9 The Act places several duties upon trustees to act in the best interests 
of the beneficiaries.10 Besides the fiduciary duties set out in s 9, s 13 allows a court to vary a 
trust instrument in instances, above all else, when a provision in the instrument prejudices the 
interests of beneficiaries. Section 20 of the Act empowers the Master or any person with such 
interest (such as a beneficiary) to apply to the High Court for the removal of a trustee. The 
application will be granted in terms of s 20(2)(e) if the applicant can prove that the trustee, 
amongst other things, failed to perform satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him or her 
under the Act. Thus, for instance, a beneficiary can, upon the presentation of sufficient 
                                                             
6 Geach and Yeats Trusts 20. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Geach and Yeats Trusts 21. 
9 As opposed to the nature of the right bestowed upon the beneficiary through the trust instrument. 
10 Section 9 of the Trust Property Control Act - “Care, diligence and skill required of trustee” states:  
“(1) A trustee shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise of his powers act with the care, 
diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages the affairs of 
another. 
  (2) Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so far as it would have the effect of 
exempting a trustee from or indemnifying him against liability for breach of trust where he fails to 
show the degree of care, diligence and skill as required in subsection (1).” 
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evidence in a court of law, have a trustee removed for failing to meet the necessary standard 
of care, diligence and skill required of him or her. 
 
Put simply, once a trust has been validly created, the beneficiaries have an interest in the trust 
property which should not easily be undone. Unfortunately, there seems to be a trend in 
South Africa to disregard completely the interests of beneficiaries. This problem extends far 
beyond Badenhorst v Badenhorst,11 but such a case is useful for highlighting this predicament. 
In the above case, there were six beneficiaries of the family trust in total. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Mr and Mrs Badenhorst were income beneficiaries, while the four children born of 
the marriage were capital beneficiaries. Furthermore, it is undeniable that each beneficiary 
had an interest in the trust and towards the trust property. For the children of the marriage, the 
capital interest they obtained was unquestionably res sic stantibus a matter of inheritance or 
at least a future donation, as was to be expected. The problem with the decision in this mater, 
it is submitted, is that upon the court’s declaration that the trust property be taken into 
consideration in the redistribution order, 50 per cent of the trust property would subsequently 
be handed over to one beneficiary, leaving the five remaining beneficiaries with the residue.  
 
It is acknowledged that the court did not order the transfer of half of the trust property; in fact, 
Mr Badenhorst was free to pay the amount in his own manner. He was free to sell trust assets 
necessary to make the payment, or for it to be taken out of his personal estate. Nevertheless, 
the net result was a loss in the value of Mr Badenhorst’s estate.12 It is correctly noted by 
Cameron et al that in South Africa, beneficiaries do not have an equitable interest in trust 
property as is the case under English law.13 Be that as it may, such an order still contradicts 
the very essence of a trust, and in particular a family trust. After all, if the trust really was a 
sham, then the beneficiaries’ rights would be illusory because the parties to the sham would 
almost certainly not intend really to benefit the beneficiaries.14 Courts should therefore be 
cautious in granting such orders in the light of the drastic outcome that may result. In this 
                                                             
11 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
12 Furthermore, should the respondent, for instance, have taken a mortgage bond out on any of the trust property 
in order to finance the redistribution of the trust property, the net loss incurred would have extended to the 
property within the trust. 
13 E Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed (2002) 23. 
14 So this problem therefore arises only where the trust is (wrongly) pierced because it is an alter-ego trust. 
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vein, the South African courts need to demonstrate added consideration to an allegation of 
shamming or a contention of an alter-ego trust. In the light of this, it is submitted that it was 
inequitable that the beneficiaries in Badenhorst suffered as a result of the court’s incorrect 
application of the relevant doctrines.  
 
In many instances, both the husband and the wife are trustees of a family trust. Moreover, 
both are usually beneficiaries of the trust. Unsurprisingly, this can become a difficult 
situation, because a trustee should always act impartially. The above situation ordinarily 
complicates the independence of the trustees, and often one of the spouses (or partners, as the 
case may be)15 will merely “go along” with the instructions and wishes of the other trustee-
spouse (or trustee-partner). Bearing this in mind, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
the outright majority of alter-ego trust disputes arise upon the dissolution of a marriage. As 
was the case in Badenhorst, the wife counter-claimed in the High Court and sought a 
redistribution order in terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act,16 whereby 50 per cent of the value 
of the plaintiff’s estate would be awarded to her, including the assets within the family trust. 
Mrs Badenhorst (the “non-trustee-spouse”) relied heavily on the contention that the family 
trust was the alter-ego of the plaintiff (the “dominant trustee-spouse”).  
 
Unlike this situation, similar divorce proceedings are met with the scenario that the spouses 
or partners are trustees of the family trust. Thus, in most instances, the party alleging the 
alter-ego is in fact a trustee and, as such, has accepted and held the office of trusteeship for 
many years prior to the divorce proceedings.17 The first mistake, which will soon become 
apparent, is that the passive trustee-spouse relies on the alter-ego contention in order to 
legitimise the piercing of the family trust and the subsequent inclusion of the trust assets in 
the personal estates of the spouses for redistribution purposes. This is incorrect, as it is certain 
that an alter-ego trust cannot on its own be pierced. As has been already discussed, proof of 
an alter-ego trust, according to the established trust doctrines, only serves as an item of 
                                                             
15 For the sake of fluidity herein, I will refer to “spouse” and “spouses”, and wish that it be interpreted to include 
Muslim marriages, customary marriages, same-sex life partnerships and any other form of official relationship 
recognised in South Africa. 
16 Act 70 of 1979. 
17 See, for example, Browne v Browne [1989] 1 FLR 292, Midland Bank Plc v Wyatt [1995] 1 FLR 696 and 
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
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evidence that the trust in question is a sham. However, not to veer off the point, one must 
again bear in mind that such a passive trustee-spouse did in fact accept the responsibilities 
and duties imposed upon him or her when that person accepted the position of trusteeship. 
Thus, although in many cases a passive trustee-spouse may contend that such position was 
undertaken under duress and through the directions of the other spouse, or that such person 
undertook the role in ignorance, neither knowing nor caring about the role that they had 
assumed, that person is still a legitimate trustee burdened by the common law and statutory 
duties which thus ensue. 
 
The above common scenario is cause for concern. Whether the spouse contending an 
allegation of alter-ego is or is not a co-trustee18 is of no relevance at this time. According to 
s 20(1) of the Act, a trustee may, on the application of any person having an interest in the 
trust property (ie a trustee or beneficiary, for instance), at any time be removed from his or 
her office by the court, if the court is satisfied that such removal will be in the interests of the 
trust and its beneficiaries. Furthermore, s 20(2)(e) of the Act allows the Master to remove any 
trustee from office if the trustee fails to perform satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him or 
her by or under the Act. Thus, the obvious question to pose is this: Why is the spouse 
contending an alter-ego trust only at the time of the dissolution of the marriage? 
 
The answer to the above question has hitherto been ignored in the South African courts. Is it 
fair that the soon-to-be-former spouse opposes the internal management of the family trust 
when it suits them? It is submitted that if the alleged alter-ego trust is a concern, then the 
spouse should have raised their objections earlier. This may seem idealistic, but any person 
                                                             
18 It should be borne in mind that in the event of a spouse’s not being a trustee, as is the case in Badenhorst, he 
or she would still (in most instances) have consented to the transfer of the shared family assets into the trust, and 
would be compensated by way of a payment or a loan account in their favour. Thus, such party, although not 
actively involved in the decisions of the trust, consented to the transfer of ownership of the assets and assumed 
the risks as well as the rewards which would have ensued once the assets fell behind the protective curtain of the 
family trust.  
The assets which were once part of the spouse’s personal estate are thus replaced by another, being the cash 
which that person received for their contribution to the trust, or a loan account. The loan account would thus 
become the only real right such spouse would now have in relation to a trust inter vivos, should the spouse be a 
non income or capital vested beneficiary. Legitimately, the spouse may claim what is owed to him or her upon 
divorce proceedings, as this is a personal right in their favour. Should the spouse have diminished the loan 
account by way of donation through the years, it should not follow that such a spouse should have recourse, as 
ignorance is not an excuse in our law.  
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accepting the office of trusteeship undertakes to perform their duties thereafter and to take 
reasonable steps to guard the trust property in the interests of the beneficiaries. In the case of 
a spouse’s not being a trustee, that person still has a right to have the trustee removed, and the 
wording of s 20 of the Act clearly intends this. The fact that the allegations are made upon 
divorce proceedings seems to demonstrate that the “interested party” was comfortable with 
the trust arrangements for the duration of the relationship.  
 
The above argument is predictably compounded in the case of a trustee-spouse’s contending, 
upon the dissolution of their marriage that the trust is the alter-ego of his or her co-trustee-
spouse. Given that the passive trustee-spouse has accepted the office of trusteeship, that 
trustee will hold the exact same duties and responsibilities that the other trustees do. Thus, 
any transactions made by, or other behaviour of, the dominant trustee-spouse which may 
point to the existence of an alter-ego trust, should be contended immediately. In the majority 
of cases, the trust instrument empowers a trustee only to make certain transactions upon the 
approval of the other trustees, otherwise the transaction is void, barring further leeway 
provided by the trust instrument.  
 
To restate this as a practical example: a husband and wife are co-trustees. The wife in this 
scenario is the passive trustee throughout the existence of her trusteeship. However, upon the 
application for a divorce, she inevitably contends that she ‘merely went along with the wishes 
of her husband’ and that the trust was her husband’s alter-ego and that she is therefore 
entitled to a half-portion of the trust property because the assets “should be treated as being 
part of his estate upon redistribution”. Would this not be firm evidence that the wife is in fact 
in breach of her fiduciary duties as a trustee? It is submitted that the answer to this question is 
“yes”, and there are a few reasons for this submission:  
 
First, any trustee, whether independent, passive or active, has a duty to act with care, 
diligence and skill. This duty is enforced in the Act itself and provides that a trustee must act 
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with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be expected of a person who manages 
the affairs of another.19 Geach and Yeats submit that:  
 
“Reckless behaviour by a trustee would clearly fall foul of this provision, but so would negligence, 
sloppiness, and general tardiness in carrying out any act on behalf of the trust. A trustee can, it seems, 
fall foul of this duty either by an act or by an omission, and a trustee who merely leaves trust matters in 
the hands of others, with no further query or interest, would most certainly be in breach of this duty.”20 
 
The passive trustee-spouse in the above example clearly falls within those guidelines, and 
thus failed to fulfil her duty. 
 
Second, all trustees are bound to find unanimity in making decisions. This duty (which can be 
overridden by the trust instrument), which is imposed upon all trustees through the common 
law, implies that all substantive decisions be made unanimously, and that non-substantive 
issues be decided by majority vote.21  Past decisions and transactions made prior to the 
pending alter-ego dispute in the example above should have been concluded as such. Thus, 
the passive trustee-spouse either agreed and confirmed the dominant trustee-spouse’s 
decisions, or failed to raise a concern or dispute a decision. In consequence, all trustees are 
bound jointly by the acts, decisions and undertakings of the other trustees which have been 
approved. Any unapproved activities are most certainly deemed to be approved should the 
other trustees fail to dispute their validity. It can therefore be concluded that the passive 
trustee-spouse did in fact approve the alleged “alter-ego” actions of her co-spouse, or 
otherwise omitted to argue the validity of the decisions, and failed to comply with this duty, 
as well as the previously mentioned duty.  
 
An interesting argument which has not yet been raised is whether the doctrine of estoppel has 
any application in the above circumstances. In particular, the implication of accepting 
estoppel by acquiescence is that because the passive trustee failed to refute the active 
trustee’s alter-ego actions, the passive trustee may be said to have acquiesced to the position 
                                                             
19 Section 9 of the Act. 
20 Geach and Yeats Trusts 85. 
21 Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 (5) SA 674 (T). 
142 
 
taken by the active trustee, and thus is considered to have lost the legal right to claim an alter-
ego trust later on. 
 
Third, any trustee who accepts office, no matter the terms of his or her appointment, has a 
duty to act independently. This may seem difficult when the co-trustee is a spouse, but the 
truth of the matter is that the passive trustee-spouse accepted the office of trusteeship, and 
had therefore undertaken to be bound by the duties imposed upon him or her. If any duty was 
to be seen as impossible to adhere to, then such trustee should not have accepted the 
appointment. This duty is eloquently described by Geach and Yeats as follows: “A trustee 
must exercise an independent discretion at all times with respect to trust matters, and must 
not be under the undue influence of any person, particularly not of the planner or founder of 
the trust.”22 It can therefore be concluded that a passive trustee-spouse alleging that the 
family trust is the alter-ego of his or her co-trustee-spouse has failed to comply with this duty, 
because such trustee was, and still is, under a duty to act impartially as well as to dispute any 
activities which are not in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 
 
Fourth, it must be remembered that a trustee occupies a fiduciary position. A trustee is, as a 
result, legally bound to act at all times within the confines of the law in the best interests of 
all the beneficiaries. Therefore, surely a trustee who seeks a court order to include the family 
trust assets in the other spouse’s estate for the purposes of a redistribution order is in breach 
of his or her fiduciary duty owed to beneficiaries? Certainly the consequences of such an 
order would not be to the benefit of the beneficiaries. Of course, such an order would be to 
the benefit of one beneficiary – being the spouse who is seeking to reclaim about half of the 
assets in the trust (assuming that person is also a beneficiary), but this would undeniably be to 
the detriment of the remaining beneficiaries and therefore contradicts the very essence of the 
office which such trustee has accepted and by which they are subsequently bound. 
 
Last, all of the above reasons are supported by a trustee’s power to take legal opinions and to 
enter into law suits or to go to arbitration. Accordingly, a trustee is bound, in the discharge of 
                                                             
22 Geach and Yeats Trusts 91. 
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the duties of trusteeship, to settle any objections or differences which may arise between 
trustees legally. As such, there cannot be any excuse for failing to resolve any problems 
which may have arisen and which led to the apparent alter-ego circumstances. 
 
Consequently, it can be argued that a passive trustee-spouse who for the first time alleges that 
the trust is the alter-ego of the co-trustee-spouse only upon divorce proceedings has in fact 
breached one or many trustee duties which he or she was or is bound by, and is consequently 
in breach of. Furthermore, if one were to analyse the concept of an alter-ego trust, it may be 
argued that because the passive trustee-spouse has not corrected or even contested the 
activities of the other co-trustee until divorce, and has in fact been willing to safeguard his or 
her assets in trust as it suited them and then seen fit to cry foul and level accusations when it 
did not, then, ironically, that may become evidence that the trust was in fact the alter-ego of 
the passive co-trustee-spouse. 
 
Regarding the rights of beneficiaries, another question that arises upon the allegation of a 
sham or an alter-ego is this: Where does the Constitution fit in with all of the above? Section 
25(1) of the Constitution states that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
Undoubtedly, the provision applies to trust property, and should therefore have a bearing on 
the potential deprivation of the property from a beneficiary. The question thus arises: when a 
spouse seeks an order to include trust property in the personal estate of the other spouse, 
would the effect thereof not be to deprive other beneficiaries arbitrarily of the trust property, 
assuming the remaining beneficiaries hold a similar legal title to the assets? The legal 
conundrum posed is therefore for a direct horizontal application of the property rights. 
Section 8, the application section of the Bill of Rights, provides for the direct horizontal 
application of fundamental rights in certain circumstances.23 According to Currie and de 
Waal, “direct horizontal application means that the rights protected in the Bill bind not only 
the state in its relations with individuals, but that individuals may, where appropriate, directly 
assert their constitutional rights both against the state and other individuals.”24 Section 8(2) of 
                                                             
23 I Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 557. 
24 Currie and de Waal BOR Handbook 558. 
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the Constitution provides that a provision of the Bill of Rights will bind individuals “if, and 
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and of any duty 
imposed by the right”. It is submitted that a beneficiary with a vested right in a trust property 
may be able to argue successfully that the inclusion of trust property for the purposes of a 
redistribution order is an arbitrary deprivation of property. This would, of course, be a “last 
resort” route for beneficiaries. Such beneficiaries may arguably have more success bringing a 
claim to the High Court for damages arising out of the passive trustee’s breach of trust.25 
 
The exposé in this section serves to add an additional and important point of view. As yet, in 
their judgments the South African courts have not considered the effects of a finding of a 
sham or an alter-ego on the remaining beneficiaries. Moreover, the duties accepted by a 
passive trustee-spouse have seemingly been forgotten. It is fairly evident at this point that all 
trustees are obliged to adhere to the duties they accepted upon appointment and one set of 
fiduciary standards should apply to all trustees. Importantly, this section differentiated 
between trustee-spouses and non-trustee-spouses. As has been made abundantly clear, a co-
trustee-spouse should also be measured against the fiduciary yardstick he or she seeks to 
enforce against the other. Significantly, though, it must be remembered that a non-trustee-
spouse who seeks to invoke the alter-ego doctrine against their soon to be ex-spouse also had 
recourse during the subsistence of their marriage. The powers granted in the Act26 would 
most definitely allow a concerned spouse to seek recourse against a mischievous trustee-
spouse. In fact, not only would such a route be considered feasible, it would be in the best 
interests of the spouse to do so, because any actions undertaken by the trustee-spouse which 
are not legitimate may lead to an allegation of a sham by a third party, and may therefore 
jeopardise the safety of the trust property.  
 
                                                             
25 The following should however be considered: in Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NNO 2006 (4) SA 
205 (C) at paras 19–20, Griesel J states: “However, even if it were to be held that the order sought does indeed 
constitute a ‘deprivation’, I am not persuaded that any such deprivation could be regarded as ‘arbitrary’. For a 
deprivation to be arbitrary, it must be procedurally unfair or must take place without sufficient reason.” The 
learned judge insisted at paras 19–20 that deprivation of property would not be considered arbitrary given a 
court hearing. 
26 Specifically s 20(1) of the Act:  
“A trustee may, on the application of the Master or any person having an interest in the trust property, at any 
time be from office by the court if the court is satisfied that such removal will be in the interests of the trust 
and its beneficiaries”. 
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On this point, it is submitted that both trustee-spouses and non-trustee-spouses who, for the 
first time, bring forward an alter-ego allegation during divorce proceedings, have most 
definitely weakened their case because an alter-ego allegation is a serious one, bringing about 
a variety of consequences, some of which can be severe.  
 
So it follows that such accusation should have been pursued earlier had the trust in fact truly 
been the alter-ego of the other spouse. Waiting until divorce proceedings may thus lead to the 
inference that the spouse who is pointing fingers was actually content with the goings on of 
the family trust prior to the proceedings. Will this, however, be enough to succeed in an 
argument of estoppel and/or to support a claim for damages for breach of trust? A foreseen 
compromise by the courts could in fact be to take the trustee’s passivity into account in 
making the redistribution order. 
 
3. THE CONTRADICTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICAN TRUST LAW 
In a series of recent judgments, the SCA has emphasised the importance of adherence to basic 
trust principles in the formation and administration of trusts.27 In Land and Agricultural Bank 
of South Africa v Parker and Others28 Cameron JA explained that during the last two decades 
there had been a change in that certain types of trust had developed in which functional 
separation between control and enjoyment was entirely lacking.29 Following similar lines, 
various cases have emerged in which the courts have sought to straighten out the unwanted 
tendencies which had begun to increase in the country. Unintentionally, however, the 
development of South African trust law which would thus ensue 30  created many 
contradictions within that sphere of law. In particular, the interrelationship of the doctrines of 
the sham and the alter-ego has become confused. It is furthermore submitted that the 
doctrines have been mistakenly employed, resulting in the fusion of incompatible company 
law doctrines with those reserved for the law of trusts. The unwarranted, and for the most part 
unforeseen adverse effects have seemingly debased the essence and primary purpose of the 
                                                             
27 A Van Der Linde and S Lombard “Nel v Metequity Ltd 2007 (3) SA 34 (SCA)” 2007 De Jure 429 at 429. 
28 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
29 Para 25. 
30 See, for example, Van der Merwe. 
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doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego, resulting in a highly dissimilar operation of the trust 
doctrines to that of its foreign law usage. The section below tells this story. 
 
3.1 THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE DOCTRINES OF THE SHAM AND 
THE ALTER-EGO 
A common misconception that has evolved locally is that a trust may be disregarded if it is 
the alter-ego of the settlor or dominant trustee. This is, however, a challenge faced throughout 
the common law jurisdictions abroad. In Australia and New Zealand the impression that a 
trust may be disregarded if it is an alter-ego trust or “puppet” of the settlor once dominated 
the respective Family Law Courts.  
 
The misunderstanding which emerged was debated at length over the years until the correct 
position crystallised in The Official Assignee v Wilson & Anor and Others.31 As was noted in 
the previous chapter, the Australian case of In the Marriage of Gould32 was an important 
milestone in the resolution of this matter. In Fogarty J’s judgment, the learned judge 
explained the material difference between the two doctrines as follows: 
 
“... the description of an entity as the ‘alter ego’ or ‘puppet’ of a person really denotes something 
different. Correctly described, it is not an assertion that it is a ‘counterfeit, a facade or a false front’. 
Rather, it describes an actual situation although as a matter of law or practicality the actions of the 
other entity may be capable of and may in fact be controlled by the party in question … a party may 
establish a trust over which he or she exercises control. It may be correct to describe that trust as the 
alter ego or even perhaps the puppet of that party, but it would not be correct to describe its existence 
or its ownership or control of property as a sham.”33 
 
                                                             
31 [2006] NZHC 389. 
32 [1993] 17 FLR 156. 
33 Para 167.  
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Interestingly though, many years prior to the above rationalisation, Richardson J explored the 
possibility of having a “half way house” between the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego. 
The statement is to be found in the case of Re Securitibank Limited (No 2)34as follows: 
 
“I consider there is no halfway house in this class of case where, as Barker J expressed it, there is ‘a 
situation where the documents indeed record the intention of the parties but which are considered by 
the Court not to express the pith and substance of the transaction’. It is a matter of first ascertaining the 
true nature of the transaction by a consideration of the legal character of the agreement which embodies 
the transaction. It is only where the genuineness of the agreement evidenced by the documents is 
challenged that it is then necessary to consider whether the substance of the transaction as represented 
by the documents is not the true substance of the transaction and the documents themselves are a cloak 
to conceal its true nature.”35 
 
In G v T36 O’Reilly J confirmed the findings held in Gould, which were applied in The 
Official Assignee v Wilson. The High Court decision handed down by Chisholm J was 
ingeniously well expressed, and the importance of the following assertion should not be 
under-estimated:  
 
“If alter ego trusts were to be automatically recognised as shams that underlying requirement would be 
negated. The result would be that a half way house between a conventional sham trust and a valid trust 
would be created. In Re Securitibank Limited (No 2) … Richardson J seems to have rejected the 
possibility that there is any half way house. I accept that view. It seems to be that to adopt a half way 
house would be to effectively re-write the traditional understanding of a sham … Put another way, the 
fact that a trust is the alter ego or puppet of the settlor does not of itself make the trust a sham because, 
amongst other things, the requisite common intention for a sham will not necessarily be present.”37 
 
The rule that emerged became known as the “no half way house” rule, and it is clearly correct. 
In Official Assignee in Bankruptcy in the Property of Gary Martin Reynolds v Wilson and 
Others,38 the Court of Appeal had predictably expressed its distaste for the previous findings 
                                                             
34 [1978] 2 NZLR 136 (CA). 
35 At 168. 
36 [2003] FamCA 1076. 
37 The Official Assignee v Wilson at paras 57–58. 
38 2008 NZCA 122. 
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of the New Zealand Family Law Court’s decisions in Prime v Hardie39 and Glass v Hughey40 
as well as many other Australian Family Court rulings where the courts had disregarded trusts 
on the basis that they were effectively the alter-ego of the settlor.  
 
Robertson J further noted: 
 
“Factual control of a trust by someone other than those authorised to have such power is not an 
irrelevant consideration. Such control may give rise to a claim for breach of trust. Evidence of such 
control may be relevant to the question of whether a trust is a sham in that it may evidence a lack of 
true intention to form a trust. That is not to say that an alter ego trust is the same as a sham. A finding 
of effective control may help establish that a trust is a sham if it indicates that it was not intended that 
the trust take effect according to its terms. To establish a sham, the intention to mislead must be shown 
to have existed from the inception of the trust (or from the time when particular property was disposed 
to the trust). Evidence of effective control of the trust post settlement may be used to infer the requisite 
intention. We are satisfied that Chisholm J’s treatment of the alter ego trust argument was correct. Alter 
ego trusts are not an independent cause of action, nor are they the same as shams. In the trust context, 
alter ego arguments are confined to evidence to help establish a sham which is how he treated the 
matter.”41 
 
In the South African context, aside from Ngwenya J’s a quo judgment of in the Badenhorst v 
Badenhorst42 case, the “no half way house” rule has repeatedly been broken. In Badenhorst, 
the court a quo judge expressed the correct position to be undertaken by the courts when he 
noted that, in order for the redistribution order to take into account the assets held in the 
family trust, the court would have to find the trust to be a sham, and not the alter-ego of Mr 
Badenhorst.43 This is the current approach undertaken overseas which gives effect to the 
sham doctrine and is congruent with the notion that the alter-ego trust argument cannot on its 
own be an independent cause of action. With regard to the allegation of the trust’s being Mr 
Badenhorst’s alter-ego, the trial court accepted evidence which plainly contradicted this. 
Under cross-examination, Mrs Badenhorst conceded that her husband had always consulted 
his co-trustee when dealing with the finances and immovable properties pertaining to the trust. 
                                                             
39 [2003] NZLR 481. 
40 [2003] NZFLR 865. 
41 Paras 71–72. 
42 2005 (2) SA 253 (C). 
43 Para 25. 
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Furthermore, Mrs Badenhorst had kept the trust assets as a bookkeeper separately from those 
of the plaintiff. She testified further that, where the plaintiff was to make payment on behalf 
of the trust from his personal account, the trust was debited accordingly, and vice versa.44 
Ngwenya J accordingly held that “[a]part from the general statements that the plaintiff was 
manipulating the trust there is no factual basis upon which [the court can] come to the 
conclusion that the trust was a vehicle through which the plaintiff protected himself”.45  
 
Unfortunately, the coherence displayed in Ngwenya J’s decision was later undone on appeal 
to the SCA. In the later case, Combrinck AJA implicitly accepted the trial court’s conclusion 
that, unless the court finds the trust to be a sham, no redistribution order can be made.46 This 
was, however, all that was discussed on the matter, after which the acting judge went on to 
rule in favour of Mrs Badenhorst. Combrinck AJA held that the present case was a classic 
example of the one party having full control of the assets of the trust, and merely using it as a 
vehicle for his business activities. The court held that the value of the trust assets should have 
been added to the value of the respondent’s estate and, on the basis of this decision, that the 
decision of the trial judge to exclude the trust assets amounted to a clear misdirection.47  
 
This supports the academic opinion that in Badenhorst the court did in fact find the trust to be 
a sham.48 Worryingly, however, Combrinck AJA’s reasoning for the inclusion of the trust 
assets was that Mr Badenhorst had full control of the assets of the trust and used the trust as 
his own personal vehicle in pursuit of his own private business affairs. Thus, the Appeal 
Court had pierced the trust by way of the alter-ego doctrine, even though it was expressly 
agreed upon that such redistribution could not occur without a finding of a sham. Failing to 
observe his own words, Combrinck AJA neither cited nor in any way relied upon the Snook 
test. This is the half way house Robertson J had cautioned against. It is plainly evident 
                                                             
44 Para 23. 
45 Para 23. 
46 Para 7. 
47 Para 13. 
48 See, for example, H Joffe “The Future of Trust Law” (2007) DR 25 at 26.  
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therefore that Combrinck AJA pierced the veneer of the trust solely on the finding of an alter-
ego.49  
 
3.2 THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL 
Judicial discretion to disregard a juristic person’s separate personality is a generally accepted 
principle in South African common law.50 The separate juristic personality of a company can 
be disregarded by way of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Notably, the doctrine was recognised as part of the South African legal system in the case of 
Lategan and Another v Boyes and Another NNO,51 where Le Roux J held, “I have no doubt 
that our Courts would brush aside the veil of corporate identity time and again where 
fraudulent use is made of the fiction of legal personality.”52 Furthermore, in terms of s 65 of 
the Close Corporations Act, 53  the judiciary is empowered to negate separate juristic 
personality where it is found that “the corporation of, or any act by or on behalf of, or any use 
of, that corporation, constitutes a gross abuse of the juristic personality of the corporation as a 
separate entity”.54 
 
The ability to brush aside the corporate façade is nevertheless limited, and for good reason. In 
Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd55 Smalberger JA was emphatic 
on the point that:  
 
“… a court has no general discretion simply to disregard a company’s separate legal personality 
whenever it considers it just to do so … It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our courts should not 
lightly disregard a company’s separate personality, but should strive to give effect to and uphold it. To 
do otherwise would negate or undermine the policy and principles that underpin the concept of separate 
corporate personality and the legal consequences that attach to it. But where fraud, dishonesty or other 
improper conduct … [is] found to be present, other considerations will come into play. The need to 
                                                             
49 Without sufficient recognition being given to doctrine of the sham, it would be unwarranted to adduce that the 
learned judge had conflated the alter-ego enquiry with the sham doctrine. 
50 Van der Linde and Lombard 2007 De Jure 436. 
51 1980 (4) SA 191 (T). 
52 At 201. 
53 Act 69 of 1984. 
54 Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act.  
55 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
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preserve the separate corporate identify would in such circumstances have to be balanced against 
policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil.”56 
 
It has therefore been well established that a court can pierce a corporate veil by treating the 
assets, rights or liabilities of a company as those of its controlling shareholder, whether to 
impose liability upon the company for its controller’s action or to impose a liability of the 
company upon its controller, where the company’s action has operated to mask an action that, 
in substance, is the act of the controller.57 In Parker the underlying question was whether it 
was possible to pierce the veneer of a trust so as to attribute its assets to the trustees. 
Indirectly the answer given by Cameron JA was in the affirmative, although a careful reading 
between the lines of the lengthy judgment is needed in order to arrive at this conclusion.  
 
In reply to any criticisms against this thesis, there are several judgments subsequent to Parker 
in which the court applied the dictum of Cameron JA. These cases form the “ripple effect” 
previously referred to in this thesis. The most recent of those is the matter of Van der Merwe 
as well as Knoop NO and Others v Birkenstock Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others.58 The facts 
in Knoop involved the applicants, who were the trustees in the insolvent estate of Etrecia 
Birkenstock and who sought an anti-dissipation order from the Bloemfontein High Court. In 
coming to a decision, Nxusani J referred to the Parker judgment and noted the following: 
 
“… A court may be empowered to go behind a Trust form. This may exist where enjoyment and 
control are not functionally separate in the Trust instrument. It is this separation that serves to secure 
diligence on the part of Trustees because it secures diligence since a lapse may be visited with action 
by the beneficiaries whose interests conduce to proper control. This separation also ensures 
independence and the careful scrutiny of transactions designed to bind the Trust.”59 
“… Where Family Trusts are concerned it usually occurs that functional separation between control 
and enjoyment is lacking. These Business Trusts are designed to secure the interests and protection of a 
                                                             
56 At 29–31. 
57 DJ Hayton “Shams, Piercing Veils, Remedial Constructive Trusts and Tracing” (2004) 8 JLR 1 at 2. 
58 [2009] ZAFSHC 67. 
59 Para 26. 
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group of family members either identified in the Trust by name or by descent or by degree of kingship 
(sic) to the founder.”60 
“… Where a Family Trust is set up to ensure either estate planning or to escape the constraints imposed 
by corporate law and assets are put into a Trust, a court may in appropriate cases look beyond the Trust 
form. A critical consideration here would be the time-line between the creation of the Trust and the 
complaint regarding the conduct.”61 
“… The reason for looking behind the Trust form is because usually everything has remained ‘as 
before’. Where the rupture of the control/enjoyment divide results in abuse, beneficiaries who control 
the Trust, will in their capacities as Trustees, have little or no independent interest in ensuring that 
transactions are validly concluded. If things go awry they would have every inducement as 
beneficiaries to deny the Trust’s liability. They are also unscrupulous in that they are easily able to rely 
on deficiencies in form or lack of authority because their conduct as Trustees is unlikely to be 
scrutinised by the beneficiaries. In such cases the Trustees are the beneficiaries or those who through 
close family connection have an identity of interest with them.”62 
 
Evidently Nxusani J was of the opinion that a court does in fact have the discretion to pierce a 
trust in the same way as a company or a close corporation. If one were to disagree with this 
submission, consideration would have to be given to para 17 of his judgment: 
  
“In my opinion it matters not whether the corporate entity is a Trust or a company. Provided it can be 
established on a balance of probabilities, that the particular transactions complained of were the tainted 
fruits of fraud or other improper conduct, a court would, in appropriate circumstances, disregard the 
separate legal personality in order to reveal the perpetrator as the ‘true villain of the piece’.”63 
 
Essentially, these are comments made in the light of Cameron JA’s decision in Parker.64 
Notably, the circumstances described by Cameron JA and Nxusani J in which it may be 
appropriate to pierce the veneer of a trust are similar to those applicable to a company. 
Crucially though, a trust misses the key ingredient which motivates the application of the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil – separate legal personality. In this regard a company 
                                                             
60 Para 28. 
61 Para 29. 
62 Para 30. 
63 Para 17. 
64 Amongst other cases, see further Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
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is distinct from those who control it. This allows a company to perform juristic acts in its own 
name, as well as to sue and be sued. This, according to the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd,65 is what affords the members of close corporations and directors of companies the well-
established protection against personal liability. This is the core of the corporate veneer. 
Needless to say, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil acts to discard the separate 
corporate personality of a company or close corporation. A trust, on the other hand, does not 
have separate legal personality, nor does it have persona standi in iudicio. It thus follows that, 
on a technical front, the doctrine is incompatible with the trust entity. Evidently this was not 
taken into consideration in the Parker case.  
 
The court also referred to another company law principle known as the Turquand Rule. 
Based on the case of Royal British Bank v Turquand,66 the rule dictates that each outsider 
contracting with the company in good faith is entitled to assume that the internal 
requirements and procedures have been complied with, even if they are not. The company 
will consequently be bound by the contract even though all matters of internal management 
and procedure (to enable the representative to act on behalf of the company) have not been 
complied with. 67  Cameron JA reasoned that within its scope, the rule that outsiders 
contracting with an entity and dealing in good faith may assume that acts performed within 
its constitution and powers have been properly and duly performed, and are not bound to 
enquire whether acts of internal management have been complied with. Furthermore, the 
learned judge reasoned that the rule may well in suitable cases have a useful role to play in 
safeguarding outsiders from the spurious contestation of liability by trusts that conclude 
business transactions.68  
 
Geach and Yeats correctly point out that the difficulty in applying the Turquand Rule to 
trusts is that it is not always obvious what constitutes an act of internal management.69 In 
                                                             
65 [1897] AC 22 (HL). 
66 [1856] 119 ER 866. 
67 ML Benade et al Entrepreneurial Law 4 ed (2008) 151. 
68 L Stander “Piercing the Veneer of the Trust in South African Trust Law: Liability of Trustees of a Business 
Trust for Fraudulent Trading” (2008) 17 INSOL 165 at 170; Parker para 18. 
69 Geach and Yeats Trusts 68. 
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Nieuwoudt and Another NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk70 the trust had entered into an 
agreement with a close corporation for the sale of 900 tons of maize which had not yet been 
planted. The agreement was concluded by one of the trustees and was later ceded to the 
respondent. In response to a request for acknowledgement of the cession by the cessionary, 
the trust alleged that the original document was a nullity, and would not be given effect to. 
The SCA in this matter, although not deciding on whether or not the Turquand Rule applied 
to trusts, did state that one must not believe that the ambit of authority conferred by a trust 
instrument is simply a matter of internal management with which outsiders need not concern 
themselves.71 The court did, however, make it known that a third party pleading ignorance of 
the ambit of authority of trustees will not be accepted. It follows that where a specified 
number of trustees are required in terms of the trust instrument (as was the case with the 
Parkers’ trust instrument), the appointed trustees lack authority to act on behalf of the trust. It 
too is clear that the failure to appoint the required number of trustees is not simply an act of 
internal management. Therefore the Turquand Rule will operate only in cases where there is 
a need for internal formalities, and then the rule operates in favour of the person who would 
have no way of knowing whether or not these internal formalities took place. 72  In 
Nieuwoudt’s case, Harms JA stated that a third party would not be entitled to assume, merely 
from the fact that one trustee can be authorised to exercise the powers of all of them, that 
such authorisation had in fact been given.73 
 
Truth be told, the use and practicality of the Turquand Rule in trust law is a moot point. The 
uncertainty, once again faced by importing a distinctively company law doctrine, surely 
outweighs any advantages of such a development.74  
 
One cannot describe the impact of the Turquand Rule without considering the doctrine of 
constructive notice. In the case of companies, the doctrine of constructive notice denotes that 
                                                             
70 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA). 
71 Para 21. 
72 Geach and Yeats Trusts 69. 
73 Para 22. 
74 First, the courts have displayed an unwillingness to accept that the failure to appoint the required number of 
trustees is an act of internal management, defeating the point of this rule’s incorporation. Second, as has been 
cautioned in the latter part of this argument, rewriting the law of trusts requires extraordinary circumstances. It 
is submitted that such circumstances fail to exist in this instance. 
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a person transacting with a company is deemed to have notice of any restriction upon a 
director or officer’s authority that is contained in the company’s constitution.75 Therefore the 
doctrine operates in favour of companies and against a person who has not read its 
constitution, and a person in such a circumstance cannot plead that he or she did not know of 
the provisions of the company’s constitution as he or she is deemed to know them. 76 
Importantly, the doctrine does not apply to close corporations, because s 17 of the Close 
Corporations Act specifically excludes the presumption of constructive notice of particulars 
in the founding statement and other documents.77 In the case of companies, however, the 
doctrine of constructive notice may apply. Every member of the public has a right of access 
to the memorandum and articles lodged with the Registrar. However, with regard to trusts, 
outsiders do not have an automatic right of access to the copies of a trust instrument which is 
lodged with the Master.78 According to s 18 of the Act, the Master will consider giving copies 
of this document only to those outsiders who in the opinion of the Master can show sufficient 
interest in the trust instrument and subsequent payment of the prescribed fee. Notably, the 
effect of the Nieuwoudt judgment regarding internal management and a third party’s inability 
to plead ignorance is that this principle has the same effect as the doctrine of constructive 
notice. Geach and Yeats submit that this is so, even though (a) there is no central register for 
trusts such as for companies and close corporations, (b) there are several Master’s offices, 
and (c) a Master may refuse an outsider sight of a trust instrument.79 
 
This viewpoint is not supported by the author. Cameron et al argues in favour, noting that the 
“suggestion that the ambit of authority conferred by the trust instrument is a matter of 
‘internal management’ with which outsiders need not concern themselves is contrary to both 
principle and authority and must be discounted”. 80  In this vein, the only established 
consequence where trustees purport to bind the trust but act without the requisite authority or 
represent an incapacitated trust, prior to Parker, is an action against the trustees in their 
                                                             
75 Blackman Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) S-36. 
76 Geach and Yeats Trusts 67. 
77 Section 17 of the Close Corporations Act states:  
“No person shall be deemed to have knowledge of any particulars merely because such particulars are stated, 
or referred to, in any founding statement or other document regarding a corporation registered by the 
Registrar or lodged with him, or which is kept at the registered office of a corporation in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act.” 
78 Note further that if the trust is foreign, the trust instrument is unlikely to be lodged anywhere as most foreign 
jurisdictions regard trusts as purely private institutions. 
79 Geach and Yeats Trusts 69. 
80 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 324. 
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capacity as such on the grounds of unjust enrichment, should the trust estate have been 
enriched.81 Therefore, the acceptance of the constructive notice doctrine into trust law fails 
for many reasons, including those noted by Geach and Yeats above. Moreover, much like the 
Turquand Rule, this doctrine was constructed specifically within the scope of company law 
and it does not logically follow that such a device has application in the field of trust law. 
 
Ultimately, neither the Turquand Rule nor the doctrine of constructive notice has a place in 
trust law. The incompatibility of both principles with trust law is evident in their application 
to company law. The ambit of the Turquand Rule is limited only to the internal management 
of a corporation and the SCA expressly noted this in Nieuwoudt.82 Cameron et al did not fully 
consider the degree of the extension proposed.  
 
Ironically, in Honoré, Cameron et al states the following when commenting on the case of 
Man Truck & Bus SA v Victor:83 
 
“It is certainly in our view wrong to impose on the trust, which has no legal personality, company law 
doctrines such as the Turquand rule (Royal British Bank v Turquand [1856] 119 ER 866 (Ex Ch)), 
under which outsiders dealing with a company are entitled to assume that internal rules and regulations 
have been fulfilled. The decision to this effect in Man Truck & Bus SA v Victor 2001 (2) SA 562 (NC), 
reached with no allusion to trust law principles or authorities, disregarded beneficiaries’ interests while 
overlooking the fact that outsiders dealing with a trust know that they are not dealing with a 
company.”84 
 
Accordingly, in Honoré Cameron et al agrees with my viewpoints, yet provides for the 
opposite ratio decidendi in the Parker case. This was not a once-off statement either: 
Cameron et al further remarks in Honoré that the judgment in the Man Truck & Bus SA case 
“illustrates the danger of imprudently translocating legal doctrines from one area of the law to 
                                                             
81 Ferera Ltd v Vos NO and Others 1953 (3) SA 450 (A) at 465. 
82 In Nieuwoudt, the court reasoned that a third party would not be entitled to assume, merely from the fact that 
one trustee can be authorised to exercise the powers of all of them, that such authorisation has in fact been given. 
83 2001 (2) SA 562 (NC). 
84 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 95 (at note 437). 
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another without due caution and consideration.”85 Cameron et al therefore highlights the very 
point this thesis seeks to make.  
 
Both the Re Esteem Settlement, Grupo Torras SA and Others v Sabah and Others86 and 
Shalson and Others v Russo and Others87 cases are also noteworthy for being occasions 
where the Court was invited to lift the veil of the trust. Richmond-Coggan suggests that the 
extension of the principle to trusts is dangerous, which, if it were to be accepted by the courts, 
would create great uncertainty for trustees and beneficiaries alike.88 Unlike in South Africa, a 
resoundingly negative answer was given in both cases. In the Esteem Settlement case, the 
Jersey Royal Court considered at length whether such a principle could apply even in relation 
to trusts. In this matter the applicants sought to persuade the court that, where the interests of 
justice required it, the court was entitled to look behind the trust and treat the assets as if they 
were the individual’s own.89 In considering this question, the court emphasised the distinction 
between a company, which is a legal entity in its own right, and a trust, which is instead 
really no more than a statement of the duties owed by the trustees to their beneficiaries.90 The 
Jersey Royal Court therefore refused to adopt the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, 
noting that the principle has no applicability to trusts. The findings in the Esteem Settlement 
case did not, however, deter the claimants in Shalson from inviting the court to pierce the 
veneer of Mr Russo’s settlement. The court also dismissed the invitation, noting that the 
suggestion had no legal limb on which to stand on.91 
 
3.3 SHAM TRUSTS 
Evidently, South African courts and local academics alike have struggled to grasp the 
doctrine of the sham. More often than not, the term “sham” has been widely used to describe 
the apparent abuse of the trust inter vivos, without any further elaboration. Worryingly, many 
writers and judges seem to use the words “sham”, “veneer”, “alter-ego” and “façade” 
                                                             
85 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 34. 
86 [2003] JLR 188. 
87 [2003] EWHC 1637. 
88 W Richmond-Coggan “Attacking the Assets of a Trust: The Courts’ use of Freezing Orders” (2007) 13 
Oxford LJ 18 at 26. 
89 Hayton 2004 JLR 2. 
90 Ibid. 
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interchangeably. At this point, it should be fairly clear that this is incorrect. Moreover, 
without using the test set out in Snook, courts and commentators have instead ascribed their 
own meanings and parameters to the doctrine, which in turn has debased the purpose of the 
longstanding trust principle. 
 
The Parker case seems to be the origin of this phenomenon, and the dictum laid down by 
Cameron JA has been taken quite literally as a guideline for the application of the sham 
doctrine. Professor Williams has articulately demonstrated the conundrum emphasised in this 
thesis: 
 
“In this dictum, the Supreme Court of Appeal [in Parker] seems to foreshadow that, in an appropriate 
case, a court would hold that a trust, though duly formed and registered, is in law a sham, and that trust 
assets are in reality owned by one or more trustees, and are therefore available to meet claims of the 
latter’s creditors … if the trust form were ‘abused’, for example, if it were a mere sham or ‘veneer’ 
which ought to be pierced in the interest of creditors, then the court, on the authority of the Supreme 
Court decision in Land and Agricultural Bank v Parker, had the power at common law to do so.” 
(Emphasis added.)92 
 
In essence, the doctrine of the sham has been convoluted, and the courts have since Parker 
confused the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with that of the sham. The word “sham” 
is used as a description, whereas the requirements of the corporate law doctrine are used to 
decide when it may be appropriate to look behind the veneer of a trust inter vivos. The Knoop 
case (discussed above) is an excellent example of the ripple effect caused by the Parker case.  
 
Other cases too have relied upon the dictum in Parker. In the matter of Nedbank Ltd v 
Thorpe,93 the bank had applied for the provisional sequestration of the estate of Thorpe, who 
had bound himself as surety for an un-repaid loan of R6 million. The Durban High Court 
accepted evidence by way of affidavit which suggested that Thorpe had over time conducted 
his business via corporate entities and trusts. Moreover, he had established several family 
                                                             
92 RC Williams “Trust Law Up-date” http://www.saipa.co.za/documents/Professional Accountant November 
December 2008.pdf (accessed 21 February 2010). 
93 [2009] ZAKZHC 44. 
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trusts which he used to protect his wealth, especially the Banavie Trust, of which he was a 
trustee and a discretionary beneficiary. The trust held many valuable assets, including an 
expensive Bentley motor vehicle which Thorpe had exclusive use of. In deciding whether the 
trust was a sham, Levinsohn DJP held that: 
 
“This circumstance by itself creates the strong suspicion that the respondent is simply conducting his 
personal business through the trust and that the trust is simply the vehicle to do so. The impression is 
created that the remaining trustees while notionally independent persons may simply be doing the 
respondent’s bidding. The acquisition by the trust of a luxury motor vehicle points in that direction and 
raises pertinently the issue proffered by Cameron JA in Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v 
Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) at 90–91 … In my view there is a real prospect of such 
examination showing that the trust is a mirage used by the respondent for his own commercial ends.”94 
 
Ultimately, Levinsohn DJP made an order for the provisional sequestration of Thorpe’s estate, 
and a year later Pillay J confirmed that the sequestration would be to the advantage of 
Thorpe’s creditors, thus confirming the rule nisi granted by Levinsohn DJP in 2008.95 
 
An earlier judgment which, too, forms part of the “ripple effect” is that of Thorpe and Others 
v Trittenwein and Another, 96  where the SCA warned that those who choose to conduct 
business through the medium of a trust in order to obtain some financial advantage can have 
no cause for complaint when this method of structuring their business works to their 
disadvantage. Pertinent to this discussion, in dismissing the appeal, Scott JA noted the 
following: 
 
“But the trust is typical of the modern business or family trust in which there is a blurring of the 
separation between ownership and enjoyment, a separation which is the very core of the idea of a trust. 
(See Land and Agricultural Bank of SA v Parker, supra, para 19 at 86E.) Those who choose to conduct 
business through the medium of trusts of this nature do so no doubt to gain some advantage, whether it 
be in estate planning or otherwise. But they cannot enjoy the advantage of a trust when it suits them 
and cry foul when it does not.”97 
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Other cases have also confirmed the rationale of Parker. In Nel and Others v Metequity 
Limited and Another98 Streicher JA shadowed the words of Cameron JA in Parker regarding 
the issue of lack of separation between control and enjoyment, and the effect thereof on 
validity.99 
 
The above is demonstrably a departure from the formalistic approach that is so often a 
product of the reasoning in Snook. One cannot deny that the Snook test is the only appropriate 
guideline for the assessment of a sham, and to hold a trust to be a sham without the Snook 
enquiry is incorrect in law. In many South African cases, the court in fact did not refer to the 
trust as a sham, but instead cast aside the protective veil in the knowledge that it was 
empowered to do so by way of the Parker dictum. The dictum is as follows: where there is a 
functional separation between control and enjoyment within the trust, and although assets are 
put into trust, everything remains as before. This will be evidence that the trust form was a 
mere façade for the conduct of a business “as before”, and that assets allegedly vesting (or 
vested) in trustees in fact belong to one or more trustees. 
 
Accordingly, in any case, including those mentioned above, should a court in some way order 
assets held in trust to be distributed to a third party or a creditor for any reason, the court has 
effectively pierced the trust. What has already been firmly established is the only way in 
which a trust can be ‘pierced’ is with the use of the Snook test to assert that the trust is a sham, 
and only if the enquiry passes the test, should a court open up the trust and allow creditors 
and other third parties access to the trust’s assets. 
 
Returning to the Parker case, there can be no room for debate as to the trust’s legal capacity 
upon completion of the commercial agreements with the bank. In the words of Cameron JA 
in Parker, “the trustee body envisaged in the trust deed was not in existence, and the trust 
estate was not capable of being bound”.100  
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Ironically, it is submitted that a simpler solution therefore existed at the hands of the SCA. 
This alternative solution was highlighted in pari materia, Chetty NO and Others v Knowles 
NO and Another, 101  where the trustees of a family trust sought an order directing the 
respondents to transfer ownership of certain immovable property into the trust’s name. The 
application arose from a sale agreement in terms of which the respondents sold the property 
to the applicants’ trust.102 According to the applicants, the trust had complied with all its 
obligations arising out of the agreement, and was therefore entitled to the transfer of the 
immovable property. However, the respondents alleged that the agreement had been validly 
cancelled, and sought an order to that effect. Similar to the facts of Parker, the trust 
instrument required a minimum of three trustees in office at all times. Prior to execution of 
the sale agreement, one of the trustees resigned, leaving the remaining two trustees in office. 
The court held that the remaining two trustees did not have the capacity to conduct the 
business of the trust at the time that the agreement of the purchase and sale was concluded.103 
Accordingly, the court declared the agreement of purchase and sale null and void. The 
contract was voided, and the parties were ultimately restored to the position they were in 
prior to the agreement.104 
 
Had Cameron JA followed a more restrictive approach to the facts of the Parker case, he, too, 
would have held the loan agreements to be null and void. By cancelling the loan agreements, 
the SCA would have been in a position to restore the bank to its original position, as was 
done in Chetty. Consequently, there would have been no necessity to pierce the veneer of the 
trust. It is submitted that a court should explore the possibility of piercing only as a desperate 
last resort – if a less drastic alternative is available, that should be followed. 
 
The concept of the sham has been defined and analysed in much detail. From the decisions 
examined, it is possible to set out the exact operation of the doctrine in Table 5.1, below. 
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103 Para 25. 
104 This approach too was adopted in Thorpe, where Scott JA held an agreement of sale void ab initio because 
one of the trustees had signed the deed of sale without the written authority of the other two trustees. 
162 
 
Table 5.1 The Essential Features of the Sham Doctrine105 
Principle Origin 
A common intention must exist between the parties to the 
sham, that acts done or documents executed do not create 
the legal rights and obligations which they appear to 
create. Put differently, it must be shown that both the 
settlor and the trustee had intended, from the inception of 
the trust arrangement involving the assets claimed, that the 
transfer of legal title would be merely a façade concealing 
the actual arrangements between the parties.106 
Snook v London and West 
Riding Investment Ltd.107 
A sham is the act done or document executed that is 
intended to mislead. It is where the parties, in order to 
mislead third persons, resort to a form of action or 
document which does not fit the real facts. 
Bateman Television v 
Coleridge Finance Co Ltd.108 
A sham does not apply to transactions that are intended to 
take effect, and do take effect, between the parties 
according to their tenor, even though those transactions 
may have the effect of fraudulently preferring another 
person. 
Hitch & Others v Stone;109 
Paintin and Nottingham Ltd v 
Miller Gale and Winter.110 
A sham may exist at the outset or emerge over time. NZI Bank Ld v Euro-National 
Corporation Ltd;111 Marac 
Finance Ltd v Virtue.112 
Where a portion of a transaction is a sham, its effect is 
limited to that portion only. 
Case W49.113 
There is no half way house between the doctrines of the 
sham and the alter-ego. Thus, a finding of an alter-ego 
trust does not automatically lead to the inference that the 
trust is a sham. The consequence, in essence, is that an 
alter-ego trust on its own may not be pierced. 
Re Securitibank Limited 
(No.2);114 Official Assignee in 
Bankruptcy in the Property of 
Gary Martin Reynolds v 
Wilson and Others.115 
The positive identification of a sham trust empowers the 
court to lift the veil of the trust. 
Re Securitibank; Wilson; 
Midland Bank v Wyatt; 116 Re 
Esteem Settlement, Grupo 
Torras SA and Others v Sabah 
and Others.117 
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Professor Hang neatly describes the reasoning behind the doctrine: 
 
“Serving only to weave a deceitful front so as to allow the settlor to evade his creditors or to avoid 
family succession or matrimonial claims, and no other useful purpose at all, a sham trust arrangement 
would be a clear-cut scenario in which there is no reason to regard the ‘trust’ arrangement as valid.”118 
 
Having most certainly “put to rest” the discrepancies evident in South African law regarding 
the utilisation of the sham doctrine, the obvious question that follows is: What would have 
happened, had the doctrine been correctly applied? In order to answer this question as best as 
possible, it is necessary to break down the Snook test into a step-by-step inquisition. Figure 
5.1 below reflects the scenario of the original sham doctrine as interpreted in Snook. 
Answering “yes” to all four questions will most certainly point to a sham trust in terms of the 
Snook test. 
Figure 5.1 The Snook Test: Sham ab initio 
 
 
                                                             
118 Hang 2009 SAcLJ 536. 
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Figure 5.2: The Emerging Sham 
 
 
Figure 5.2 above, on the other hand, depicts the emerging sham enquiry. Taking into account 
the investigation undertaken in Chapter 4, the above diagram recognises emerging shams 
only in the strictest of degrees. Thus, an emerging sham would occur where the document 
was bona fide at inception, but the parties have departed from their initial agreement and have 
allowed the trust to mask their new arrangement. Importantly, it must be recognised that an 
emerging sham will be identified only if both the settlor and a trustee other than the settlor 
share this new shamming intention, thus staying true to the bilateral intention required in the 
Snook test.  
 
Those activities undertaken by either a settlor or a trustee on their own cannot fall under the 
emerging sham and consequently would result instead in a claim for breach of trust. Whether 
it be a sham trust ab initio or an emerging one, it is submitted that although many courts are 
adamant that the two parties be specifically the settlor and a trustee for the purposes of the 
Snook test, the settlor may in fact be replaced by a “dominant trustee”, should the settlor have 
died or not be a beneficiary under the trust. This thought takes account of those modern-day 
trusts which are purposefully settled by a third party at the request of the true settlor. 
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5.3: The Complete Sham Enquiry 
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Figure 5.3 above is the outcome of the research undertaken in Chapter 4. The flowchart takes 
account of the current strict approach adopted by the courts around the world. In order to 
make a finding of a sham, all the boxes need to be ticked. The diagram can also help with 
making a decision on an emerging sham and even a breach of trust. These are the most 
common alternatives to the direct sham verdict. Using the Parker case as an example, let us 
see what the result would be according to the diagram: 
 
Step 1: Is the sham alleged to have occurred at the inception of the trust? 
No. The Family Trust, which was established in 1992, was legitimately created. There seems 
to be no evidence which would suggest the settlor (Mr Parker) and the trustees (the Parkers 
and their family attorney) had colluded at the commencement of the trust to create a sham. 
 
Step 2: Were the trustees’ acts and documents bona fide at inception? 
Yes. The Jacky Parker Trust was set up in good faith. No act or document can point to the 
contrary. 
 
Step 3: Subjectively, did the settlor and the trustee together change their intentions bilaterally 
to create a sham? 
No. Although the Parkers failed for nearly two years to give effect to the terms of the trust 
instrument and appoint a third trustee, the evidence does not suggest that the co-trustees 
wished to use the trust to conceal a transaction. Although the Parkers accepted loans and 
contracted on behalf of the trust as co-principal debtor and surety in a number of agreements, 
the Parkers still wished those transactions to operate according to its tenor. As was decided in 
Yorkshire Railway Wagon Company v Maclure:119 “it was not intended by them as a mere 
blind or cloak for something behind, it was a transaction … and intended to be acted upon 
according to its purport and apparent effect”.120  
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Step 4: Was the intention held by only the settlor or trustee? 
No. Unfortunately, the court never enquired into the individual intentions of the Parkers. As 
such there can be no inference which would suggest either of the parties wished to use the 
trust as a sham. 
 
Result: 
No sham – find another cause of action. Thus, the product of the diagram is in line with my 
previous submissions. There was no sham, not even an emerging sham. The result opens the 
door to other possibilities, such as voiding the agreements. The court could therefore make an 
order to restore the Bank to the position it was in prior to the agreements. 
 
3.4 ALTER-EGO TRUSTS 
An important by-product of Figure 5.3 is the effect it would have had on many alter-ego 
cases in South Africa. The statement “a trust cannot be pierced without a finding of a sham” 
holds true for all scenarios, including the matrimonial and partnership disputes which arise 
upon divorce proceedings, whereby one of the parties to the relationship asserts that the trust 
property be regarded as forming part of the personal estate of the other spouse for the 
purposes of redistribution. The reason for this assertion is that in order to give effect to such a 
wish, the court would have to disregard the trust structure, effectively piercing the trust. The 
making of such an order has become more frequent over time, although the courts do not 
make an enquiry into the sham status of the trust or announce that the trust has been 
disregarded. What in fact is the norm is that a court will make a finding of an alter-ego trust 
and then include the trust property in the estate of one of the spouses. This is a perturbing 
tendency. 
 
In order to challenge various South African court decisions, it is necessary to cast our minds 
briefly back to the research undertaken in Chapter 4. The outcome of the foreign alter-ego 
investigation was that the alter-ego principle was often amalgamated with the doctrine of the 
sham. In opposition to this development, it must be remembered that, unlike a sham trust, an 
alter-ego trust is intended to be genuine. Consequently, there is no requirement of an 
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intention to deceive or mislead. What is required in order to prove an alter-ego trust, however, 
is de facto control. According to Chetty J in the case of Brunette v Brunette and Another,121 
in order to determine whether a settlor (or dominant trustee) was in de facto control, the court 
would have regard to the terms of the trust instrument as well as evidence of how the trust 
was conducted.122 The general requirements enumerated by the learned judge, coupled with 
the five requirements adapted from the American court guideline,123 allow the following 
factors, illustrated in Figure 5.4, to be used as an indication of whether the trust can fall under 
the alter-ego doctrine: 
 
Figure 5.4 The Elements of an Alter-ego Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above is useful for an alter-ego enquiry. There are three layers attached to an 
alter-ego analysis. The top layer is the conclusion that the trust is in fact the alter-ego of the 
settlor or dominant trustee. The middle layer comprises the words of Chetty J, where he 
indicated the two factors important in the enquiry, namely “the terms of the trust instrument” 
and “evidence of how the trust was conducted”. These two aspects overshadow the bottom 
layer and provide the most important avenues to examine when addressing the questions 
specified in the bottom layer. Should evidence indicate that all five factors are present, the 
                                                             
121 2009 (5) SA 81 (SE). 
122 Paras 3–4. See also, the Badenhorst SCA case. 
123 See Chapter 4. 
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trustee or settlor may be deemed to have de facto control of the trust – an alter-ego trust 
conclusion will most likely thus follow. 
 
A crucial step forward has thus been made regarding how a court may decide whether or not 
the trust is an alter-ego trust. The question which still lingers, however, is what would the 
point be of proving an alter-ego trust if one may not pierce it? Robertson J contends that a 
finding of de facto control may help establish whether a trust is a sham if the evidence 
indicates that there was no intention to establish a trust according to the terms of the trust 
instrument.124 In this instance, a court would have to be persuaded that there was an intention 
to mislead from the inception of the trust or from the time when the particular property was 
disposed to the trust. Significantly, though, the intention to misuse the trust would have to be 
shared by another trustee or the settlor. In all other situations, the proof thereof can only bring 
about a claim for breach of trust against that particular trustee.  
 
The point is easily made with reference to the Badenhorst case. Marcus notes that: 
 
“… it is intended that the trust be treated as a separate legal entity which is not capable of being 
assailed by creditors … the case of Badenhorst illustrates that this protection is not absolute … While 
the Cape High Court had protected the separate identity of trusts, the Appeal Court did not. Instead, it 
upheld the long-established principle that the assets (and liabilities) in a trust vest in the trustees, but 
also noted that a trust is a legal animal all of its own. The court went on to find that the mere fact that 
assets vest in the trustees, and do not form part of the husband’s estate, does not exclude them from 
consideration when determining what must be taken into account in a redistribution order consequent 
on divorce proceedings. The court held that to succeed in a claim of this kind there needs to be 
evidence that the party controlled the trust and that, but for the trust, would have acquired the assets in 
his or her own name.”125 
 
 
                                                             
124 Wilson para 71. 
125 R Marcus “Trust Busters” (2006) 6 Without Prejudice 55 at 55. 
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The conclusions reached by Marcus run concurrent with those in this thesis. The court did in 
fact cast aside the veil of the Badenhorsts’ family trust on evidence which supported a finding 
of an alter-ego:  
 
“It was noted by the court that very often, in cases of trusts, whilst de jure control vested in the hands 
of the trustees, the founder (who is often a beneficiary of the trust) may have de facto control over the 
assets. The court observed that it was easy to appoint relatives or friends who are ‘either supine or do 
the bidding of their appointer’. If de facto control of assets vested in the founder and/or a trustee, then 
the assets held in the trust could be regarded as those of the controller. Control is a matter of fact, and 
the court considered the terms of the trust deed as well as evidence as to how the affairs of the trust 
were conducted during the marriage. In the case in question, it was clear that the husband and founder 
of the trust, who was also a trustee and income beneficiary, arranged the affairs of the trust in such a 
way that he controlled what happened with the assets. He paid scant regard to the difference between 
his own assets and the assets in the trust, and hardly ever sought advice or consent of his fellow trustee 
(his brother) in making any decisions as regards the trust’s assets.”126  
 
On this premise, the SCA found that the assets in the trust should be taken into account as 
part of the redistribution order.  
 
It would be wrong to presume that the Badenhorst case is confined to matters within divorce 
proceedings. Marcus submits that: 
 
“While this case concerns itself particularly with divorce proceedings, its wider ramifications should 
not be ignored. Conceptually, the principle enunciated in the case could be extended to assist creditors 
who wish to attack the status of trusts as a separate legal entity. It will no doubt be open for them to 
argue that (rather like piercing the corporate veil in a company) the separate legal identity of the trust 
and its trustees should be ignored, and that assets contained in the trust should form part of the 
controllers’ estate.”127  
 
The ripple effect is indeed apparent as the SCA had once again pierced the trust without an 
accurate finding of a sham. 
                                                             
126 Marcus 2006 Without Prejudice 55. 
127 Ibid. 
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Progressively, the amalgamation of the doctrines together with the new precedent constructed 
in Parker and followed in Badenhorst has led to the wide discretion a court now has to 
“pierce a trust”. In Nedbank, Levinsohn DJP held the following after reflecting on the 
judgment in Parker: 
 
“This circumstance by itself creates the strong suspicion that [Thorpe] is simply conducting his 
personal business through the trust and that the trust is simply the vehicle to do so. The impression is 
created that the remaining trustees, while notionally independent persons, may simply be doing 
[Thorpe’s] bidding. … In my view, there is a real prospect of [a forensic examination] showing that the 
trust is a mirage used by [Thorpe] for his own commercial ends.”128 
 
Following Levinsohn DJP’s judgment, Pillay J confirmed the rule nisi by way of the alter-
ego doctrine: 
 
“It is indeed probable that the true and complete control of the trusts vests in the Respondent [Thorpe]. 
There is in my view evidence to suggest that the Banavie Trust is the alter ego of the Respondent and is 
utilized by him for the purposes of receiving income generated from various activities and at the same 
time insulating his assets and wealth from his creditors.”129 
 
Various other court cases, including Thorpe v Trittenwein, displayed similar interpretations of 
the discretion traversed through Parker: 
 
“Those who choose to conduct business through the medium of trusts of this nature do so no doubt to 
gain some advantage, whether it be in estate planning or otherwise. But they cannot enjoy the 
advantage of a trust when it suits them and cry foul when it does not. If the result is unfortunate, 
Thorpe has himself to blame.”130 
 
Similar to the outcome in Badenhorst, in Jordaan v Jordaan131 it was also decided that 
because of the manner in which the trusts were administered, the value of the trust property 
                                                             
128 Paras 49–50. 
129 Para 27. 
130 Thorpe v Trittenwein para 17. 
131 2001 (3) SA 288 (C). 
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was to be taken into consideration for the purposes of a redistribution order in terms of s 7(3) 
of the Divorce Act. 
 
4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FINDING A TRUST TO BE A SHAM OR AN 
ALTER-EGO 
The final issue to address regarding the application of the doctrines is the consequences that 
flow from a finding of a sham or an alter-ego. It is not immediately apparent from the above 
investigation what consequence should follow from finding that the parties to an arrangement 
entered into it with the intention of misleading others. In one sense the arrangement does not 
truly reflect what the parties intended, and so it could be considered void on the basis of 
contract law as the party contracting with the trust was unaware of its true nature and thus 
ought not be bound to it.132 On the other hand, the parties to the sham entered into it with an 
intention to mislead others – which is fraudulent – suggesting that the transaction should 
perhaps instead be treated as merely voidable.133  
 
A further query that arises is the actual status of the trust itself. After a finding of a sham or 
an alter-ego, does the trust continue to exist, or would it dissolve? In Jordaan Traverso J 
(after declaring the trust to be the alter-ego of the husband, Mr Jordaan) remarked:  
 
“Vir bogenoemde redes kom ek tot die gevolgtrekking dat by die beoordeling van die vraag wat die 
omvang van die herverdelingsbevel moet wees, dit reg en billik is om die bates van die trusts in ag te 
neem. Vanweë hierdie bevinding is dit nie nodig om te besluit of dit in die omstandighede nodig is om 
die ‘corporate veil’ deur te dring nie.”134 
 
                                                             
132 It would be unconscionable to allow the trustees to avoid liability as a result of their own dishonesty, so the 
stance would have to be similar to that seen in Man Truck & Bus v Victor, where the innocent party is restored 
to their position prior to the agreement. 
133 M Conaglen “Sham Trusts” (2008) 67 Cambridge LJ 176 at 202. 
134 Para 34. The statement loosely translates as follows: “For these reasons, I come to the conclusion that, in 
assessing the question of the extent to which the trust assets are to be taken into account in the redistribution 
order, the query is done on the basis of what is right and fair. Because of this, it is not necessary to decide upon 
the issue of piercing the ‘corporate veil’”. 
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The court further remarked: “[e]k is tevrede dat die verweerder hierdie bedrag kan bekostig 
selfs uit sy persoonlike bates.”135 It would be interesting to know whether these trusts still 
exist today. Badenhorst adds to the confusion in this regard, as the court desisted from saying 
that the trust was invalid. 
 
The last factor which requires attention is, in reality and from a practical standpoint, taking 
into account the occurrences and interpretation of the doctrines abroad, whether only sham 
trusts are capable of being pierced. 
 
It is submitted that there are two avenues which could be followed in South Africa based on 
the research undertaken for this thesis. The first option would be the “strict academic” 
approach, which is based squarely on the acknowledgment of the “no half way house” rule, 
as well as the intention behind the stringent sham guidelines outlined in Snook. The second 
approach available is the “intermediate-equity” approach. This approach seeks an equitable 
remedy, taking into account the individual facts of the case as well as the possibility of 
relaxing the “no half way house” rule. 
 
4.1 THE STRICT ACADEMIC APPROACH 
This strict academic approach makes use of the classic rules contained within the doctrines of 
the sham and the alter-ego. The foundation for this policy is the observance of the separate 
legal identity of a trust inter vivos, and that only upon the finding of a sham may such trust be 
pierced. Thus, an alter-ego trust on its own cannot be pierced. This is because, as Robertson J 
fairly noted in Wilson, the uptake of control by someone other than an authorised person 
cannot be sufficient to extinguish the rights of the beneficiaries under a trust.136 
 
                                                             
135 Ibid. The statement loosely translates as follows: “I am satisfied that the respondent can afford to pay this 
amount himself out of his personal assets.” 
136 Para 70. 
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If a court is to hold that a trust is the alter-ego of a controller – in other words, if all the 
bottom boxes are ticked in Figure 5.4 – then in order to pierce the trust, the facts would have 
to pass through Figure 5.3 (the complete sham enquiry) and the result would need to be an 
emerging sham. The reason for this condition is that an alter-ego trust is intended to be 
genuine from the inception of the trust, and therefore piercing is limited to an emerging sham.  
 
Should the result of the sham enquiry be an emerging sham trust, the court would have had to 
accept evidence which suggested that the controller was assisted by another trustee. This 
result would thus meet the exacting requirements in Snook of a bilateral intention. However, 
proof in court would be difficult, as counsel would have to persuade the court that the shared 
intention between the controller and the other trustee was to create a façade. In this instance a 
façade could be proven if the controller and trustee had chosen to disregard the trust 
instrument and instead used the trust from that point onwards as an instrument to hide behind 
when it suited them, and to ignore when it did not. The approach would therefore adhere to 
the doctrine of the sham, the Snook test and the less powerful alter-ego doctrine. 
 
Should the facts and evidence not lend themselves to the inference that an emerging sham 
was created, the finding of an alter-ego trust should in any case allow for an action against the 
guilty parties for breach of their fiduciary duties. Following this, a trustee could then be sued 
personally by a beneficiary or other interested party. 
 
Transactions between innocent third parties and a sham trust are therefore void. The trust too 
would be void because the trust object would not be lawful, and thus no trust would 
theoretically have come into existence. The overseas cases favour the view that a sham 
transaction is “void and unenforceable”137 and “wholly invalid and of no effect”.138 This view 
is taken in order to give practical effect to the underlying purpose of the sham doctrine:139 to 
enable the court to “see through” the false façade and “look at the real transaction”. A court 
                                                             
137 Midland Bank plc v Wyatt [1995] 1 FLR 696 at 707; Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodman [1991] 
BCLC 897. 
138 Rahman v Chase Bank (C.I.)Trust Co. Ltd [1991] JLR 103 at 168; Minwalla v Minwalla [2005] EWHC 2823 
(Fam) 60; Grupo Torras SA v Al–Sabah [2003] JLR 188 at 552. 
139 Conaglen 2008 Cambridge LJ 203. 
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would thus have to order the Master to deregister the trust as well as require the trustees of 
the void trust to notify, cancel and restore all affected third parties. What happens to the trust 
property thereafter is undecided overseas. Assuming there are assets after creditors have been 
paid, then logically the trust assets would move back into the settlor’s estate (or his or her 
deceased estate). Should a third party sustain economic loss under these sham conditions, the 
third party would be entitled to sue the shamming parties. The plaintiff’s case would thus be 
based on Aquilian liability140 for pure economic loss caused by the breach of a legal duty 
owed to the contracting third parties to apprise them of true facts.141 
 
The advantages of this approach are that the “no half way house” rule would be upheld along 
with the classical sham definition laid down in Snook. Moreover, this strategy would 
undoubtedly align the country with the strict modern approach adopted in New Zealand. A 
firm reason for the adoption of this policy would be that a court should at all times bear in 
mind that the invalidation of a trust would extinguish the income and capital rights of the 
beneficiaries. This reasoning explains why foreign courts observe the strictest approach when 
considering the casting aside of a trust’s veil. 
 
4.2 THE INTERMEDIATE-EQUITY APPROACH 
This intermediate-equity approach makes use of various aspects of the law of equity together 
with good common sense. The core idea of this approach is that the law recognises the 
substance of the situation rather than the form. Importantly, though, this approach should also 
have its limitations. 
 
The foundation of this strategy is that a court should, in exceptional circumstances, allow for 
the relaxation of the ‘no half way house’ rule where necessary. Thus, for example, should a 
court properly declare a trust to be the alter-ego of a dominant trustee-spouse, the court could, 
in the interests of fairness and justice, allow for the trust to be pierced without having to 
declare it a sham. 
                                                             
140 In delict on the basis of the actio legis Aquiliae. 
141 This is based on the precedent laid down by Fourie J in Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd and Another v Van Zyl 
NO 2007 (1) SA 610 (C), as it is submitted, is applicable in a sham trust scenario. 
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Among the various principles of equity applicable to this approach, the propositions “he who 
seeks equity must do equity” and “delay defeats equity” are highly applicable. Thus, a court 
would not have the discretion to pierce an alter-ego trust if the person who seeks the piercing 
is a trustee. As has been elaborately debated earlier in this chapter, such an application is far 
too late to be considered and, as such, the trustee seeking the piercing of the trust is in breach 
of his or her own fiduciary duties, because that person would, during the existence of the trust, 
merely have left matters in the hands of others. A balance should therefore be arrived at. 
 
The proof of a sham by way of the Snook test would thus void the trust. Transactions between 
innocent third parties and a sham trust would also be void. With this approach, however, 
alter-ego trusts will be considered voidable at the moderate discretion of the court, which 
should in any case still consider the impact a decision may have on the innocent beneficiaries 
(if any) of the trust. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
General principles are important in any legal system as their application ensures consistency, 
logicality and predictability. Admittedly, there are varying approaches abroad concerning the 
policies followed regarding sham and alter-ego enquiries. What we do know, though, is that 
the majority of countries use the Snook test in order to define and identify a sham trust. 
Unlike South Africa, each country has adopted and adhered to the approach, barring 
developments which have occurred by way of precedent. In South Africa the lack of a single, 
clearly defined principle has resulted in a number of overlapping rights, duties and other 
factors which the courts are to consider. The lack of continuity has undoubtedly led to the 
widespread confusion concerning these important principles. 
 
In Parker, the SCA emphasised the importance of the adherence to basic trust principles in 
the formation and administration of trusts. It is submitted that the courts, too, should “adhere” 
to the basic trust principles. In their case, though, observance would require extensive 
research into the nature and history of the doctrines in order to arrive at a fair strategy which 
both upholds and respects the underlying characteristics of the doctrines.  
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At present, it is apparent that the Parker case has infused a generic test. Problematically, 
though, the test has to decide whether or not a trust may be pierced, and not specifically 
whether or not the trust is a sham. It is respectfully submitted that the decision in Parker 
reveals that the South African Judiciary has mistakenly adopted a test based on whether there 
is functional separation between control and enjoyment. In Badenhorst, another test which 
has subsequently been used is the “but for” test. Combrinck AJA held in the matter that the 
appellant was entitled to a half-share in the family trust because the other party controlled the 
trust and, but for the trust, he would have acquired and owned the assets in his own name.142 
In Van der Merwe, the Western Cape High Court elaborated on the precedent in Parker and 
set forth a new test. The assessment which Binns-Ward J formulated in the matter involves 
the issue of evidence of abuse by the trustees. “[T]he issue in such cases of abuse of the trust 
form is whether or not it would be conscionable for a court to give credence to a natural 
person’s disguise of him or herself as a trustee of what is in reality treated by such person as 
his or her own property.”143 
 
The suggested approaches in section 4, above, assimilate the various methods used abroad. 
These are not the only possibilities available, but are what I would consider the necessary two 
options. By choosing such an avenue, the assorted notions and arguments enumerated in this 
chapter must be considered, and such consideration should take into account the precedent 
that would best fit future interpretation of trust issues in this country. The use of the Snook 
test is, however, mandatory and a sham declaration too will always void a trust. Furthermore, 
it would be altogether incorrect to use the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in order to 
pierce a trust.  
 
The results of this study suggest that New Zealand has interpreted and applied the trust 
doctrines the most precisely and no fault can be identified in the recent Court of Appeal 
ruling in Wilson. Ironically, though, with the precise understanding comes a purist point of 
view on the piercing of trusts. Thus, New Zealand is proving that it is possible to follow 
through with the “strict academic” approach, and for it to operate successfully in a legal 
system. Such an approach should not be disregarded. 
                                                             
142 Para 9. 
143 Para 38. 
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Notwithstanding South Africa’s misdirections in the application of the law pertaining to trusts, 
it should be clear from this thesis that there is still the potential to salvage this area of the law. 
A truly mismanaged trust should be dealt with according to trust law and not company law. 
Moreover, such trust principles should be respected and employed with caution. It is thus 
submitted that the courts should change the existing approach in order to create certainty, 
predictability and a more sound trust law in harmony with its very origins.  
 
The legal personality of a company is a matter of substance and not merely a technicality 
which may be shifted to other areas of the law. Substance must not be cast aside in the name 
of apparent convenience, and piercing the veneer of a trust imposes a scheme of rights and 
obligations on the parties that is very different from those upon which they arranged their 
affairs. Accordingly, when the courts lift the veil, the effect of doing so is substantial and is 
also potentially damaging to those parties. “But in all cases the expressed intention of the 
parties prevails until it is shown that there is some other intention which is disguised by the 
expressed intention.”144 
                                                             
144 JF Coaker and DT Zeffert Mercantile Law of South Africa: Wille and Millin 18 ed (1984) 24. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
“Trusts have now pervaded all fields of social institutions in common-law countries. They are like 
those extraordinary drugs curing at the same time toothache, sprained ankles, and baldness sold by 
peddlers on the Paris boulevards; they solve equally well family troubles, business difficulties, 
religious and charitable problems. What amazes the sceptical civilian is that they do really solve 
them!”1 
 
This thesis has set out to study the pierceability of the trust inter vivos in South Africa from a 
legal-comparative perspective. Above I make reference to Pierre Lepaulle’s statement made 
in 1927. Unbelievably, the essence of a trust has remained unchanged for the best part of a 
century. The simplicity, practicality and advantages it has over other institutions bode well 
for the sustainability of the trust. But what has changed is the society in which a trust is now 
employed. It is undoubtedly necessary for South Africa to keep pace with the modern trends 
occurring in other common law jurisdictions. Smith and Van der Westhuizen2 state that:  
 
“[W]ithin the context of the law of trusts, judicial support for the necessity of progressive development 
is evident in the case of Braun v Blann and Botha NNO and Another:3 it is one of the functions of our 
law to keep pace with the requirements of changing conditions in our society.”4 
 
Regarding trust law, Pace and Van der Westhuizen5 also favour legislative reform: 
 
“[T]he substantial increase in the number of trusts in the last decade, and the corresponding increase in 
their use in commerce, have caused existing legislation to become in need of urgent attention, either 
                                                             
1 P Lepaulle “Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts” (1927) 36 (8) Yale LJ 1126 at 1126. 
2 BS Smith and WM van der Westhuizen “The need for legislative reform regarding the authorisation of trustees 
in the South African law of trusts” (2007) 32(1) JJS 163 at 171. 
3 1984 (2) SA 850 (A). 
4 At 866H. 
5 RP Pace and WM van der Westhuizen “Wills and Trusts” 
http://bwpubs.uovs.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates$vid=MyLNB:10.1048/Enu (accessed 21 February 2010). 
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because of deficiencies or because technical and time requirements demanded by the modern 
commercial community and world were not foreseen and, thus, have not been provided for in the Trust 
Property Control Act.” 
 
The research undertaken in this thesis clearly indicates that the case law in South Africa 
conflicts not only with itself, but also with that of the rest of the world. Although not all 
foreign jurisdictions have followed the contemporary use of the trust doctrines as New 
Zealand has, the courts abroad have maintained judicial certainty by applying the Snook test 
and, for the most part, respecting the separateness of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-
ego.  
 
For the above reasons, it is submitted that there is a need for both legislative and judicial 
reform. In this chapter I argue for certain advancements in the law that would, in my opinion, 
correct the pitfalls in South African trust law as best as possible. These developments can be 
implemented through Parliament, the courts, or in a few instances, both.  
 
Over and above the suggestions put forward in this chapter, I also provide many 
administrative recommendations targeted at trustees, settlors, beneficiaries and people 
considering setting up trusts. These recommendations are the result of the research carried out 
for this thesis. I discuss the duties and ethics required of trustees and settlors in order to avoid 
a sham or alter-ego contention, with specific emphasis on the characteristics of diligence, 
honesty, integrity, impartiality and knowledge. The intricacies involved in drafting a modern 
trust instrument are also examined and accompanied by various recommendations 
surrounding the purpose and object of the document, trustee amendment power and 
protection clauses.  
 
While the handbook which accompanies this work is a product of the entire thesis, the topics 
covered in this chapter refer in greater detail to some of the most important issues dealt with 
in the handbook. 
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2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1 THE TRUST INSTRUMENT 
In the light of the recommendations below, one must consider that “a trust only secures 
absolute certainty when a court proclaims the trust to be valid”.6 Thus, the trustees and settlor 
should take every precaution possible to safeguard their trust against any possible future 
disputes. 
 
In terms of recommendations, there can be no better starting point than the trust’s constitutive 
charter.7 Reflecting on the words of Cameron JA in Parker:  
 
“[I]t is only through the trustees, specified as in the trust instrument, that the trust can act. Who the 
trustees are, their number, how they are appointed, and under what circumstances they have power to 
bind the trust estate are matters defined in the trust deed.”8 
 
The basic formalities of the trust instrument are covered in Chapter 2; this section, on the 
other hand, offers a higher degree of insight into how the trust instrument can and cannot be 
used should the parties to the trust wish to protect their trust from the finding of a sham or an 
alter-ego. 
 
2.1.1 DRAFTING 
2.1.1.1  GENERALLY 
The drafter of a trust cannot draft his or her way out of a sham. He or she can, however, help 
draft their way into one by producing trust documentation which fails to record accurately the 
                                                             
6 Mossack Fonseca “Foundation or Trust? A General Overview” 
www.mossfon.com/trust/institutional_brochure.pdf (accessed 1 June 2010). 
7 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) para 10. 
8 Para 10. 
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true intention of the settlor.9 Thus, the greater the gap between reality and the trust instrument, 
the greater the possibility of facilitating a sham.  
 
Generally speaking, the provisions of a trust instrument will vary according to the type of 
trust and the nature of the trust property. The golden rule, however, is to over-formalise the 
trust instrument. Bearing in mind that, if a trust is declared void, the South African Revenue 
Service (S.A.R.S.) is entitled to calculate any additional tax owed by the settlor (as the assets 
would fall back into his or her personal estate), the wording and protection offered in the trust 
instrument cannot be overlooked.  
 
It should be noted, however, that “over-formalisation” does not imply inflexibility. In fact, a 
trust instrument should be as flexible as is realistically necessary. There are a number of 
reasons why trust instruments need to be drafted so that they can be modified to 
accommodate future changes: 
• If a trust is to act as an investment vehicle, it may become too cumbersome and 
expensive as a result of the requirement that each trustee must sign all banking 
documents, property transfers, leases, renewals of leases, etc.10 
• Taxation, trust laws and other company laws may change and, in doing so, adversely 
affect trusts. This will create a need to modify the trust instrument in order to 
restructure it to best advantage.11  
• Changes in relationships will make it desirable for spouses/partners who have 
separated to cease to be associated with a trust after a settlement has been agreed upon. 
This will preferably involve the removal of a spouse/partner as a beneficiary, trustee 
or a person who possesses other administrative entitlements.12 
• Circumstances could have changed and the provisions of a trust instrument might not 
adequately provide for these changed circumstances. 
                                                             
9 J Kessler “What is (and What is not) a Sham” 
http://www.kessler.co.uk/dtwt/articles/Kessler_What_is_and_what_is_not_a_sham.html (accessed 17 May 
2009). 
10 A Grant “Dealing with Property when It is in a Trust” http://www.anthonygrant.com/trusts/55-dealing-with-
property-when-it-is-in-a-trust (accessed 14 October 2009). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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• Any of the conditions dealt with in s 13 of the Act.13 
 
For the sake of completeness, it is submitted that the following particulars should always be 
covered in a trust instrument: 
• the name of the trust; 
• definitions and interpretation clauses; 
• principal objects of the trust; 
• power to receive additions; 
• power of appointment; 
• powers to add and exclude beneficiaries; 
• trustee termination, appointment, dispute resolution and sub-minima; 
• administrative powers of the trustees; 
• extended power of advancement or maintenance; 
• indemnity for the trustees out of the trust fund; 
• meetings, minutes and accounts; 
• duration of the trust; 
• registration of the instrument; 
• amendment of the instrument, and 
• two schedules usually attached to the instrument, the first covering the powers of the 
trustees and, the second a summary of the initial trust fund. 
 
However, even with a perfectly drafted trust instrument, it would serve little purpose if the 
parties to the trust did not adhere to its provisions. Selecting trustees is therefore as crucial to 
the survival of the trust as is the instrument itself.14  
 
 
 
                                                             
13 See the section below for a full record of those factors announced in the Act. 
14 Trustee selection is discussed below. 
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2.1.2 THE FORMULATION OF A SOUND TRUST INSTRUMENT 
A goal throughout this thesis has been to develop a trust instrument which takes into account 
the various factors which may expose the trust to contention as an alter-ego or a sham. 
Attached as Appendix A is a family trust instrument drafted to survive sham and alter-ego 
challenges. The pertinent issues addressed, amongst others, include: 
• assurance is given of the separation between control and enjoyment; 
• trust administration is complete and adequate; 
• a trust bank account is established and used appropriately; 
• decision-making is a unanimous process among all trustees; 
• a dominant trustee does not emerge; 
• a settlor cannot issue instructions to the trustees, nor can he or she act unilaterally; 
• assurance of an independent trustee who is actively involved in the decision-making 
being in office at all times; 
• the correct balance of amendment powers is achieved; 
• protection clauses are in place, and 
• the appropriate trustee duties are spelt out. 
 
Most importantly, however, the trust instrument must reflect the true intention of the settlor. 
In the interests of trust security this is a fundamental rule which cannot be violated. 
Consequently, whether a trust is set up to protect a beneficiary against the claims of his or her 
creditors or to preserve the assets of the family for future generations, such motivation must 
be declared.15 Anthony Grant submits that: 
 
“[i]f a trust is to survive claims that it is the alter-ego of a trustee/beneficiary/[settlor] or a sham, it 
should in substance fulfil the necessary requirements of a trust. This means that it should not be worded 
in such a way that the settlor has the power to ensure that the assets can be utilised by him/her as a 
beneficiary in ways which he/she prefers. This means that powers of appointment should preferably be 
shared with independent trustees; or vested in them alone and that powers to appoint and remove 
                                                             
15  Note that the former object is not unlawful. See, for example, Hiddingh’s Trustee v Colonial Orphan 
Chamber and Hiddingh 1883 (2) SC 273. 
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trustees and beneficiaries should also be shared with independent trustees or appointers, or vested in 
them alone.”16 
 
Over and above all other considerations, it is submitted that in order for any trust to withstand 
an alter-ego or a sham enquiry, it should be structured and managed so that it is in substance 
a trust, and is not merely a trust in form. 
 
A current trend is for settlors to diversify their trust into various risk portfolios. Thus, an 
equity portfolio would fall into a specifically created share trust and business property into a 
separate property trust. The reason for the diversification is that different assets carry with 
them different levels of risk. The various types of inter vivos trust that can be established 
include: share, business, property, charitable, trading, investment, family and business 
property trusts.17 For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen to write up a trust instrument.  
 
The generic facts surrounding Appendix A are as follows: Mr Ronald Robin Smith wishes to 
transfer his family property, holiday house and vehicle into a trust. He is married out of 
community of property, with accrual, to Mrs Sarah Smith. John and Sarah have two children, 
Lindsay and David, whom John intends to nominate as capital and income discretionary 
beneficiaries. John and Sarah also agree to include themselves as discretionary beneficiaries 
under the trust. John will be the settlor, and will donate an initial R500 to the trust. John has 
elected Advocate Craig Renoirs as the trust’s independent professional trustee, and wishes to 
also be a trustee of the family trust. The third and final trustee is Sarah’s sister, Lynda 
Wynberg, who is not a professional person by title. The object of the trust is to preserve and 
safeguard the family assets from the couple’s creditors, as well as to minimise any future 
estate duty. 
 
 
                                                             
16 Grant “Dealing with Property in a Trust”. 
17 To name but a few; this is not an exhaustive list. 
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2.1.3 SCOPE OF THE AMENDMENT POWER 
Section 13 of the Act provides for the amendment of a trust instrument under certain 
circumstances. Those instances include where the court is of the opinion that the settlor of a 
trust did not contemplate consequences which (a) hamper the achievement of the objects of 
the settlor; (b) prejudice the interests of beneficiaries; or (c) are in conflict with the public 
interest. Discussing public-policy considerations in amendments by court of a trust 
instrument, Geach and Yeats submit that: 
 
“[t]he provisions of the South African Constitution could have a direct impact on the contents of the 
provisions of a trust deed and its amendment in terms of section 13 of the … Act. If a clause of a trust 
deed is regarded as offending basic principles as set out in the Constitution, this may justify a court 
making an amendment order in terms of section 13 of the Act. But it is also now clear that if the terms 
of a deed are illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy, a court does not have to resort to section 13, 
but can amend a trust deed by striking out the offending clauses in terms of the common law. And it 
has been held in Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NNO18 that what amounts to public policy is 
to be found in the South African Constitution.”19 
 
The guidelines are much less certain when it comes to an amendment of an inter vivos trust 
outside the Act:  
 
“To what extent can amendments be made to an inter vivos trust without having to make an application 
in terms of section 13 of the Trust Property Control Act? This raises a number of other questions 
including: who can propose the making of an amendment? Who can or must first agree to these 
amendments before they are valid?”20  
 
According to Hofer and Others v Kevitt NO and Others,21 unless the beneficiaries have 
accepted the benefit22 stipulated for them in terms of the provisions of the trust instrument, 
the trust instrument can be varied by agreement between the settlor (if applicable) and the 
                                                             
18 2006 (4) SA 205 (C). 
19 WD Geach and J Yeats Trusts Law and Practice (2007) 146. 
20 Geach and Yeats Trusts 149. 
21 1998 (1) SA 382 (SCA). 
22  The beneficiaries may accept such benefits in writing and addressed to the trustees. Acceptance is 
automatically assumed if a beneficiary has already received a benefit from the trust. 
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trustees.23  The problematic interpretation of obiter remarks is highlighted by Geach and 
Yeats: 
 
“This decision could be interpreted to mean that the founder of an inter vivos trust is free to make 
changes to an inter vivos trust at any time by agreement with the trustees. But if the beneficiaries, either 
vested or discretionary, have accepted the benefits that have or may accrue to them in terms of the trust 
deed, then … any variations or amendments thereto can only be made with their approval.”24 
 
As a result of the common law, if the settlor is still alive, it may be possible for him or her to 
bypass the beneficiaries and possibly even “bully” the trustees into accepting various 
amendments to the trust instrument. Moreover, a clause in a trust instrument may allow for a 
settlor or dominant trustee to pass amendments without the unanimous approval of the 
trustees. It is submitted that the greater the discretion to be given to a settlor (or dominant 
trustee), the more carefully the trust instrument must be drafted. 
 
There is therefore a fine balance which needs to be achieved: on the one hand, the trust 
instrument should recognise that external events or changes may occur, resulting in the need 
to amend the instrument. On the other hand, the power of amendment needs to be restricted in 
so much as it is necessary to prevent abuse. See Figure 6.1 below. 
                                                             
23 Para 10. 
24 Geach and Yeats Trusts 150. 
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Figure 6.1 The Considerations of Liberal versus Restrictive Powers to amend Trust 
Instruments 
 
For the reasons above, it is thus preferable that the modification mechanism does not vest 
solely with one party who is able to take full benefit of the trust’s income and/or assets, but is 
rather shared with other parties to the trust. A balance between the abovementioned 
approaches is required, although the effect of the mechanism should lean towards a more 
restrictive rather than liberal approach regarding trust instrument amendments. 
 
Another important consideration regarding amendments is accommodation for changes in 
relationships. This is a concern relevant to most inter vivos trusts where two of the trustees 
are related in some way. The most common example would be that of a husband and wife 
(co-trustee-spouses) who share the power of variation jointly. Should their relationship 
dissolve, there is a real prospect of a stalemate occurring concerning any future trust 
decisions. The matter may further be compounded if there is a third trustee and that party 
sides with either of the trustee-spouses. Although trustee selection is a topic dealt with below, 
Liberal  approach 
towards  
amendments
Restrictive 
approach towards 
amendments
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it is submitted at the outset that trustees sharing any sort of personal relationship should be 
avoided. Nonetheless, should this not be the case, and the co-trustee-spouses face divorce and 
redistribution proceedings, trust decisions and amendments must vest in multiple trustees, of 
whom at least one must be independent. Furthermore, it is submitted that a mechanism must 
be in place to deal with the “shuffle” that would occur within the trust at the dissolution of the 
marriage or partnership. Anthony Grant suggests that: 
 
“Where there is a general power of amendment it should be possible to enable a trust deed to be altered 
so that where the parties separate they can, having resolved their disputes, arrange for the orderly 
removal from the trust deed of the spouse/partner who is no longer to be associated with the trust.”25 
 
It is therefore important for the amendment clause in a trust instrument to not restrain the 
trustees from effecting the above shuffle. Moreover, it is submitted from a practical 
standpoint that a further document will be required. 
 
I have termed this document a “pre-trust post-relationship contract”. The idea behind the 
agreement is similar to that behind an antenuptial contract, but it deals instead only with 
matters relating to the trust property and the formalities and administration of the trust, 
should the two parties end their marriage or partnership. Using this proposed agreement 
would save both money and time because the former partners would not have to (or be able to) 
battle for the trust property, proceeds or trusteeship. Furthermore, the agreement may in fact 
establish that the parties are to ensure the trust remains operative even if their relationship 
does not. They could then stipulate that both be removed as trustees and be replaced by 
independent trustees. Simultaneously, the two parties would become vested beneficiaries (if 
they are not already) with an agreed capital or income distribution as is seen to be fit and fair. 
It is submitted that such contract is absolutely necessary in the case of family trusts, whether 
or not the parties are trustees.  
 
                                                             
25 Grant “Dealing with Property in a Trust”. 
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In addition, the earlier discoveries in this thesis suggest that an alter-ego clause should also be 
included in such a contract. The passage in the contract should effectively deny a co-trustee-
spouse the opportunity of contending that the trust is the alter-ego of the other trustee-spouse 
should the ex-partners enter into divorce proceedings. The reason for this agreement is 
threefold. First, the case law cited in this thesis indicates that the majority of alter-ego claims 
have their origins in an application for a redistribution order. This is worrying in that it 
indicates gross abuse of the trust entity because the partners contentedly shield their assets 
underneath the trust’s veil and then, as soon as the relationship breaks down, one of the 
parties will argue that the trust is the alter-ego of the other and ultimately push the court into 
piercing the trust. Second, the party alleging the alter-ego is a trustee themself. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, by alleging an alter-ego trust, that trustee ironically is in breach of his or her 
fiduciary duties owed to the trust beneficiaries. Third, it is evident that there has been a 
mistreatment of alter-ego trusts in South Africa. The confusion between the doctrines of the 
sham and the alter-ego means that a court may mistakenly void an alter-ego trust. 
 
A contract of this nature would therefore address many of the concerns reflected in this thesis 
and so, if spouses wish to be co-trustees, the above agreement would definitely smooth things 
over if the relationship were to end. Should the agreement be respected, the ex-spouses could 
then replace themselves with independent trustees and apply to the trustees for capital and 
income distributions which would suit the parties as well as the future of the trust. 
 
A final consideration concerning amendment clauses is the restriction of settlor power. In 
order to uphold the separation of enjoyment and control, a line so clearly drawn by Cameron 
JA in Parker, 26  a settlor should not be given exclusive amendment rights in the trust 
instrument. Should the settlor wish to maintain a presence around the trust, he or she may be 
given the right to apply for an amendment, but his or hers should be strictly controlled in the 
trust instrument, and left to the sole discretion of the trustees to approve or disapprove. 
 
                                                             
26 Para 23. 
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In the light of the above considerations, it is submitted that the following amendment clause 
should be inserted in an inter vivos trust instrument: 
 
“
1. The trustees may revise or amend this trust instrument provided that such revision or 
amendment: 
Amendment of the trust instrument 
a. does not constitute any revocation of the trust, and 
b. does not compromise the purpose and objectives of the trust, and 
c. is unanimously accepted by the trustees. 
 
2. Should the revision or amendment have the potential to prejudice the rights or 
interests of any of the existing beneficiaries, the written consent of the beneficiaries 
whose rights will be prejudiced is required. The beneficiaries herewith referred to in 
this clause include both vested and discretionary beneficiaries. This provision is not 
applicable to beneficiaries who: 
a. have yet to accept (in writing or orally) the benefits that may accrue to them in 
terms of this trust instrument, and 
b. have not yet received any benefit in terms of the trust instrument. 
 
3. The trustees may further amend or revise this trust instrument in the event of any 
legislation necessitating such amendment or revision in order to comply therewith, so 
long as such amendment or revision complies with subsections 1 and 2 of this clause. 
 
4. Should the settlor wish to amend or revise this trust instrument: 
a. the settlor should apply to the trustees in writing, setting out the proposed 
changes and giving reasons for such proposal; 
b. the trustees must then hold a properly constituted meeting in order to 
determine the nature of the proposed amendment or revision and assess its 
merits;  
c. when making a decision to approve or disapprove such request, the trustees’ 
decision is subject to the directives, guidelines and rules contained within this 
clause; 
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d. the trustees must inform the beneficiaries and settlor in writing of the decision 
made and the reasons therefor. 
 
5. No amendment or revision to this trust shall be of any force and effect to the extent 
that any benefit shall be conferred by such amendment on the settlor or his/her estate, 
nor shall any variation give the settlor or any trustee the power to appropriate or 
dispose of any trust property, on his or her or own, as he or she sees fit, for his or her 
own benefit or for the benefit of his or her estate, whether such power is exercisable 
by him or her or with his or her consent, and whether such power could be obtained 
directly or indirectly by the exercise, with or without notice, of power exercisable by 
him or her or with his or her consent. 
 
6. In the event that any proposed amendment or revision is not unanimously accepted by 
the trustees, the majority decision will prevail, provided that: 
a. at least one of the trustees of this trust is an independent professional trustee, 
and 
b. the independent professional trustee approves the amendment or revision. 
 
7. This clause does not apply to the powers of addition and exclusion [refer to section 
dealing with the trustees’ powers of addition and exclusion].” 
  
 
2.1.4 PROTECTION CLAUSES 
Overseas there has been a mixed reception regarding the use of protection strategies in trust 
instruments.27 The basic purpose of such a device is to protect trustees against the residual 
risks which are inevitable in any trust inter vivos. According to Gothard, there are four main 
types of protection clause.  
 
                                                             
27 The majority of cases restrict the use of these devices. See further, Parujan v Atlantic Western Trustees 
Limited 2003 JLR N (11). 
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The first are trustee exemption clauses: “These exempt trustees from liability for specified 
risk (eg loss to the trust fund resulting from the trustees’ negligence).”28 The basis of this 
clause is that of the common indemnity clause often found in written contracts. English law 
still supports the use of these exemption clauses in trust instruments and, notably, Armitage v 
Nurse29 is the leading case in the UK, where the Court of Appeal held that such a clause was 
effective: “no matter how indolent, [imprudent], lacking in diligence, negligence or wilful 
[the trustee] may have been, so long as he has not acted dishonestly.”30 Conversely, the Lord 
Chancellor has argued that “professional trustees” should in future:  
 
“[N]ot be able to rely on a clause exempting them from liability for their own negligence. The … 
rationale was that the current law is too deferential to trustees, in particular professional trustees’ as it is 
not in beneficiaries’ interests for trustees to have the benefit of insurance and sweeping exemption 
clauses.”31 
 
The latter submission is supported in this thesis and it is submitted that trustee exemption 
clauses should not generally be used in trust instruments. Most importantly, professional 
trustees and settlors who are trustees (settlor-trustees) should never be covered by these 
clauses. In this regard, there is assurance that the professional trustee abides by his or her 
duties and exercises extra caution in the administration of the trust. He or she is likely to 
charge a much higher fee than ordinary trustees, and is thus expected to deliver the expected 
diligence in the exercise of his or her responsibilities and ethics. Likewise with settlor-
trustees, excluding these persons from the above exemption clause will help to ensure that 
their unique position is not abused. Particularly in the eyes of the courts, a trust instrument 
which guarantees that professional trustees execute their duties properly whilst 
simultaneously limiting the freedom and discretion of a settlor-trustee is, at least on paper, an 
impermeable arrangement. 
 
 
                                                             
28 C Gothard “Trust Administration: A Guide to the New Environment” (2005) Journal of International Trust 
and Corporate Planning 12(3) 177 at 180. 
29 [1998] Ch 241. 
30 At 251. 
31 Gothard 2005 JITCP 181. 
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The second trustee protection clause is the duty exclusion clause:  
“These exclude or limit specific statutory or common law duties that would otherwise be imposed on 
trustees. A typical example is the exclusion or limitation of the statutory duty of care … or so-called 
‘anti-Bartlett’ clauses.”32  
 
It is submitted that such limitation is unwelcome in the modern-day trust instrument as a 
court may easily conclude that the trust instrument unnecessarily accentuates trustee 
recklessness and may help a court to infer that the trust was intended to deceive others 
because the trustees were not obliged to act with care in the interests of the beneficiaries. 
 
The third trustee protection clause is the enlargement of powers clause:  
“These confer extended powers on trustees, reducing the possibility of acting ultra vires, although the 
trustees must still act in good faith and in the best interests of beneficiaries, which are irreducible core 
duties.”33  
 
It is submitted that the clause may be carefully placed in trust instruments which may require 
an “above average” vesting of power in the trustees. For example, trustees of an “investment 
trust”34 may be given the power to appropriate or dispose of property without the approval of 
the other trustees if such transaction is under a certain value (ie R10 000) and is a transaction 
in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Such a clause may allow trustees to bypass the time-
consuming process of obtaining a quorum in the interests of pursuing a favourable investment, 
which would have otherwise elapsed. Importantly, this clause must always be subject to a 
reasonableness criterion. 
 
The fourth protection clause is known as the release and indemnity clause. “These can take a 
variety of forms, but the most effective ones automatically release an outgoing trustee from 
                                                             
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34  “Investment trust” in the South African context refers to a trust entity which exclusively holds equity 
portfolios as trust property. 
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specified liabilities and indemnify the trustee of the trust fund in respect of liabilities 
incurred.”35 Gothard adds: “[t]he usefulness of the indemnity depends on the trust assets, and 
frequently an outgoing trustee will also seek a separate indemnity from the new trustees and 
one or more beneficiaries”.36 This clause will most certainly add to the attractiveness of 
undertaking a role as a trustee, whilst having the flexibility to resign at a later stage without 
incurring unnecessary liability. 
 
2.1.5 CONTROL THROUGH PROVISIONS IN THE TRUST INSTRUMENT 
A trust instrument may be drawn up in such a way that trustees are subject to the wishes and 
directions of the settlor in execution of their duties. Olivier notes that the result may be that, 
although the settlor gives up control in form, in substance this is not the case.37 It is submitted 
that the concern for this arrangement is twofold. First, this was firmly prohibited by 
Combrinck AJA in Badenhorst v Badenhorst,38 where the learned judge noted that to succeed 
in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate of one of the parties, there needs to be 
evidence that such party controlled the trust. The judge continued that in this undesirable 
state of affairs, the trustees would have de iure control of the trust while the settlor retains de 
facto control.39 Second, the power retained by the settlor may aid in affirming a sham trust. 
Pryke accepts this conclusion: 
 
“The reservation of wide powers to the settlor in the trust deed (particularly powers to appoint capital 
and income and investment powers) will not of themselves be sufficient to give rise to the argument 
that a trust is a sham. However, obviously the more powers that are reserved to the settlor (or perhaps 
to third parties who might be under the control of the settlor) the more credibility there will be to a 
sham argument because of the reduced nature of the trustee’s role.”40 
 
It is therefore of the utmost importance that the trust instrument does not contain any clauses 
which may lend themselves to the conclusion that the settlor has retained a degree of control 
                                                             
35 Gothard 2005 JITCP 181–182. 
36 Ibid. 
37 L Olivier "Trusts: Traps and Pitfalls" (2001) 118 SALJ 224 at 226–227. 
38 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
39 Para 9. 
40  S Pryke “Sham Trusts” http://www.walkers.com.ky/pubdocs/Sham_Trusts_S.Pryke.pdf (accessed 8 April 
2009). 
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over the trustees. Moreover, given South Africa’s current interpretation of the trust doctrines 
(and the incorporation of other company law doctrine), mere proof of the settlor’s retaining 
de facto control may lead to the lifting of the trust’s veil. 
 
Olivier notes certain instances where, from the provisions of the trust instrument, it is clear 
that the settlor has maintained de facto control:41 
• the settlor retains the lifetime power to dismiss and appoint trustees and to vary the 
provisions of the trust instrument; 
• the settlor [in his or her position as settlor] is entitled to a distribution of trust capital 
or income; 
• the trustees must at all times act in the exclusive interest of the settlor, and 
• important administrative decisions require the settlor’s prior written consent. 
 
Similarly, a settlor-trustee may also retain exclusive de facto control by drafting the trust 
instrument so as to disallow their removal by means of a majority decision made by their co-
trustees. Likewise, the trust instrument may be drafted so as to bestow the settlor-trustee with 
the power to approve and veto trustee decisions. Under such circumstances there is little point 
in establishing such a trust at the outset, and under the present precedent such a trust would 
most probably be disregarded in court. 
 
The degree of control required to give rise to a presumption that a separate legal entity has 
been formed is not yet certain. Certainly, though, the facts of each case have to be analysed to 
determine whether in substance the trustees were not free to exercise control over the trust 
assets in the best interests of the beneficiaries.42 
 
 
                                                             
41 Olivier 2001 SALJ 227. 
42 Olivier 2001 SALJ 227–228. 
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2.1.6 BENEFICIARY CONTROL OVER TRUSTEES  
An interesting development abroad has reaffirmed the importance of the separation between 
control and enjoyment. American case law has provided authority for the view that when 
beneficiaries have control over the trustees, a valid trust will not exist, and that the trustees 
were in reality the agents of the beneficiaries.43 Olivier asserts that: 
 
“The result is that the beneficiaries are deemed to be partners and may be held personally liable for the 
debts of the undertaking.... Obviously, the other requirements for a valid partnership, namely that the 
object must be to make a profit, and that each party has to make a contribution to the undertaking and 
share in its profits, also have to be present … the mere fact that the express intention of the parties [was] 
to form a trust does not stand in the way of a court finding that in substance a partnership was 
formed.”44 
 
In considering the new development, Olivier notes that: 
 
“[I]t may be argued that a similar decision will be reached when the substance over form principle is 
applied. If in form the trustees have to act independently in the best interests of the beneficiaries, but in 
substance they are mere puppets in the hands of the beneficiaries, the substance of the agreement may 
well indicate that a partnership and not a trust was formed.”45 
 
Consequently, the separation so often stressed in South Africa is crucial not only in avoiding 
an alter-ego trust, but also in invalidating the trust. Arguably, the American approach 
contradicts the doctrine of the sham, because, strictly speaking, only a sham trust may be 
pierced. If this were the precedent in South Africa, the dictum may be taken a step further and 
one may argue that the majority of the trusts in matrimonial alter-ego cases are also 
“partnerships” and not trusts in the first place. The American precedent is rejected in this 
thesis. However, at present most trust disputes in South Africa are adjudicated on the basis of 
fairness, as opposed to legal theory, so on that basis the outcome of such a case is uncertain. 
                                                             
43 Simson v Klipstein 262 Fed 823 (1920); Priestley v Treasurer & Receiver General 120 NE 100, 230 Mass 452 
(1918); Kadota Fig Association of Producers v Case-Swayne Co 73 Cal App 2d 796, 167 P 2d 518 (1946); 
Engineering Service Corporation v Longride Development Co 156 Cal App 2d 583, 320 P 2d 192 (1958). 
44 Olivier 2001 SALJ 229. 
45 Olivier 2001 SALJ 228–229. 
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It is therefore especially recommended that trustees maintain a clear distance from the settlors 
and their affairs. 
 
2.2 THE SETTLOR 
The most simplistic recommendation that is applicable to any settlor is that after the “making 
over”, they must be prepared to forgo control of the trust assets in favour of the trustees, and 
the trustees should take a firm stand against interference by the settlor.46 This may be tricky 
when the settlor is also a trustee and even more so if he/she is also a beneficiary. In order to 
maintain the trust’s standing, this situation should always be avoided. If it cannot – and in 
many family trust scenarios this is the norm – the use of an independent trustee will be most 
essential. In this situation, in fact, the majority of trustees should be independent. 
 
The risky scenario above is often thought to be avoided by using a nominee settlor. What 
often happens then is that an outsider, normally a relative, a lawyer or a trust company, is 
instructed to settle an initial nominal trust fund. The real settlor then adds a more substantial 
trust fund and acts as a trustee without being labelled the settlor of the trust. However, the 
above may in fact have the adverse effect, as Kessler explains: 
 
“It goes without saying that the person who provides trust property directly or indirectly will be the 
‘settlor’ for tax purposes and likewise for insolvency and matrimonial law purposes. This style of 
drafting may have the pernicious result of leading a court to infer an intention to mislead the reader into 
thinking that the nominee settlor is the only and real settlor. (Though the true and more innocent 
explanation may be that the parties are seeking confidentiality and mistakenly believe that every trust 
deed needs a named settlor; or that this is done for no reason whatsoever.) One wonders how often the 
nominee settlor actually provides the initial trust find – although fortunately this hardly matters.”47 
 
Thus, to avoid any inference that the parties intended to mislead third parties, the true settlor 
should make the initial settlement. It is submitted that the settlor should then withdraw from 
all administrative affairs relating to the trust fund, and should not appoint him- or herself as a 
                                                             
46 Olivier 2001 SALJ 230. 
47 Kessler “What is (and What is not) a Sham”. 
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trustee. The appointment of appropriate independent trustees would ensure that the assets are 
kept safely behind the veil of the trust. The settlor may become a beneficiary and thus still 
receive the benefits attributed to the trust assets. Importantly, though, the settlor must be 
accompanied by other co-beneficiaries, because a trust cannot have a sole settlor who is also 
the sole beneficiary and the sole trustee. 
 
In reality, the above recommendations are directed at persons who are not entirely 
comfortable with making over their assets into a trust fund. If the trust instrument is sound, 
independent trustees are appointed and the correct beneficiaries identified (with their 
corresponding degrees of rights, ie vested or discretionary), one should be comfortable with 
the arrangement. If one is not, then a trust is quite simply not the correct solution. After all, 
misadministration would most likely dilute the ability of that trust to meet the purpose for 
which the trust was established in any case. 
 
Another arrangement which requires attention is the settlor's possible control through a letter 
of wishes. This letter is normally used to inform trustees how the trust should be administered. 
It is a document separate from the trust instrument and, strictly speaking, is not legally 
binding. Thus, trustees have a degree of discretion whether or not to follow the instructions, 
but often a settlor will have the illegitimate power of substituting trustees through the 
provisions of the trust instrument, so out of fear, the trustees may follow the wishes of the 
settlor. Olivier agrees with this postulation, but adds: 
 
“Uncertainty exists whether the mere existence of a letter of wishes results in a founder in substance 
never intending to give up control of the trust assets. The mere existence of the letter should not in 
itself be an indication that the formation of the trust was a sham. The facts of each case have to be 
analysed to determine whether, although in form control of the assets was transferred from the founder, 
he in substance retained control. If the purpose of the letter is to retain control of the assets and the 
trustee considered himself bound by it, it may well be incorporated into a trust deed. This may be 
precisely the effect the founder tried to avoid by not incorporating the contents of the letter in the trust 
deed, for example, pretending that a vested trust is in effect a discretionary trust.”48 
 
                                                             
48 Olivier 2001 SALJ 228. 
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Such circumstance may show an intention to mislead others. Bear in mind that in order to 
fulfil the bilateral intention in the Snook test, a trustee may consciously share the shamming 
intention of the settlor, or instead neither care about nor dispute the settlor’s intentions (thus it 
is presumed the trustee too shared the shamming intention). It is therefore submitted that for 
the above reasons, a letter of wishes should be avoided whenever possible. In many instances, 
however, a letter of wishes is the most practical solution for a settlor who wishes to provide 
the trustees with guidance as to how the trust should be administered after the death of the 
default beneficiaries and/or the settlor. With this in mind, should a letter be used, it must be 
carefully constructed to emphasise that it is in no way binding.49  
 
2.3 THE TRUSTEES 
“Trusts are not tax-efficient asset-secretive vehicles. To approach them with this in mind not only 
condemns the client who may in fact have much broader family ideals, it also belittles the protective 
origins of the trust.”50 
 
Arguably, the manner in which trustees conduct their duties and approach the affairs of the 
trust is one of the most influential aspects affecting the actual protection a trust will 
ultimately provide. Trustees should not aim to create the “asset-secretive vehicle” mentioned 
above, but rather an open and transparent entity which invites the views and input of its 
beneficiaries whilst still maintaining a strict division between control and enjoyment. The 
achievement of this entity would be a trust in the purest sense, one that is more likely to 
withstand any disputation against it. 
 
                                                             
49 The letter will normally have the following or similar phrases in it:  
Addressed to the trustees … I would like to clarify that it is not my wish to interfere in any way with your wide 
powers and discretion as Trustees with the content of this letter…. I also confirm that this not in any way 
binding on you legally or otherwise…. Nevertheless, I would like for you to know my wishes regarding the 
exercising of your powers…. [wishes] I would like to repeat that the abovementioned will be an indication about 
my wishes and a guideline about the employment of the assets…. As Trustees you have wide powers and your 
discretion is and should be unbounded. I trust that you will exercise your powers in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries…. Signed the settlor. 
50 P Bobbin “Beware the Trusty Short Cut” 
http://www.argylelawyers.com.au/pdf_files/finsvcs_pub/ap166175.pdf (accessed 17 March 2009). 
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Below is a discussion of various issues surrounding the use of trustees to safeguard the trust, 
taking into account the research undertaken for this thesis. 
 
2.3.1 CHOOSING TRUSTEES 
Once the decision has been made to establish a trust, choosing the trustees becomes the most 
important decision the settlor will then make. Moreover, such a decision should also take into 
account the obiter remarks of Cameron JA in Parker concerning the independent trustee: 
 
“The debasement of the trust form evidenced in this and other cases, and the consequent breaches of 
trust this entails, suggest that the Master should in carrying out his statutory functions ensure that an 
adequate separation of control from enjoyment is maintained in every trust. This can be achieved by 
insisting on the appointment of an independent outsider as trustee to every trust in which (a) the 
trustees are all beneficiaries and (b) the beneficiaries are all related to one another. The independent 
outsider does not have to be a professional person, such as an attorney or accountant: but someone who 
with proper realisation of the responsibilities of trusteeship accepts office in order to ensure that the 
trust functions properly, that the provisions of the trust deed are observed, and that the conduct of 
trustees who lack a sufficiently independent interest in the observance of substantive and procedural 
requirements arising from the trust deed can be scrutinised and checked. Such an outsider will not 
accept office without being aware that failure to observe these duties may risk action for breach of 
trust.”51 
 
2.3.1.1   SETTLORS AS TRUSTEES 
Technically speaking, South African trust laws do allow for those who create a trust to also 
assume the role of trustee, but this is not advisable. A quick look at the recognised advantages 
of this arrangement will swiftly highlight the reasons why this risky scenario should be 
avoided. According to Maxwell, the main advantages of this option are that of control and 
ease of administration: 
 “The settlor as trustee is generally free to make whatever decisions they wish without consultation or 
reference to any other person. Administration is also made easier as there are no independent trustees 
required to attend meetings and sign documents.”52 
                                                             
51 Parker paras 35–36. 
52 M Maxwell Trusts: A Kiwi Sham? (2007) 45. 
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Ironically, the benefits emphasise the dangers of this situation, because it will be assumed 
that the settlor-trustee has operated the trust without respect for the division of control and 
enjoyment. Perception is therefore the main disadvantage of this arrangement. In the event of 
the trust’s being challenged, it is likely that those making the challenge will work harder to 
prove that no trust exists.53 
 
In my opinion, someone should establish a trust only if that person is completely comfortable 
with “making-over” his or her property as well as paying professional trustee fees. If doubt 
does exist, the potential settlor should rather explore alternative asset management solutions 
as opposed to making him- or herself a trustee in order to ease his or her reservations.  
 
One of the options below – the independent trustee, either non-professional or professional –
is therefore recommended for every trust inter vivos. However, should the settlor still wish to 
be a trustee, all the trustees will have to maintain the very highest standards of administration 
and record-keeping.54 
 
2.3.1.2   INDEPENDENT NON-PROFESSIONAL TRUSTEES 
This situation is semantically deceiving because the trustee in this instance will never be 
considered truly independent. The various types of non-professional trustee who are 
frequently made use of include friends, family members (who are not beneficiaries), 
neighbours, colleagues and, in some cases, professionals from other fields.55  
 
It is submitted that the use of an independent non-professional trustee is certainly more 
advantageous for establishing the trust’s integrity than the previous settlor-trustee 
arrangement. That said, however, in reality, “too many non-professional independent trustees 
                                                             
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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are used merely to ‘rubber stamp’ decisions for the ‘main trustees’ and this greatly increases 
the risk of a trust operating under this structure being challenged in the future”.56 
 
There are thus a number of reasons why the appointment of this type of trustee should also be 
avoided. First, it may be argued that the settlor has not actually relinquished ownership and 
control of the trust property, and is instead relying on the trustees to act as puppets; and, 
second, there is also the risk that non-professional trustees do not understand their duties fully 
and may therefore place the trust in danger. 
 
2.3.1.3  INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL TRUSTEES 
A central theme throughout this thesis has been that enjoyment and control of the trust assets 
should be functionally separate. It was suggested by Cameron JA in a number of obiter 
remarks that to minimise instances of the abuse of the trust form, the Master should, when 
registering a trust, insist that there be at least one independent trustee.57 According to the 
learned judge, the duties imposed on trustees, and the standard of care exacted on them, 
derive from this principle.58 
 
Since the judgment in Parker there has been much discussion about independent trustees, 
with many trusts hastily appointing additional trustees and updating their trust instruments in 
an attempt to conform to the remarks of Cameron JA. The Master’s Office incorporated the 
suggestions of the SCA in memorandum JM21E, identifying the primary function of the 
independent trustee as being to ensure adherence to the content of the trust instrument, 
making sure that no decision made by other trustees is to the detriment of the beneficiaries. 
Thus, the independent trustee should have the decisive voice in all decisions.59 
 
                                                             
56 Maxwell A Kiwi Sham 4. 
57 Para 35. 
58 Para 22. 
59 Property Tools “The Role of the Independent Trustee” 
http://www.propertytools.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22:the-role-of-the-
independent-trustee&catid=2:articles&Itemid=14 (accessed 30 April 2010). 
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The thinking behind the implementation of this notion is that the independent trustee should 
have no reason for concluding or approving a transaction that may prove to be invalid, 
because first, he or she should be knowledgeable about trust law; and, second, he or she 
would not have any interest in the trust property or be a beneficiary, and would thus make 
decisions based on what is correct and in the best interests of all the beneficiaries and the 
continuation of the trust.  
 
An interesting departure from this train of thought has, however, arisen. In opposition to 
Cameron JA’s view, Kernick queried whether it is correct to lay such emphasis on the 
separation of enjoyment and control, and to view this separation as the origin of the duties 
imposed on trustees and the standard of care required of them: 
 
“It seems to me that … all three are rather manifestations of the fiduciary nature of the institution of 
trusts, and it is an attempt to ensure the observance of this fiduciary nature that leads to the suggestions 
that enjoyment and control should be separate, that there are certain duties imposed on trustees and that 
a particular standard of care is required of them … The court [in Parker] went on to say: ‘And it is 
separation that serves to secure diligence on the part of the trustee, since a lapse may be visited with 
action by beneficiaries whose interests conduce to demanding better’. On the contrary, I suggest that it 
is not the separation as such that secures diligence: Whether he is a beneficiary or not, a trustee’s 
diligence is secured by his knowledge that an action against him could follow a lapse on his part. And 
that action could be brought against him not only by a beneficiary, but by any affected party.”60 
 
Kernick correctly reasons that separation tends to ensure independence of judgement as it 
removes conflict of interests and assists impartiality; but so does a trustee’s appreciation of 
their duties and of the standard of care required of them.61 Thus, it is not whether a trustee has 
independence that brings about the separation of enjoyment and control but, rather, it is the 
observance of their fiduciary duties. 
 
The question therefore arises whether in fact the use of an independent trustee is at all 
necessary. In New Zealand, case law has established that far more trusts with “independent” 
                                                             
60 L Kernick “Declaration of Independence” (2007) DR 27 at 28. 
61 Kernick 2007 DR 29. 
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trustees have been set aside as shams than trusts without independent professional trustees.62 
Whether this is applicable to independent professional trustees is uncertain. Kernick suggests 
that it would be unwise to burden the Master with the task of identifying what qualifies as an 
“independent” trustee and of ensuring that there is one in every trust, because the Master’s 
offices can hardly cope with their present duties.63 Instead, what is suggested is that the 
Master ensures that the trustees are aware of the seriousness of the duties they have taken on 
and of the consequences of failing to meet those requirements: 
 
“I suggest, then, that this is where the Master could be of real assistance – not of course, in actually 
educating trustees himself, but in requiring them to warrant that they have educated themselves. He 
could therefore refuse to dispense with the provision of security unless each trustee signs, perhaps in 
affidavit form, an acknowledgment that he is aware of his duties, which could be briefly detailed in the 
document, together with a quotation of s 9 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, also 
acknowledging that he could be exposing himself to civil and criminal action. If such a form were to 
replace the present rather bland acceptance of trust form, it might go a long way towards preventing all 
trustees from shirking their duty or trying to escape the consequences of their dereliction of duty or, 
perhaps, even from accepting appointment in the first place.”64 
 
Taking into account the dissimilar viewpoints, it is submitted that a combination of the two 
solutions would best fit the current trust laws in South Africa. Thus, the Trust Property 
Control Act should be amended to ensure independent trustees are used in all inter vivos 
trusts as well as to amend the acceptance of trust form. 
 
In terms of the need for legislative reform, it is submitted that the problems identified above 
could be alleviated by adequate legislative provisions.  
 
                                                             
62 R Holmes “Sham Trusts and Sham Transactions” http://www.rossholmes.co.nz/article.php?id=112 (accessed 
14 May 2009). 
63 Kernick 2007 DR 32. 
64 Kernick 2007 DR 31. In Parker, the court appeared to agree with this conclusion, before the words were lost 
in the remainder of the judgment. The court noted (at para 36) that a trustee should be someone “with proper 
realization of the responsibilities of trusteeship … being aware that failure to observe these duties may risk 
action for breach of trust”. 
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Consequently, the amendment submitted below should ensure certainty regarding the 
necessity of the independent trustee and their duties: 
 
“
1. All inter vivos trusts, to which this act applies, are to have at least one independent 
professional trustee in office at all times. 
The Independent Trustee 
 
2. Except where the Master authorises otherwise, inter vivos trusts which are already in 
operation are to take reasonable measures to adhere promptly to this provision. 
 
3. If the office of the independent professional trustee cannot be filled or becomes vacant, 
the Master shall, after consultation with the interested parties, appoint a person who 
meets the required standards as the trust’s independent professional trustee. 
 
4. Remuneration of the independent professional trustee is to be decided upon and recorded 
in writing prior to the Master’s issuing authorisation of the independent professional 
trustee. 
 
5. Trustees are required to amend their trust instruments so as to accommodate this 
provision. 
 
6. The rights and duties of the independent professional trustee must in no way be diluted, 
and should at the least be equal to that of the remaining trustees.” 
 
The above amendment must be accompanied by the inclusion in s 1 of the Act of a definition 
of “independent professional trustee”. The following description serves as a guideline: 
 
“
‘independent professional trustee’ means a normal trustee for all transactions and decisions 
made by the trustees, but who is a professional chartered accountant, admitted attorney or 
1. Definitions 
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legal advocate. This trustee must have no relation or connection, blood or other, to any of the 
existing or proposed trustees, beneficiaries, settlor or nominee settlor of the trust.” 
 
The final recommendation is for the Master to insist that all trustees, both present and future, 
warrant in affidavit form that they have educated themselves regarding trustee rights and 
duties and have accepted the provisions contained in the Act. If a trustee is to waive this 
responsibility, the Master should have the discretion (and does so in terms of s 6 of the Act) 
to require the trustee to furnish security. 
 
2.3.2 TRUSTEE ETHICS AND DUTIES 
“It is now also clear from recent legal judgments that one of the key requirements for a valid trust is 
that there must be a separation of beneficial ownership from control. The trustees are required to 
administer the assets under their control for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. Often, however, 
the sole trustees of a trust are also the beneficiaries of that trust. In a recent Appellate Division 
judgment, it was clearly stated that such trusts ‘invite abuses’. And abuses will not be tolerated by the 
courts.”65 
 
A basic, yet highly fundamental responsibility all trustees must adhere to is honesty. In order 
to minimise the room for an alter-ego or a sham allegation to succeed, all trustees are to act 
truthfully in all matters concerning the trust. This means that trustees should always treat the 
trust as it should be treated, and as it always should have been treated.66 This ethical duty is 
what ensures a separation of power, because an honest trustee would not be inclined to 
conflate enjoyment and control.67 It is submitted that even without employing an independent 
professional trustee, the line between control and ownership is more likely to be observed if 
the trustees are selected on the basis of their honesty and integrity, in addition to their 
knowledge of trust affairs. 
                                                             
65  Market Views “You may be Disappointed to discover that Your Trust is not a Trust” 
http://www.sharenet.co.za/marketviews/article/34/You_May_Be_Disappointed_To_Discover_That_Your_Trust
_Is_Not_A_Trust (accessed 2 March 2010). 
66 P Bobbin “Alter-Ego Trust Failure” http://www.argylelawyers.com.au/pdf_files/fin_dit_pub/AP143058.pdf 
(accessed 9 April 2009). 
67 This is the converse of Cameron JA’s views in Parker, where the learned judge reasoned (at para 22) that it is 
the “separation of powers that serves to secure diligence on the part of the trustee”.  
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A diligent and honest trustee would also observe impartiality. This fiduciary duty, as pointed 
out by du Toit,68 comprises of two elements:  
 
“On the one hand a trustee must avoid a conflict of interest between his personal concerns and his 
official duties. An important manifestation of this rule is that a trustee is not permitted to derive 
unauthorised profit from the administration of a trust … The second aspect to the duty of impartiality 
relates to a trustee’s obligation to treat beneficiaries impartially, particularly when trust income and/or 
capital is distributed.”69 
 
Figure 6.2 depicts the most crucial characteristics that constitute the ideal trustee. Importantly, 
all five elements are required to be present, or else the “chain” breaks. When the chain is 
broken, the other elements will fall away, because each element relies on the other. Thus, 
even if the remaining four components are present, the absence of one means that the others 
could place the trustee's position in jeopardy.  
 
Figure 6.2 The Components that form the “Perfect” Trustee and their Rooted 
Relationship to One Another 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
68 This duty is covered in greater detail in chapter 2. 
69 F du Toit South African Trust Law: Principles & Practice 2 ed (2007) 71–72. 
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Besides the ethical considerations that have been key to this discussion, there are a number of 
statutory and common law trustee duties which need to be emphasised for the purposes of 
setting out practical recommendations. 
 
Under the common law, trustees have a duty to keep proper records concerning the 
administration of the trust. This duty is more commonly referred to as the “duty to account”, 
and is important in defending an alter-ego argument as evidence can then be provided that the 
trust was properly managed.70 At the very least, trustees are required to keep the following 
records: 71 
• trust instruments; 
• agreements for sale and purchase of trust assets; 
• deeds of acknowledgment of debt; 
• deeds of forgiveness of debt; 
• trust minutes (in minute book); 
• trustee resolutions; 
• the trust’s financial accounts; 
• beneficiary details; 
• the trust’s tax records; 
• copies of independent advice given to the trustees, and 
• general correspondence. 
 
Trustees should also ensure that all original documents are placed in safe custody. 72 
Realistically, financial records have become one of the most important pieces of evidence 
against a sham or an alter-ego argument, and trustees must keep track of all income received 
by, distributions from, and expenditures made by the trust. To further strengthen the banking 
and financial records, trustees must record which trustees authorised each transaction and, if 
applicable, under which resolution it was decided. All of the above will, however, serve little 
purpose if the trustees do not fulfil their statutory duty to open a separate trust bank account. 
                                                             
70 Pryke “Sham Trusts”. 
71 Maxwell A Kiwi Sham? 53–54. 
72 Maxwell A Kiwi Sham? 54. 
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The Act provides that whenever a person receives money in his or her capacity as a trustee, 
he or she shall deposit it in a separate trust account at a banking institution or building 
society.73 Cameron et al noted that the Act does not stipulate whether the account must be in 
the trustee’s own name or in the name of the trust, but in practice, banks and building 
societies permit accounts to be opened in the name of a trust or in the name of the trustees for 
the time being of the trust.74 It is submitted that it is preferable to open the account in the 
name of the trust for two important reasons: first, the trustees may change over time and the 
account would then become ineffective and invalid; and, second, having the account in the 
trust’s own name will help avoid any unnecessary inferences that such trustee had exercised 
dominance over the other trustees. 
 
Foreign and local case law suggests that the abovementioned responsibilities and duties are 
those which are most overlooked or ignored by trustees (and settlors) who are party to a sham 
or an alter-ego trust. Those obligations should always be adhered to by any trustee. There are, 
of course, many other fiduciary responsibilities which must be observed by trustees, but those 
set out above are the most critical. The remainder of the trustee duties are set out in the 
handbook attached to this thesis. 
 
2.4 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
There seems to be much uncertainty in South Africa on the topic of the disclosure of trust 
information. Interestingly, the same is evident overseas. In Canada, for instance, the basis for 
the trustees’ obligations to provide information has been expressed in two ways: 
 
“On the one hand, it has been put on the proprietary basis that beneficiaries are entitled to inspect trust 
documents and obtain other information about the trust because they have a proprietary interest in such 
documents and information corresponding to their interest in the trust property. On the other hand, it 
has been put more generally on the basis that trustees are administering property for the benefit of 
                                                             
73 Section 10 of the Trust Property Control Act. Applied in Tijmstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie NO 2002 (1) SA 459 
(T). 
74 E Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed (2002) 306. 
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others and as such are required to provide information and account for their dealings with the trust 
property.”75  
 
Thus, according to Youdan, whichever one of the above is correct will be relevant in the 
determination of who is entitled to obtain trust information, since the first basis (the 
proprietary basis) would not allow discretionary beneficiaries access to such information.76 
The question was, however, answered in a string of judgments, the most recent being Schmidt 
v Rosewood Trust Ltd.77 The Privy Council in this matter overturned the Ontario decision of 
Re Ballard Estate,78 which favoured the non-proprietary basis for the obligation to provide 
trust information. Thus, the law as it stands in Canada is that access by beneficiaries to 
information relating to the trust lies within the discretion of the court and it does not depend 
on any proprietary entitlement. 79  There is therefore no direct obligation for trustees to 
disclose information to the beneficiaries. Should the trustees deny a beneficiary information 
requested, a court with the appropriate jurisdiction would decide on the matter in terms of the 
Act and the Promotion of Access to Information Act.80 
 
In both Australia and the UK, the disclosure of information is qualified by three rules. In 
Australia s 52 of the Trusts Act81 deals directly with this matter and states that: 
 
“Trustees are under a duty to keep and render to the beneficiaries a full and candid record of their 
stewardship, including all appropriate financial accounts. They may employ accountants to assist in the 
keeping of proper accounts and can seek reimbursement for such expenses incurred in fulfilling this 
duty.” 
 
                                                             
75  TG Youdan “Family Trusts” http://www.dwpv.com/images/Paper_-_Family_Trusts_Timothy_Youdan.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2010). 
76 Ibid. 
77 [2003] 2 AC 709. 
78 (1994) 20 OR (3d) 350 (Ont Gen Div). 
79 Youdan “Family Trusts”. 
80 Act 2 of 2000. Hereafter referred to as the “PAIA Act”. 
81 Act of 1973. 
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Thus, beneficiaries have a prima facie right of access to trust documents and information, but 
this rule does not extend to strangers.82 Mahoney J supported this view in Hartigan Nominees 
(Pty) Ltd v Rydge,83 where the learned judge commented: 
 
“In general a trustee is not obliged to volunteer documents or information to beneficiaries or possible 
beneficiaries. However, if a beneficiary requests it, a trustee is in general obliged to provide documents 
and information to the beneficiary, at his cost, in relation to the trust property, and to provide an 
accounting in respect of the administration of it.”84 
 
There are three main qualifications to this principle. First, trustees are not bound to disclose 
reasons for the exercise of their discretion because a trustee’s exercise of a discretionary 
power cannot be challenged in the absence of mala fides.85 The requirement would also add 
to trustees’ already onerous obligations. 86  The second qualification is that there is no 
entitlement to documents which are not trust documents. Thus the beneficiaries’ right to 
inspect documents is limited to trust documents only, and documents such as trustee 
correspondence is plainly off limits. 87  The third qualification is secrecy provisions. This 
limitation holds that:  
 
“[B]eneficiaries’ rights to access information may be regulated by the trust instrument. Thus 
beneficiaries do not have access to documents which are expressed to be confidential, especially where 
such documents may relate to the exercise of the trustees’ discretions.”88 
 
Similarly, in the UK it was held that trustees who exercise discretionary powers need not 
disclose why they have exercised their discretion in a particular way.89 In the matter of Re 
Londonderry’s Settlement90 the English Court of Appeal held that beneficiaries were not 
entitled to inspect documents if those documents concerned the reasons for the exercise of the 
                                                             
82 T Cockburn “Trustee Duties: Disclosure of Information” (2008) 12 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of 
Law 1 at 2. 
83 (1992) 29 NSWLR 405. 
84 At 431. 
85 Cockburn 2008 MUEJL 4. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Cockburn 2008 MUEJL 5. 
88 Tierney v King [1983] 2 Qd R 580. 
89 Re Beloved Wilke’s Charity (1851) 3 Mac & D 440. 
90 [1965] Ch 918. 
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trustees’ discretion. In Australia and the UK all courts have treated a settlor’s letter of wishes 
as confidential and out of the reach of anyone to whom the letter is not directly addressed.91 
 
Thus the trend overseas is that trust instruments, annual financial statements and possibly 
even resolutions should all be made available to both vested and discretionary beneficiaries, 
should they request them. Any document which does not form part of either would thus not 
be accessible. In South Africa, s 18 of the Act allows for persons (subject to the 
Administration of Deceased Estates Act 92 ) with “sufficient interest” to gain copies of 
documents pertaining to testamentary trusts from the Master. There is, however, no such 
provision for inter vivos trusts. Geach and Yeats state that “every beneficiary, whether that 
beneficiary has a vested or discretionary right, has a right to information concerning trust 
matters, including access to information regarding the manner in which trust assets have been 
invested and distributed.”93 This particularly bold statement is, however, not complemented 
by any evidence in support of it. However, it is believed that this statement was made in the 
light of the decision in Doyle v Board of Executors.94 In this case a beneficiary argued that 
the accounts presented to him were insufficient. Importantly, the court held that the trustee 
was bound, in the discharge of the duties of trustee, to demonstrate to the beneficiary that 
what he had received was the correct product of the initial capital, properly administered.95 
Geach and Yeats comment on the impact of this decision as follows: 
 
“The Doyle decision makes it clear that a trustee occupies a fiduciary office. By virtue of that alone, a 
trustee owes the utmost good faith towards all beneficiaries, whether actual or potential. And so while 
it is clearly a duty of a trustee to account to a beneficiary when requested to do so, it may be good 
practice to be proactive and to communicate with beneficiaries on a regular basis.”96 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the interpretation of Doyle and a beneficiary’s right to 
information by Geach and Yeats may be a stretch too far, especially in the light of the 
bestowal of such drastic powers to discretionary beneficiaries. However, there may be 
                                                             
91 See, for example, Re Rabiaotti’s Settlements [2000] WTLR 953. 
92 Act 66 of 1965. 
93 Geach and Yeats Trusts 123. 
94 1999 (2) SA 805 (C). 
95 At 815G. 
96 Geach and Yeats Trusts 93–94. 
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legislation which indirectly supports this view. The PAIA Act, which was enacted to give 
effect to the constitutional right of access to information held by the State, applies 
horizontally to any information held by another person or private body when that information 
is required for the exercise or protection of any rights,97  and has as a result turned the 
principles of informational and document access upside down. Cameron et al reasons that the 
PAIA Act: 
 
“clearly covers the Master with whom trust instruments are lodged, since it applies to all recorded 
information held in any form by any department of state or administration or any other functionary 
when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation.98 That is, 
however, as far as the PAIA Act may be applicable in the above deliberation.”99 
 
It is submitted that the consequence of the PAIA Act is that s 18 of the Act applies to both 
testamentary and inter vivos trusts. Thus, where information is held by the Master, 
beneficiaries may circumvent the trustees and, upon written request and payment of the 
prescribed fee, receive a certified copy of the document, should the beneficiaries prove to the 
Master that they have “sufficient interest” in such document. Conversely, where information 
is held by the trustees, and disclosure to the beneficiaries (or other third parties) has been 
refused, such party would have to rely on the inherent supervisory jurisdiction the courts have 
over trustees and persuade a court of competent jurisdiction to order the information to be 
handed down to the interested party. Importantly, documents such as trust instruments, 
financial statements and accounts should never be refused to a beneficiary because a trust 
should maintain some level of transparency for the purposes of sustaining its legal validity. 
 
Furthermore, in view of the above, it is suggested that it would be ideal to include in the trust 
instrument an indication of the agreed level of information that can be made available. Such 
provision could therefore detail the policies to be followed by trustees regarding the gathering 
and provision of information.  
 
                                                             
97 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 265–266. 
98 Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 266. Sections 50–73 of the PAIA Act. 
99 Ibid. 
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2.5 LEGAL TECHNICALITIES 
2.5.1 REDEFINING SHAM AND ALTER-EGO TRUSTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Case law over the last decade has steered South African trust law off the steady path which 
other foreign law jurisdictions have begun to follow. Undoubtedly, the Parker, Badenhorst, 
and Van der Merwe cases are likely to be only the tip of the iceberg of what is to come, if 
South Africa is to maintain its current direction. Above all else, the conflation of the 
doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego, the unnecessary importation of the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil, and a general lack of legal certainty surrounding trust law have 
dictated what could possibly see the end of the inter vivos trust as we know it today. 
Notwithstanding the above concerns, it is clear from this work that there is still the potential 
to salvage this area of the law. A truly mismanaged trust should be dealt with according to 
trust law and not company law. It is thus submitted that the courts should change the existing 
approach in order to create certainty, predictability and a more sound trust law, in harmony 
with its very origins. The legal personality of a company is a matter of substance and not 
merely a technicality that may be shifted to other areas of the law. It is submitted that an 
appropriate amendment to the Trust Property Control Act coupled with a positive and 
knowledgeable response by the courts will help South Africa to correct the unwanted and 
unwarranted differences in its trust law. 
 
The first concern which evidently needs addressing is an accurate clarification of the 
doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego. In this regard, a court could set out a clear description 
detailing the intrinsic workings of the doctrines, their effect on and application to trust law in 
South Africa and even a possible test to identify and/or distinguish between the two. 
Importantly, these significant details need to be ascertained with reference to the Snook test, 
as well as taking into account the recent developments in New Zealand, Australia and the UK. 
Thus, the examination to be undertaken should follow the same approach as pursued in this 
thesis.  
 
Without such judicial intervention, it is unlikely that those critical areas of trust law will ever 
recover. Alternatively, if Parliament were to intervene, the Legislature may be able to publish 
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an appendix to the Act in the guise of a schedule. Such a “code of good practice” could 
address the following objectives:  
• to identify and define the nature of the doctrines of the sham (including an emerging 
sham) and the alter-ego; 
• to address the applicability of those doctrines in South Africa; 
• to provide very broad guidelines for identifying sham and alter-ego trusts, and how to 
differentiate between the two; 
• to prohibit the use of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil; 
• to override any prior legal precedents developed prior to the amendment which may 
distort the operation of the amendment, and 
• to define what impact a finding of a sham or an alter-ego would have on the validity 
of the trust in issue. 
 
It is submitted that should either of the approaches described above be used, the end result 
should be a law of trusts that is firmer, more certain and in line with the ethics and values of 
the South African Constitution. The research undertaken towards this thesis, along with the 
conclusions reached in Chapter 5, would undoubtedly assist the Legislature and/or Judiciary 
in reaching the above desired goals. To name but a few, issues such as the rights of 
beneficiaries, the interrelationship of the doctrines, the compatibility of the corporate law 
doctrine, and the global tendencies pertaining to sham and alter-ego trusts could be of great 
assistance. Figure 5.3 “The Complete Sham Enquiry” and Figure 5.4 “The Elements of an 
Alter-ego Trust” (both in Chapter 5) should both prove useful in creating the appropriate 
legislative or judicial guidelines. 
 
2.5.2 RATIFICATION 
The necessity for statutory intervention is not limited only to the problems discussed above. 
Outside the scope of alter-ego and sham trusts, there is an important additional matter which 
should also be attended to for the sake of legal certainty.  
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Surprisingly, there has been a somewhat mixed reaction to the question of the validity of an 
act performed prior to the authorisation of a trustee. In Simplex (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe 
and Others NNO100 Goldblatt J held that written authorisation was, by virtue of the Act’s101 
peremptory nature, a precondition for a trustee’s right to act as such.102 Any action performed 
prior to authorisation was therefore to be regarded as null and void, and, as a result, incapable 
of ratification.103 Importantly, and for the sake of legal certainty, this approach was sustained 
in a number of cases 104  subsequent to Simplex. However, in Kropman v Nysschen 105 
MacArthur J held that anything done prior to authorisation was unauthorised, but that such 
unauthorised acts were capable of ratification at the discretion of the court.106 The courts are 
thus faced with a dilemma, and de Waal explains that a choice would have to be made 
between the two approaches.107  Smith and Van der Westhuizen argue for the legislative 
intervention of this matter, simply because no clear choice has been made. Importantly, 
though, distinction must be made between a contract made by a trustee and one made by an 
agent in order to determine the validity thereof.108 It is submitted that Smith and Van der 
Westhuizen’s proposed legislative insertion to the Act would alleviate the above dilemma. 
The legislative “prototype” suggested would seek to cover instances in which the person has 
professed to act as a trustee for a trust but is in fact precluded from binding the trust for one 
of the following reasons: (1) the person has not obtained the requisite authorisation in terms 
of s 6(1) of the Act; or (2) there was a deficiency in the number of trustees in office as 
required by the trust instrument or other law. 109  According to Smith and Van der 
Westhuizen’s model, should one of the above scenarios occur, then the contract in question 
may be ratified, on condition that the additional trustee or trustees are duly authorised and the 
ratification is consented to in writing by all of the trustees.110 
 
                                                             
100 1996 (1) SA 111 (W). 
101 In particular ss 6(1), which states that: “Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust 
instrument, section 7 or a court order comes into force after the commencement of this Act, shall act in that 
capacity only if authorized thereto in writing by the Master.” 
102 At 112H–I. 
103 At 113E–114I. Smith 2007 JJS 165. 
104 See, for example, Van der Merwe v Van der Merwe 2000 (2) SA 519 (C); Kriel v Terblanche NO en Andere 
2002 (6) SA 132 (NC); and Watt v Sea Plant Products Bpk and Others 1998 (4) All SA 109 (C). 
105 1999 (2) SA 567 (T). 
106 At 576D–F. 
107 MJ de Waal “Authorisation of Trustees in Terms of the Trust Property Control Act” (2000) 63 THRHR 472 
at 476. 
108 Smith and Van der Westhuizen 2007 JJS 174. 
109 Smith and Van der Westhuizen 2007 JJS 183. 
110 Ibid. 
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Moreover, the above adjustment would also put to rest the debate as to the applicability of the 
doctrine of constructive notice111 and the Turquand Rule,112 as both are therefore rendered 
ineffectual – a position which should be adopted by the courts even without the proposed 
amendment. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this research was to study, analyse and explain the use, nature and 
applicability of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego in South Africa. Subsidiary to this 
purpose, this thesis undertook to assess the extent of the problems faced in South African 
trust law, as well as to provide realistic recommendations in order to alleviate any undue 
developments in the law as well as to offer practical administrative recommendations which 
would ensure that a trust retains its protection. To achieve the above objectives, it was 
necessary to trace the development of the law of trusts through to the latest of the applicable 
cases in South Africa and then to make informed comparisons with trust law tendencies 
abroad. Most notably, foreign law precedent relevant to the doctrines of the sham and the 
alter-ego were contrasted with the South African interpretation of those doctrines in order to 
ascertain key quantifiable differences. All the issues were studied from a legal-comparative 
perspective. 
 
As for sham trusts and the corresponding doctrine, the study revealed an overwhelming 
propensity abroad to follow Diplock LJ’s restrictive view of the term “sham” which had 
emerged in the early matter of Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd.113 Although 
originally conceived and applied in a hire-purchase agreement dispute, the words of his 
                                                             
111 “The doctrine implies that an individual or juristic entity that deals with a company is presumed to be 
informed of any internal formalities or constraints prescribed by the company’s public documents, mainly the 
constitution, relating to the transaction and the authority of the person representing the company in the 
transaction. The individual or juristic entity is thus prohibited from denying the knowledge of the formalities or 
constraints.” Legal City “Mitigation of the Doctrine of Constructive Notice by the Turquand Rule” 
http://www.legalcity.net/Index.cfm?fuseaction=MAGAZINE.article&ArticleID=3548133 (accessed 20 April 
2010). 
112 “The rule implies that a third party contracting with a company in good faith is entitled to ‘assume that the 
internal requirements and procedures of the company have been complied with’. In those circumstances the 
company will be bound by the contract even though all its internal affairs may not have been properly ordered” - 
D Kouvelakis “S 228 and the Turquand Rule”   
http://www.routledges.co.za/publications/article/commercial/2005/3/189 (accessed 20 April 2010). 
113 [1967] 2 QB 786. 
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lordship soon resonated into other areas of the law, including its very own place in English 
trust law. The Snook test, as it was to become known, dictated that there be a joint common 
intention between the settlor and at least one trustee other than the settlor him- or herself to 
present the declared trusts to a third party as genuine, when in reality, the trust was nothing 
more than a false front. In this study it was confirmed that the restrictive approach to a 
determination of a sham was, in the light of the interests of innocent beneficiaries, the correct 
approach for trust law. It is of interest that research conducted in this study114 of cases in the 
UK, Jersey, Australia and New Zealand revealed that there is an inverse relationship between 
the number of courts using the Snook test and the number of trusts pierced. This finding 
reflects positively on the test because the nature of the trust institution and the inherent 
protection it offers to its beneficiaries demand that the courts be constrained in their ability 
and discretion to pierce trusts. 
 
Another reason the test is useful – and most probably the reason it has become so widely 
accepted – is the need for clear and definite parameters. Between 2000 and 2010 South 
African trust law cases patently revealed what could happen without such guidelines. In 
Badenhorst v Badenhorst115 the court a quo held that, unless the trust is found to be a sham, 
the court was not at liberty to pierce it. This strict interpretation of the law was, however, 
ignored on appeal, and the SCA lifted the veil of the trust on the basis that the respondent 
controlled the trust and, but for the trust, would have acquired and owned the assets in his 
own name.116 
 
Worryingly, similar to many cases preceding Badenhorst, the trust was pierced without any 
reference to Snook. In fact, there has not been a single reported case in South Africa where 
either the meaning or the use of a sham has been explicitly defined. There is therefore an 
urgent need for legislative or judicial intervention to clarify this potentially damaging 
uncertainty. 
 
                                                             
114 Depicted in Figure 4.1 “Frequency of the Snook Test Utilisation and the Correlation to the Frequency of 
Trusts Pierced”, Chapter 4. 
115 2005 (2) SA 253 (C). 
116 Para 9. 
220 
 
The Parker case also caused quite a stir. Probably the most widely discussed trust law case in 
decades, the SCA made it clear that the courts would have to be much stricter in their 
insistence that trustees adhere to their legal duties. In fact, Cameron JA argued in Parker that 
where trustees and/or the settlor acts in breach of the duties imposed by the trust instrument, 
it may provide evidence to assist the court in determining that the trust form was a veneer that 
should be pierced.117 
 
In the matter of Van der Merwe, the Western Cape High Court added to the jurisprudence on 
trust veil-lifting when Binns-Ward J agreed with Cameron JA’s ratio decidendi in Parker and 
further held that the case before the court was an appropriate example for the court to 
exercise its discretion and disregard the veneer of the trust form.118  
 
As a result of these cases, the view on sham trusts in South Africa has become uncertain. 
Additionally, a perturbing effect of the uncertainties has emerged – being the collapse of the 
understanding of alter-ego trusts in and the distinct difference between sham and alter-ego 
trusts. Correctly applied, an alter-ego allegation is a question of de facto control. Importantly, 
various cases in South Africa have emphasised this, and Brunette v Brunette and Another119 
immediately springs to mind. But South African courts have not attributed the common 
foreign legal consequence to a finding of an alter-ego. In this respect it has been repeatedly 
established throughout this thesis that while a sham allegation may form an independent 
cause of action, the alter-ego argument does not. Thus, in Badenhorst, for instance, whereas 
the facts of the case may have led to the conclusion that the trust was the alter-ego of Mr 
Badenhorst, that does not automatically allow a court to life the veil of the trust. As noted 
above in Chapter 5, a decision needs to be made by a competent court with the necessary 
authority as to which direction should be followed, the most probable options being the 
“strict academic approach” or the “intermediate-equity approach”. 
 
                                                             
117 Para 37.3. 
118 Para 41. 
119 2009 (5) SA 81 (SE). 
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Apart from the legal reservations examined throughout this thesis, there are measures which 
can be undertaken by parties to a trust in order to ensure that their trust avoids court scrutiny. 
Thus, over and above the legal theory discussed, this chapter has also sought to provide 
practical advice regarding many aspects applicable to trustees and settlors. The foremost 
advice offered is in respect of the drafting of the trust instrument. It should be evident by now 
that this document forms the foundation of the trust, and should cover all the objectives 
discussed in section 2.1.2 of this chapter. The scope of the amendment power remains 
important, and the conclusion reached was that a balance needs to be found between a liberal 
and a restrictive amendment policy, but should lean more towards restrictive. The submitted 
provision for amending the trust instrument in section 2.1.3 should be considered, if one were 
to achieve that result.  
 
It was also found that protection clauses are worthy of consideration when drafting the trust 
instrument. However, as a recommendation, a trust instrument should not exempt settlor-
trustees and professional trustees from liability. In addition, it was concluded that duty 
exclusion clauses were unwelcome because they may accommodate trustee recklessness. 
What was found to be useful was the enlargement of power clause, when applicable, as well 
as the release and indemnity clause. Astute application of these features will undoubtedly 
certify a higher level of trust assurance. 
 
Most notably, the separation of control and enjoyment has been a message continually 
emphasised by the courts in South Africa.120 This approach has not been disputed in this 
thesis, because the trust inter vivos requires the distinction to be made between those who 
administer the trust and those who benefit from it. However, the American view that 
beneficiary control may lead to the inference of a partnership is unequivocally rejected. That 
said, beneficiary control should never occur; it is submitted that such a situation should rather 
be dealt with according to the doctrine of the alter-ego.  
 
                                                             
120 In Parker, for instance, Cameron JA reasoned (at para 22) that the enjoyment and control of the trust assets 
should be functionally separated. 
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It has also been established that in theory a settlor should play a very limited role in the trust. 
In fact, after making over the trust property, he or she should have no further involvement in 
the administration of the trust. Practically, however, this is normally far from the actual 
reality of the trust’s affairs. Often the settlor is a trustee, and under such circumstances should 
be vigilant not to dominate the other trustees. The keeping of accurate minutes and other 
records cannot be over-emphasised in this scenario, and should reflect shared decision-
making. Moreover, deadlocks must be resolved through a decisive casting vote of the trust’s 
independent trustee, and never by the settlor-trustee. In addition, this chapter reached two 
very important conclusions: first, that nominee trustees must be avoided and, second, that a 
letter of wishes should be used only when absolutely necessary. 
 
Trustees and their actions have arguably formed the cornerstone of this thesis and in this 
regard I support Cameron JA’s views in Parker, and in particular the importance of the point 
that a trust should always have at least one professional trustee in office at all times. Where I 
depart from the learned judge’s views is on how that should be implemented. An important 
element such as this should not be open to choice, or even debate, and thus it is recommended 
that this requirement be legislated.  
 
Legislation has, however, settled the next topic in this chapter – the disclosure of information. 
It was recommended that policies for trust information disclosure be written into the trust 
instrument in order to avoid disputes in the future. The policy should always be to allow a 
beneficiary access to the financial statements and the trust instrument in order to uphold the 
bare minimum suggested transparency. 
 
The final conclusions reached in this thesis drew on the prevailing doubt which prompted the 
researching and writing of this thesis. South Africa is in desperate need of a legislative or 
judicial clarification of the doctrines of the sham and the alter-ego. The research undertaken 
towards this thesis clearly illustrates the inaccuracies and concomitant uncertainties faced in 
South Africa’s trust law. The entanglement, it is submitted, is remediable, and clear 
definitions of the doctrines complemented by guidelines similar to those set out herein would 
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undoubtedly cure many of the misdirections. Moreover, the suggested options would also 
allow for an outcome much less drastic in comparison to the devastation often caused when 
the veneer of the trust is pierced.  
 
It is apparent that at present, the law of trusts in South Africa is shadowing the movements of 
the country’s company laws, especially in relation to the rules pertaining to veil-lifting. It is 
submitted, as the title of this thesis suggests, that there are real and apparent dangers 
associated with translocating the doctrine of piercing the veil into trust law. The trust law 
doctrines have proven to work well overseas.  
 
“Few areas of activity have emerged unscathed from the recent worldwide turmoil in the banking 
system and the consequent weakness in financial markets. Consumer confidence around the world has 
been battered and the valuation of family assets has been under pressure. All these factors might well 
deter people from setting up trusts. In reality, the indications are that trusts are still widely seen as a 
useful way to plan for the long-term future. Generally, the evidence suggest that trusts continue to grow 
in popularity.”121 
Trusts are here to stay, and it is the duty of the Courts and the Legislature to meet current 
trends and ensure ongoing development. 
 
                                                             
121  Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners “Trusts Explained” www.step.org/PDF/Trusts_Explained.pdf 
(accessed 10 March 2010). 
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DEED OF TRUST 
Between 
 
MR RONALD ROBIN SMITH 
(“the founder”) 
 
  And 
 
ADV CRAIG RENOIRS 
MR RONALD ROBIN SMITH 
MRS LYNDA WYNBERG 
 (“the trustees”) 
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AND the said appearers declared that WHEREAS: 
 
1. The founders are desirous of creating a trust for the purpose of carrying out the 
objects hereinafter described; 
2. the founders have agreed to donate a sum of money to the said trust, subject to the 
conditions set out hereunder; 
3. the trustees have agreed to accept their appointment as trustees, subject to the said 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED THAT: The founders undertake to donate irrevocably to the 
trustees, and immediately following the signature hereof, for the objects hereinafter described 
an amount of R500 (FIVE HUNDRED RAND), subject to the following terms and conditions 
(Addendum A): 
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ADDENDUM A: TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
1. 
In this Trust Deed unless the contrary appears from the context the following 
expressions shall have the following meanings: 
DEFINITIONS 
 
1.1 Words importing the singular shall include the plural and vice versa and words 
relating to any gender shall include the other gender and vice versa. 
 
1.2 Where figures are referred to in numerals and in words, if there is a conflict 
between the two, the words shall prevail. 
 
1.3 When any number of days is prescribed in this Trust Deed, same shall be 
reckoned exclusively of the first and inclusively of the last day, unless the last 
day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday, in which case the last day shall 
be the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday as 
prescribed in the Public Holidays Act. 
 
1.4 The “trustees” refers to the incumbent of the office of trustee and includes not 
only the persons who signed this Deed as trustees but also any persons 
succeeding or assumed by them as trustees according to the provisions of the 
Deed. 
 
1.5 “Independent Trustee” otherwise referred to as “Independent Professional 
Trustee” means a normal trustee for all transactions and decisions made by the 
trustees, but who is a professional chartered accountant, admitted attorney or a 
legal advocate. This trustee must have no relation or connection, blood or other, 
other than on a professional level, to any of the existing or proposed trustees, 
beneficiaries, founder or nominee founder of the trust. 
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1.6 The “beneficiaries” mean the persons to whom the trust income and capital will 
be distributed as selected by the trustees in their discretion from among the 
members of the class consisting of those persons listed per Addendum B. 
 
1.7 “the assets”, “the trust assets”, “the Trust”, “the capital”, “the trust capital” and 
the “Smith Family Trust” shall be interchangeable and shall mean and include: 
 
1.7.1 All assets and investments as described in Clause 8 hereunder, at any time 
or times hereafter ceded or transferred to and accepted by the trustees by 
way of addition or accretion to the assets hereby settled, whether by the 
founder or by any other person or entity in terms of Clause 9 hereof, and 
either inter vivos or by last will. 
 
1.8 “Net Income” means the income and/or loss derived from the trust property from 
time to time, as determined by the trustees in their discretion, after the deduction 
of all costs and expenses of the administration of the trust and as provided for this 
Deed, including, trustees’ remuneration, such taxation as may be payable in 
respect of the income of the trust and such other expenditure as the trustees may 
in their discretion elect to charge against income. 
 
1.9 “The balance of the trust property” means the trust property, (or the balance 
thereof after use of capital as herein elsewhere provided), and income in the 
hands of the trustees after deduction therefrom of all unpaid costs, expenses and 
liabilities of, incidental to, and arising in the course of the administration of the 
Trust, including trustees’ remuneration, distribution fees in respect of capital 
distributions and taxation payable in respect of capital distributions and taxation 
payable in respect of the income of the Trust. 
 
1.10“Distribution” means the payment or delivery to a beneficiary, of net income or 
any part of the capital of the trust property but shall not include a loan by the trust 
to a beneficiary. The word “distribute” has a corresponding meaning. 
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1.11 “Maintenance” used in relation to a person means without derogating from 
generality of the concept of maintenance, his travels, medical, dental and similar 
treatment and advice, self actualisation, self development, reasonable pleasures, 
taxes, general upkeep, welfare and benefit, marriage and education (including 
higher education), the acquisition or provision of residential facilities or a 
residence for him, setting him up in a business or a profession or fitting him for a 
career and funding the promotion of his talents, skills and interests. 
 
1.12 “Person” means a natural person, juristic person, non natural person or trust. 
 
1.13 “Quorum” means a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of trustees in attendance, 
should there be four or more trustees in office and authorised by the Master. 
Should there be less than four trustees in office, there should be a minimum of 
two trustees to constitute a “quorum”, provided that the Independent Trustee is 
amongst those two trustees. Should there only be one trustee in office, Clause 11 
applies. 
 
1.14 The captions to the Clauses of this Deed and the Index are provided for 
convenience and shall be disregarded for the purpose of the interpretation of this 
Deed. 
 
1.15 “Lawful issue” means legitimate child. 
 
 
2. 
The assets of the trust shall consist of the following: 
DESCRIPTION OF TRUST ASSETS 
 
2.1 The aforesaid amount of R500 (FIVE HUNDRED RAND); 
 
2.2 such further donations, grants or bequests to or in favour of the trust as may be 
made from time to time; as well as 
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2.3 such further assets or investments as the trustees may acquire for the trust 
including any income not immediately required for the purpose of the trust and 
which may be capitalised by the trustees in terms hereof. 
 
 
3. 
3.1 The founder has irrevocably settled on the trustees as the initial subject matter, 
and the trust has taken effect from the date when the Donation constituting this 
trust was given by the founder.  
SETTLEMENT 
 
3.2 The trustees shall have the right at any time and from time to time to change the 
name of the trust by unanimous agreement. 
 
3.3 The trust shall be known as the SMITH FAMILY TRUST. 
 
 
4. 
4.1 The principal objectives of the trust are that the trustees: 
OBJECT OF THE TRUST 
 
4.1.1 preserve the Trust Fund; and 
 
4.1.2 maintain the Trust Fund; and 
 
4.1.3 enhance the Trust Fund in terms of clause 5 infra; and 
 
4.1.4 in their absolute and sole discretion distribute or pay any income, expenses, 
capital gains, accrued, realised or unrealised gains of the Trust; and 
 
4.1.5 pay distribute or authorise the use of any asset, movable or immovable, 
whether corporeal comprising the Trust Fund; 
 
For the well-being of any beneficiary, subject to the provisions of this Trust Deed. 
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5. 
Save for the fiduciary, administrative, and operational functions of the trustees, it is the 
duty of the trustees to carry out and conduct the following principal operations and 
functions on behalf of the Trust, so as to facilitate and achieve the objectives of the Trust: 
PURPOSE OF THE TRUST 
 
5.1 to invest and employ the Trust Fund, income or capital gains in the broadest sense; 
 
5.2 to ensure that the Trust Fund is, as far as is practically possible, rendered 
economically productive; 
 
5.3 to acquire and assert any rights, including rights in movable and immovable 
property, corporeal and incorporeal assets, for investment, speculative, rental, 
holding or any other purpose as the trustees in their discretion may determine; 
 
5.4 to specifically acquire any immovable property, of any nature whatsoever, and 
without limiting the generality of the aforesaid, to acquire property of a 
residential, agricultural, commercial or industrial nature, with or without any 
improvements to such immovable property; 
 
5.5 to develop, hold, gear, re-finance, restructure, mortgage, re-mortgage, encumber 
and to conduct and execute any and all transactions and agreements relating to 
any property or any rights in any property so acquired; 
 
5.6 to carry on and conduct the business of realtors, estate agents, letting and rent 
collection agents, property investors, brokers, valuators and developers; further to 
purchase and/or lease specialised properties for any purpose whatsoever and 
howsoever they in their discretion deem fit to further the objectives of the Trust. 
 
5.7 The trustees are hereby empowered to exercise the powers afforded to them in 
terms of this Deed to utilise and apply the trust property to any other objective 
whatsoever. 
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6. 
6.1 Upon the founder having sold, ceded, transferred or selling, ceding or transferring 
any assets, investments or other property to the trustees, the founder shall be 
excluded from any right, title and interest therein and the control thereof and all 
right, title and interest therein, including every right of negotiation, shall vest in 
the trustees in their fiduciary capacities, subject to the under mentioned terms, 
provisions, conditions and trustee instructions.  
TRUST FUND TO VEST IN TRUSTEES 
 
6.2 Howsoever or wherever the capital, income, profits, trust property and/or assets, 
or capital profits of the trust may be held or registered, they shall be held for the 
trust and at no time shall the trustees be deemed to acquire for themselves or on 
their personal account any contingent and/or vested right or interest in the capital, 
capital profits, income and/or assets of the trust save insofar as the trustee may be 
a beneficiary of the Trust. 
 
6.3 The trustees undertake: 
 
6.3.1 to indicate clearly in their bookkeeping that the trust property or any 
capital profits, capital gains, income or profits of the trust is held by them 
in their capacities as trustees; 
 
6.3.2 if applicable, to register trust property or keep the trust property registered 
in such a manner to make it clear from the registration that it is a trust asset; 
 
6.3.3 to make any account or investment at a financial institution identifiable as 
a trust account or trust investment; 
 
6.3.4 in respect of any other trust asset to make such asset clearly identifiable as 
a trust asset; and 
 
6.3.5 to open a separate trust account at a banking institution or building society 
and to deposit all money which they may receive in their capacity as 
trustees therein. 
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7. 
It is the intention of the founder that the trust be administered autonomously by the 
board of trustees and that the board of trustees should at all times function 
independently and impartially from the instructions and will of the beneficiaries. To 
this end and to ensure that at all times this intention be upheld de facto and de jure, 
the trustees shall undertake that the following provisions be met: 
THE INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE 
 
7.1 that at all times during the existence of the trust there shall be an Independent 
Trustee; 
 
7.2 in the event that an Independent Trustee ceases to be a trustee for any reason 
whatsoever, the then remaining trustees shall endeavour to appoint another 
Independent Trustee to the board of trustees; 
 
7.3  The Independent Trustee shall meet all the following criteria and the criteria set 
out in Clause 1.5, and such trustee particularly: 
 
7.3.1 shall be an “at arm’s length” third party person not connected or related to 
the founder or any beneficiary; and 
 
7.3.2 shall preferably have the requisite operational, legal, accounting, tax and 
administrative skills to ensure that the appointed person be properly 
positioned to carry out the function of an Independent Trustee. 
 
 
8. 
The Trust Fund shall include: 
TRUST PROPERTY 
 
8.1 the settlement referred to in Clause 3 above; 
 
8.2 any other monies, property or assets which the trustees, in their capacity as such, 
may acquire by donation, inheritance, purchase, investment, re-investment, loan, 
exchange or otherwise, as well as 
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8.3 the undistributed, accumulated or capitalised income, profits or capital profits or 
gains of the trust as at the end of each financial year of the Trust 
 
 
9. 
The trustees are hereby empowered to accept and acquire for the purpose of the trust 
gifts, bequests, grants or payments from any person (including the founders or either 
of them), organisation, state, firm or company that may be given, bequeathed or paid 
to them as an addition or with the intention to add to the Trust Fund hereby 
constituted and whether any such addition consists of stocks, shares, moneys, 
movable or immovable tangible or intangible property, and any addition so accepted 
and acquired shall be deemed to form part of the Trust Fund and shall be administered 
and dealt with subject to the terms of this deed of trust. Any additions to the Trust 
Fund so received by the trustees may be retained by the trustees in the form in which 
they are received and such retention shall be sufficient compliance with the power to 
invest herein contained. 
POWER TO RECEIVE ADDITIONS 
 
 
10. 
10.1 There shall at all times be not less than two trustees in office. The first trustees 
signing this annexure hereby accept their appointment. 
THE TRUSTEES 
 
10.2 If at any time there are fewer than two trustees in office, the remaining trustee 
shall during such time act only to fill the vacancy in such office.  
10.3 Subject to Clauses 10.2 above and 10.4 below, any vacancy in the office of 
trustee shall be filled form time to time by such person as shall be nominated by 
the trustees remaining in office. 
 
10.4 On the written acceptance of his appointment as a trustee, a succeeding trustee 
shall be vested with all the powers and subject to all the duties of a trustee, as if 
he had been one of the first trustees. 
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10.5 The trustees in office from time to time shall at all times have the right to 
nominate and appoint such additional trustee or trustees as they may decide, 
provided that their decision to do so shall be unanimous. 
 
10.6 A trustee need not be a South African citizen or be resident in or domicile in 
South Africa or be incorporated as a legal person in South Africa. 
 
10.7 The Independent Trustee shall, unless otherwise agreed upon between the 
trustees, be the administrative trustee who shall be entitled to charge fees for 
services rendered to the trust as administrative trustee. 
 
10.8 No trustee shall have the power, on his own, to appropriate or dispose of any 
trust property, as he sees fit, for his own benefit or for the benefit of his estate 
(this does not apply if such disposition were for the benefit of this Trust Fund). In 
the event of the board of trustees consisting of only two trustees, then a 
distribution of capital to any trustee who is a beneficiary shall be made only if 
approved by the trustees unanimously. This clause does not prevent the trustees 
from being remunerated in terms of Clause 22. 
 
 
11. 
11.1 A trustee shall be entitled to appoint another person (approved by the other 
trustees in writing) to act as his alternate during his temporary absence or 
temporary unavailability to act as trustee. An alternate trustee, while so acting, 
shall have all the duties, functions and powers of the trustee he represents.  
ALTERNATE TRUSTEES 
 
11.2 In the event of all serving trustees being so absent or incapable of performing 
their duties, they are entitled by mutual power of attorney to nominate another 
person or persons to temporarily act in their place and to act as trustees of the 
Trust. 
 
11.3 There shall always be not less than two (2) trustees. If no provision has been 
made for the appointment of a new trustee/s so that, but for this clause there 
would be insufficient trustees of this Trust, then the remaining trustee/s shall 
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appoint a trustee/s to fill any vacancies and if there are no trustees at any time, the 
beneficiary/ies (duly assisted by their guardians where applicable), shall appoint a 
trustee/s to fill any vacancies. 
 
11.4A written resolution signed by all trustees for the time being, or their respective 
alternates, shall be as effective as a resolution taken at a meeting of trustees. 
 
 
12. 
12.1 The office of any trustee shall be vacated if such trustee: 
VACATION OF OFFICE BY TRUSTEE 
 
12.1.1 resigns (which he shall be entitled to do) after giving written notice to the 
Master of the High Court and the trustees for the time being of the Trust; 
or 
 
12.1.2 dies; or 
 
12.1.3 becomes of unsound mind or incapable of managing his affairs, or for any 
other reason becomes incapable of acting as a trustee or unfit so to act; or 
 
12.1.4 becomes insolvent or is placed under a sequestration order or assigns his 
estate for the benefit of his creditors, or compounds or attempts to 
compound or effects or attempts to effect any compromise with said 
creditors; or 
 
12.1.5 is removed from office by Order of Court. 
 
 
13. 
13.1The trustees may revise or amend this trust instrument provided that such revision 
or amendment: 
AMENDMENT OF THE TRUST DEED 
 
13.1.1 does not constitute any revocation of the trust, and 
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13.1.2 does not compromise the purpose and objectives of the trust, and 
 
13.1.3 is unanimously accepted by the trustees. 
 
13.2Should the revision or amendment have the potential to prejudice the rights or 
interests of any of the existing beneficiaries, the written consent of the 
beneficiaries whose rights will be prejudiced is required. The beneficiaries 
herewith referred to in this clause include both vested and discretionary 
beneficiaries. This provision is not applicable to beneficiaries who: 
 
13.2.1 have yet to accept (in writing or orally) the benefits that may accrue to 
them in terms of this trust instrument, and 
 
13.2.2 have not yet received any benefit in terms of the trust instrument. 
 
13.3The trustees may further amend or revise this trust instrument in the event of any 
legislation necessitating such amendment or revision in order to comply 
therewith, so long as such amendment or revision complies with subsections 1 
and 2 of this clause. 
 
13.4Should the founder wish to amend or revise this trust instrument: 
 
13.4.1 the founder should apply to the trustees in writing, setting out the proposed 
changes and giving reasons for such proposal; 
 
13.4.2 the trustees must then hold a properly constituted meeting in order to 
determine the nature of the proposed amendment or revision and assess its 
merits;  
13.4.3 when making a decision to approve or disapprove such request, the 
trustees’ decision is subject to the directives, guidelines and rules 
contained within this clause; 
 
13.4.4 the trustees must inform the beneficiaries and founder in writing of the 
decision made and the reasons therefor. 
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13.5No amendment or revision to this trust shall be of any force and effect to the 
extent that any benefit shall be conferred by such amendment on the founder or 
his/her estate, nor shall any variation give the founder or any trustee the power to 
appropriate or dispose of any trust property, on his or her or own, as he or she 
sees fit, for his or her own benefit or for the benefit of his or her estate, whether 
such power is exercisable by him or her or with his or her consent, and whether 
such power could be obtained directly or indirectly by the exercise, with or 
without notice, of power exercisable by him or her or with his or her consent. 
 
13.6In the event that any proposed amendment or revision is not unanimously 
accepted by the trustees, the majority decision will prevail, provided that: 
 
13.6.1 at least one of the trustees of this trust is an Independent Trustee, and 
 
13.6.2 the Independent Trustee approves the amendment or revision. 
 
This clause does not apply to the powers of addition and exclusion. See Clause 14, below. 
 
 
14. 
14.1 The trustees are hereby empowered in terms of the Trust Deed to add and/or 
exclude beneficiaries to and from this Trust, on condition that: 
TRUSTEES POWER OF ADDITION AND EXCLUSION OF 
BENEFICIARIES 
 
14.1.1 The decision is made by means of a written resolution; and 
 
14.1.2 has been decided upon in a meeting which constitutes a ‘quorum’ as 
defined in Clause 1.13; and 
 
14.1.3 does not have the effect of leaving this trust without any beneficiaries; and 
 
14.1.4 is made by unanimous agreement. 
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14.2 Such addition or exclusion will not amount to an amendment of the Trust Deed, 
despite the consequential necessity to update Addendum A of the Trust Deed. 
 
 
15. 
Subject to Clause 13, the trustees are hereby empowered in terms of the Trust Deed to 
deal with the trust property, capital and/or income and or capital profits or gains of the 
trust for the benefit and purposes of the Trust, in their discretion, including and 
without prejudice to the generality of the aforegoing, the following specific powers 
and authorities: 
POWER OF THE TRUSTEES 
 
15.1to open and operate any banking account or facility and/or building society 
account or facility, apply for any credit or debit cards and to draw and issue 
cheques and to receive cheques, deposits, promissory notes and/or bills of 
exchange, and attend to any of the latter by electronic, telephonic or internet 
means;  
 
15.2to acquire, dispose of, invest in, let or hire, exchange, and/or barter movable, 
immovable or incorporeal property and to sign and execute all requisite 
documents and to do all things necessary for the purposes of effecting and 
registering, if needs be, the transfer according to law of any such property. In 
exercising any powers of sale, whether conferred in this sub-clause or otherwise, 
they shall be entitled to cause such sale to be effected by public auction or by 
private treaty and in such manner and on such terms and conditions as they in 
their sole and absolute discretion may deem fit and in exercising any powers of 
lease they shall be entitled to cause any property to be let at such rental, for such 
period and on such terms and conditions as they, in their sole and absolute 
discretion, may deem fit; 
 
15.3to invest in shares, stocks, debentures, debenture stock, unit trusts, warrants, 
options, bonds, gilts, securities, promissory notes, bills of exchange and other 
negotiable instruments. In the event of a company or a unit trust scheme 
prohibiting, in terms of its articles or regulations, the transfer of shares or units 
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into the name of the trust as such, the shares or units shall be registered in their 
personal names or in the names of their representatives and shall be held as 
nominees on behalf of the Trust; 
 
15.4to retain and allow the trust property or any part or parts thereof to remain in the 
present state of investment thereof for so long as they think fit;  
 
15.5to lend money on such terms and at such interest and with or without security to 
beneficiaries as the trustees may determine; 
 
15.6to dispose of and otherwise vary any trust investment;  
 
15.7in their sole and absolute discretion, to borrow money for the purposes of 
discharging any liability of the trust and/or for the purpose of paying income tax 
and/or for the purpose of making payment of capital and/or income, and or capital 
profits or gains to any beneficiary and/or for the purpose of making a loan to any 
beneficiary and/or for the purpose of making an investment and/or for the 
purposes of preserving any asset or investment of the trust and/or for the purposes 
of conducting any type of business or in order to provide any type of services on 
behalf of the trust and/or any other purpose deemed necessary or desirable by the 
trustees, at such time or times, at such rate of interest or other consideration for 
any such loan and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem desirable. 
Such borrowings may be made from any suitable person or persons and, should 
they consider it advisable to do so, the trustees may secure the payment of any 
such loan by pledging or mortgaging the trust property or any part thereof or by 
any other security device. Any such loan or loans may be extended, renewed or 
repaid from time to time as the trustees may deem to be in the best interest of the 
Trust;  
 
15.8to obtain and utilise in the name of the Trust, membership in and any credit 
facilities from any agricultural or other society and for this purpose to encumber 
the trust property or any part thereof by way of pledge, hypothec or mortgage as 
security; 
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15.9to make donations for charitable, ecclesiastical, educational or other like purposes 
either from the income, capital profits or gains or the capital of the Trust; 
 
15.10 to mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber any property, asset, 
income or capital, or capital profits or gains forming part of the trust property and 
to execute any act or deed relating to alienation, partition, exchange, transfer, 
mortgage, hypothecation or otherwise, in any deeds registry, mining titles office 
or other public office dealing with servitudes, usufructs, limited interests or 
otherwise; and to make any applications, grant consents, and agree to or cause 
affect of any amendments, variations, cancellations, cessions, releases, reductions, 
substitutions or otherwise generally relating to any deed, bond, or document for 
any purpose and generally to do or cause to be done any act whatsoever in any 
such office; 
 
15.11 to appear before the Registrar of Deeds, Registrar of Claims, conveyancer or 
other proper officer and to execute any Mortgage Bond or Deed of 
Hypothecation as security for loans of money or as security for any other 
indebtedness or obligation contracted on the Trust’s behalf; 
 
 
15.12  to appear before any Notary Public and to execute any Notarial Deed; 
 
15.13 To collect rent, cancel leases, and to evict a lessee from property belonging to 
the Trust; 
 
15.14 to improve, alter, repair and maintain any movable and immovable property of 
the trust and further to improve and develop immovable property by erecting 
buildings thereon or otherwise, to expend the capital or income or capital profits 
of the trust upon the preservation, maintenance and upkeep of such property or 
buildings, to demolish such buildings or effect such improvements thereto as 
they may consider fit; 
 
15.15 to sue for, recover and receive all debts or sums of money, goods, effects and 
things, which are due, owing, payable or belong to the Trust, or to enter into any 
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legal action, whether by way of summons action, application or any other form, 
in any forum, for any claim or benefit or rights of the Trust;  
 
15.16 to allow time for the payment of debts due to them and grant credit in respect of 
the whole or any part of the purchase price arising on the sale of any assets 
constituting portion of the trust property, in either case with or without security 
and with or without interest, as they may think fit;  
 
15.17 to institute or defend, oppose, compromise or submit to arbitration all accounts, 
debts, claims, demands, disputes, legal proceedings and matters which may 
subsist or arise between the trust and any person;  
 
15.18 to attend all meetings of creditors of any person indebted to the trust whether in 
sequestration, liquidation, judicial management or otherwise, and to vote for the 
election of a trustee and/or liquidator and/or judicial manager and to vote on all 
questions submitted to any such meetings of creditors and generally to exercise 
all rights of or afforded to a creditor;  
 
15.19 to exercise the voting power attached to any share, stock, stock debenture, 
interest, unit or any company in which the share, stock, stock debenture, 
security, interest or unit is held, in such manner as they may deem fit, and to 
take such steps or enter into such agreements with other persons as they may 
deem fit, for the purposes of amalgamation, merger of or compromise in any 
company in which the shares, stock, debenture, interest, or unit are held;  
 
15.20 to subscribe to the memorandum and articles of association of and apply for 
shares in any company and to apply for the registration of any company;  
 
15.21 to determine whether any surplus on the realisation of any asset or the receipt of 
any dividends, distribution or bonus or capitalisation shares by the trust be 
regarded as income or capital of the Trust;  
 
15.22 to appoint or cause to be appointed or to remove any one or more of themselves 
or their nominees as directors or officers of any company whose share form 
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portion of the trust property, with the right to receive and retain remuneration 
for their services as directors and other officers;  
 
15.23 to consent to any re-organisation, arrangement or reconstruction of any 
company, the securities of which form, from time to time, the whole or any part 
of the trust property and to consent to any reduction of capital or other dealings 
with such securities as they may consider advantageous or desirable;  
 
15.24 to exercise and take up and realise any rights of conversion or subscription 
attaching, or appertaining to any share, stock, interest, debenture or unit forming 
part of the trust property; 
 
15.25 to guarantee the obligations of any person, to enter into indemnities and to bind 
the trust as surety for, and/or co-principal debtor in solidum with any person 
and/or company in respect of any debt or obligation of that person and/or 
company, whether for consideration or gratuitously on such terms as they 
consider fit, including the renunciation of the benefits of excussion and division. 
The trustees shall be entitled in respect of any obligations or liabilities so 
assumed by them to pledge, mortgage, cede in security or otherwise encumber 
all or any of the trust property in such manner and subject to such terms and 
conditions as they shall deem fit as collateral for such obligations;  
 
15.26 to give receipt, releases or other effectual discharges for any sum of money or 
thing recovered or received;  
 
15.27 to engage the services of professional practitioners, agents, independent 
contractors and tradesmen for the performance of work and rendering of 
services necessary or incidental to the affairs or property of the Trust;  
 
15.28 to enter into any partnership, joint venture, conduct of business or other 
association with any other person, firm, company or trust for the doing or 
performance of any transaction or series of transactions within the powers of the 
trustees in terms hereof, and/or to acquire and/or hold any assets in co-
ownership or partnership with any person; 
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15.29 to determine whether any sums disbursed are on account of capital or income or 
capital profits or gains or partly on account of one and partly on account of the 
others and in what proportions, and the decision of the trustees, whether made in 
writing or implied from their acts, shall be conclusive and binding upon all the 
beneficiaries; 
 
15.30 to effect an assurance policy on the life of the founder, a trustee and/or a 
beneficiary, to effect a short term insurance policy, or to take cession of such 
policy and to pay the premiums for such policy out of the income, capital profits 
or gains or capital of the Trust. To continue any such policy and/or to surrender, 
redeem, dispose of, encumber and borrow against any such policy, with the 
right generally to deal with any such policy as they in their discretion deem fit. 
If during the currency of the trust a person so assured should die while the 
assurance policy on his life is still in operation, the proceeds of such policy shall 
form part of the trust property; 
 
15.31 to contract on behalf of the trust and to ratify, adopt or reject contracts made on 
behalf or for the benefit of the Trust; 
 
15.32 to employ and pay out of the trust any other person or other persons to do any 
act or acts, although the trustees or any of them could have done any such act or 
acts; 
 
15.33 to conduct or carry on any business or to provide any type of services on behalf 
of and for the benefit of the Trust, and to employ the trust property and income 
or any capital profit or gain, in the conduct of any such business; 
 
15.34 to hold the whole or any part of the trust property in the name of the Trust, or in 
their names, or in the names of any other persons nominated by them for that 
purpose; 
 
15.35 in the event of the trustees obtaining the necessary authority, to incorporate any 
company, or establish a trust in any place in the world at the expense of the trust 
with limited or unlimited liability for the purpose of inter alia, acquiring the 
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whole or any part of the assets of the Trust. The consideration on the sale of the 
assets of the Trust, or any part thereof, to any company incorporated pursuant to 
this sub-clause, may consist of wholly or partly paid debentures or debenture 
stock or other securities of the company, and may be credited as fully paid and 
may be allotted to or otherwise vested in the trustees and be capital monies in 
the hands of the trustees; 
 
15.36 in the event of the trustees obtaining the necessary authority, to hold the trust 
property or any part thereof in or to transfer the administration and management 
of the trust property or any part thereof to any country in the world; 
 
15.37 to pay out of the income, capital profits or, at their discretion, out of the capital 
or the trust property all rates, taxes, duties and other impositions lawfully levied 
or imposed on the trust property or income or capital profits or gains of the trust 
or any part thereof or on any beneficiary hereunder on account of his interest in 
the trust hereby created or which may be imposed on the trustees in respect of 
matters arising out of the Trust;  
 
15.38  to pay out of the income, capital profits or out of the trust property all and/or 
any expenses (including legal fees) incurred in the administration of the trust or 
any expenditure incurred pertaining to any activity undertaken by the Trust, or 
on behalf of any trustee or beneficiary; 
 
15.39 to accept and acquire for the purpose of the trust any gifts, bequests, grants, 
donations or inheritance from any person or estate, or payments from any 
person, firm, company or association that may be given, bequeathed or paid to 
them as an addition or with the intention to add to the funds hereby donated to 
them. Any additions so accepted and acquired shall be deemed to form part of 
the trust property to be administered and dealt with subject to the terms of this 
deed; 
 
15.40 to be entitled to treat as income, or capital profits or gains any periodic receipts 
although received from wasting assets, and shall not be required to make 
provision for the amortisation of the same. They shall also be entitled to 
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determine in such manner as they may consider fit what shall be treated as 
income and what shall be treated as capital profits or gains in respect of any 
liquidation, dividend or return of capital in the case of companies whose shares 
are being held as portion of the trust property by the trustees; and generally to 
decide any question which may arise as to how much constitutes capital profits 
or gains and how much constitutes income by apportioning in such manner as 
they may consider fit;  
 
15.41 to do all or any of the above things and to exercise all or any of the above rights 
and powers in the Republic of South Africa or in any other part of the world. 
 
 
16. 
16.1 Subject to Clause 20, a decision of the trustees may be made by: 
DECISION OF TRUSTEES 
 
16.1.1 a resolution approved at a meeting of trustees; or 
 
16.1.2 a written resolution signed by all the trustees (including the duly 
authorised representative of a trustee). 
 
 
17. 
Subject to their giving effect to the terms of this deed, the trustees shall, in 
administering the Trust, adopt such procedures and take such administrative steps as 
they shall from time to time deem necessary or desirable. 
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST 
 
 
18. 
18.1 The trustees may meet together for the dispatch of business, adjourn and 
otherwise regulate their meetings as they think fit. Any trustee shall be entitled on 
reasonable written notice to the other trustees to summon a meeting of the 
trustees. All trustees shall be given reasonable notice of any meeting of the 
trustees. 
MEETINGS OF TRUSTEES 
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18.2 The meetings may be held either by the quorum of trustees being physically 
present as stipulated in Clause 18.4 below, or by the quorum of trustees 
interacting by way of any means of electronic communication or such other 
advanced means of communication as decided by the trustees which shall include 
but not be limited to radio, telephone, closed circuit television or other electronic 
means of audio or audio/visual communication. If the trustees are in different 
places or time zones, the meeting will be deemed to be held at the place and time 
where the majority of the trustees are present, and if there is no majority present 
at one place, the meeting will be deemed to be held at the time and place 
specified in the notice calling the meeting. In the event that a meeting is held 
where the physical presence of the trustees are required, the venue of such 
meeting shall be decided upon by the trustees. 
 
18.3 At or for each meeting of trustees, the trustees present, in person or by alternate, 
shall elect a chairperson. Each trustee shall have one vote. Should there be an 
equality of votes, Clause 20 applies.  
 
18.4 If there is no quorum, the trustees may adjourn the meeting for 24 hours or such 
longer period as the trustees shall determine, and at the continuation of the said 
adjourned meeting those trustees who are present shall form a quorum provided 
that the absent trustees have received reasonable notice of the adjournment and 
continuation of the meeting. 
 
18.5 The trustees themselves shall determine policy and procedures to be followed at 
meetings. 
 
18.6 The trustees shall keep minutes of all meetings of trustees concerning the affairs 
of the Trust. 
 
18.7 The trustees shall meet at least once a year and shall decide upon the use and/or 
allocations of capital gains, capital profits, capital losses, operating losses, 
assessed losses, net losses and profits earned or losses incurred or accrued by the 
Trust, and in accordance with Clause 27 and within their sole, absolute and 
unfettered discretion to determine whether they are to distribute and pay any 
248 
 
benefits to any beneficiary or to hold any capital gains, capital profits, capital 
losses, operating losses, assessed losses, net losses, profits for the Trust. 
 
 
19. 
All negotiable instruments, contracts, deeds and other documents which require to be 
signed on behalf of the trust shall be signed in such manner as the trustees shall from 
time to time determine. 
EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTS 
 
 
20. 
20.1Provided that there is a ‘quorum’ as defined in Clause 1.13, any dispute and/or 
deadlock will be dealt with as follows: 
DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN TRUSTEES 
 
20.1.1 Unless otherwise provided for in this deed, in the event of any 
disagreements arising between the trustees at any time, the view of the 
majority shall prevail and be of the same force and effect as if it were a 
unanimous decision of all the trustees. Should there be an equality of votes, 
the Independent Trustee shall have the casting vote. 
 
20.1.2 In the event there are only two trustees nominated to the board of the Trust, 
all decisions to be taken by them, to be effective, must be by unanimous 
consent. Any issue, event, resolution or motion which is not unanimously 
agreed upon shall constitute a stalemate and shall be resolved as set out in 
the provisions contained in and under Clause 20.1.3 below. 
 
20.1.3 Any ‘stalemate’ that may arise between two trustees, shall be referred to 
an independent mediator, who is an expert in the field pertaining to the 
stalemate, and who shall resolve such stalemate within 48 (forty-eight) 
hours of the stalemate arising. 
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20.1.3.1 The decision of the mediator shall be final and binding on the 
trustees subject to the following: 
 
20.1.3.1.1 the mediator shall only be empowered to adjudicate on matters 
which do not pertain to remuneration and/or monetary 
consideration; and 
 
20.1.3.1.2 the mediator shall be impartial and shall have an unfettered 
discretion in making any ruling or adjudication. 
 
20.1.3.2 All cost incurred in referring a stalemate in terms of Clause 
20.1.2 supra shall be borne by the Trust, save that in the event 
of the mediator being of the opinion that any trustee who has 
referred a stalemate has acted in trivial, vexatious, obstructive 
or unreasonable manner . 
 
20.1.3.3 The parties shall jointly nominate the mediator, provided that, if 
they are unable to agree on the identity of the mediator within 3 
days of the stalemate arising, then the mediator shall be 
nominated by the trust auditor. 
 
20.1.3.4 Should any stalemate arise between the trustees in regard to 
remuneration and/or monetary consideration and/or any other 
stalemate shall be submitted to and decided by arbitration. 
 
20.1.3.5 Arbitration shall be held: 
 
20.1.3.5.1 with only the parties and their representatives present there at; 
 
20.1.3.5.2 unless otherwise agreed in writing where the majority of the 
trustees may be resident, it being the intention that the 
arbitration shall, where possible, be held and concluded within 
21 (twenty-one) working days after it has been demanded. 
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20.1.3.6 No trustee or person shall be entitled to demand security for 
costs from any other trustee in respect of any arbitration 
proceedings contemplated by this Clause 21 and, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the 
arbitrator shall not have the power to make any order in relation 
to security for costs for any arbitration proceedings 
contemplated in this clause. 
 
20.1.3.7 The arbitrator shall be, if the matter in stalemate is principally: 
 
20.1.3.7.1 a legal matter, a practising advocate of not less than 15 (fifteen) 
years standing, or a practising attorney of not less than 10 (ten) 
years standing; 
 
20.1.3.7.2 accounting matter, a practising chartered accountant of not less 
than 10 (ten) years standing; 
 
20.1.3.7.3 any other matter, an independent person agreed upon between 
the parties. 
 
20.1.3.8 Should the parties fail to agree whether the stalemate is of legal, 
accounting or other nature within 7 (seven) days after the 
arbitration has been demanded, then the trust auditor as duly 
appointed from time to time shall determine whether the 
stalemate is of a legal, accounting or other nature. 
 
20.1.3.9 The arbitrator shall have the total and unfettered discretion with 
regard to the proceedings. Furthermore the arbitrator: 
 
20.1.3.9.1 may dispense wholly or in part with formal submissions or 
pleadings; 
 
20.1.3.9.2 shall include such order as to costs as he deems just provided 
that any costs incurred in referring a stalemate in terms of 
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Clause 20.1.3.4 supra shall be borne by the Trust, save that in 
the event of the arbitrator being of the opinion that any trustee 
who has referred a stalemate and acted in a trivial, vexatious, 
obstructive or unreasonable manner, where the arbitrator has 
ruled against such a trustee, the arbitrator may award that such 
trustee bear the costs of any matter that has been referred; 
 
20.1.3.9.3 the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1965, or any statute 
which replaces it, shall not apply; 
 
20.1.3.9.4 the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the 
Trust. 
 
 
21. 
The trustees shall cause to be kept complete and accurate records of all receipts, 
expenditure, assets and liabilities of the Trust. Promptly after the last day of 
FEBRUARY (or as at such other date as the trustees shall from time to time 
determine) in each year, the trustees shall cause to be prepared (in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles) financial statements for such period 
consisting of a balance sheet, a statement of income, capital profits and/or gains and 
expenditure and a statement of the trust property and liabilities at the close of such 
period. The trustees shall have the right (but shall not be obliged) from time to time to 
appoint a practicing Chartered Accountant (SA) to act as the auditor of the Trust, who 
shall report on the financial statements in the customary manner. 
TRUST ACCOUNTS 
 
 
22. 
The trustees may from time to time determine a reasonable remuneration which shall 
be paid to them for the administration of the Trust. 
TRUSTEE REMUNERATION 
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23. 
Any trustee engaged in any profession shall be entitled to charge for services rendered 
to the trust at a rate to which he or his firm would have been entitled in the ordinary 
course of his profession or business.  
PROFESSIONAL FEES AND BROKERAGE 
 
 
24. 
All bona fide costs and expenses incurred by the trustees in the administration of the 
trust or the exercise of the powers conferred upon them, shall be paid by the trustees 
out of the trust income, capital profits and/or trust property as decided by the trustees.  
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 
 
 
25. 
The trustees shall at all times be empowered to employ an attorney, accountant, 
independent contractor, or agent (including a committee) to transact all or any 
business required or permitted to be done in pursuance of this trust and to effect 
payment out of the trust property, capital profits or the income of the trust of all 
charges and expenses so incurred. 
DELEGATION OF POWERS 
 
 
26. 
26.1 Subject to the provisions of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988: 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
 
26.1.1  The trustees, shall be indemnified from any claims for any taxation, levies 
imposts, duties of whatsoever nature and howsoever arising, save that such 
indemnity extends only to the trustees in their capacity as representative 
taxpayers on behalf of the Trust. 
 
26.1.2 In the event that any trustee or any person is assessed by the South African 
Receiver of Revenue to be liable for any taxation as a result of any 
distribution made by the trustees to any beneficiary in terms of this Trust 
Deed, then such trustee or person shall be entitled to recover an amount 
equal to such taxation levied by the South African Receiver of Revenue 
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from the trust in terms of sections 90 and 91 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962. 
 
26.1.3 The following further indemnity is applicable to trustees who are neither 
the founder, nor the Independent Trustee: 
 
26.1.3.1 each trustee is absolved from all responsibility in the event that the 
bona fide carrying on of their duties, exercise of their powers of 
administration of the Trust, results in any loss of any part of the Trust 
Fund, capital profit or income from time to time under their tenure of 
trusteeship; 
 
26.1.3.2 no trustee shall be answerable for any act, omission, commission, 
negligence, fraud or improper investment of any trustee or of any 
attorney, accountant, independent contractor or agent employed by the 
trustees, except for his/her own personal and wilful fraud or dishonesty; 
 
26.1.3.3 if the trustees should bona fide make any payment to any person 
assumed by them to be thereto entitled hereunder, and it is 
subsequently found that some other person or persons is or are entitled 
thereto under this Trust Deed, the trustees shall nevertheless not be 
responsible for the monies so paid; 
 
26.1.3.4 A trustee shall not be liable for any act of dishonesty committed by 
another trustee unless her was privy thereto and a trustee shall not be 
bound to take any proceedings against a co-trustee for any breach or 
alleged breach of their fiduciary obligations committed by such co-
trustee; 
 
26.1.3.5 the trustees shall be indemnified out of and by the trust against all 
claims and demands that may be made upon them arising out of the 
bona fide exercise of any of the powers conferred under this deed, 
subject, however, to the provisions of section 9 of the Trust Property 
Control Act 57 of 1988. 
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27. 
27.1 Pending the distribution of the trust property as hereinafter provided, none of the 
income, losses, operating loss, assessed loss, net loss, capital profits and or capital 
gains or capital losses of the trust shall be deemed to be attributable to the share 
or the prospective or contingent share of any beneficiary, save that the trustees, 
may in their absolute, sole and unfettered discretion distribute, pay or make over 
any income, losses, operating loss, assessed loss, net loss, capital profits and or 
capital gains, or capital losses to any beneficiary without maintaining equality as 
between the beneficiaries, and further to utilise such income, losses, operating 
loss, assessed loss, net loss, capital profits and or capital gains, or capital losses to 
pay or apply from time to time in such proportions as the trustees may, in their 
sole and absolute discretion, consider desirable for the benefit and welfare of all 
or any one or more of the beneficiaries, without any obligation to maintain 
equality as between the beneficiaries. The trustees shall be entitled to accumulate 
the whole or any part of such income, losses, operating loss, assessed loss, net 
loss, capital profits and or capital gains, or capital losses for any period they shall 
think fit and either retain the same uninvested (without responsibility for any loss) 
or invest the same in any of the securities or investments hereinbefore authorised.  
DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
27.2 The trustees shall use, pay, distribute or apply the whole or portions of the trust 
capital or trust property, in such proportions and at such time or times as they in 
their sole, absolute and unfettered discretion determine, for the benefit of or to all 
or any one or more of the beneficiaries, without the necessity to maintain equality 
between the beneficiaries; provided that, without the unanimous consent of all the 
trustees for the time being, capital distributions shall not be made to a beneficiary 
who is also a trustee.  
 
27.3 Further and subject to Clauses 27.1 and 27.2 above, the trustees shall in their sole, 
absolute and unfettered discretion determine whether any distribution which 
represents the payment or distribution of any capital profit or gain arising out of 
the disposal of trust property, asset or capital of the Trust, constitutes the vesting 
of an interest in the capital profit or gain in respect of that disposal for purposes 
of paragraph 80(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
irrespective of whether the amount actually distributed is lower or higher than the 
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amount of the capital gain determined in respect of that disposal in terms of the 
Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
 
27.4 In the event of all the trust property, income and/or capital of the trust having 
already been used, paid or applied, the trustees shall terminate the trust upon the 
written agreement of the then trustees and beneficiaries of the Trust, and effect 
final distributions in terms of Clauses 27.1, 27.2 and 27.3, above. Should 
perchance, any of the remaining beneficiaries die prior to the date of vesting of 
the trust property, their share shall be paid to his/her issue by representation per 
stirpes in equal shares (if however, such issue has not attained the age of 25 years 
the beneficiary’s share shall be held over until such issue attains the said 25 
years). If any beneficiary shall die before attaining a vested interest hereunder 
without leaving issue then the share of the trust property which would have gone 
to such beneficiary shall devolve upon the remaining beneficiaries in equal shares 
or their issue by representation per stirpes. Should, perchance, all the 
beneficiaries be deceased and there be income or capital of the trust or any trust 
property on hand, the trustees shall, in order to terminate the Trust, pay or deliver 
such income or capital to or on behalf of the heir or heirs (testate and/or intestate, 
as determined by the trustee, having regard to the respective financial 
circumstances of such heirs) of one, some or all of the beneficiaries, in such 
proportions as the trustees in their discretion determine. 
 
 
28. 
28.1 Any benefits payable or distributed to a beneficiary, whether before or after such 
benefit or distribution vests in a beneficiary, may be wholly or partly paid to such 
beneficiary personally, applied for the benefit of such beneficiary or invested on 
behalf of such beneficiary in any one or more investments, or held under the 
control of the trustees as the trustees consider appropriate. Any such payment, 
distribution or investment may be affected wholly or partly in cash or by the 
delivery of assets. 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
 
28.2 In making a distribution or payment at any time to any beneficiary of any portion 
of the trust property, income or capital profit or gain in terms of this deed, the 
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trustees shall be entitled to make any such distribution or payment either in cash 
or in specie or partly in cash and partly in specie. The trustees may in their sole 
and absolute discretion grant the use of any trust property to any beneficiary with 
or without consideration therefore. The trustees’ valuation of any asset distributed 
by them in specie in terms hereof shall be final and binding on all interested 
parties. For the purpose of this clause the word “specie” shall be deemed to 
include any capital asset at that time held as portion of the trust property which is 
in a form other than cash money. 
 
28.3 If any beneficiary shall be a minor, the trustees shall not be obliged to pay any 
income or capital profits or gains of the Trust, or any trust property, to which 
such beneficiary may be entitled, into the Guardian’s Fund, but the trustees may 
either retain such amounts and deal with them as part of the trust property during 
the minority of such beneficiary, or they shall be entitled to pay over such 
amounts either to such minor beneficiary or to his parents or guardian as they in 
their sole and absolute discretion think fit, and the receipt of such parent or 
guardian shall constitute a complete discharge to the trustees of all their 
obligations to the minor beneficiary in regard to the amounts so paid over.  
 
28.4 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Deed, unborn children 
shall not be recognised as having any rights under this Deed or to the trust 
property or any part of the trust property and the trustees shall not be required to 
take any account of unborn children in their administration of the trust or any 
decision affecting the trust including any decision to terminate the Trust. 
 
 
29. 
Any benefit to which any beneficiary shall become entitled (and any assets acquired 
by virtue thereof and the income and fruits of such benefit and assets) shall be and 
remain the sole property of the beneficiary concerned and shall not fall into any 
community of property nor be subject to any marital power or right of administration 
of the spouse of such beneficiary or any other person, nor be taken into account for 
any accrual, or any claim by a life partner or common law husband or wife.  
BENEFITS OF TRUST EXCLUSIVE TO BENEFICIARY 
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30. 
30.1 No beneficiary shall be entitled to any benefits, rights, awards or any hope of or 
claim or entitlement to any income or capital profits or gains of the trust or trust 
property, until any such benefit, right, award or hope vests in a beneficiary. 
Nothing herein contained shall create or confer upon any beneficiary any right or 
claim to any benefit or award or delivery of any assets hereunder. 
ENCUMBRANCE OR DISPOSAL OF BENEFITS 
 
30.2 Any benefit, right, award, hope, spes, claim or entitlement a beneficiary may 
have in terms of this trust shall not be capable of being pledged or in any way 
encumbered, ceded, assigned, dealt with, disposed of or alienated whether 
voluntarily or as a result of attachment in execution, insolvency or death as the 
case may be, and no such pledge, encumbrance, cession assignment, dealing, 
disposal or alienation (whether purported or accomplished) shall have any legal 
effect or be recognised by the trustees. A beneficiary for the purpose of this 
clause shall include (but without limitation) the executor and/or administrator 
and/or trustee of the estate of testamentary trust of a deceased beneficiary, the 
trustee of any inter vivos trust established for the benefit of a beneficiary, the 
trustee of an insolvent estate of any insolvent beneficiary, the judicial manager or 
liquidator or any beneficiary which is a company and any other person entitled to 
exercise any rights in respect of the property of any beneficiary who is under any 
legal disability of any kind.  
 
30.3 No rights or hopes of the beneficiaries under this trust and no part thereof shall 
be attachable by any creditor of any beneficiary or vest in his trustee in 
insolvency and if, prior to any vesting, payment or award being made to any 
beneficiary, he shall have committed or suffered any act, default or process of law, 
whereby such rights or hopes or any part thereof would, but for the provisions of 
this clause, become vested in or payable to any other party or parties or if any 
beneficiary shall be declared insolvent or assign his estate in favour of his 
creditors or if an attachment is made or execution is levied on or against the rights 
or hopes of any beneficiary or any part there of then and in any or all of such 
cases such rights and hopes of the beneficiary concerned under this trust shall 
immediately and entirely thenceforth cease and those rights and hopes shall 
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thereupon and subject to the provisions below, vest in the trustees to be dealt with 
by them, subject to the conditions of Clauses 30.3.1 and 30.3.2, namely: 
 
30.3.1 no such beneficiary shall be obliged to repay to the trust any amounts 
previously paid or advanced to him by the Trust;  
 
30.3.2 the trustees shall be entitled, in their discretion, to continue to hold in this 
trust for the lifetime of the beneficiary concerned (or such lesser period as 
they may decide on) the share or part of the share of the trust capital to 
which he would, but for the provisions of this Clause 30, have been or 
become entitled and to pay, or without detracting from the other powers 
conferred on them and subject to such conditions as they may decide to 
impose, to advance to or to apply for the benefit of him or his brothers and 
sisters, his spouse, descendants or dependents for his or their maintenance, 
such portion of the amount so held by them or of the income accruing 
there from as they in their discretion shall deem fit, and in the case of a 
Trust;  
 
30.3.3 if the trustees do continue to hold the said share of the trust capital in trust 
as aforesaid then, notwithstanding that the rights and hopes of the 
beneficiary shall have ceased and determined and notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary herein contained, such rights and hopes shall, on 
the beneficiary’s death, devolve upon the parties entitled thereto by 
substitution determined as at the date of the beneficiary’s actual death.  
 
30.4 No beneficiary shall be entitled to anticipate any benefits conferred by virtue of 
this trust or any rights accruing there under, nor shall a beneficiary be entitled to 
cede, assign or pledge the same. 
 
30.5 The trustees shall be entitled to acknowledge and accept or refuse to recognise 
and to treat as null and void any cession, assignment or pledge of the rights or 
hopes of any beneficiary hereunder. The trustees may refuse to make any 
payment otherwise than direct to or on behalf of or for the benefit of the person 
entitled thereto under this Trust Deed.  
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31. 
31.1 No trustee shall be disqualified by his office from contracting with the trust or 
any company or firm in which the trust is interested nor shall any contract entered 
into by the trust or any such company or firm be invalidated or voided by reason 
of such interest nor shall any trustee so contracting or being so interested or 
acquiring any benefit under any contract entered into with the trust or any such 
company or firm be liable to account to the trust for any profits or benefits 
realised by or under such contract by reason only of his holding that office; 
provided that he shall have disclosed to the other trustees the nature of his interest 
before the making of the contract if it shall not already have been known to them. 
TRUSTEES’ INTEREST IN CONTRACTS 
 
31.2 The exercise of any of the powers, authorities or discretions conferred upon the 
trustees shall not be affected or prejudiced by reason of the fact that any of them 
may be interested or concerned, directly or indirectly in any company in any 
manner whatsoever, nor shall any trustee be liable because of the fiduciary 
relationship hereby established or here out arising, to account for any benefit 
direct or indirect, derived by or accruing to him by reason of any such interest or 
concern nor shall any act, contract or dealing of the trustee be, because of any 
benefit, direct or indirect, derived by or accruing to any such trustee, voidable or 
void, the intent of this provision being to dispense in respect of the trustees or any 
of them with all the consequences arising from the fiduciary relationship in which 
they or any of them by reason of their appointment hereunder stand in or toward 
any such company in which they may be interested or concerned, directly or 
indirectly, save that in exercising any of the powers, authorities or discretions 
conferred upon the trustees in terms of this deed, the trustees shall disclose to the 
other trustees any personal interest they have in such dealings with this trust if it 
shall not already have been known to the other trustees. 
 
 
32. 
The discretionary powers vested in the trustees in terms of this Deed shall be 
complete, exclusive and absolute and any decision made by them pursuant to any such 
TRUSTEES’ DISCRETION 
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discretionary powers shall be binding and unchallengeable by any beneficiary affected 
thereby or by any other person. 
 
 
33. 
The trustees for the time being of the Trust, whether originally or subsequently 
appointed, shall not be required to furnish security to the Master of the High Court of 
South Africa or any other official under The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 or 
any other legislation which may now be or which may hereafter become of force and 
effect, for the performance of their duties as trustees, unless the majority of trustees 
determine otherwise. 
EXEMPTION FROM SECURITY 
 
 
34. 
No right or hopes of any beneficiary under this Trust Deed and no part thereof shall 
be attachable by any creditor of any beneficiary or vest in his trustee in insolvency 
and if prior to any distribution being made to a beneficiary, he shall have committed 
or suffered any act, default or process of law whereby such rights or hopes or any part 
thereof would, but for the provisions of this clause, become vested in or payable to 
any other party or parties or if any beneficiary shall be declared insolvent or assign his 
estate in favour of his creditors or if any attachment is made or execution is levied of 
or against the rights or hopes of a beneficiary or any part hereof or if a beneficiary 
shall institute proceedings in a Court of Law against the trust or the trustees or any of 
them in that capacity, then and in any or all such events, the rights and hopes of a 
beneficiary shall immediately and entirely thenceforth cease and determine as if the 
beneficiary had died at the time of such cessation and determination and the benefit 
shall follow the destination it would have followed had the beneficiary in fact died at 
the said time; provided always that the trustees in their absolute discretion may for as 
long as they deem fit and in such manner as they deem appropriate apply for the 
maintenance of such beneficiary, his spouse or issue any benefit to which the 
EFFECT OF CERTAIN EVENTS ON BENEFICIARY’S SHARE OF TRUST 
PROPERTY 
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beneficiary himself would have been entitled in terms of this Deed and but for this 
clause. 
 
 
35. 
35.1 Any form of tax or duty assessed against the trust by reason of the provisions of 
this Deed shall be discharged by the trustees as a first charge out of the trust 
property. 
PAYMENT OF TAX 
 
35.2 For the purposes of raising funds to discharge or refund the amount of any tax or 
duty referred to above, the trustees may exercise such of their powers as they 
consider necessary, including their power to borrow monies and their power to 
realise trust property. 
 
Any such payment or refund may be effected wholly or partly out of income or 
wholly or partly out of capital. 
 
 
36. 
36.1 Any beneficiary shall be entitled by written notice to the trustees to declare that 
he shall thenceforth cease to be a beneficiary of the trust and upon delivery of 
such notice, this trust shall thenceforth take effect as if that beneficiary were dead. 
RENUNCIATION BY BENEFICIARY 
 
36.2 If it should happen that because of a renunciation by a beneficiary/renunciation 
by beneficiaries there are no beneficiaries of the trust the trustees are empowered 
in their sole discretion to nominate a beneficiary or beneficiaries by unanimous 
written resolution signed by all of them. After such nomination has been made 
any such nominated beneficiary shall have the same legal status as the original 
beneficiaries of the Trust.  
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37. 
37.1 This trust recognises and approves the validity of the above relationship contract. 
In the event that such a contract is executed and is then duly ratified by way of 
resolution by the trustees of this Trust, then such contract will be binding on all 
parties to this Trust Fund. 
THE PRE-TRUST POST RELATIONSHIP CONTRACT 
 
37.2In the event of a deadlock when the trustees vote on the approval of the contract, 
Clause 20 applies. 
 
37.3 The relationship contract, if endorsed by way of resolution of the trustees, may 
determine steps to ensure that upon the dissolution of the relationship (which is 
the subject of the contract), that the Trust Fund continues to remain operative.  
 
37.3.1 Such steps may include the addition and/or removal of trustee/s; the 
addition of Independent Trustee/s; the conversion of discretionary rights 
into vested rights; as well as any capital and/or income distribution/s. 
 
37.4The contract will not remove the rights and duties bestowed upon the trustees in 
terms of Clause 38. Thus, should the time come where it is appropriate to 
terminate the trust as prescribed in Clause 38, such termination should be carried 
out, on condition that: 
 
37.4.1 The termination is not caused by the dissolution of the relationship 
relevant to the contract; and 
 
37.4.2 The termination follows the conditions set out in Clause 38. 
 
 
38. 
It is in the intention of the founder that the trust shall endure in perpetuity, save that in the 
event of the object and purpose of the trust no longer being capable of being achieved or 
TERMINATION 
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in the event of any statutory prescription as to the period the trust may continue to endure, 
then the trustees may terminate the trust as follows: 
 
38.1the trust shall terminate upon such dates as the trustee shall unanimously decide; 
 
38.2the trustees shall remain vested with all the powers granted in terms of this Trust 
Deed, as is required to effect and attend to the final distribution and the winding 
up and termination of the Trust, and to attend to all ancillary and or statutory 
requirements that need to be effected; 
 
38.3upon the termination of the Trust, the Trust Fund or the balance or portion thereof, 
or the proceeds of those assets (in each case after payment of all the trust’s 
liabilities or the assumption thereof by the beneficiaries as the trustees and the 
beneficiaries shall agree upon) shall be distributed to the beneficiaries in any 
proportion as the trustees in their sole and absolute discretion shall direct;  
 
 
39. 
Each of the rights, powers, obligations and discretions established by or contained in 
this Deed is distinct, separate and severable and shall be implemented as such 
irrespective of how it has been grouped together or linked grammatically. 
RIGHTS, POWERS, OBLIGATIONS AND DISCRETIONS 
 
If any provision hereof or if any such rights, powers, obligations or discretions is 
found by any Court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, unlawful or unenforceable 
for any reason, such finding shall in no way affect any of the remaining provisions of 
this Deed which shall continue to be of full force and effect. 
 
Should any provisions within this Deed be deemed to conflict with one another, the 
interpretation of the said provisions should be in such a way as to give effect to the 
wishes of the founder, the best interests of the beneficiaries and the objectives of this 
Trust. 
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ACCEPTANCE BY TRUSTEES: 
Name of Trust:   SMITH FAMILY TRUST 
Founder:    RONALD ROBIN SMITH 
I D Number:    511201 0198 08 1 
Donation:    R500.00 (FIVE HUNDRED RAND)  
Date of Donation:   22 JANUARY 2011 
 
The trustees hereby accept their appointment as trustees subject to the terms and 
conditions set out in this deed. 
 
 
 
TRUSTEES: 
 
Name:   CRAIG RENOIRS 
I D Number:  560111 5232 18 3 
 
Name:   RONALD ROBIN SMITH 
I D Number:  480229 5133 08 1 
 
Name:   LYNDA WYNBERG 
I D Number:  811201 0198 08 8 
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Signed at________________________ on the ______ day of _____________________ 20__. 
 
AS WITNESSES: 
1. ___________________________ 
 
2. ___________________________   ___________________________ 
 
FOUNDER: RONALD ROBIN 
SMITH 
 
Signed at________________________ on the ______ day of _____________________ 20__. 
 
AS WITNESSES: 
1. ___________________________ 
 
2. ___________________________   ___________________________ 
 
TRUSTEE: CRAIG RENOIRS 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
TRUSTEE: RONALD ROBIN 
SMITH 
 
___________________________ 
 
TRUSTEE: LYNDA WYNBERG 
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ADDENDUM B: BENEFICIARIES 
The persons as referred to in Clause 1.6 of Addendum A of the Deed shall include the 
following persons: 
 
 
Name:   RONALD ROBIN SMITH 
I D number:  511201 0198 08 1 
 
Name:   SARAH SMITH 
I D number:  560203 5195 08 3 
 
Name:   LINDSAY ANNE SMITH 
I D number:  830319 2365 08 7 
 
Name:   DAVID BELL SMITH 
I D number:  940420 6584 08 5 
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IMPORTANT NOTE 
This booklet is intended to be an easy reference, 
pocket-sized guide for present and future founders, 
trustees and beneficiaries. This booklet is the product 
of two years research, produced in conjunction with 
the author's Master of Laws degree. Some aspects of 
this booklet are theoretical, although the principal 
focus is practical. 
The information contained herein is a summary of 
some of the key aspects of trusts, trustees’ duties, 
beneficiaries’ rights, proper trust administration and 
the Trust Property Control Act. Professional advice 
should always be sought when dealing with matters 
relating to trusts. 
While every care has been taken in the compilation of 
this booklet, no responsibility of any nature 
whatsoever shall be accepted for any inaccuracies, 
errors or omissions.  All rights reserved 2010 © 
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Introduction 
Various estimates suggest that there are now well over a 
quarter of a million trusts in use across South Africa. Although 
there is no way of determining an exact figure, one can be 
certain that that number, however large it may be, is on the 
rise. But the increasing popularity of this legal entity 
unfortunately carries with it an increasing amount of misuse, 
and with that, more interest and intervention by the courts. 
 
Of late, the South African judiciary has emphatically sought to 
expose and punish those individuals seeking to misuse trusts. 
Due to this trend, trusts are no longer the "fail proof" tool they 
once were. But despite the higher levels of scrutiny, trusts are 
still a must for anyone who is a professional, intends to amass 
wealth, or owns their own business. 
 
In the present day, there is still nothing quite like the trust 
entity, and it is unlikely to be replaced in the near future. The 
good news is that a trust which is carefully planned, executed 
and administered should not lose its protective veneer. This 
booklet will add guidance to some of the most critical 
administrative aspects of trusts, and should be useful in the 
hands of those considering setting up an inter vivos (living) 
trust, as well as beneficiaries, trustees and founders. 
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The Basics 
There are a number of different types of trusts that are formed 
for a variety of purposes. What this guide is concerned with are 
those trusts which fall under the confines of the South African 
legislation governing trusts - the Trust Property Control Act (the 
Act).
What is a Trust? 
i
 
 More particularly, this guide will deal exclusively with 
inter vivos trusts. 
According to the Act, a trust is the arrangement through which 
control and ownership in property is by virtue of a trust deed 
made over or bequeathed to another person or persons.ii
 
 
'Made over' refers to those trusts which are set up during the 
lifetime of the founder (the creator) and are known as inter 
vivos trusts. 'Bequeathed' on the other hand denotes a trust 
which is set up upon 
the death of the 
founder (usually by 
instruction in the 
deceased's will) and 
are known as 
testamentary trusts. 
FACT 
"A trust is a legal relationship 
between various parties 
established either to provide 
protection from risk or a benefit 
of some sort" 
 
  
TRUSTS: A Guide For Founders, Trustees and Beneficiaries 
 
Page 5 
Trusts are set up for a wide range of reasons, usually relating to 
a person's particular circumstances and the socio-economic 
environment. The purpose for most people in establishing a 
trust is to safeguard the family’s assets and wealth against risk, 
and for a variety of reasons which may include: 
Why Establish a Trust? 
• Protecting assets from business risk; 
• Protecting children’s inheritance from claims; 
• Providing for special family needs, such as a child with a 
disability; 
• Protecting assets in a second marriage/ relationship 
situation and/or relationship breakdown; 
• Preventing claims on your estate when you die (family 
protection and testamentary promises); 
• Protecting assets against estate duty; 
• Providing funding for educational costs for children and/or 
grandchildren; 
• Allowing family assets, such as family homes, to pass to the 
next generation without exposing inheritances to estate 
duty tax;  
• Giving to the community through a charitable trust.iii
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The bottom line is that the choice to establish a trust is a 
personal one. The decision is one based on weighing up the 
likelihood of an undesirable event occurring versus the costs 
and responsibilities of operating a trust.iv
 
 
• Trusts are most certainly still the most effective way to 
protect assets from a person's creditors, indiscretions and 
insolvency. 
The Advantages of Trusts 
• Trusts are flexible and can be set up according to the wishes 
of the founder. Moreover, trust documentation can be 
amended to stay in line with current trends. 
• Trusts are an effective tool to bypass estate duty. The 
growth on assets, such as shares, transferred to a trust is 
not subject to estate duty, because the growth belongs to 
the trust. If you have made use of a loan to the trust, the 
value of the asset as at the date of transfer remains an 
asset of your estate because of the loan account in your 
estate.v
• Trusts can hold and protect assets for minors and 
incapacitated dependents. 
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• Trusts do not die. Not only can the assets remain in the 
family, but because there is no winding up of the estate, the 
trust never incurs  conveyancing costs, Master's fees or 
executor's remuneration. 
• Loan accounts can be reduced over time by taking 
advantage of the annual donations tax exemption.vi
• Trusts can be used as effective tax-efficient tools. 
 
 
• Assets transferred to a trust are no longer owned by the 
person establishing the trust or transferring the asset. 
The Disadvantages of Trusts 
• The costs associated with the establishment and continued 
administration can be expensive. Legal fees to register a 
trust can cost many thousands and some Masters of the 
High Court insist that an auditor be appointed to audit a 
trust before it is registered.vii
• There is no guarantee that the trust will retain its protective 
veneer should the trust be attacked in court. 
 
• All trustees are required to have dedication and 
commitment to the administration of the trust.  
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• Trustees need to be educated on trusts and be familiar with 
the legislation and common law. 
• There is no central Master's office. Because of this, all 
correspondence with the Master's office needs to happen 
at the office where the trust was registered. The Parties 
The founder, otherwise referred to as the ‘settlor’ or ‘donor’ is 
the person who in reality establishes the trust. Interestingly, a 
trust may have more than one founder. Business trusts can 
often have several founders who act together in agreement to 
form the trust. Once a trust is formed however, be it a family 
trust or any other type of trust, the founder should no longer 
control or manage trust assets in his or her capacity as founder. 
It is possible for the founder to be a trustee,
The Founder 
viii
 
 but such 
appointment should be for the right reasons, and not to 
preserve the control he or she would have otherwise lost. 
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Did you know? 
Trusts were introduced in the 
Cape in 1815 after the British 
occupied the area 
intermittently between 1795 
and 1806. 
 
The trustees undoubtedly form the backbone of a trust’s 
activities. A person becomes appointed as a trustee in terms of 
a trust deed or by the Master if the trust deed does not provide 
for it. The nominated person must accept the appointment 
upon which the Master too must then authorise the 
appointment by issuing written letters of authority.  
The Trustee 
Trustees have bare ownership of trust assets, and must 
administer trust assets in accordance with the terms of the 
trust deed. Such ownership, or co-ownership in the case of 
multiple trustees is however non-beneficial – meaning that the 
ownership does not 
entitle the trustee to the 
enjoyment of the trust 
property.  
Perhaps one of the most 
important duties that 
arises as a result of one 
person assuming responsibility to manage and control assets 
on behalf of another is a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary is a person 
who undertakes or assumes responsibility to act for or on 
behalf of and in the interests of another.ix This duty requires 
that property under the control of trustees be managed and  
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controlled for the purposes of the trust deed and for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries. In terms of this duty, trustees are 
prohibited from the following: 
• Exceeding their powers; 
• Exercising their powers for an improper purpose; 
• Fettering their own discretion; 
• Placing themselves in a position where their personal 
interests conflict with their duties to the beneficiaries; 
• Making a secret profit; 
• Competing with any business of the trust; 
• Making personal use of or abusing confidential 
information; or 
• Unduly favouring one beneficiary to the detriment of 
another or others.x
 
 
Bearing in mind that trusts are generally created to benefit one 
or more persons or classes of persons, the trust beneficiary 
forms an integral part of the institution. Any person, be it born 
or unborn, natural or juristic, can become a beneficiary. This is 
because the law sets no requirements for trust beneficiaries, 
and thus, they need not have contractual or legal capacity. 
The Beneficiary 
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Trustees may also be beneficiariesxi or even the sole beneficiary 
in a trust, although a trustee may not be the sole beneficiary as 
well as the sole trusteexii
Beneficiaries also enjoy a wide spectrum of rights. Income and 
capital rights are normally the first differentiation. The trust 
deed in this regard should always distinguish between income 
and capital beneficiaries as well as give clear definitions as to 
what exactly is income and what is capital for the purposes of 
the trust. Due to the difficulties that may arise where there are 
both classes of beneficiaries designated in the trust deed, it 
may be desirable for the trust deed to provide that in the event 
of the income of a trust being insufficient for the maintenance, 
education or medical care of an income beneficiary, then the 
capital of the trust may be used to make good on any 
shortfall.
 as there would be no separation of 
the control from the enjoyment of the trust assets. 
xiii
Other important privileges which affect trust beneficiaries are 
variable and fixed rights. Dependent on the terms of the trust 
deed, a beneficiary may be entitled to a fixed amount of 
income or it could be entirely variable. The variation may also 
depend on the economic circumstances, or even the happening 
of a specified event. 
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Defining these rights is therefore of the utmost importance in 
order to avoid confusion at a later point.  
A trust deed may also allow a beneficiary the right to use and 
enjoy trust assets. The formation of this right in the trust deed 
should be carefully thought out and planned, as disputes often 
arise regarding the obligation a beneficiary may have to 
preserve and maintain the asset. ‘In the absence of a clause 
giving clear directions as to how costs and expenses are to be 
treated, a distinction should be drawn between costs and 
expenses that are necessary to keep the property in a usable 
form (such as repair and maintenance) and other costs (such as 
rates, employee costs and improvements)’.xiv
Beneficiaries also have either a discretionary or a vested right. 
A discretionary right is in the nature of a contingent right or a 
spes or hope, thus, the trustee will at times exercise their 
discretion in favour of a beneficiary with a discretionary right 
and the beneficiary will in turn benefit to the extent that the 
discretion has been exercised in their favour.
 
xv On the other 
hand, a beneficiary with a vested right can enforce that right by 
calling upon the trustees to deliver to that beneficiary income 
or capital or a specific asset, depending on whether the right is 
a vested right to income, capital or a specific asset.xvi  
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Note however that both discretionary and vested beneficiaries 
have personal rights against the trustees because the rights 
that a beneficiary has, whether discretionary or vested, are 
personal rights.xvii
 
 
Should a founder wish to remain anonymous, he may make use 
of a nominee founder.xviii
The Nominee Founder 
 
Thus the nominee founder’s name would appear on the trust 
deed, and after the initial donation, he would play no further 
role in the trust.  
The nominee founder is the agent of 
the true founder and is usually someone approached by the 
founder to form the trust in their own name. The nominee 
would then be given instructions as to what the trust deed 
should contain and who the trustees are to be.  
Nominee founders are however unnecessary and a court would 
most likely, if required, look through the formality and hold the 
principal founder to be the true founder of the trust. 
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Fact 
The "legal veneer" is the legal 
separation of ownership 
between the founder, his or her 
estate and the transferred asset. 
 
How Do Trusts Protect  Assets? 
A trust's ability to protect assets is attributed to the legal 
veneer which encloses the trust property. Once a trust is 
established, any assets which are transferred to the trust 
immediately change ownership, and the trustees will 
consequently become the new owner of the property. Thus, 
once property is made over to the trust, the transferor loses 
ownership and legal title to the asset. 
The trust estate in effect forms a separate entity,xix but unlike a 
company or close corporation, it does not have its own legal 
personality. xx
  
 As a result, a trust does not have legal standing, 
and because of this, litigation will always be cited as against the 
trustees of the trust. 
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The Formation of a Trust 
For a valid trust to be created: 
 
(a) the founder must intend to create one; 
(b) the founder’s intention must be expressed in a mode 
 appropriate to create an obligation; 
(c)  the property subject to the trust must be defined with 
 reasonable certainty; 
(d)  the trust object, which may either be personal or 
 impersonal, must be defined with reasonable 
 certainty; and  
(e) the trust object must be lawful. 
 
 
It is also not essential that the trust property be transferred to 
the trustee or beneficiary. All that is necessary for the existence 
of a valid trust is that the founder should be under a duty to 
give the control of the property to a trustee.xxi
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The Trust Deed 
The trust deed is the trust's constitutive charter.
xxiii
xxii Generally 
speaking, it is only through the trustees, as specified in the trust 
deed, that the trust can act. Who the trustees are, their 
number, how they are appointed and under what 
circumstances they have power to bind the trust estate are 
matters defined in the trust deed.  
Generally speaking, the provisions of a trust deed will vary 
according to the type of trust and the nature of the trust 
property. The golden rule however is to be as thorough as 
possible when drafting the trust deed, covering all conceivable 
uncertainties. Bearing in mind that if a trust is declared void, 
the South African Revenue Service (SARS) is entitled to 
calculate any additional tax owed by the founder (as the assets 
would fall back into his or her personal estate), the importance 
of getting the wording of the trust deed right cannot be 
underestimated. 
This does not however imply inflexibility. In fact, a trust deed 
should be as flexible as is realistically necessary.  
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There are a number of reasons why trust deeds need to be 
drafted so that they can be modified to accommodate future 
changes: 
• If a trust is to act as an investment vehicle, it may become 
too cumbersome and expensive as a result of the 
requirement that each trustee must sign all banking 
documents, property transfers, leases, renewals of leases 
etc; xxiv
• Taxation, trust laws and other company laws may change, 
and  in doing so, adversely affect trusts. This will create a 
need to modify trusts and enable them to be restructured 
to best advantage; 
 
xxv
• Changes in relationships will make it desirable for 
spouses/partners who have separated, to cease to be 
associated with a trust after a settlement has been agreed 
upon. This will preferably involve the removal of a 
spouse/partner as a beneficiary, trustee or a person who 
possesses other administrative entitlements; 
  
xxvi
• Financial or even family circumstances could have changed 
and the provisions of a trust deed might not adequately 
provide for these changed circumstances; and 
 
• Any of the conditions dealt with in s 13 of the Act. 
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Ordinarily, the following sections should always be present in a 
trust deed: 
• The name of the trust ; 
• Definitions and interpretation clauses; 
• Principal objects of the trust; 
• Power to receive additions; 
• Power of appointment; 
• Powers to add and exclude beneficiaries; 
• Trustee termination, appointment, dispute resolution and 
sub-minima; 
• Administrative powers of the trustees; 
• Extended power of advancement or maintenance; 
• Indemnity for the trustees out of the trust fund; 
• Meetings, minutes and accounts; 
• Duration of the trust; 
• Amendment of the deed; 
• Usually two schedules are attached to the deed, the first 
covering the powers of the trustees and the second being a 
summary of the initial trust fund. 
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Take Note 
Even with a perfectly drafted trust deed, it would serve 
little purpose if the parties to the trust did not adhere to its 
provisions. Selecting trustees is therefore as crucial to the 
survival of the trust as is the deed itself. 
 
Drafting the amendment clause of a trust deed requires 
particular attention. There is a fine balance which needs to be 
achieved: on the one hand, the trust deed should recognise 
that external events or changes may occur resulting in the need 
to amend the deed. On the other hand, the power of 
amendment needs to be restricted in so much as it is necessary 
to prevent abuse. 
Scope of the Amendment Power 
The following clause is suggested as the appropriate 
amendment clause: 
1. The trustees may revise or amend this trust deed provided that such 
revision or amendment: 
Amendment of the trust deed 
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a. does not constitute a revocation of the trust, and 
b. does not compromise the purpose and objectives of the trust, and 
c. is accepted by the trustees unanimously. 
 
2. Should the revision or amendment have the potential to prejudice the 
rights or interests of any of the existing beneficiaries, unanimous 
written consent of the beneficiaries is required. The beneficiaries 
herewith referred to in this clause include both vested and 
discretionary beneficiaries. This provision is not applicable to 
beneficiaries who: 
a. have yet to accept (in writing or orally) the benefits that may 
accrue to them in terms of this trust deed, or 
b. have not yet received any benefit in terms of this trust deed. 
 
3. The trustees may further amend or revise this trust deed in the event 
of any legislation necessitating such amendment or revision to comply 
therewith, so long as such amendment or revision complies with 
subsections 1 and 2 of this clause. 
4. Should the founder wish to amend or revise this trust deed: 
a. the founder should apply to the trustees in writing, setting out the 
proposed changes and giving reasons for such proposal. 
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b. the trustees must then hold a properly constituted meeting in 
order to determine the nature of the proposed amendment or 
revision and assess the merits thereof.  
c. the trustees decision is subject to the directives, guidelines and 
rules contained within this clause when making a decision to 
approve or disapprove such request. 
d. the trustees must inform the beneficiaries and founder in writing 
of the decision made and the reasons for such decision. 
 
5. No amendment or revision to this trust shall be of any force and effect 
to the extent that any benefit shall be conferred by such amendment 
on the founder or their estate, nor shall any variation give the founder, 
or any trustee the power to appropriate or dispose of any trust 
property, on his own, as he sees fit, for his own benefit or for the 
benefit of his estate, whether such power is exercisable by him or with 
his consent, and whether such power could be obtained directly or 
indirectly by the exercise, with or without notice, of power exercisable 
by him or with his consent. 
 
6. In the event that any proposed amendment or revision is not 
unanimously accepted by the trustees, the majority decision will 
prevail, provided that: 
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Take Note 
When drafting a trust deed, it is important to make certain that 
there are no clauses which may lend themselves to the 
conclusion that the founder has retained a degree of control 
over the trustees. Similarly, the trust deed should not contain 
any provisions which allow for a trustee to dominate the other 
trustees. 
 
 
a. the trustees of this trust are comprised of at least one 
independent professional trustee, and 
b. the independent professional trustee approves the amendment or 
revision. 
 
7. This clause does not apply to the powers of addition and exclusion 
[refer to section dealing with the trustees’ powers of addition and 
exclusion]. 
 
Trustee Duties and Ethics 
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The manner in which the trustees conduct their duties and 
approach the affairs of the trust is one of the most influential 
aspects which affects the actual protection a trust will 
ultimately provide. 
‘It is now also clear from recent legal judgments that one of the 
key requirements for a valid trust is that there must be a 
separation of beneficial ownership from control. The trustees 
are required to administer the assets under their control for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. Often however the sole 
trustees of a trust are also the beneficiaries of that trust. In a 
recent Appellate Division judgment, it was clearly stated that 
such trusts “invite abuses”. And abuses will not be tolerated by 
the courts’.xxvii 
All trustees are to act honestly in all matters concerning the 
trust. This means that trustees should always treat the trust as 
it should be treated, and as it always should have been 
treated.xxviii
Ethics 
 This ethical duty is what ensures a separation of 
power, because an honest trustee will not be inclined to 
conflate enjoyment and control.xxix
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An honest trustee will also observe impartiality. Impartiality has 
two elements to it in the context of trusts: 
• On the one hand a trustee must avoid a conflict of interest 
between his personal concerns and his official duties. An 
important manifestation of this rule is that a trustee is not 
permitted to derive unauthorised profit from the 
administration of a trust. 
• The second aspect to the duty of impartiality relates to a 
trustee’s obligation to treat beneficiaries impartially, 
particularly when trust income and/or capital is 
distributed.xxx
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
interrelatedness of 
a trustee's ethics 
Duties 
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Under the common law, trustees have a duty to keep proper 
records concerning the administration of the trust. This duty is 
more commonly referred to as the “duty to account”, and is 
important in defending an alter-ego argument as evidence can 
then be provided that the trust was properly managed.xxxi
 
  
At the very least, trustees are required to keep the following 
records: 
 
• Trust deeds; 
• Agreements for sale and purchase of trust assets; 
• Deeds of acknowledgment of debt; 
• Deeds of forgiveness of debt; 
• Trust minutes (in the minute book); 
• Trustee resolutions; 
• The trust’s financial accounts; 
• Beneficiary details; 
• The trust’s tax records; 
• Copies of independent advice given to the trustees; and 
• General trustee correspondence.xxxii 
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Trustees should also ensure that all original documents are 
placed in safe custody.xxxiii 
 
Realistically, financial records have 
become one of the most important pieces of evidence against a 
sham or alter-ego argument, and trustees must keep track of all 
income to, distributions from, and expenditures by the trust. To 
further strengthen the banking and financial records, trustees 
must record which trustees authorised each transaction and if 
applicable, in terms of which resolution it was decided. 
Specific duties in terms of the Trust Property Control Act 
Statutory duty Section of 
the Act 
To lodge with the Master the trust deed 4 
To furnish the Master with an address 5 
To obtain written authorisation from the Master 
and lodge security if required 
6 
To act with care, diligence and skill 9 
To bank monies 10 
To register and identify trust property 11 
To protect trust documents 17 
To perform all duties imposed by the trust deed 19 
To account to the Master when required to do so 19, 16 
To take only reasonable remuneration 22 
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• The duty to act independently: a trustee must exercise an 
independent discretion at all times when dealing with trust 
matters.xxxiv
Specific duties in terms of the Trust Deed and the Common Law 
 
• The duty to invest productively: if the trust is to endure for 
a long period, the trustees are obliged to invest the assets 
of the trust in a manner that provides adequate income as 
well as capital growth.xxxv
• The duty to avoid risk: when trustees deal with or invest 
money, it must be done with safety and security. Trust 
assets must not be placed in a situation involving an 
element of risk and uncertainty.xxxvi
 
 
• The duty to account to beneficiaries: section 18 of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Actxxxvii
In this regard, it is 
undesirable for trustees to sign a deed of suretyship in 
which they bind the trust as surety and co-principal debtor 
for a transaction which is to benefit the trustee or founder’s 
estate in such capacity. 
 
 
applies to both 
testamentary and inter vivos trusts. Thus, where 
information is held by the Master, beneficiaries (or other 
interested persons) may upon written request and payment 
of the prescribed fee, receive a certified copy of the  
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document, should they be able to prove to the Master that 
they have “sufficient interest” in such document.  
 
Conversely, where information is held by the trustees, and 
disclosure to the beneficiaries (or other third parties) has 
been refused, such party would have to rely on the inherent 
supervisory jurisdiction the courts have over trustees and 
persuade a court of competent jurisdiction to order the 
information to be handed down to the interested party.  
 
Importantly, documents such as trust deeds, financial 
statements and accounts should never be refused to a 
beneficiary because a trust should maintain some level of 
transparency, for the purposes of sustaining its legal 
validity. It is suggested that the trust deed should house the 
agreed level of information which can be made available. 
Such provision can therefore detail the policies to be 
followed by trustees regarding information.  
 
• The duty not to exceed powers and to act only within 
given powers: if a power is not conferred on a trust through 
the trust deed, it will not be inferred. For example, the 
power to sell a property does not grant a trustee the power 
to mortgage the property.xxxviii 
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Remarkable... 
A common reason a founder would make use of the trust inter 
vivos was displayed upon the death of the late Harry 
Oppenheimer. The South African mining tycoon, reputed to be 
one of the ten richest men in the world, went to his grave leaving 
little trace of his vast personal fortune. Conservatively estimated 
to be worth over R30 billion around the time of his death, Harry’s 
will declared a mere R307 million as his personal wealth. The 
remainder of his fortune had been carefully placed in trust to 
protect his assets for the future benefit of his family. The attempt 
to minimise estate duty paid off, and to this day serves as an 
enormous reminder of one the greatest benefits of trusts. 
 
• The duty to make proper and correct distributions to 
identified beneficiaries: trust assets must always be applied 
as provided for in the trust deed.xxxix 
• The duty to identify properly the beneficiaries of the trust: 
The trustees must also 
transfer income and/or capital to the beneficiaries when 
obliged to do so in terms of the trust deed. 
although not always as easy as it may sound, the trustees 
are expected to do so to the best of their ability. 
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• The duty to obtain expert advice: where necessary, 
trustees must obtain the advice of an expert in the relevant 
field.  
• The duty to appoint the stipulated number of trustees: 
failure to respect this duty may lead to the invalidity of the 
acts undertaken during the subminimum trustee period.xl
• The duty to comply with all laws: trustees must obey all 
legislation relevant to their undertaking. This includes the 
Trust Property Control Act, the PAIA Act, the Constitution 
and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act.
 
xli
• The duty to ensure a proper system of control is in place: 
systems must ensure that assets are kept safe and their 
actual location is recorded.
 
xlii
 
 Choosing Trustees 
Once the decision has been made to establish a trust, choosing 
the trustees becomes the next important decision the founder 
will have to make.  
Recent South African case law has crystallised the importance 
of having conscientious trustees who are independent and able 
to ensure a separation between control and enjoyment.xliii 
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Founder-trustees are a common occurrence in South Africa, 
and more often than not, the intentions behind such an 
arrangement are innocent. Unfortunately, this situation may 
invite the inference that the founder-trustee has operated the 
trust without respect for the division of control and enjoyment.  
Founders as Trustees 
For the above reasons, founders should, where possible avoid 
this scenario. If however it is unavoidable, there are certain 
formalities which must be paid extra attention: 
a) Trust documentation must all be in order: minutes, financial 
statements, trustee correspondence and trust resolutions 
must all be well drafted and kept safe. 
b) There should be at least three trustees in office and at least 
one of those should be an independent professional 
trustee.  
c) The founder-trustee must not chair the meetings. 
d) The trust deed specifically permits the founder to be a 
trustee, so as to be open and transparent with the 
arrangement. Additionally, the provision should ensure that 
this trustee does not dominate the other trustees. 
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This situation is semantically deceiving because the trustee in 
this instance will rarely be considered truly independent. The 
various types of non-professional trustees who are frequently 
utilised include friends, family members (who are not 
beneficiaries), neighbours, colleagues and in some cases 
professionals from other fields.
Independent Non-professional Trustees 
xliv
Whilst this arrangement is more desirable than founder-
trustees, often in reality too many non-professional 
independent trustees are used merely to "rubber stamp" 
decisions for the dominant trustees.  
 
There are two main arguments against the use of this trustee: 
1) It may be argued that the founder has not actually 
relinquished ownership, control and enjoyment of the 
trust property, and is instead relying on the trustees to act 
as his puppets. 
 
2) There is also the risk that the non-professional trustees do 
not understand their duties fully and may therefore place 
the trust in danger. 
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Enjoyment and control of your trust assets must be functionally 
separate. 
Independent Professional Trustees 
 
It has been suggested by the Supreme Court of Appeal that to 
try to minimise instances of the abuse of the trust form, the 
Master should, when registering a trust, insist that there be at 
least one independent trustee.xlv
It is recommended that, no matter the level of risk the trust 
may be exposed to or the value of the property it may own, 
every trust must have at least one independent professional 
trustee in office. 
 The thinking behind the 
implementation of this notion is that the independent trustee 
should have no reason for concluding or approving a 
transaction that may prove to be invalid, because firstly, he 
should be knowledgeable about trust law; and secondly, he 
would not have any interest in the trust property or be a 
beneficiary, and would thus make his decisions based on what 
is correct and in the best interests of all the beneficiaries and 
the continuation of the trust.  
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For Clarity... 
‘Independent professional trustee’ means a normal trustee for 
all transactions and decisions made by the trustees, but who is 
a professional chartered accountant, admitted attorney or an 
advocate. This trustee must have no relation or connection, 
blood or other, to any of the existing or proposed trustees, 
beneficiaries, founder or nominee founder of the trust. 
The trust deed must recognise the independent trustee, and 
place emphasis on his presence in trustee meetings and trust 
decisions. 
 Beneficiary Rights 
A beneficiary may have any number and a variety of rights, 
depending on the terms and conditions of the trust deed or 
upon the manner in which trustees have, or have not exercised 
their discretion in favour of a beneficiary.xlvi
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The most important classification of these rights are 
discretionary rights and vested rights, as well as income rights 
and capital rights.  
A discretionary right is nothing more than a contingent right - a 
spes or a hope. Consequently, only if the trustees exercise their 
discretion in favour of a beneficiary with a discretionary right, 
will that beneficiary benefit to the extent that the discretion 
has been exercised in their favour.xlvii 
A vested right, on the other hand, gives a beneficiary far more 
certainty in the sense that a beneficiary with a vested right 
knows exactly what he or she can expect in the way of assets, 
income or benefits from the trust.xlviii
Until the time that the 
trustees have exercised their discretion, a discretionary 
beneficiary only has a hope that some benefit will be received 
in the future. Thus, in the case of a discretionary  trust, the 
beneficiaries do not have any vested right in the trust property, 
and any income or capital received by the beneficiary is 
determined purely in the discretion of the trustees.  
 
 
A vested right therefore 
allows a beneficiary to enforce that right by calling upon the 
trustees to deliver the income or capital to that beneficiary. 
Notably, a beneficiary with a vested right carries a personal 
right. This is a right against the trustees to claim income and/or  
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Do Not Forget 
Trusts can be used for good and bad. An example of a bad use 
of a trust would be to transfer all assets into a trust to avoid 
paying out a spouse on divorce. In these instances, the courts 
may overlook the trust and make an order to disregard the 
trust. 
capital or the transfer of an asset.xlix
 
 This right can be 
contrasted with the discretionary right, which is nothing more 
than an expectation that income or capital may eventually 
accrue to that beneficiary. 
Vested or contingent, capital or income, beneficiaries do have 
rights which are inherent in the trust institution itself.l
The Trust Property Control Act places several duties upon 
trustees to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Besides 
the fiduciary duties set out in s9, s13 allows a court to vary a 
trust deed in instances, above all else, when a provision in the 
deed prejudices the interests of beneficiaries.  
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Section 20 of the Trust Property Control Act empowers the 
Master or any person with such interest (such as a beneficiary) 
to apply to the High Court for the removal of a trustee. The 
application will be granted in terms of s20(2)(3) if the applicant 
can prove that the trustee, amongst other things, failed to 
perform satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him or her under 
the Act. Thus, for instance, a beneficiary can, upon the 
presentation of sufficient evidence in a court of law, have a 
trustee removed for failing to meet the necessary standard of 
care, diligence and skill required of them. 
 Trust Vulnerability 
The world over, there has been a growing interest in the law 
and theory surrounding the limits to the protection a trust 
actually has to offer. In particular, many trust disputes have 
involved a party attempting to prove that no trust exists and 
therefore the assets held within it are open to challenge as 
though they were owned by a particular trustee or the 
founder.li
 
 Unfortunately, in South Africa, the law in this regard 
is not settled. Most certainly though, South African courts have  
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the authority at common law to "pierce" the veneer of a trust 
inter vivos in the appropriate circumstances. 
The effect of a piercing is that the trust will be looked past, and 
the court would make a judgment without having regard to the 
existence of the trust. 
The reality of this ability is unsettling for trustees and founders. 
In South Africa, the courts have developed two distinct routes 
for trust piercing: 
The first is where the conduct of the trustees invites the 
inference that the trust was a mere façade for the conduct of 
business 'as before', and that assets allegedly vesting in 
trustees in fact belong to one or more trustees.lii
The second is where a trustee (or founder) operates the trust 
with full control over trust assets and merely uses the trust as a 
vehicle for personal or business activities.
 
liii
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The most important consequence of these tendencies is that 
trustees and founders cannot sit back idly and rely on the 
trust's veneer to protect the assets. In reality, a trust is only 
proved to be legitimate if it is the subject of a dispute and a 
court has to determine its validity.  
Therefore, trustees must play an active and determinative role 
in all trust matters. A trust must be treated with respect and on 
the assumption that in the future, the trust may be challenged. 
Overseas, the system for trust piercing is fairly certain. 
Although no two jurisdictions follow the same exact rules, the 
principles and guidelines are standardised. Unlike in South 
Africa, foreign courts quickly separate alter-ego cases from 
sham cases, and tend to deal with each allegation separately. Sham Trusts 
The word "sham" has been used in various contexts in South 
African court judgments, but without clear authority. With 
respect, courts have tended to use the term as a general 
description for a trust which is not bona fide.  
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In common law jurisdictions overseas however, the word 
"sham" refers directly to the doctrine of the sham.  
Overseas, the purpose of identifying sham trusts and making 
use of the doctrine is clear: any piercing challenge directed at a 
trust inter vivos requires a finding of a sham. In broad terms, a 
declaration that a trust is a sham effectively peels the trust 
aside, exposing the assets and treating the assets as if they 
were personally owned by the 'shammer' (usually the founder). 
Accepted unanimously in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
the United Kingdom is the Snook test,liv which sets out the 
shamming status of any transaction. This test has been adopted 
and readily applied in the majority of sham trust cases abroad 
and in summary, requires there to be a common intention 
amongst the founder and at least one trustee to mislead or 
deceive third parties into the belief that the trust is genuine, 
when in fact it is not.lv
The importance of understanding the sham doctrine lies in the 
possibility that South Africa may too follow suit. Moreover, the 
sham doctrine provides critical insight into the key points which 
are relied upon when foreign courts consider a piercing 
application.  
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Fact 
A trustee should be in the 
saddle and firmly holding 
the reins; he should not be 
running after the horse 
desperately trying to mount 
it - Parujan v Atlantic 
Western Trustees Limited. 
The diagram on the following page illustrates the sham enquiry. 
Importantly, the test recognises the existence of an 'emerging 
sham'. An emerging sham incorporates the same Snook test, 
but relaxes the rule that the sham must have occurred from the 
trust's inception. An emerging sham therefore occurs where 
the founder and the trustee's intentions change after the trust 
has been legitimately set up. A sham in this case would 
therefore only "emerge" later on, and not at the outset. 
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Alter-ego Trusts 
This doctrine, which is often masked in the description of a 
trust being the “alter-ego”, “puppet” or “nominee” of a 
founder, is a principle separate and distinct from the sham 
doctrine. In essence, an alter-ego trust arises in two distinct 
situations:  
• The first is where assets are settled on a trust, but the 
trustees of the trust act as mere puppets, doing whatever 
they are instructed to do.  
• The second is where the trust property is treated as if it 
were personally owned, instead of belonging to the trust.  
 
Interestingly, the majority of both foreign and local alter-ego 
cases revolve around matrimonial proceedings. 
 
In South Africa, the courts have authority at common law to 
pierce an alter-ego trust. For that reason, trustee 
independence and his or her complete separation of enjoyment 
and control cannot be overemphasised.  
Overseas, the distinction between sham trusts and alter-ego 
trust is continuously made, and as such, the courts abroad have 
lately avoided the temptation to conflate the two doctrines. In  
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Take Note 
In South Africa, an alter-ego enquiry often involves a 
distinction between de facto control and de iure control:  
the founder often puts de iure control of assets of a 
business of a family in the hands of trustees. But the 
trustees act as mere puppets in the hands of the founder 
who manages the trusts through them, and de facto it is 
the founder who controls the trust despite the fact that de 
iure control is in the hands of the trustees. 
 
 
 
fact, the New Zealand Supreme Court recently cautioned 
against the past tendency to amalgamate the two, because 
such a development would be to effectively re-write the 
traditional understanding of a sham.lvi
 
 
The consequence is that unlike sham trusts, a court is not 
entitled to pierce an alter-ego trust, and that to do so, would 
be inferring (automatically) that the trust was a sham without 
conducting the necessary sham enquiry. 
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At present, the common tendency abroad is for a court to make 
use of such evidence in its sham enquiry. If the facts lend 
themselves to the inference of a sham, only then may the 
trust's veneer be pierced. 
 
Astonishingly, despite the fact that the courts today have 
asserted an increasing  interest in trusts, many founders 
continue to treat trust assets as if they still own them, failing to 
observe even the most basic principles of the fiduciary duties 
they created. Courts may under such circumstances, be 
compelled to look behind the guise and into the reality of the 
situation, which ultimately may lead to a declaration that the 
trust is in fact the alter-ego of the founder or trustee. 
 The Trustee’s Checklist 
Often referred to as a trust "warrant of fitness",lvii
 
 the table on 
the following page is a set of questions which may indicate a 
trust's vulnerability level. 
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 Yes No 
Have all the trustees read the trust deed in the 
last year? 
  
Does the trust have a separate bank account?   
Is there an independent professional trustee in 
office? 
  
Have the financial statements been prepared and 
accepted by the board of trustees each year? 
  
Have all insurance policies been transferred into 
the trust's name? 
  
Is there the sub-minimum number of trustees in 
office, as specified in the trust deed? 
  
Do all trustees have a personal copy of the trust 
deed? 
  
Have the beneficiaries been identified?   
Has at least one trustee meeting taken place over 
the past 12 months? 
  
Have the trustees been issued with a letter of 
authorisation from the Master? 
  
Is the majority of trust property situated within 
the jurisdiction of the Master's office of the High 
Court where the trust is registered? 
  
Can beneficiaries obtain copies of trust 
documentation, such as the trust deed and 
financial statements? 
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 Yes No 
If the trust makes use of a loan account, has the 
trust made use of the annual donations tax 
exemption? 
  
Are the trustees educated and familiar with the 
Trust Property Control Act and other relevant 
legislation? 
  
Are the trustees aware of all their common law 
and statutory duties? 
  
 
As a broad indication, answering “yes” to all the above 
questions means that the trust is secure. Answering “no” to 
more than two indicates that the trust does require attention 
and professional advice should be sought. 
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The Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 
[ASSENTED TO 1 JUNE, 1988] 
[DATE OF COMMENCEMENT: 31 MARCH, 1989] 
(Afrikaans text signed by the State President) 
  
As amended by 
Justice Laws Rationalisation Act, No. 18 of 1996 
[with effect from 1 April 1997] 
  
ACT 
To regulate further the control of trust property; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith. 
 
 
 
 
  
TRUSTS: A Guide For Founders, Trustees and Beneficiaries 
 
Page 50 
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1.   Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates— 
“banking institution” means an institution registered otherwise than 
provisionally as a bank in terms of the Banks Act, 1965 (Act No. 23 of 
1965
“building society” means a mutual building society registered finally 
as a mutual building society in terms of the Mutual Building Societies 
Act, 1965 (
); 
Act No. 24 of 1965), or a building society registered finally as 
a building society in terms of the Building Societies Act, 1986 (Act No. 82 
of 1986
“court” means the provincial or local division of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa having jurisdiction; 
); 
“financial institution” means a financial institution as defined in the 
Financial Institutions (Investment of Funds) Act, 1984 (Act No. 39 of 
1984
“Master”, in relation to any matter, means the Master, Deputy 
Master or Assistant Master of the Supreme Court appointed under 
section 2 of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), 
who under section 3 of this Act has jurisdiction in respect of the matter 
concerned; 
); 
“trust” means the arrangement through which the ownership in 
property of one person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or 
bequeathed— 
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to 
be administered or disposed of according to the 
provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of 
the person or class of persons designated in the trust  
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 instrument or for the achievement of the object stated 
in the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, 
which property is placed under the control of another 
person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of 
according to the provisions of the trust instrument for 
the benefit of the person or class of persons 
designated in the trust instrument or for the 
achievement of the object stated in the trust 
instrument, 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be 
administered by any person as executor, tutor or curator in terms of the 
provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 
1965); 
“trustee” means any person (including the founder of a trust) who 
acts as trustee by virtue of an authorization under section 6 and includes 
any person whose appointment as trustee is already of force and effect 
at the commencement of this Act; 
“trust instrument” means a written agreement or a testamentary 
writing or a court order according to which a trust was created; 
“trust property” or “property” means movable or immovable 
property, and includes contingent interests in property, which in 
accordance with the provisions of a trust instrument are to be 
administered or disposed of by a trustee. 
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2.   Certain documents deemed to be trust instruments.—If a 
document represents the reduction to writing of an oral agreement by 
which a trust was created or varied, such document shall for the purposes 
of this Act be deemed to be a trust instrument. 
3.   Jurisdiction of Masters.— 
(1)  (a)  In respect of trust property which is to be administered or 
disposed of in terms of a testamentary writing, jurisdiction shall lie with the 
Master in whose office the testamentary writing or a copy thereof is 
registered and accepted, and in any other case, with the Master in whose 
area of appointment in terms of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 
(Act No. 66 of 1965), the greater or greatest portion of the trust property is 
situated: Provided that a Master who has exercised jurisdiction shall 
continue to have jurisdiction notwithstanding any change in the situation of 
the greater or greatest portion of the trust property. 
(b)  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) a Master 
who would otherwise have no jurisdiction in respect of trust property may, 
on written application by any person having an interest in that trust 
property, and with the consent of the Master who has such jurisdiction, 
assume jurisdiction of that trust property. 
(2)  No act performed by a Master in the bona fide belief that he has 
jurisdiction shall be invalid merely on the ground that it should have been 
performed by another Master. 
(3)  If more than one Master has in such belief exercised jurisdiction 
in respect of the same trust property, that property shall, without prejudice 
to the validity of any act already performed by or under the authority of 
any other Master, as soon as it becomes known to the Masters concerned, 
be administered or disposed of under the supervision of the Master who  
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first exercised such jurisdiction, and any authorization or appointment of a 
trustee made by any other Master in respect of that property, shall 
thereupon be cancelled by such other Master. 
4.   Lodgement of trust instrument. 
(1)  Except where the Master is already in possession of the trust 
instrument in question or an amendment thereof, a trustee whose 
appointment comes into force after the commencement of this Act shall, 
before he assumes control of the trust property, upon payment of the 
prescribed fee, lodge with the Master the trust instrument in terms of 
which the trust property is to be administered or disposed of by him, or a 
copy thereof certified as a true copy by a notary or other person approved 
by the Master. 
(2)  When a trust instrument which has been lodged with the Master 
is varied, the trustee shall lodge the amendment or a copy thereof so 
certified with the Master. 
5.   Notification of address.—A person whose appointment as 
trustee comes into effect after the commencement of this Act, shall furnish 
the Master with an address for the service upon him of notices and process 
and shall, in case of change of address, within 14 days notify the Master by 
registered post of the new address. 
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6.   Authorization of trustee and security. 
(1)  Any person whose appointment as trustee in terms of a trust 
instrument, section 7 or a court order comes into force after the 
commencement of this Act, shall act in that capacity only if authorized 
thereto in writing by the Master. 
 
(2)  The Master does not grant authority to the trustee in terms of 
this section, unless— 
(a) he has furnished security to the satisfaction of the 
Master for the due and faithful performance of his 
duties as trustee; or 
(b) he has been exempted from furnishing security by a 
court order or by the Master under subsection (3) (a) 
or, subject to the provisions of subsection (3) (d), in 
terms of a trust instrument: 
Provided that where the furnishing of security is required, the Master may, 
pending the furnishing of security, authorize the trustee in writing to 
perform specified acts with regard to the trust property. 
(3)  The Master may, if in his opinion there are sound reasons to do 
so— 
(a) whether or not security is required by the trust 
instrument (except a court order), dispense with 
security by a trustee; 
(b) reduce or cancel any security furnished; 
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(c) order a trustee to furnish additional security; 
(d) order a trustee who has been exempted from 
furnishing security in terms of a trust instrument 
(except a court order) to furnish security. 
 
(4)  If any authorization is given in terms of this section to a trustee 
which is a corporation, such authorization shall, subject to the provisions of 
the trust instrument, be given in the name of a nominee of the corporation 
for whose actions as trustee the corporation is legally liable, and any 
substitution for such nominee of some other person shall be endorsed on 
the said authorization. 
7.   Appointment of trustee and co-trustee by Master. 
(1)  If the office of trustee cannot be filled or becomes vacant, the 
Master shall, in the absence of any provision in the trust instrument, after 
consultation with so many interested parties as he may deem necessary, 
appoint any person as trustee. 
(2)  When the Master considers it desirable, he may, notwithstanding 
the provisions of the trust instrument, appoint as co-trustee of any serving 
trustee any person whom he deems fit. 
8.   Foreign trustees.—When a person who was appointed outside 
the Republic as trustee has to administer or dispose of trust property in the 
Republic, the provisions of this Act shall apply to such trustee in respect of  
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such trust property and the Master may authorize such trustee under 
section 6 to act as trustee in respect of that property. 
9.   Care, diligence and skill required of trustee. 
(1)  A trustee shall in the performance of his duties and the exercise 
of his powers act with the care, diligence and skill which can reasonably be 
expected of a person who manages the affairs of another. 
(2)  Any provision contained in a trust instrument shall be void in so 
far as it would have the effect of exempting a trustee from or indemnifying 
him against liability for breach of trust where he fails to show the degree of 
care, diligence and skill as required in subsection (1). 
10.   Trust account.—Whenever a person receives money in his 
capacity as trustee, he shall deposit such money in a separate trust account 
at a banking institution or building society. 
11.   Registration and identification of trust property. 
(1)  Subject to the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Investment 
of Funds) Act, 1984 (Act No. 39 of 1984), section 40 of the Administration 
of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), and the provisions of the trust 
instrument concerned, a trustee shall— 
(a) indicate clearly in his bookkeeping the property which 
he holds in his capacity as trustee; 
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(b) if applicable, register trust property or keep it 
registered in such manner as to make it clear from the 
registration that it is trust property; 
(c) make any account or investment at a financial 
institution identifiable as a trust account or trust 
investment; 
(d) in the case of trust property other than property 
referred to in paragraphs (b) or (c), make such 
property identifiable as trust property in the best 
possible manner. 
(2)  In so far as the registration or identification of trust property 
being administered by a trustee at the commencement of this Act does not 
comply with the requirements of subsection (1), the trustee shall within a 
period of 12 months after the said commencement take such steps or 
cause such steps to be taken as may be necessary to bring the registration 
or identification of such property into conformity with the said 
requirements. 
(3)  Upon application in terms of subsection (2) to bring the 
registration of trust property into line with the provisions of subsection (1), 
the officer in charge of a deeds registry where such trust property is 
registered, shall free of charge take such steps as may be necessary to 
effect the required registration. 
12.   Separate position of trust property.—Trust property shall not 
form part of the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as he as 
trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust property. 
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13.   Power of court to vary trust provisions.—If a trust instrument 
contains any provision which brings about consequences which in the 
opinion of the court the founder of a trust did not contemplate or foresee 
and which— 
(a) hampers the achievement of the objects of the 
founder; or 
(b) prejudices the interests of beneficiaries; or 
(c) is in conflict with the public interest, 
the court may, on application of the trustee or any person who in the 
opinion of the court has a sufficient interest in the trust property, delete or 
vary any such provision or make in respect thereof any order which such 
court deems just, including an order whereby particular trust property is 
substituted for particular other property, or an order terminating the trust. 
14.   Variation of trust instrument.—Whenever a trust beneficiary 
under tutorship or curatorship becomes entitled to a benefit in terms of a 
trust instrument, the tutor or curator of such a beneficiary may on behalf of 
the beneficiary agree to the amendment of the provisions of a trust 
instrument, provided such amendment is to the benefit of the beneficiary. 
15.   Report of irregularities.—If an irregularity in connection with 
the administration of a trust comes to the notice of a person who audits 
the accounts of a trust, such person shall, if in his opinion it is a material 
irregularity, report it in writing to the trustee, and if such irregularity is not 
rectified to the satisfaction of such person within one month as from the 
date upon which it was reported to the trustee, that person shall report it 
in writing to the Master. 
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16.   Master may call upon trustee to account.  
(1)  A trustee shall, at the written request of the Master, account to 
the Master to his satisfaction and in accordance with the Master’s 
requirements for his administration and disposal of trust property and 
shall, at the written request of the Master, deliver to the Master any book, 
record, account or document relating to his administration or disposal of 
the trust property and shall to the best of his ability answer honestly and 
truthfully any question put to him by the Master in connection with the 
administration and disposal of the trust property. 
(2)  The Master may, if he deems it necessary, cause an investigation 
to be carried out by some fit and proper person appointed by him into the 
trustee’s administration and disposal of trust property. 
(3)  The Master shall make such order as he deems fit in connection 
with the costs of an investigation referred to in subsection (2). 
17.   Custody of documents.—A trustee shall not without the written 
consent of the Master destroy any document which serves as proof of the 
investment, safe custody, control, administration, alienation or distribution 
of trust property before the expiry of a period of five years from the 
termination of a trust. 
18.   Copies of documents.—Subject to the provisions of section 5 (2) 
of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), regarding 
the documents in connection with the estate of a deceased person, the 
Master shall upon written request and payment of the prescribed fee 
furnish a certified copy of any document under his control relating to trust  
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property to a trustee, his surety or his representative or any other person 
who in the opinion of the Master has sufficient interest in such document. 
19.   Failure by trustee to account or perform duties.—If any trustee 
fails to comply with a request by the Master in terms of section 16 or to 
perform any duty imposed upon him by the trust instrument or by law, the 
Master or any person having an interest in the trust property may apply to 
the court for an order directing the trustee to comply with such request or 
to perform such duty. 
20.   Removal of trustee.  
(1)  A trustee may, on the application of the Master or any person 
having an interest in the trust property, at any time be removed from his 
office by the court if the court is satisfied that such removal will be in the 
interests of the trust and its beneficiaries. 
(2)  A trustee may at any time be removed from his office by the 
Master— 
(a) if he has been convicted in the Republic or elsewhere 
of any offence of which dishonesty is an element or of 
any other offence for which he has been sentenced to 
imprisonment without the option of a fine; or 
(b) if he fails to give security or additional security, as the 
case may be, to the satisfaction of the Master within 
two months after having been requested thereto or 
 
  
TRUSTS: A Guide For Founders, Trustees and Beneficiaries 
 
Page 62 
 
 within such further period as is allowed by the Master; or 
(c) if his estate is sequestrated or liquidated or placed 
under judicial management; or 
 
(d) if he has been declared by a competent court to be 
mentally ill or incapable of managing his own affairs or 
if he is by virtue of the Mental Health Act, 1973 (Act 
No. 18 of 1973), detained as a patient in an institution 
or as a State patient; or 
[Para. (d) amended by s. 4 of Act No. 18 of 1996.] 
 
(e) if he fails to perform satisfactorily any duty imposed 
upon him by or under this Act or to comply with any 
lawful request of the Master. 
(3)  If a trustee authorized to act under section 6 (1) is removed from 
his office or resigns, he shall without delay return his written authority to 
the Master. 
21.   Resignation by trustee.—Whether or not the trust instrument 
provides for the trustee’s resignation, the trustee may resign by notice in 
writing to the Master and the ascertained beneficiaries who have legal 
capacity, or to the tutors or curators of the beneficiaries of the trust under 
tutorship or curatorship. 
22.   Remuneration of trustee.—A trustee shall in respect of the 
execution of his official duties be entitled to such remuneration as provided 
for in the trust instrument or, where no such provision is made, to a  
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reasonable remuneration, which shall in the event of a dispute be fixed by 
the Master. 
23.   Access to court.—Any person who feels aggrieved by an 
authorization, appointment or removal of a trustee by the Master or by any 
decision, order or direction of the Master made or issued under this Act, 
may apply to the court for relief, and the court shall have the power to 
consider the merits of any such matter, to take evidence and to make any 
order it deems fit. 
24.   Regulations.—The Minister of Justice may make regulations 
regarding any matter which in terms of this Act is required or permitted to 
be prescribed. 
25.   Application of Act.—This Act shall not apply to a trust which has 
been exempted by any other Act from the application of the Trust Moneys 
Protection Act, 1934 (Act No. 34 of 1934), or to a scheme in terms of the 
Participation Bonds Act, 1981 (Act No. 55 of 1981). 
26.   Amendment or repeal of laws, and savings.  
(1)  The laws mentioned in the Schedule are hereby repealed or 
amended to the extent indicated in the third column thereof. 
(2)  Anything done under any provision of any law repealed by 
subsection (1) which may be done under a corresponding provision of this 
Act, shall be deemed to have been done under that corresponding 
provision. 
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27.   Short title and commencement.—This Act shall be called the 
Trust Property Control Act, 1988, and shall come into operation on a date 
to be fixed by the State President by proclamation in the Gazette. 
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